Watson v. State

DAVIS, Judge. The appellant, Ethel Watson, was originally convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County on August 2, 1988 of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment on January 31, 1989. On appeal, this Court, in an unpublished opinion filed on October 26, 1989, reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Our reversal was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals in State v. Watson, 321 Md. 47 , 580 A.2d 1067 (1990).

On remand, the appellant was again convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant now seeks our review of the following issue: Did the trial court err in allowing the deceased’s father to testify that she told him that a boy named “Robert” was the father of the child she was carrying? Facts On September 13, 1987, the Harford County Police and ambulance crews were summoned to the Chase Manor Motel in Edgewood, Maryland. The call to which they responded was initiated by the appellant.

When police and rescue units arrived at the appellant’s motel room, they ⁴⁹⁷ discovered the cold, stiff body of the appellant’s girlfriend, Jeannette Hill, 1 on the bed. She was dead. Chandrika Patel, co-manager of the motel, testified that the appellant had checked into the motel between noon and 1:00 p.m. that day, and that she noticed nothing unusual that afternoon. Patel further testified that later in the day the appellant came to the office asking for change because his girlfriend was sick.

Patel stated that while in the motel laundry room, she glanced across the parking lot, towards the appellant’s room, and she saw the appellant and a black woman who was standing and leaning against a dresser. There were no signs of forced entry into the room. An autopsy revealed that Hill’s death was caused by manual strangulation accompanied by blunt force injury (e.g., a blow or blows with a fist) to her abdomen. Hill was approximately six months pregnant at the time of the incident.

The assistant medical examiner who performed the examination determined that the blows to her abdomen had killed the fetus approximately two hours before Hill’s strangulation, and that Hill had been dead for approximately two hours before police arrived. The autopsy further revealed that Hill had a blood alcohol level of .09 percent and that there was a small amount of PCP in her system. Though there was blood under several of the fingernails on Hill’s right hand, there were no marks on the appellant’s face or hands. The appellant was taken into custody.

While at the police station, the appellant gave a written statement concerning what had occurred. In that statement, the appellant recounts that he picked up Hill at approximately 11:00 a.m. at her home in Washington, D.C., dropped off their son, who lived with the appellant, at the home of appellant’s sister in Baltimore, and drove to Aberdeen. In Aberdeen, the appellant bought a pint of vodka, orange juice, and a six-pack of beer. At Hill’s suggestion, they went to the motel where, ⁴⁹⁸ after making love, the appellant fell asleep.

Around 4:30 p.m., the appellant was awakened by the calls for help coming from Hill in the bathroom. The appellant stated that he ran to the bathroom and found Hill squatting in the shower. The appellant helped her to her feet, dried her off, helped her dress, and left to start the car. When he returned to the room, Hill was lying on the floor.

He noticed that blood was coming from her mouth. After picking her up and placing her on the bed, the appellant stated that he attempted, unsuccessfully, to call “911” from the room telephone and ultimately used the pay telephone with change obtained from the motel office. The appellant does not say in his statement exactly how Hill died. The State presented the testimony of Hill’s father and the prior testimony of Hill’s mother, 2 which established that Hill and the appellant had a long-standing sexual relationship.

Hill’s father further testified that, prior to her death, Hill had told him that “a boy named Robert” was the father of the unborn child she was carrying. Regarding this statement, the following colloquy took place: [STATE]: Now, in September of 1987 what was Rosie’s physical condition? [WITNESS]: She was in good health. Like always. And always had been. [STATE]: Was she expecting a baby in September of 1987? [WITNESS]: She was pregnant at the time. [STATE]: Now, did Rosie tell you who that baby’s father was. [DEFENSE]: Objection.

THE COURT: First off just yes or no? [WITNESS]: Yes. [STATE]: Who did she tell you that baby’s father was. [DEFENSE]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. ⁴⁹⁹ [WITNESS]: A boy named Robert. The State argued that the appellant had a motive for committing the murder because he discovered that the child Hill was carrying was not his.

The defense cross-examined Mr. Hill: [DEFENSE]: And you indicate that you were told at some point that someone named Robert was the father of the child, isn’t that right? [STATE]: Objection. That was not for little Tony. THE COURT: A different child. [DEFENSE]: Who was Robert the father of? [WITNESS]: He was the father of the unborn child. [DEFENSE]: Well who was the father of the born child? [WITNESS]: A boy by the name, Edward Drumgee (phonetic). The appellant introduced a series of character witnesses who testified that, in their view, he was honest, truthful, peaceful, and dependable, and that they knew him to be a skilled and scrupulously honest automobile mechanic.

At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the jury convicted the appellant of first degree murder, battery, and assault; and the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder. 3 The appellant now seeks our review of his conviction. Legal Analysis I Hearsay is “an out-of-court assertion offered in court for the truth of the matter asserted, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court assert-er.” Cassidy v. State, 74 Md.App. 1, 6 , 536 A.2d 666 (1988). Exceptions, however, to the hearsay rule render certain statements admissible on the theory that the underlying circumstances contain inherent guarantees of trustworthi ⁵⁰⁰ ness. An out-of-court statement, then, may be admitted either because it is not offered for the truth of the assertion or because it comes within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule.

The statement that the victim made to her father prior to her death would properly have been admitted because it was not offered to prove that “a boy named Robert” was the father of her baby but rather to prove that appellant killed Jeannette Hill, driven by jealousy and rage because she had become pregnant by someone other than the appellant. The general rule is that such evidence is admissible if introduced for the purpose of showing that a party relied on or acted upon the statement and not for the purpose of showing that the facts stated in the declaration are true. Shunk v. Walker, 87 Md.App. 389, 401 , 589 A.2d 1303 (1991), citing Purvis v. State, 27 Md.App. 713 , 343 A.2d 898 (1975). See also McCray v. State, 84 Md.App. 513, 518 , 581 A.2d 45 (1990).

In order for the statement to have been probative and relevant as to a reason or motive that the appellant had to kill the victim, it was incumbent upon the State to prove that the appellant knew or believed that “Robert” or someone other than the appellant was the father of the unborn child. The prosecutor argued that Hill’s assailant inflicted blows deliberately to her abdomen. In her closing argument, she hypothesized: Could it be that he wanted to kill the baby? Could it be that he was annoyed that someone had cut in on his herd of lovely ladies, that the victim was pregnant by another man?

Would that have offended his male pride? These people had a child in common, a child who lived with the defendant. But paternity had not been established. Could it be they had a dispute over the child, she wanted him back?

There are a lot of reasons the defendant could have why he wanted to eliminate Rose [referring to the victim]. Despite the argument of counsel speculating that the motivation for the appellant to pummel the pregnant victim in her abdomen was because of the possibility that she was ⁵⁰¹ pregnant by a man other than himself, the only evidence offered in support of the argument is the hearsay statement made by the victim to her father about the paternity of her unborn child. Because the State failed to establish any knowledge, either circumstantially or by direct evidence, that the appellant knew of this statement, it is inadmissible for the purpose of showing that the appellant “relied on and acted upon the statement.” Shunk, 87 Md.App. at 401 , 589 A.2d 1303 . Although the colloquy between the court and counsel regarding the admission of the statement involved the proof of motive, the court’s decision to admit the statement was based on the pedigree exception.

II In a conference in chambers, the prosecutor inquired as to whether she would be allowed to ask the victim’s father “as to his understanding of who the father was of the child the victim was carrying at the time of her death.” The lower court, citing Rhoades v. Bussinger, 188 Md. 638 , 53 A.2d 419 (1947), and Hendrickson v. Attick, 136 Md. 1 , 109 A. 468 (1920), determined that “[i]t would appear that a father speaking for a deceased, for the deceased daughter was the declarant would be allowed to state statements about her pedigree.” The pedigree exception is described in L. McLain, Maryland Evidence, § 804(4) at 477-78 (1987) (footnote omitted), as statements by a declarant, who has died or is otherwise unavailable, “concerning the declarant’s own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, ancestry, family relationship to others, or other similar facts of personal or family history or concerning such personal and family history of persons related to the declarant by blood, adoption, or marriage.” See also C. McCormick, Evidence, § 322 at 901 (3d ed., 1984), and Copes v. Pierce, 7 Gill 247 (1848). According to McLain, however, not all such declarations are admissible. “The declaration must have been made ⁵⁰² ante litem motam, i.e., prior to any litigation or dispute regarding the matter, and at a time when there was no apparent motive to falsify.” Id. at 478. The requirements, more specifically, to qualify as a pedigree exception to the hearsay rule are that [t]hese statements are admissible, however only upon a showing that the declarant is unavailable, that the statement was made before the origin of the controversy giving rise to the litigation in which the statement is offered (i.e., ante litem motam) and that there was no apparent motive for the declarant to misrepresent the facts---- The general difficulty of obtaining other evidence of family matters, reflected in the unavailability requirement, furnishes impetus for the hearsay exception. Assurances of reliability are found in the probability that in the absence of any motive for lying, the discussions of relatives (and others intimately related to them) as to family members will be accurate.

McCormick, supra, at 902 (footnotes omitted). Generally,