Waters v. Waters

Cochran, J., delivered the opinion of this Court. This is an appeal from a decision of the Court below upon a motion for a new trial, and an examination of the record has satisfied us that the motion to dismiss should be sustained. The issues upon which these proceedings were had, were made up in the Orphans’ Court, and transmitted to a Court of Law for trial; and although they were still to be dealt with as within the probate powers of the Orphans’ Court, the verdict upon them was nevertheless to be found in accordance with principles applicable to the trial of issues joined in the usual course of proceedings in Courts of Law. 14 Md. Rep., 532 . 9 Gill, 56 . The provisions of the Code, authorizing the transmission of issues to the Courts of Law for trial, were not intended to restrict or qualify the general powers of those Courts, but to secure a trial of such issues subject to the exercise of those powers ; and it was, therefore, the duty of the Court below, in ⁷³ trying the issues contained in this record, to exercise its powers, both legal and'discretionary, according to the exigencies of the case.

It is true that Art. 5, sec. 5, of the Code, provides, that “exceptions may be taken to any opinion given by the Court before whom issues from the Orphans’ Court may be tried and an appeal taken;” but this clause cannot be so construed as to qualify or restrict any power of the Court to which issues may be sent, a result that would necessarily follow if rulings upon matters resting in discretion could be reached by exceptions, and made the subject of review on appeal. This provision, as we understand it, was intended simply to confer a right of exception and appeal corresponding in its essential particulars with the right as it existed in actions at law ; and thus construed, the question, as to the appellant’s right of review, necessarily depends upon the principles and rules applicable to a like state of ease in an action at law. The motion for a new trial, the granting of which constitutes the ground of this appeal, was addressed to the sound discretion of the Court; and, according to the general current of authority, the granting or refusal to grant it, was a matter resting altogether in the Court’s discretionary power. This power is an equitable one in its nature, and its exercise is always presumed to be in accordance with the requirements of