Ware v. Ware

MOYLAN, Judge. The appellant, Ronnie Soloman Ware, Sr., challenges the Orders issued by Judge Theresa A. Nolan in the Circuit for Prince George’s County awarding the appellee, Sandra Moore Ware, 1) a monetary award in the amount of $1,602,588.20, 2) indefinite alimony, 3) child support, and 4) attorney’s fees. On appeal, the appellant contends: 1. that the trial court erred in granting the appellee a monetary award which included a portion of the appellant’s lottery winnings acquired after the parties were separated; 2. that the trial court erred in granting the appellee an award of indefinite alimony based on disparity of income; 3. that the trial court erred in awarding the appellee child support when the appellee’s financial statements indicated that she had excess income on a monthly basis and the minor child had no unmet needs; and 4. that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the appellant to pay § 14,000 towards the appellee’s attorney’s fees. On cross-appeal, the appellee contends: that the trial court erred in limiting its award of attorney’s fees to only $14,000.

Facts and Procedural Background This case involves a dispute between the parties, formerly husband and wife, over the $17 million Powerball winnings won by the appellant shortly after the parties separated in December 1995. The parties were married in August 1992, and have one minor child, Rodney Soloman Ware, Jr., born on December 8,1993. While the parties were living together, their monetary contributions to the marriage were substantially equal. Al ²¹¹ though the appellee was unemployed for short periods of time on at least three occasions during the marriage, she had primary responsibility for caring for the child and for keeping up the home.

When both were working, the parties shared those responsibilities. When both were employed, each party earned approximately $25,000 per year. The marriage between the parties was short-lived. In December of 1995, after only three-and-a-half years of marriage, the parties separated and the appellee moved into her own apartment.

According to the appellee, the marriage broke up as a result of financial strain caused by the appellant’s gambling. The appellee also alleged that on at least three occasions there had been physical altercations between her and the appellant. It was also revealed, however, that the appellee had committed adultery in April of 1995. The appellant was unaware of his wife’s infidelity until September 1997. 1 Notwithstanding the separation, from December 1995 until April 1996, the appellant would often visit the plaintiff in her new apartment and stay overnight.

The parties continued to have sexual relations during that period of time. In April of 1996, four months after the parties separated, the appellant won the D.C. Powerball lottery, winning an annuity of $17 million. The appellant received his first initial payment in the first week of May 1996 in the amount $856,853.08, and was to receive $846,000 per year, before taxes, for the following nineteen years. On August 13, 1996, the appellee filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.

The appellant initially responded by filing a Counter-Complaint for a Limited Divorce. In October of 1997, the appellant filed an Amended Supplemental Counter-Complaint for Absolute Divorce after learning of the appellee’s adultery for the first time during a deposition held on September 24, ²¹² 1997. The parties also entered into a Parenting Agreement which resolved the issues of child custody and visitation. On December 1, 1997, a hearing was held before Judge Nolan with respect to the appellee’s Complaint for Absolute Divorce and the appellant’s Amended Supplemental Complaint for Absolute Divorce.

By consent of all parties, the appellee’s requests for child support and attorney’s fees were severed from the trial and were to be resolved following a ruling from the trial court on the parties’ respective Complaints for divorce and the appellee’s requests for a monetary award and indefinite alimony. On April 8, 1998, the trial court issued a written Opinion and Order granting the appellant an absolute divorce from the appellee on the grounds of adultery. The trial court then awarded the appellee a monetary award totaling $1,602,588.20. The trial court also ordered the appellant to pay the appellee, as indefinite alimony, $3,500 per month commencing on April 1.1998.

On April 20, 1998, the appellant filed a timely Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, seeking 1) reconsideration of the trial court’s award of indefinite alimony and 2) clarification as to who should bear the tax consequences of the monetary award. On November 2, 1998, a hearing was held on the appellant’s motion, which was ultimately denied on November 25.1998. On December 14, 1998, a hearing was held regarding the issue of child support, during which testimony was presented by both parties. On February 4, 1999, after considering the evidence presented at that hearing and reviewing the memo-randa of law submitted by the parties, the trial court issued an Order requiring the appellant to pay $1,500 per month for child support.

The trial court further ordered that the appellant contribute $14,000 towards the appellee’s attorney’s fees. Both parties filed motions to modify that Order. On May 3, 1999 the trial court issued a Memorandum of Court denying all outstanding motions. The parties then noted timely appeals. ²¹³ The Monetary Award The appellant’s sole contention with regard to the monetary award is that the trial court erred in awarding the appellee any portion of his lottery winnings.

Although conceding that the “annuity is technically marital property because it was acquired during the course of the marriage and prior to the granting of the Judgment of Absolute Divorce,” the appellant, relying on Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 509 , 629 A.2d 70 (1993), nonetheless contends that the record in this case “contains no evidence which would justify awarding any portion of the annuity to the wife.” As explained by this Court in Strauss v. Strauss, 101 Md.App. 490, 501 , 647 A.2d 818 (1994): Maryland law requires the application of a three-step analysis when calculating a monetary award in the course of a divorce proceeding: (1) the trial court must initially characterize all property owned by the parties, however titled, as either marital or non-marital; (2) the court shall then determine the value of all marital property; and, finally, (3) the court may then make a monetary award as an adjustment of the parties’ equities and rights in the marital property. (Citations omitted). See also Doser v. Doser, 106 Md.App. 329, 349-50 , 664 A.2d 453 (1995). It is undisputed that in this case, Judge Nolan 1) properly characterized the Powerball winnings as marital property and 2) properly determined the value of that marital property.

In then balancing the equities as part of the third step, a court is called upon to consider the following factors set forth in Md.Code, § 8-205(b) of the Family Law Article: (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; ²¹⁴ (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property or interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both; (9) the contribution by either party of the property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety; (10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use and personal property or the family home; and (11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both. After proper consideration of those factors, the ultimate decision of whether to grant a monetary award and the amount of such an award are matters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 504 , 629 A.2d 70 (1993); Lemley v. Lemley, 102 Md.App. 266, 298 , 649 A.2d 1119 (1994). The Appellant’s Reliance on Alston In support of his contention that the appellee is not entitled to any portion of his lottery winnings, the appellant relies solely on the Court of Appeals opinion in Alston .

He specifically argues that because the facts in this case are “indistinguishable” from those in Alston , had the trial court given proper weight to the eighth factor in § 8-205(b) the trial court would necessarily have concluded, as did the Court in Alston , ²¹⁵ that the appellee was not entitled to any portion of his lottery winnings. Our response to the appellant’s reliance on Alston is twofold. In our judgment, the facts in this case are not “indistinguishable” from those in Alston . There are a number of significant distinctions, both factual and procedural, between this case and Alston .

We will turn to a consideration of those distinctions in a moment. What Is The Holding of Alston? More fundamentally, however, there is a chasm of disagreement between this Court and the appellant as to what is the actual holding of Alston . At one point, to be sure, the Alston opinion wavers and thereby leaves itself vulnerable to two very different arguable interpretations.

One could distill from that opinion, as this Court does, a more modest holding as to the guidelines a trial judge should follow in exercising discretion. One could also, however, arguably distill from that same opinion, as the appellant does, a more sweeping holding that would virtually reduce itself to a rule of law that gambling winnings accrued by one party after a separation should never be made the subject of a monetary award. In deciding how to apply Alston to the case before us, we touch the raw central nerve of stare decisis itself. In play is the most rudimentary procedure in all of Anglo-American common law, that of how to read a judicial opinion and how to extract therefrom the proper rule of judge-made law.

We begin, as any first-year law school student in legal method is taught to begin, with the axiomatic principle that the reader of an appellate opinion must punctiliously avoid being led astray by occasionally broad language and must, instead, carefully extract from the opinion the narrowest reasonable holding that can explain the actual decision made by the court in a particular case. In Alston , a husband purchased a winning lotto ticket with an annuity value of over one million dollars a year-and-a-half after he and his wife had separated, but before they were ²¹⁶ divorced. The wife had initially filed, prior to the husband’s winning of the lottery, a divorce action based on the couple’s voluntary separation for over one year and did not seek either alimony or a monetary award. That action was pending in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City when the wife first learned that her husband had won the lottery.

After learning of her husband’s sudden stroke of fortune, the wife immediately dismissed that initial divorce petition. Approximately six months later, the wife filed a second complaint for absolute divorce, this time in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, on the ground of adultery. She sought a monetary award representing a substantial part of her husband’s lottery annuity- After granting the wife an absolute divorce based on the husband’s adultery, the trial court granted the wife a monetary award of fifty percent of the yearly net distribution on the annuity. In Alston v. Alston, 85 Md.App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), this Court affirmed the trial court, holding that it had not abused its discretion in making the monetary award.

The Court of Appeals reversed our decision, holding that the trial court erred. The literal issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the trial judge had abused his discretion in making a monetary award to the separated wife of one-half of the lottery winnings won by her husband after the separation. The literal holding of the Court of Appeals on that issue was that “THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN AWARDING HALF OF THE LOTTO ANNUITY TO MRS. ALSTON.” 381 Md. at 509, 629 A.2d 70 .

Immediately after announcing that holding, however, the Court went on to make the following observation: Moreover, the record before us contains no evidence which would justify awarding any portion of the annuity to Mrs. Alston. It is that further observation from which the appellant draws sustenance in this case. ²¹⁷ Did the Court in Alston hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to “award half of the Lotto annuity” to the wife? Or did the Court hold that under facts indistinguishable from those in Alston, the Court was actually bereft of discretion to make any award to the wife? It is that latter reading which the appellant would have us give to the Alston opinion.

The language in question, to be sure, is broad. It must, however, yield to an overriding question: If, hypothetically, the trial judge in Alston had given weighty and careful consideration to the eighth factor (a subject to bé more fully discussed) and had the trial judge in Alston then meticulously fashioned a monetary award that gave 90% of the Lotto annuity to the husband and 10% to the separated wife, would the Court of Appeals have held that that hypothetical decision was also an abuse of discretion? The answer, of course, is that no one knows because that issue was never before the Court. The interpretation urged on us by the appellant, therefore, cannot constitute the holding of the case for it unnecessarily settles a question that was not the subject for decision.

A sweeping holding such as that urged by the appellant, moreover, would render meaningless the 98% of the Alston opinion that preceded it. The Court did not announce a rule of law that after-acquired gambling winnings are not marital property or are not subject to a monetary award. The Court in Alston carefully pointed out that the trial judge must weigh numerous relevant factors and then exercise “sound discretion.” Even given facts such as those in Alston, the Court of Appeals listed and explained the criteria that should guide the exercise of discretion. It emphasized the special weight that should be given to the eighth factor.

It analyzed cases from around the country, 331 Md. at 508-09 , 629 A.2d 70 , and stressed that in Maryland, unlike in many other states, “equitable” distribution is not necessarily “equal” distribution: In making a marital property monetary award, a trial judge must weigh the relevant factors in light of the legislative purpose, and then use his or her sound discretion to ²¹⁸ arrive at an award that is equitable and in accordance with the statute. Of course, equal distribution may often be proper, and where that result is equitable and consistent with the legislative purpose, a court should not hesitate to make such an award. Each divorce situation is different, and must be evaluated individually. In light of the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, the trial judge erred in awarding half of the Lotto annuity to Mrs. Alston. 331 Md. at 509 , 629 A.2d 70 (emphasis supplied).

The more, moderate holding that we extract from the Alston opinion is that the trial judge, albeit possessing discretion even under the Alston facts, abused his discretion in two separate regards. He failed to give proper weight, in a situation such as this involving after-acquired gambling winnings, to the so-called eighth factor. He also mechanistically failed to distinguish an “equitable” distribution from an “equal” distribution. In balancing the equities in the making of a monetary award, § 8-205(b) of the Family Law Article sets out eleven factors that a trial judge should consider.

The eighth factor directs the trial judge to consider “how and when specific marital property ... was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property.” In a case such as this, involving gambling winnings that came to the husband after the parties had separated, the Court of Appeals stressed that this eighth factor “should be given greater weight than the others” and faulted both the trial court and this Court for having failed in the Alston case to give that factor the weight it deserved: The statutory factors listed in § 8-205(b) are not prioritized in any way, nor has the General Assembly mandated any particular weighing or balancing of the factors. The application and weighing of the factors is left to the discretion of the trial court. Nevertheless, ... the eighth factor, relating to “how and when specific marital property” was acquired and the contribution that each party made toward its acquisition, should be given considerable weight. The ²¹⁹ circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals indicated that the eighth factor should not be given any more weight than any other factor in this case.

Under the particular circumstances here, however, such approach was not consistent with the statute. ... [GJenerally in a case such as this the eighth factor should be given greater weight than the others. 331 Md. at 507 , 629 A.2d 70 (emphasis supplied). In Skrabak v. Skrabak, 108 Md.App. 633, 656 , 673 A.2d 732 (1996), we gave a similarly moderate reading to the opinion in Alston: Alston does not state that property acquired after separation should be taken out of the marital property pool, only that the timing of acquisition must be considered. The trial judge did that in this case. In concluding that the trial judge had abused his discretion, the Court of Appeals in Alston also strongly suggested that the trial judge may have failed to recognize the difference between an equitable division of marital property and an equal division and “may have succumbed to the temptation to divide the property equally”: In this case, ... once property was determined to be “marital,” the circuit court may have succumbed to the temptation to divide the property equally.

As previously discussed, our statute requires “equitable” division of marital property, not “equal” division. The Maryland Legislature specifically rejected the notion that marital property should presumptively be divided equally. In Maryland, as in the majority of equitable distribution states, “equitable” does not necessarily mean “equal.” 331 Md. at 508 , 629 A.2d 70 (footnote omitted; emphasis supplied). In Skrabak v. Skrabak, this Court concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in making a monetary award of after-acquired property.

He gave due weight to the eighth factor, as enjoined by Alston, and resisted succumbing to the temptation of treating an equitable division necessarily as an equal division, as also enjoined by Alston. Under the ²²⁰ circumstances, his division of “after-acquired property” was not an abuse of discretion: Dr. and Mrs. Skrabak had $987,825 of marital property. Mrs. Skrabak’s monetary award of $292,000 is not grossly disproportionate, it is not an equal division of the after-acquired property, and it does not indicate that the trial judge did not give considerable weight to FL § 8-205(b)(8). 108 Md.App. at 656 , 673 A.2d 732 (footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied). Indeed, in the Alston opinion itself, 331 Md. at 500 , 629 A.2d 70 , the Court of Appeals clearly stated what it had decided: We shall conclude in this case that the trial court erred when it awarded to the wife half of the value of a specific piece of marital property.

(Emphasis supplied). Applying the Alston holding as we distill it from the Alston opinion, we now turn our attention to whether the trial judge 1) thoughtfully considered all of the factors, especially the eighth factor; and 2) carefully fashioned an equitable, albeit not an equal, division of the after-acquired marital property. Factual Distinctions There are a number of factual distinctions between this case and Alston. In Alston, /the parties had been separated for over a year-and-a-half when the winning lottery ticket was purchased.

In this case, the parties had been separated for only four months when the winning ticket was purchased. In Alston, the wife had already filed for divorce long before the winning ticket was purchased. In this case, neither party had taken any formal steps toward filing for divorce. In this case, unlike the situation in Alston, the parties continued to have sexual relations on a regular basis throughout the four-month period of separation.

In this case, the appellant was a frequent overnight visitor at his wife’s new apartment. In this case, the parties had a three-year-old son who was a continuous source of contact between them. In Alston, the children had long since been emancipated. In this case, unlike ²²¹ Alston, the appellee loaned her car to the appellant, drove him to work, and loaned him money, all subsequent to the separation.

In this case, moreover, both parties testified to having sexual relations between them as late as two months after the winning Powerball ticket had been purchased. This was not a case, as was Alston, where it could fairly be said that “the marital family has, as a practical matter, ceased to exist.” 331 Md. at 507 , 629 A.2d 70 . In her Opinion and Order, Judge Nolan noted a number of these factual distinctions between the present case and Alston: The Court will award to the plaintiff a monetary award in consideration of the above-referenced factors. The Court makes its award in light of the fact that the defendant won the Powerball after the parties had separated and were living in separate residences.

The Court, however, also makes its award in light of the fact that the parties continued to have sexual relations during this period of separation. Furthermore, the Court makes its award considering the letter written by the plaintiff to the defendant prior to the winning of the Powerball, in which the plaintiff expressed that the marriage was over. The Court believes that the facts in this case are somewhat distinguishable from the facts in the Alston case. Here, the parties were separated only four months but continued to have sexual relations before the defendant won the Powerball.

In Alston, the parties were separated for at least a year and a half, during which time Mrs. Alston filed her first divorce complaint, before Mr. Alston won the lottery. However, in making its monetary award, the Court focuses on the eighth factor — how and when the specific marital property was acquired, including the effort expended by each party. (Emphasis supplied). Procedural Distinction No. 1: The Thoughtful Weighing of the Eighth Factor In Alston, 331 Md. at 507 , 629 A.2d 70 , the Court of Appeals explained why “in a case such as this the eighth factor should ²²² be given greater weight than the others” and faulted both the trial court and this Court for having “indicated that the eighth factor should not be given any more weight than any other factor.” Heedful of Alston, Judge Nolan acknowledged that the eighth factor “should be given considerable weight.” In a 23-page Opinion and Order, she made a detailed analysis of all of the factors listed in § 8-205(b).

She then engaged specifically in a detailed discussion of the eighth factor: 8. How and when specific marital property or interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, was acquired, including the effort expended' by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan or both. The defendant contends that this factor should be given considerable weight. The court in Alston stated that: ... generally in a case such as this the eight factor should be given greater weight* than the others.

Where one party, wholly through his or her own efforts, and without any direct or indirect contribution by the other, acquires a specific item of marital property after the parties have separated and after the marital family has, as a practical matter, ceased to exist, a monetary award representing an equal division of that particular property would not ordinarily be consonant with the history and purpose of the statute. (Emphasis added). Alston, 331 Md. at 507 , 629 A.2d 70 . As in Alston, the defendant in this case took the time and effort to purchase the lottery ticket.

While the cost was little and the effort minimal, the annuity was acquired entirely through the defendant’s efforts. The plaintiff argued that even though she did not play a direct part in purchasing the lottery ticket, she made indirect contributions to the purchase of the winning lottery ticket. The plaintiff relies on Alston as her basis for this theory. The plaintiff argues that because of the defendant’s ²²³ excessive spending on lottery tickets and sporting bets, she was forced to subsidize the defendant’s lower contributions to the support of the parties’ child.

The plaintiff further argues that if the parties had considered the child support guidelines during the period of time when the defendant was playing the lottery, his contribution would have been below the guidelines amount. Thus, the plaintiff argues that she indirectly contributed to the specific item of marital property — the lottery winnings. The Court finds that both parties spent approximately equal amounts of money on recreation activities, whether it was on purchasing lottery tickets, going shopping, or spending time with friends at various different locations. The Court does not find that the plaintiff indirectly contributed to the purchase of the winning lottery ticket.

In fact, the plaintiff testified that she had no idea as to the amount of money the Defendant was spending on lottery tickets after she moved out of the marital residence in December 1995. It can be said, however, that the plaintiff was responsible for more of the household responsibilities such as caring for Ronnie, Jr. The Court recognizes that this factor should be given more weight than all other factors to be considered. (Emphasis supplied). With respect to affording the eighth factor the special weight it deserves in a case such as this, Judge Nolan scrupulously did precisely what the Alston case admonished should be done.

There is no way that her decisional process could be characterized as an abuse of discretion in that regard. Procedural Distinction No. 2: The Careful Fashioning of the Monetary Award In holding that an abuse of discretion occurred in the Alston case, the Court of Appeals noted that “[i]n this case, as in many other cases, once property was determined to be ‘marital,’ the circuit court may have succumbed to the temptation to divide the property equally.” 331 Md. at 508 , 629 A.2d 70 . It ²²⁴ then analyzed the history of the Maryland statute, pointing out that the “Maryland Legislature specifically rejected the notion that marital property should presumptively be divided equally,” and reiterated that “ ‘equitable’ does not necessarily mean ‘equal.’ ” Id. Again heedful of the teachings of Alston, Judge Nolan did not “succumb to the temptation to divide the property equally.” She diligently considered all of the intertwined factors and then carefully fashioned a monetary award that gave the wife 20% of the value of the several payments that the appellant had received prior to the divorce decree.

She then further provided that the monetary award would be reduced to 10% of all future payments: For these reasons and based on an evaluation of all of the required factors, the Court will include in the monetary award to the plaintiff, 20% of the value of the defendant’s current assets ... This part of the award therefore totals Seventy-nine Thousand, Seven-Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars and Twenty Cents ($79,788.20). The Court makes this award in full recognition of the money already paid by the defendant to the plaintiff during the last two years since the defendant has been receiving annuity payments from his Powerball winnings. The Court will also include in the monetary award to the plaintiff and against the defendant 10% of the payments to be received by the defendant on May 1, 1998 and on each subsequent May 1, until the year 2015.

The Court recognizes that each one of these payments to the defendant will be $846,000.00 Thus, each payment to the plaintiff shall be $84,600.00 The payment of the monetary award shall be made to the plaintiff. Thus, the monetary award totals $1,602,588.20. We hold that Judge Nolan in this case, in making the monetary award, did everything that Alston enjoined her to do. We hold, therefore, that she did not abuse the discretion entrusted to her in this regard. ²²⁵ The Tax Consequences of the Monetary Award Simply as a subcontention of his argument that Judge Nolan allegedly abused her discretion in making the monetary award, the appellant argues that when the potential income tax consequences of the award are taken into consideration the award represents “such an inequitable result as to amount to a clear abuse of discretion by the Chancellor.” We do not agree.

At trial, both parties offered Certified Public Accountants as expert witnesses. Those witnesses testified as to the tax implications of the lottery winnings. The carefully crafted monetary award ordered by Judge Nolan clearly took those implications into consideration. Equally clearly, the monetary award ordered by the court did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

The appellant was due to receive his lottery annuity in twenty annual payments. As of the time the monetary award was ordered, two of those annual payments had already been made. The appellant appropriately was responsible for the taxes that were due on those payments. With respect to the first two payments that had already been made, the appellant explained that much of that income had gone into the purchase of other assets.

He further explained that all of his then-current assets were directly traceable to the annuity payments. He requested the court, therefore, to evaluate the marital property as a whole and to make an appropriate division thereof. In the Opinion and Order of the Court, Judge Nolan explained how she handled the first two annuity payments as part of the total marital property: The Defendant urges the Court not to count the Defendant’s 1996 and 1997 annuity payments in addition to the Defendant’s other assets in determining the value of Defendant’s property. Defendant argues that all of his current assets are directly traceable to either the 1996 or 1997 annuity payments.

The Defendant further argues that he had no assets prior to winning the lottery and that it would be wrong to assign a value to the 1996 and 1997 proceeds as ²²⁶ well as the other property titled in the name of the Defendant such as his car, his bank accounts, and any of his other assets. The Court agrees with the Defendant, and will not consider the value assigned to the 1996 and 1997 annuity payments already paid to the Defendant. However, the Court will consider the value of all assets titled in the Defendant’s name as of the date of the divorce when determining which property is marital and in determining the value of the property. These assets include various bank and brokerage accounts that are titled in his sole name.

Said assets have been derived solely from the lottery winnings, and are, therefore, marital property. Without serious dispute from either party, the evaluation of the marital property yielded a total value of $398,941. The monetary award to the appellee was for 20% of that marital property. The award, therefore, was in the amount of $79,-788.20.

In view of the fact that essentially all of the marital property resulted from the payment of the first two lottery annuities, the award to the appellee represented, in effect, 20% of the net,