Wathen v. Pearce

Offutt, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Robert B. Wathen and Lottie V. Wathen, the appellants, as partners, and Jane A. Pearce, the appellee, severally own fractional undivided interests in six barges which are employed in the transportation of freight, bay and coastwise, and are operated by the appellants as managing owners. Jane A. Pearce, the widow of Alvin A. Pearce, now owns the following fractional shares of the several barges: 1/32 of each of three barges, 3/32 of one barge, 1/16 of one barge, and 5/64 of one barge, which her husband owned at his death, and she therefore holds a minority interest in each barge. The majority interest in each barge is owned or controlled by, the appellants, who operate them all as managing owners.

The barges are vessels used for the transportation of water borne freight, are without motive power, and are towed from place to place. In their operation expenses are incurred for towing, the wages of employes, repairs, insurance, commissions, food, and other similar needs, which are paid when possible from the earnings of the barges. It is not apparent that, apart from fluctuating ⁶⁵⁶ accumulations of such earnings, the owners maintain any-operating balances or capital reserve for operating the barges, but the managing owners have been accustomed for some time to impound and retain a portion of the earnings of the barges, of not less than $200 on each barge, or not less than $1,000 for the six barges, as working capital. When Alvin A. Pearce acquired the interests which the appellee now holds it is said that he knew of that custom and assented to it, but it does not appear that at his death, his widow, the appellee, was apprised of the fact that he had acquiesced in it, or that she herself knew of it.

On September 24th, 1937, the books of the appellants showed a credit balance resulting from the operation of the six barges of $829.46 in favor of the appellee. On the 'theory that those entries constituted a promise by the appellants to pay that sum, the appellee brought this action of account stated, to secure a judgment therefor against the appellants. The defendants pleaded the general issue and a special plea setting up the defense that, to earn freight charges, expenses incident to the operation of the barges are necessarily incurred and are payable before earnings are available to defray them, that defendants are under no obligation to pay appellee’s proportion of such charges out of their personal funds, that appellee has neglected to provide a fund for the payment of such expenses, and that by the custom of the trade appellants are entitled to retain a reasonable amount of plaintiff’s share of the earnings of the.barges for necessary operating expenses, and that the amount now retained by the defendants is less than the amount which they may reasonably retain from plaintiff’s share of such earnings for that purpose. The plaintiff, instead of traversing or otherwise replying to that plea, joined “issue” thereon.

But as the case was tried as though it were properly at issue on that defense, the irregularity will be disregarded. The trial of the case resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount of the retained balance, and from ⁶⁵⁷ that judgment this appeal was taken. It submits four exceptions, three relating to questions of evidence, one, the fourth, to the court’s rulings on the prayers. There was evidence in the case tending to prove these facts: The accounting practice of the defendants with respect to the barges was thus described by Lloyd H. Lewis, who keeps their books and who was the only witness called by the plaintiff: “I enter into the voyage account of each barge the amount of freight and any other revenue we may get, and charge against it any towing or other bills in the nature of commissions or insurance, and strike a balance at the end of each voyage, and then ascertain what each interest in the barge is entitled to or to be charged with.

The commission items which appear in a number of voyage accounts represent a commission charged to the boat for broker cargo, and this is not in all cases payable to Wathen and Company. Some other brokers may charter the barge and procure the cargo. Without giving the details of each and every voyage of all these barges from December 1st, 1934, to September 27th, 1937, the statement of account with Mrs. Pearce as of September 27th, 1937, shows that there has been credited to her from the trip statements of the various barges $829.46. That is made up of the trips of all of these six barges for the period from December 1st, 1934, which was the date of the last settlement with her and approximately as of Captain Pearce’s death.

Some of the trip statements might show as many as four or five voyages. We don’t make a statement up for each voyage. For instance, if we go to New York with a cargo of coal and bring back a cargo of fertilizer or something else, we would put them in as one trip, but there are a great many voyage statements covering two or three trips in each statement. Some of them show a profit and others show a loss.

The records show that the gross profit or total amounts credited to her up until September 27th, 1937, were $1,091.92, the total of the various amounts credited after various voyages, and as against that we have certain debits totalling $261.86, and that represented ⁶⁵⁸ losses on some six voyage statements, whereas there were profits on some, roughly, twenty-five.” The appellants have been engaged in the business of boat owners and operators for thirty-five years and at present operate thirty-five barges, including the six under consideration here. Robert B. Wathen, an appellant, testified that the partners are managing owners of the six barges and have been since they owned interests in them, a period of fifteen or twenty years; that where they own a majority interest they become managing owners “automatically”, where they own less than that, they are managing owners by appointment of the majority. In the course of his examination Wathen said that it had been “our custom” to retain a portion of each boat’s earnings for working 'capital, and that usually they “have it understood with the owners * * * when they go in, how much to retain as we did in this instance. * * * I am just giving the custom”. The amount of the contribution exacted from each co-owner is in the discretion of Wathen, and is affected by two factors, one, the extent of the owner’s share, the other, the probable cost of operating the boat and keeping it in repair.

The amount varies in proportion to the amount required to keep the several barges in seaworthy and usable condition. “Every year the boats at regular intervals are tied up for the U. S. Steamboat Government Inspection. They come and look the boat over, and say just what should be done, in their opinion, before they will give us a renewal of our certificate to operate her for the next year. Aside from the government, the cargo underwriter, insurance, will come and look over the boat and will say what should be done to keep the boat up in a seaworthy condition, so that she would be insurable to handle cargo operating coastwise. Then we have the American Bureau of Shipping, who now inspects the barge every year — goes all over her and makes certain recommendations that we have to do, in order to get a loadline, in order that the boat can operate and carry cargo.

We have no control ⁶⁵⁹ over these inspections. Every boat owner and operator on the Atlantic seaboard has to do the same.” At the time of the trial, five of the barges were tied up for inspection, and it will be necessary to spend from two to five thousand dollars on each of them, and when those repairs are completed the $829.46 credited to Mrs. Pearce will not be sufficient to meet her share of that expense. Bills against the owners are paid monthly, and bills for freight are sent monthly, but in some cases they extend credit of thirty, sixty or ninety days to their customers. Although the case was tried before a jury, the exceptions to the evidence are so involved with colloquies between court and counsel that it is difficult to discover either their purpose or the particular ruling to which they are directed, except the first exception, which is quite without merit.

Wathen was asked whether he had “had any trouble with any of the other owners, except Mrs. Pearce, at this time”. The court sustained an objection to the question, and that ruling is the subject of the first exception. The issue in the case was not whether Wathen had had trouble with other owners but whether he owed money to Mrs. Pearce. Whether the other owners were too good natured or she too exacting was wholly collateral, and there was no error in that ruling.

The second exception follows a colloquy between counsel for the defendants and the court, covering more than two printed pages of the record, but no ruling is found or statement made to which the appellants excepted. That exception must therefore be disregarded. The third exception apparently embraces all rulings made throughout the trial of the case both on the prayers and on questions of evidence, and cannot for that reason be considered in this court. Guth v. Elliott, 158 Md. 243, 250 , 148 A. 216 , and cases there cited.

The fourth exception is to the court’s rulings on the prayers. The two principal points relied upon by the appellants in support of the appeal, are (1) that one joint owner of personal property cannot sue another joint ⁶⁶⁰ owner thereof at law for a share of the joint profits, and (2) that conceding for the argument that, under the statute of 4 Anne, ch. 16, sec. 27, and the Statute of 52 H. 3 , Cap. 23, one joint tenant may sue another at law as on an account stated, that this action is not on an account stated. There are three demurrer prayers, but no variance prayer, so that in dealing with the demurrer prayer, the inquiry is whether the evidence makes out a cause of action regardless of the pleadings. In Hamilton v. Conine, 28 Md. 635, 642 , the court, in dealing with litigation concerning disputes between joint tenants, co-parceners, partners, and others in similar relations, laid down what is still the law of this state in this language: “By the Statute of 4th Anne, ch. 16, sec. 27, it was provided, that ‘actions of account shall and may be brought and maintained by one joint tenant and tenant in common against the other as bailiff, for receiving more than comes to his just share or proportion.’ This form of action, thus given by statute, as well as the common law action of account, is, in practice, but seldom used, a bill in equity being in most cases the more convenient and effectual remedy; but the action of account may still be resorted to in this State, in cases to which it is applicable.

Gibbs v. Clagett, 2 G. & J. 17 ; Green v. Johnson, 3 G. & J. 394 . Here, as in England, common law and equity jurisdictions are carefully separated, and we have closely followed the English practice; we see no good reason why it should be departed from in this instance. In Browne on Actions at Lam, 132 (45 Law Lib., 99) the rule is thus stated: ‘Joint tenants, tenants in common and co-parceners cannot in general, maintain any action against each other because they are in the nature of partners;’ and in 1 Chitty’s Pl., 39, it is said: ‘At law one partner or tenant in common cannot, in general, sue his co-partner or co-tenant, in any action, in form ex-contractu, but must proceed by action of account or by bill in equity.’ In reference to the right to sue each other and the mode of doing so, tenants in common are thus assimilated to partners; the rules of law governing ac ⁶⁶¹ tions between the latter, apply with equal force to the former, and this analogy runs through all the decisions.” The authority of that case was recognized as late as Redue v. Hofferbert, 161 Md. 296, 303 , 157 A. 294 , and the principles stated are supported by the general weight of authority. 27 A. L. R. 240, 21 A. L. R. 34. And in Milburn v. Guyther, 8 Gill