Warfield v. Latrobe

Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a petition filed by the appellant contesting the election of the appellee, as Mayor of the City of Baltimore. " The petition alleges, that the appellee was returned as •elected, and had taken the oath of office, and claimed to exercise the functions, and to be entitled to the salary payable to the Mayor of the City of Baltimore; ¹²⁹ He further alleges, that the returns were false and fraudulent — that illegal votes were cast for the appellee, and that legal votes, which would have been cast for the petitioner were refused, and that owing to fraud and violence in certain precincts, the election in such precincts was altogether null and void. The petitioner claims to have been duly elected to the office of mayor, and prays the Court to adopt such mode of proceeding, and prescribe such rules for taking testimony and adjudging costs as may seem most satisfactory and least expensive, and to provide also for the counting by the Court, or under its direction and supervision, of the ballots cast at said election, and the inspection of the poll-books returned, &c.

The Constitution of 1867 continued in force all Acts of Assembly not inconsistent with the provisions of that instrument, and it is claimed the Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a contest in regard to the election of mayor under the following section, and of Art. 35 of the Code, which were in force at the time the Constitution was adopted: “Sec. 53. All cases of contested election of any of the officers not provided for in the Constitution, or in the preceding section, shall be decided by the Judges of the several Circuit Courts, each in his respective circuit, and by the Superior Court of Baltimore City, in Baltimore City.” “Sec. 54. Each Judge of the Circuit Court and of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, may adopt such mode of proceeding in cases of contested elections, and prescribe such rules for taking testimony and adjudging costs as to him shall seem most satisfactory and least expensive.” Conceding for the purposes of this case, the jurisdiction thus claimed, the question is whether an appeal will lie from the rulings and judgment of that Court. It is admitted that the several sections of the Code above referred to, make no provision for an appeal, and the ques ¹³⁰ tion therefore, depends upon whether the judgment was rendered in a case of which the Court had jurisdiction by virtue of its common law powers, or whether it was a special and exclusive jurisdiction conferred by the statute, and to he exercised not according to the common law, hut in a mode and manner therein prescribed ?

If the Court acted under a special and exclusive jurisdiction, then, according to the well settled law of this State, its judgment in the premises is final and conclusive, unless the right of appeal is expressly given by the statute. It was thus decided in the case of the Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad Co. vs. Condon, 8 G. & J., 448 , in which the Court said: “There is no appeal expressly given to the Court of Appeals, under the Act of Assembly investing the County Courts with the power of hearing and setting aside inquisitions like the present. It is a special limited jurisdiction given to the County Courts, from the decision of which no appeal lies to any other tribunal.” ' And in the Savage Manufacturing Co. vs. Owings, 3 Gill, 498 , it was also held, that the judgment of the Court below was final and conclusive. Judge Chambers said : “ Jurisdiction of this proceeding is not exercised by the County