Ward v. Ward

Moore, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant Emma P. Ward again appeals to this Court, following our remand to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in Ward v. Ward, 48 Md. App. 307 , 426 A.2d 443 (1981) (Ward I). This time she complains that the chancellor "effectively ignored” our mandate by granting a monetary award which far exceeds the value of all marital property. Also, appellant asserts, neither the findings of fact nor the evidence justified a $50,000 award to the husband, or a deviation from the presumption of equal division of the parties’ former matrimonial residence.

We shall vacate the judgment and remand. I The pertinent facts may be briefly stated. Appellant and appellee Ronald Harold Ward were married in 1956. They had no children.

The couple first separated in 1976 and, except for brief periods of reconciliation, remained apart until their divorce in 1980. After a trial in March of that year, the chancellor denied appellant’s amended bill for divorce a vinculo matrimonii, granted appellee’s cross-bill on the ground of adultery, and disposed of certain marital property, including two vacation lots in New Jersey. 1 The chancellor also awarded appellant a fixed sum of $10,000 in substitution of her one-half interest in the parties’ marital home in Clinton, Maryland, which they owned as tenants by the entireties. On appeal (Ward I), the wife argued that the chancellor had misconstrued and misapplied the property disposition statute. We agreed, holding that the $10,000 award was not authorized by either § 3-6A-04 or § 3-6A-05.

Id. at 311. We ³³⁸ also found that, in effect, the award transferred ownership of the property from one spouse to the other, in contravention of § 3-6A-04; and that, if the $10,000 interest were intended to be a monetary award under § 3-6A-05, it did not comport with the directions of that section. Id. Upon remand, no new testimony was taken, by mutual agreement.

Both parties submitted proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and forms of decrees based upon the evidence adduced at trial in March 1980. Except for the proposed decree, these documents were essentially identical. The chancellor adopted appellee’s decree which contained typed-in awards of $50,000 to the husband and $10,000 to the wife "in adjustment of [their] equities in the marital property.” 2 II The applicable statute, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.

Code Ann. § 3-6A-05 (1980 Repl. Vol.), which empowers a court to distribute assets acquired during marriage through a monetary award, Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 25 , 410 A.2d 1052 (1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807 (1980), is reproduced in Ward I, 48 Md. App. at 309-11 . The statute permits a court to make an award of money "in accordance with the announced policy of the legislature which is to give ³³⁹ careful consideration to both monetary and non-monetary contributions by the spouses to the marriage.” Wimmer v. Wimmer, 287 Md. 663 , n.2 at 667, 414 A.2d 1254 (1980). The monetary award is designed to accomplish an equitable division of the marital property in an indirect manner.

Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392 , n.2 at 396, 431 A.2d 1371 (1981). The statute does not require an equal division of marital property, nor does it contemplate too harsh a decretal award. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 131 , 437 A.2d 883 (1981). The clear intent is to counterbalance any unfairness that may result from the actual distribution of property acquired during the marriage, strictly in accordance with its title.

Section 3-6A-05 envisions a three-step process. Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54 , 448 A.2d 916, 928-29 (1982) 294 Md. at 79 : 1) if an equitable adjustment over and above the distribution of the spouse’s property in accordance with its title is an issue, the court shall determine which property is marital property; 2) the court shall then determine the value of all marital property; 3) finally, the court may make a monetary award as an adjustment of the parties’ "equities and rights” concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded. If an award is deemed appropriate, the court shall then consider each of the nine factors enumerated in § 3-6A-05 (b) in determining a fair and equitable amount and the method of its payment. The monetary award is thus an addition to and not a substitution for a legal division of the property accumulated during marriage, according to title.

It is "intended to compensate a spouse who holds title to less than an equitable portion” of that property. Note, Property Disposition Upon Divorce in Maryland: An Analysis of the New Statute, 8 U. Balt. L. Rev. 377 , 386 (1979). As the Note suggests, the monetary award is similar to alimony in gross, a lump sum award for the present value of a wife’s inchoate marital rights.

Id. at 393 . It is important to realize that the monetary award is purely discretionary. 3 Section 3-6A-05 may not be ³⁴⁰ applicable in every or even most divorce cases. What triggers operation of the statute is the claim that a division of the parties’ property according to its title would create an inequity which could be overcome through a monetary award. Further, the initial determination of what constitutes marital property does not depend upon any consideration of the nine factors in § 3-6A-05 (b).

Harper, supra, 448 A.2d at 928-29 . Marital property is broadly defined in § 3-6A-01 (e) as "all property, however titled, acquired by either or both spouses during their marriage” subject to the exceptions listed. Tracking the language of § 3-6A-05 (a), we know that division of the property in this case was an issue because the wife charged in her bill of complaint that the husband appropriated to his own use property in which she had an interest. 4 In step 1, the chancellor determined that the only marital property was the couple’s home at 12404 Tove Court, Clinton, Maryland, the other property having been disposed of. In step 2, the chancellor found that the net value of the marital property was $32,000.

In step 3, the chancellor presumably decided that a monetary award was necessary in view of the parties’ interests in the marital home and other circumstances. He then considered each of the nine factors and found as follows: 1. Each party contributed over the course of the marriage to marital property and to family finances in varying amounts depending upon the employment and educational status of the husband and wife at particular times throughout the marriage [§ 3-6A-05 (b) (1)]; The wife contributed approximately $5,000 to ³⁴¹ the initial purchase of the parties’ marital home from her own resources [Id.]; Since the parties’ separation in 1976, the husband has had full use of the marital home, and has also paid the mortgage, taxes and upkeep [Id.]; The value of the house has appreciated substantially since its purchase in 1973 for $36,000 [Id.]; The husband is entitled to some credit for his upkeep of the home during the last few years of the marriage, and both parties are entitled to share in the appreciated value of the home lid.]; The marital home of the parties is in both names [Id.]; 2. The testimony reflected that the marital home has an existing mortgage of approximately $28,000, and thus equity in the home at the time of trial was approximately $32,000, which corresponds to the total value of jointly owned marital property [§ 3-6A-05 (b) (2)]; 3.

Both parties are in relatively stable economic situations and the court does not deem this factor relevant in this case [§ 3-6A-05 (b) (3)1; 4. Although the wife testified that the parties separated because of the husband’s cruelty, this allegation was not adequately corroborated. The only evidence of the wife’s adultery was several years after the parties’ separation, and thus this factor has no bearing on the monetary award in this case [§ 3-6A-05 (b) (4)]; 5. The marriage lasted for 16 years, but in view of the parties’ generally equal contributions, this factor alone is not relevant to the monetary award [§ 3-6A-05 (b) (5)]; 6.

Both parties are in their 30s and are in good general health although the wife testified to a number of chronic physical problems. The Court ³⁴² does not deem this factor relevant in making the monetary award [§ 3-6A-05 (b) (6)]; 7. The testimony at trial revealed that both parties participated in the selection of the marital home in