Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Williams

⁶⁵¹ MEREDITH, J. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMA-TA”), appellant, appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County which affirmed the ruling of the Workers’ Compensation Commission that an injury to the right leg of Jan Williams, appellee, was causally related to the prior injury to his left leg, and therefore covered by workers’ compensation benefits. WMATA presents one question for review: Whether Claimant’s March 23, 2009L,] right knee injury, incurred when he was hit by a car while returning from lunch on a day when he was attending therapy, is causally related to the work accident of April 15, 2008, where Plaintiff injured his back and left knee? We will answer that question in the negative, and reverse the decision of the circuit court. We will remand the case to the circuit court with instructions that the circuit court remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History Mr. Williams’s position as a mechanic for WMATA is very physically demanding. On April 15, 2008, while he was employed as a mechanic for WMATA, Mr. Williams injured his back and left knee on the job. Mr. Williams underwent physical therapy to treat the injury to his left knee. Prior to Mr. Williams regaining his full strength, when the physical therapy progress had started to plateau, it was recommended that Mr. Williams undergo work hardening, which is a more intensive form of physical therapy.

CAM Physical Therapy provided the work hardening program at a location that is not a WMATA facility. On the second to last day of the work hardening program, March 23, 2009, Mr. Williams walked to his truck during his lunch break and ate his lunch. After he finished eating, Mr. Williams walked through the parking lot, intending to return for another session of the work hardening program. While Mr. ⁶⁵² Williams was walking back from lunch, the driver of a car on the parking lot put her car into reverse and backed into Mr. Williams, knocking him to the ground.

This resulted in an injury to Mr. Williams’s right knee for which Mr. Williams claimed workers’ compensation benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Commission found “that the disability of the claimant’s right leg/knee is causally related to the aforesaid accidental injury,” and awarded benefits. WMATA filed a petition for judicial review, and requested a trial de novo in the circuit court. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the circuit court made the following factual findings: The facts are very simple in this matter.

The claimant injured his back and left knee in a work-related accident on April 15th, 2008. He was going through his rehabilitation, through [h]is doctor, through [h]is therapist. It was recommended to do a work hardening program, which he was completing]. He was I believe 19 or 20 classes into it, at which time on March the 23rd, 2009 the Claimant, Mr. Williams, in this matter, sustained an injury to his right knee when a car backed up and hit him.

Certainly, he was not working at this time. He was, the best term of course to use is he was rehabilitating at this point in time. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, and found that Mr. Williams’s injury to his right knee was compensable. WMATA appealed to this Court.

DISCUSSION I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Maryland Code (1991, 2008 RepLVol.), Labor and Employment Article (“LE”), § 9-745, there are two statutorily provided options for review in the circuit court of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission—(1) either an administrative appeal submitted on the record made ⁶⁵³ before the Commission, pursuant to LE § 9-745(c) and (e); or (2) an essential trial de novo, pursuant to LE § 9—745(d). Here, WMATA requested an essential trial de novo, and, although the ultimate decision of the Commission is considered prima facie correct, this Court reviews the circuit court’s decision, not the decision of the Commission. Doe v. Buccini Pollin Grp., Inc., 201 Md.App. 409, 419-20 (2011). Under these circumstances, we review the factual findings of the circuit court for clear error, and we review matters of law de novo.

Id.

II

APPLICATION OF MACKIN TO THE PRESENT CASE WMATA contends that reversal is required by the decision of Mackin v. Harris, 342 Md. 1 , 672 A.2d 1110 (1996), in which the Court of Appeals addressed a similar factual scenario. In Mackin , a former employee of Mackin & Associates was undergoing physical therapy to treat an injury which the employee incurred while employed by Mackin & Associates. Id. at 2-3 , 672 A.2d 1110 . That injury was compensable through workers’ compensation.

Id. On the way to the physical therapist’s office, the employee slipped and fell on a patch of ice and sustained an additional injury. Id. The employee made a second claim for worker’s compensation benefits from Mackin & Associates, arguing that the second injury “was a consequence of the first and should likewise be compensable.” Id. at 3 , 672 A.2d 1110 .

At the time of the second injury, the employee was no longer employed by Mackin & Associates. Id. at 2 , 672 A.2d 1110 . In its opinion addressing whether the second injury should be compensable under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals took note of the analysis of Professor Larson in this area, id. at 5 , 672 A.2d 1110 , and quoted the following passage expressing Professor Larson’s view on consequential injuries such as the injury in the Mackin case: “Since, in the strict sense, none of the consequential injuries we are concerned with are in the course of employment, it becomes necessary to contrive a new concept, which we may ⁶⁵⁴ for convenience call ‘quasi-course of employment.’ By this expression is meant activities undertaken by the employee following upon his injury which, although they take place outside the time and space limits of the employment, and would not be considered employment activities for usual purposes, are nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that they are necessary or reasonable activities that would not have been undertaken but for the compensable injury. ‘Reasonable’ at this point relates not to the method used, but to the category of activity itself----Quasi-course activities in this sense would include, for example, making a trip to the doctor’s office and reaching for aspirin in the medicine cabinet.” Id. at 6-7 , 672 A.2d 1110 (quoting Lex K. Larson, 1 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 13.11(d) (1993)). But the Mackin Court adopted a narrower rule regarding compensability of subsequent injuries: We are in general agreement with the basic rule advocated by Professor Larson—that a subsequent injury is com-pensable if it is the direct and material result of a compensable primary injury.

We do not agree, however, that this concept of causation should be extended to embrace every subsequent accident that may occur while going to and coming from a doctor or other health care provider or obtaining or taking medication for an original compensable injury. More specifically, we hold that under the facts of this case, the fall on ice while going to a therapist’s office for treatment of a compensable injury suffered three years earlier with a former employer is not a direct and natural result of the earlier injury. Professor Larson’s approach to causation in consequential injury cases appears to rely heavily, if not almost exclusively, on the “but for” test; but for the first injury and the need for treatment therefor, would the second accident have occurred? ⁶⁵⁵ ... This expansive view of causation, which invokes the necessity to “contrive” the legal fiction of “quasi-course of employment” or to find implicit conditions of employment, leads to rather extraordinary results.

Id. at 7-9 , 672 A.2d 1110 (emphasis added). The Court enunciated the proper standard to be applied in Maryland cases as follows: Rather, the proper approach is to view retrospectively what actually occurred and then determine in a reasonable and practical manner whether there is a sufficient nexus between the earlier industrial accident and the later injuiy to constitute the latter as a “direct and natural result” of the former, and to therefore establish causation. Cf. Henley [v. Prince George’s County, 305 Md. 320, 336 , 503 A.2d 1333 (1986) ].

Although, as we have discussed, there are some essential differences between the concepts of proximate cause applicable to tort law and those applicable in workers’ compensation cases, we find more similarities than differences in the area of consequential injuries. Specifically, we reject the notion that causation in such cases may be determined solely by reference to the “but for” test, and we persist in our view that the claimant must establish “a direct causal connection” between the original accidental injury and the subsequent injury or condition. Unger & Mahon v. Lidston, [ 177 Md. 265, 269 , 9 A.2d 604 (1939) ]. Id. at 10 , 672 A.2d 1110 (emphasis added).

Purporting to apply the standard set out in Mackin to the present case, the circuit court in this case stated: [T]he question is[: ... ] is he covered or not. And the question in \Mackin ] was a situation where the person was going to his physical therapist three years after the injury, no longer working for the company, and slips and falls on some ice. And the question is whether or not it was compensable or not. ... And the basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original injury, or a new and ⁶⁵⁶ distinct injury is compensable, if it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary injury.

The circuit court then recounted the portion of the Mackin opinion, set out above, in which Professor Larson advocates that consequential injuries should be covered as part of a “quasi-course of employment.” Yet, the circuit court failed to note that, in Mackin , the Court of Appeals actually adopted a significantly narrower standard than the one advocated by Professor Larson, and the Court of Appeals criticized Larson’s formulation that is based on the “ ‘eontrive[ed]’ ... legal fiction of ‘quasi-course of employment’ ” because “it leads to rather extraordinary results.” Mackin, supra, 342 Md. at 8-9 , 672 A.2d 1110 . The circuit court concluded that Mackin supports Mr. Williams’s workers’ compensation claim for the second injury, and stated: In this case Mr. Williams was rehabilitating. He was ordered to be and he was directed by a doctor to take this work hardening program. He was at the work hardening program.

In his analysis, he’s a covered employee. The Court affirms Commissioner Adams’ finding in this matter— In our view, WMATA’s position is supported by the Mackin Court’s analysis. There was not a sufficient nexus between Mr. Williams’s two accidents for the circuit court to conclude that there was a direct causal connection between the first accidental injury (to the left knee) and the subsequent injury to the right knee. If the test of causal relation which the claimant was required to satisfy was simply the “but for” test, then it would have been satisfied—i.e., but for Mr. Williams’s first injury, he would not have been in the parking lot for the work hardening program, and would not have been hit by a car in that lot.

But the Court in Mackin expressly rejected that line of reasoning, and required the demonstration of a “direct and material relationship,” which the Court said was akin to the concept of proximate cause in tort law. Id. at 10 , 672 A.2d 1110 . There must be “ ‘a direct causal ⁶⁵⁷ connection’ between the original accidental injury and the subsequent injury.” Id. Here, Mr. Williams’s second injury was not caused by his first injury.

The appropriate method of analysis, and the method adopted in Mackin , is to view “retrospectively what actually occurred and then determine in a reasonable and practical manner whether there is a sufficient nexus