Warner v. Miltenberger's Lessee

Bartol, J., delivered the opinion of this Court: The decision of this case depends upon the true construction of the following clause in the last will of George Warner, late of Baltimore City: “I give, devise and bequeath to my grandchildren, George and Catharine Miltenbergor, their heirs and assigns forever, as tenants in common, my two lots of ground lying on the east and west sides of Leadenhall street, in ‘Ridgely’s Addition ’ to Baltimore town, (now city.)” The testator died in 1829. The will bears date March 3rd, 1827, with a codicil dated June 20th, 1829, and was admitted to probate in July 1829, The lessor of the plaintiff is grandson of the testator, and one of the devisees named in the above clause of his will, under which he claims the property in controversy in this case. The defendant (now appellant) claims as residuary legatee under the former will; and the question between the parties is, what extent of ground passed by the devise? By agreement of counsel, a warrant of resurvey was issued to lay down the land claimed, and such other lands or lots as either party might wish located; but as both claimed under the same testator, no location as to title prior to his need be made.

It was also agreed that duly certified extracts of deeds, leases, &c., and any original deeds and plats in the possession of the testator at the time of his death, and sale-plats by which he purchased land, might be used for the purpose of location, and as evidence at the trial, in the place of more formal papers. The warrant of resurvey was issued, executed and returned with plats, locations and explanations under instructions of the respective parties. Defence was taken for all within the plaintiff’s claim and pretensions, as delineated on the plats; and on the trial in the Court below, a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the ground claimed, with nominal damages. ²⁷¹ The plaintiff offered two prayers, and the defendant one prayer. The plaintiff's first prayer was granted by consent; the defendant objected to the second prayer; but the Court below granted that also, and rejected the defendant’s prayer; and the only exception taken below, and brought up by this appeal, was taken to tho granting of Liu; plaintiff’s second prayer, and the rejection of the defendant's prayer.

These prayers will be found ante, pages 264 and 265, and will be more particularly noticed hereafter. The case has been argued with very great care and ability, and in expressing our judgment upon the material questions involved, we are much aided by the clear, careful and elaborate exposition of the case furnished by the printed briefs and oral arguments of counsel; and have found less difficulty in reaching a satisfactory conclusion, than in expressing in a brief and intelligible manner the grounds upon which that conclusion is based. This grows out of the great number and variety of facts embraced in tho bill of exceptions, and the number of locations presented by the plats, all of them tending to illustrate the meaning of the words of the will, and designed to show tho real intent of the testator in the devise in question — that is, tho sense in which the testator used the word “lot” in the devise — upon which the whole controversy turns. The appellant contending that the word must be construed to mean a parcel of ground marked and defined on the plat of “Ridgely’s Addition” to Baltimore town, as the same was made and adopted by the public authorities, bounded and circumscribed by streets, lanes and alleys, as located on the plat, and designated by numbers, commonly known as a building lot.

That this is the legal construction of the word, and that no evidence can be introduced to show that the testator used it in any other sense. While the appellee contends that it is competent to show by testimony, derived from other parts of tho will, and by extrinsic evidence, explaining the sense in which the testator used tho word, lot, that it embraced a, ²⁷² larger parcel of ground, and was .not intended to refer to' the small subdivisions designated as town lots on the plat of “Ridgely’s Addition to Baltimore Town.” We think it is clear upon established precedents and authority, that it was competent for the appellee to introduce, for this purpose, the evidence contained in the bill of exceptions. Much learning and ability have been expended, both by Courts and elementary writers, in considering the question of resorting to extrinsic evidence for aid in the interpretation of wills, and the rules and principles governing this interesting branch of the law, may now be considered as-defined and established with as much precision as the subject is capable of. They are very clearly stated in the excellent work of Mr. Wigram, published in the 2nd vol. of the Library of Law and Equity, and also in the 1st vol. of Greenleaf’s Ev., ch. 15.

For the rules more particularly applicable to this case, we refer to the 1st, 5th and 7th propositions of Wigram, to 1 Greenleaf, secs. 286 to 289 inclusive; and to the very able and learned opinion of Lord