Warren House Co. v. Handwerger

Horney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The several questions presented by this appeal involve the problem of whether a court of equity, in the absence of a showing of acts of conspiracy, coercion or intimidation, should exercise jurisdiction to grant an injunction to prohibit the disparagement of business and property rights. We think not. The plaintiff-appellant is the Warren House Company, a body corporate, trading as the Warren House Motor Hotel, which conducts a motor inn and shopping arcade in Pikesville.

The defendants-appellees are Irvin E. Handwerger and six other individuals. The appellant filed a bill in equity against the appellees seeking to enjoin them from uttering alleged false and malicious statements about the business of the appellant. Each of the appellees demurred to the bill of complaint and the chancellor sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. The appeal is from the judgment for costs entered on the sustensions.

The bill alleged that the appellees had made certain vile, vicious and slanderous statements attacking the good reputation of the appellant and that such statements were false and were made with intent to injure it. The bill further alleged that the slanderous statements were made in the presence of other persons and that the appellant has no adequate remedy at law to protect its property rights. But the bill did not allege the existence of a conspiracy, or other concerted effort, between the individual appellees to injure the business of the appellant. In Prucha v. Weiss, 233 Md. 479 , 197 A. 2d 253 (1964), where we had occasion to deny injunctive relief and damages ¹⁷⁹ for alleged past and prospective false and malicious preelection statements because equity, in the absence of independent grounds of equitable jurisdiction, lacked power to issue an injunction restraining the publication of defamatory matter, it was said that the primary reasons for the reluctance of equity to extend its jurisdiction so as to grant injunctive relief in a case such as that seems to be the fear that to grant such relief would violate, not only the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and press and trial by jury, but also the traditional limitation of equitable jurisdiction to the protection of property rights.

We did not say, however, nor did the latter statement mean, as the appellant supposes, that equity will assume jurisdiction in every case in which injury to business or property rights is involved. On the contrary, the prevailing rule in other jurisdictions is that equity will not exercise its jurisdiction to restrain false statements disparaging business or property rights where no other wrong,