Wantland v. State

Gilbert, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is revisited because the Supreme Court of the United States, in Wantland v. Maryland, No. 80-5640, ⁶³⁷ vacated our judgment in Wantland v. State, 45 Md. App. 527 , 413 A.2d 1376 (1980) and remanded the matter to us for reconsideration in the light of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). At Wantland’s request, we allowed new briefs to be submitted and reset the case for oral argument. The thrust of Wantland’s argument on reconsideration is, as might be expected, that his oral statements to the police should have been suppressed, citing Edwards v. Arizona, supra.

We perceive no reason to repeat the sordid facts of the case. Instead, we shall quote only those facts that are pertinent to the "statements” given by Wantland to the police. "I. —THE PRE-TRIAL STATEMENTS— During the course of the investigation into young Henley’s death, Corporal David R. Hatfield was assigned to 'find anybody [in the area concerned] that could ... [furnish] either [a] positive or negative response ... [as to the identity of] a possible suspect.. ..’ Wantland, described in the transcript as 'the caretaker or occupant of the Berger Mansion’ was one of the persons that Hatfield was to interview with respect to the identity of the suspect. At approximately 10:30 p.m. on Sunday, June 18, 1978, Hatfield and another police officer went to the Berger Mansion where they found Wantland.

The officers requested that Wantland accompany them to the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (B.C.I.). The avowed purpose for requesting Wantland to accompany them was to learn what Wantland knew about the crime. Wantland went with the officers. When the trio arrived at the B.C.I. facility, Wantland was taken to an 'Interview Room’ at ⁶³⁸ sometime shortly after 11 p.m.

No restraints were placed upon him, and he was not [(emphasis in original)] given the Miranda [1] warnings. Hatfield, during the next five hours, succeeded in getting Wantland to make a six page statement. The statement was suppressed by the circuit judge on Wantland’s motion. Hatfield left the Interview Room at the conclusion of the interview, around 3:30 a.m., June 19, 1978.

Corporal T.R. Tucker entered about one-half hour thereafter. Tucker informed Wantland that he, Wantland, was under arrest for the murder of Donnie Henley. Tucker related to the court that he 'read.. . [Wantland] a waiver of rights form’ and recorded Wantland’s answers to the questions printed thereon. Wantland was then handed the form to read and sign.

The printed form declared that Wantland understood the Miranda warnings. With respect to the question of whether Wantland was willing to make a statement without the presence of an attorney, Wantland responded, 'No.’ Notwithstanding Wantland’s express negative reply to the Miranda litany, Tucker recounted, Wantland continued to talk. The officer questioned Wantland in order to determine whether Wantland was willing to make a statement even though counsel was not present. According to Tucker, Wantland answered that he wanted to talk.

Prior to any conversation regarding the offenses forming the gravamen of this appeal, Wantland was permitted to use the toilet facilities, as well as to purchase some cigarettes. Upon returning to the Interview Room, Wantland explained to the officer the reason for the negative response to the question on the waiver of rights form relative to counsel. He ⁶³⁹ related that at the time of a prior arrest, 'he made a statement to the police and it was in error and it was admitted at the time of trial.. . .’ Wantland made clear that his objection was to making a written [(emphasis in original)] statement. Wantland apparently was of the belief that in order to be admissible as evidence a statement had to be in writing.

Tucker did nothing to alter or correct Wantland’s misbelief, but, instead, acting on the appellant’s desire to 'talk,’ began his interrogation. The trial court denied Wantland’s attempt to suppress that statement. The third oral statement was taken the following afternoon by Corporal M.K. Morrissette. Morrissette told the court that he was assigned to take Wantland to the Prince George’s County Hospital so that a physician could take samples of the appellant’s saliva and blood.

While at the hospital, Wantland complained to Morrissette that no one would listen to appellant. Morrissette suggested that he would take a statement following the medical procedure. At the completion of the sampling, Wantland was transported back to B.C.I. by Morrissette. There, prior to any questioning, Wantland was again advised of his Miranda rights.

Appellant responded that he was willing to make a statement to the officer without benefit of counsel. It was clear from subsequent remarks that Wantland made the oral statement under the misconception that it could not be used against him. The circuit judge, over objection, admitted the statement into evidence. The fourth and final statement was made by appellant to Corporal Rowzie, the coordinator of the investigation.

Rowzie told Judge Levin that on July 5, 1978, he went to Prince George’s County Detention Center in order to speak to Wantland. Before there was any contact between Rowzie and the appellant, an unidentified correctional officer ⁶⁴⁰ explained to Wantland that he was entitled to have his attorney present during any interview with the police officer. A form entitled 'Detainee Waiver,’ the text of which purported to be a waiver of that right, was presented to Wantland, who signed the form. Rowzie recounted that he then advised the appellant of the full panoply of Miranda.

Wantland was asked if he understood those rights, and he replied in the affirmative. According to the officer, the appellant then stated that he already had an attorney, but that he did not desire the attorney’s presence during the interview. That, of course, is precisely what he waived when he signed the form presented to him by the guard. Rowzie questioned the appellant and took an oral statement which was admitted, over objection, at trial.” (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.) Justice White, for the Court, said in Edwards : "[Although we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North Carolina v. Butler,... [ 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)], the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.

We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.” ⁶⁴¹ (Footnote omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.) 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d at 386 . Shortly after Edwards was decided, we had the occasion to apply it in Bryant v. State, 49 Md. App. 272 , 431 A.2d 714 (1981). There we said: "Edwards does not, in our view, expand upon Miranda’s breadth but, rather, serves to underscore that when an accused, arrestee, or suspect, at any custodial questioning, demands his right to have counsel present, all [(emphasis in original)] interrogation must at that point cease until counsel for the accused, arrestee, or suspect is present. Once the right to the presence of counsel has been invoked, the authorities may not thereafter, directly or indirectly, initiate another attempt at interrogation until and unless counsel for the accused, arrestee, or suspect is present.

Edwards makes perspicuous that notwithstanding the prior invocation of the Miranda tenet of the right to the presence of counsel, the accused, arrestee, or suspect may validly waive that right provided the accused, arrestee, or suspect, himself, initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.’... See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). The burden of showing a waiver of Miranda rights rests on the prosecution. '[A] valid waiver of . .. [the right to counsel] cannot be established by showing only that .. . [the accused, arrestee, or suspect] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.’ (Footnote omitted.) Edwards v. Arizona, supra.” (Emphasis supplied.) We think it clear that Wantland invoked his right to counsel. At that point interrogation was halted.

Nevertheless, ⁶⁴² Wantland continued to talk. The transcript of the testimony of Corporal T.R. Tucker of the Prince George’s County Police Department, given at the suppression hearing, is, in pertinent part, as follows: "[By Corporal Tucker:] A. I entered Interview Room Number 1, Bureau of Criminal Investigations, with my partner Corporal Morrissette. I told Mr. Wantland he was under arrest, was going to be charged with murder of the Henley boy. This was shortly after 4:00 a.m.

Mr. Wantland began to talk to me. I told him to