Walls v. Bank of Glen Burnie

BYRNES, Judge. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County dismissed a complaint filed by Leslie Walls, appellant, against The Bank of Glen Burnie, appellee. Ms. Walls then filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, in which she sought leave to amend her complaint. The court denied that request.

On appeal, Ms. Walls asks whether the circuit court abused its discretion in doing so. She does not challenge the court’s ruling dismissing her complaint. For the following reasons, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 1 Leslie Walls was employed by The Bank of Glen Burnie (“the Bank”) for ten years, beginning in July .1988.

In October 1998, Ms. Walls was standing at the door of a female coworker’s office when she heard a male co-worker make a lewd and offensive remark. She reported the male co-worker’s remark to “management.” Management failed to conduct an investigation and to reprimand the male co-employee for his comment. Instead, appellant was criticized by her superiors for being away from her desk at the time of the incident. After the incident, Ms. Walls was treated differently and unfairly by the management and staff of the Bank.

Her every move was documented and recorded by management, and she ²³³ was required to obtain permission from her supervisor to use the bathroom. On February 19, 1999, Ms. Walls was terminated from her job. She was told that she was being terminated because she was not properly performing her job. In fact, Ms. Walls was terminated because she had reported her male co-worker’s lewd and offensive remark.

On March 28, 1999, Ms. Walls filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). On May 19,1999, the EEOC issued her a written “Notice of Right to Sue.” The right to sue letter advised Ms. Walls that she had 90 days from that date in which to file suit, in federal or state court, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). On August 16,1999, Ms. Walls filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

Her complaint set forth two counts, both of which appear to state common law tort claims for wrongful discharge. In the first count, captioned “Retaliation,” Ms. Walls alleged that her termination from employment had been in violation of the clear mandate of public policy set forth in Md.Code (1957, Repl.Vol.1998, Supp.2000), Article 49B, § 15 and Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In count two, entitled “Hostile Work Environment,” she alleged that the Bank had created a hostile work environment so as to force her to quit her job, and that this conduct also violated the clear mandate of public policy set forth in Article 49B, § 15 and Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.

The Bank argued that to the extent that Ms. Walls was seeking to recover for violations of Article 49B of the Maryland Code, no private right of action exists under that statute; and to the extent that appellant was seeking to make a claim for wrongful discharge based upon the policies advanced by Article 49B, she was limited to the statutory administrative remedies contained in that article, and therefore could not state such a cause of action. See Chappell v. Southern Maryland Hosp., ²³⁴ 320 Md. 483 , 578 A.2d 766 (1990); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603 , 561 A.2d 179 (1989). Ms. Walls filed an opposition memorandum. She argued that the Bank’s legal position was incorrect.

She also asked the court for leave to amend, if it were to rule in the Bank’s favor. Specifically, Ms. Walls stated, “If this court concludes, however, that Plaintiff must pursue a statutory remedy, Plaintiff requests the right to [amend] her complaint to include her federal or state remedies.” On December 14, 1999, after the Bank filed a reply memorandum of law, the motion was argued before the court. The court took the matter under advisement, and later that day issued an order stating: Upon consideration of The Bank of Glen Bumie’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs response, memoranda and argument of counsel, it is this 14th day of December, 1999 ORDERED, that the Motion is hereby GRANTED pursuant to Chappell v. S.M.H. [Southern Maryland Hosp., Inc.], 320 Md. 483, at 496 [, 578 A.2d 766 ] (1990), and that the above-captioned case is hereby dismissed, without prejudice for Plaintiff to pursue statutory remedies. (Underlining added by.circuit court to form order submitted by the Bank.) On December 21, 1999, Ms. Walls filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, pursuant to Rule 2-534, asking the court for leave to amend her complaint to pursue her Title VII claim.

She pointed out that more than 90 days had elapsed from the day on which she had received her right to sue letter from the EEOC, and, therefore, if she were to file a new lawsuit asserting her federal statutory claim, it would be time-barred. She further argued that if the court were to grant her leave to amend, her Title VII claim would “relate back” to the August 16, 1999 filing date of the original complaint and, therefore, would not be barred. Ms. Walls asked the court to revise its order from “without prejudice for Plaintiff to pursue her statutory remedies” to “with leave granted to Plaintiff to ²³⁵ amend the complaint.” The Bank opposed Ms. Walls’s motion to alter or amend judgment. On January 12, 2000, the circuit court denied the motion to alter or amend.

This appeal followed. DISCUSSION Ms. Walls contends that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied her request for leave to file an amended complaint because, notwithstanding the court’s intention, when it granted the motion to dismiss, not to prejudice her right to pursue any statutory remedy, its order of dismissal did just that. Ms. Walls points out, as she did below, that if the court had granted her leave to file an amended complaint to pursue her remedy under Title VII on the same facts that she alleged in her original complaint, the amended complaint would have related back to the August 16, 1999 filing date, and the court’s purpose would have been accomplished. Without leave to amend, the court’s purpose would not be accomplished, because any new suit that she filed to pursue her Title VII remedy would be time-barred.

Thus, by denying her request for leave to amend, the court thwarted the very objective it sought in its dismissal order. The Bank’s response is three-fold. Two of its arguments relate to non-preservation. First, the Bank asserts that whether an amended complaint would have been based on the same set of operative facts as alleged in the original complaint is unknown and purely speculative, because Ms. Walls never attempted to file an amended complaint and did not proffer one to the court.

Second, the Bank argues that whether any such amended complaint would have related back to Ms. Walls’s failed wrongful discharge claims is a question that was not raised or decided below and, therefore, should not be addressed on appeal. Finally, the Bank argues that because Ms. Walls’s failed wrongful discharge claims were not legally viable, and could not have been cured by amendment, any amendment necessarily would have brought a new claim. Thus, under Gaskins v. Marshall Craft Associates, Inc., 110 ²³⁶ Md.App. 705, 678 A.2d 615 (1996), Ms. Walls’s timeliness problem would not have been solved by the court granting leave to amend because “the defect in [her] complaint [could] not be remedied by an amendment which [might] or [might] not have relate[d] back to the filing of her original complaint.” The standard on review of a circuit court’s denial of a motion to alter or amend judgment is whether the court abused its discretion. See Wormwood v. Batching Systems, Inc., 124 Md.App. 695, 700 , 723 A.2d 568 (1999) (citations omitted). “The real question is whether justice has not been done, and our review of the exercise of a court’s discretion will be guided by that concept.” Id. at 700-01 , 723 A.2d 568 (citing Clarke Baridon, Inc. v. Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., 218 Md. 480, 483 , 147 A.2d 221 (1958); B & K Rentals v. Universal Leaf, 73 Md.App. 530, 537 , 535 A.2d 492 (1988), rev’d on other grounds, 319 Md. 127 , 571 A.2d 1213 (1990)).

Generally, amendments to pleadings “should be freely allowed in order to promote justice.” Crowe v. Houseworth, 272 Md. 481, 485 , 325 A.2d 592 (1974) (citing Earl v. Anchor Pontiac Buick, Inc., 246 Md. 653, 656 , 229 A.2d 412 (1967)). Amendments are allowed “so that cases will be tried on their merits rather than upon the niceties of pleading.” Id. (citing Ehrlich v. Board of Educ., 257 Md. 542, 547-50 , 263 A.2d 853 (1970)). Whether to grant leave to amend rests within the discretion of the trial court.

Nevertheless, a trial court should not grant leave to amend if the amendment would result in prejudice to the opposing party or undue delay. But neither should the court overlook the principles recognizing that leave to amend “should be generously granted.” Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 109 Md.App. 217, 248 , 674 A.2d 106 (1996) (citations omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 48 Md.App. 617, 632 , 429 A.2d 277 (1981)), aff'd, 346 Md. 122 , 695 A.2d 153 (1997).

We disagree with the Bank’s first non-preservation argument: that because Ms. Walls did not attempt to file an ²³⁷ amended complaint, and did not proffer an amended complaint to the court, we do not know what she was seeking to accomplish by the sought after amendment, and, therefore, the question whether the court abused its discretion in denying her motion was not preserved for review. It would have been improper for Ms. Walls to have filed an amended complaint after the Bank’s motion to dismiss was granted because when a circuit court dismisses a complaint, an amended complaint cannot be filed without express leave of court. See Rule 2-433(c). Moreover, in her opposition to the Bank’s motion to dismiss and in her motion to alter or amend judgment, Ms. Walls made plain that she wished to amend her complaint to seek statutory remedies—specifically, a remedy under Title VII.

At no time did Ms. Walls indicate that she was seeking leave of court to add factual allegations to those already included in the original complaint. Rule 2-341 governs amendments to pleadings. Subsection (c) of that rule, entitled “Scope,” provides: An amendment may seek to (1) change the nature of the action or defense, (2) set forth a better statement of facts concerning a matter already raised in a pleading, (3) set forth transactions or events that have occurred since the filing of the pleading sought to be amended, (4) correct misnomer of a party, (5) correct misjoinder or nonjoinder of a party so long as one of the original plaintiffs and one of the original defendants remain as parties to the action, (6) add a party or parties, (7) make any other appropriate change. Amendments shall be freely allowed when justice so permits.

(Emphasis added.) In this case, we are concerned with an amendment that was sought to change the nature of the action; more precisely, to change the nature of the action from a tort claim for wrongful discharge to a statutory violation claim under Title VII. Our discussion of the question presented in this case necessarily requires an understanding of the doctrine of “relation back.” In Nam v. Montgomery County, 127 Md.App. ²³⁸ 172, 732 A.2d 356 (1999), we explained that doctrine as follows: “[I]f the factual situation remains essentially the same after the amendment as it was before it, the doctrine of relation back applies and the amended cause of action is not barred by limitations.” Id. at 186, 732 A.2d 356 (citing Smith v. Gehring, 64 Md.App. 359, 364 , 496 A.2d 317 (1985)). In other words, ordinarily, limitations on a claim stated in an amended complaint is measured from the date of the accrual of the cause of action to the date of the filing of the amended complaint. When the claim “relates back” to the date of filing of the original complaint, however, limitations is measured from the date of the accrual of the cause of action to the date of filing of the original complaint.

See Myers v. Aragona, 21 Md.App. 45, 51 , 318 A.2d 263 (1974). As we have stated, relying on our decision in Gaskins v. Marshall Craft Associates, supra, 110 Md.App. 705 , 678 A.2d 615 , the Bank argues that regardless of whether an amended complaint by Ms. Walls that was based on the same factual occurrences that formed the predicate for the original complaint would have related back, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Ms. Walls’s request to file an amended complaint. Indeed, the Bank argues not only that Gaskins compels that conclusion but also that that case is on all fours with the case at bar, and, therefore, should control the outcome of this appeal. We disagree.

In Gaskins, the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint alleging violation of the Maryland Equal Pay for Equal Work Act and a wrongful discharge tort claim. As in the case sub judice, the plaintiff offered the policies embodied in Article 49 as the foundation for her wrongful discharge claim. The circuit court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. It ruled that the first claim was preempted by federal statute.

It also ruled that the second claim was not legally viable because the public policy foundation for the tort claim was found in a statute that itself contained a remedy for vindicating those objectives. ²³⁹ On appeal, we held that the circuit court had erred in concluding that the first claim was preempted by federal law; we also held, however, that the court properly had dismissed the wrongful discharge claim because “the very statutes that [the plaintiff] relied on to establish her policy claim provided a remedy for her cause of action.” Id. at 715, 678 A.2d 615 (citations and footnote omitted). In responding to the plaintiffs argument that the circuit court had abused its discretion in failing to grant her leave to amend (which, because of the disposition of the first issue, related only to the wrongful discharge claim), we explained that given that “there was nothing [the plaintiff] could have done within the scope of Rule 2-841(c) that would have made her complaint viable as to Count II[,]” the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing “that aspect of [her] claims without leave to amend.” Id. at 716 , 678 A.2d 615 . In the case at bar, if Ms. Walls were arguing, as the plaintiff in Gaskins argued, that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her leave to amend her wrongful discharge claim to make it viable, then we would agree that, as in Gaskins, the court could not have abused its discretion because there was no amendment that Ms. Walls could have filed that would have stated a viable wrongful discharge claim. That is not Ms. Walls’s argument, however.

Instead, she maintains that an amendment to her wrongful discharge claim that would not have changed the operative facts alleged but would have engrafted onto the same factual allegations a claim for violation of Title VII, would have changed the nature of her action, as permitted by Rule 2-341(c), from one that was not viable to one that was viable; therefore (and because, in addition, the circuit court intended for her to be able to pursue her statutory claims), the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her