Watters v. State

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. Ronald Gene Watters was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, of first degree murder, assault with intent to murder, and assault and battery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction. The other convictions were merged.

On appeal Watters contends that the trial court erred: —in denying his motion for mistrial, and —in refusing his motion to suppress certain statements. We conclude no error occurred. FACTS On the evening of June 7, 1988, Lisa Taylor stopped at her parents’ house after work to pick up some checks for her college tuition. After a short visit, she left to return to her apartment.

Two days later, it was discovered that Taylor had never returned to her home. More than three months later, a badly decomposed body was found in a ²³³ wooded area near the campus of Salisbury State University. A comparison of dental records revealed that the body was that of Lisa Taylor. Dr. Margarita Korell testified that the cause of death was by an obstruction of the airway as a result of a smock forced into the larynx and pharynx area of the throat.

The police had no suspects and developed no leads in solving the homicide. On December 1,1988, however, Watters, while being held at the Wicomico County Detention Center on unrelated charges, asked to speak to the police. In a series of interviews with the police, Watters made statements implicating himself in the Taylor homicide. Watters was subsequently charged with various offenses stemming from the murder of Taylor.

MISTRIAL Appellant complains that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial as a consequence of the denial of public access to voir dire proceedings. Hence, he concludes that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a mistrial. After returning from a lunch recess on the first day of trial, defense counsel alerted the court that he would move for a mistrial. Counsel had learned that, during the morning proceedings at the time prospective veniremen were being voir dired, members of the sheriffs department had unilaterally excluded members of the public from the courtroom.

This included members of appellant’s family and members of the news media. The court then allowed the examination of T.A. Phillips, the deputy sheriff. The following exchange took place: “BY [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: “Q Okay. Were you authorized or instructed to keep spectators, members of the public and/or news media outside the courtroom? “A No, sir. ²³⁴ “Q Are you aware that that was followed? “A Yes, sir, it was. “Q And by who was that followed? “A By myself. “Q You say no one instructed you, is that correct? “A No, sir. “Q You took it upon your own to exclude spectators and members of the news media? “A Yes, sir. ****** “Q Who was excluded, to your knowledge? “A The only persons allowed in the courtroom were those on jury duty and those as witnesses in the trial pending before the Court. “Q Are you aware of how many civilian spectators, members of the public, news media personnel attempted to gain entrance into the courtroom this morning for the proceedings? “A No, sir. “Q Again, on whose authority did you exclude members of the public and members of the media? “A On my own. “Q And what authority did you have to do that? “A Just my own. “THE COURT: He is in charge of courtroom security. “BY [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: “Q Did you ask the advice or consent of either myself, [the Assistant State’s Attorney], or the administrative judge of the Circuit Court for [Wicomico] County before you made that decision? “A No, sir.” Appellant’s counsel then asked Phillips what instructions he had given the deputy who had screened entrance into the courtroom.

This colloquy occurred: ²³⁵ “THE WITNESS: To allow only jurors and witnesses in the case to enter the courtroom. “BY [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: “Q Did you instruct him as to why? “A Because of the nature of the number of people involved in the case and the courtroom would not handle all the persons who wanted to get into the courtroom. “Q Now, the courtroom, every seat in the courtroom was not filled this morning, is that correct? “A There were some seats. “Q Can you estimate for us how many you believe were available? “A No, sir, I can’t.” On cross-examination, the State asked: “Q Deputy Phillips, very briefly, the individuals you asked not to come into the courtroom, to the best of your knowledge were they on both sides of the case, spectators for both sides, as opposed to either the defense or the state? “A I have no way of knowing that. “Q It was an across-the-board type of thing, is that correct? “A Yes, sir. “Q I have nothing further, Your Honor.” Appellant’s mother then testified that she and other family members were denied access into the courtroom that morning. Appellant renewed his motion for a mistrial and the court ruled: “It was done as a matter of Court security because of the crowded conditions of the courtroom, and it is not denying him his right to a public trial. The motion is denied.” In support of their respective positions, both the State and appellant rely on Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501 , 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984), which held that the guarantees of open public proceedings in criminal trials cover the voir dire proceedings. In addressing this question, the ²³⁶ United States Supreme Court focused on First Amendment values.

Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 509 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at 823 n. 8. 1 Unlike Press-Enterprise Co., the question we have before us focuses on the Sixth Amendment, rather than the First Amendment. In Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), however, the United States Supreme Court noted that “there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 , 104 S.Ct. at 2215 . The Court went on to say: “Under Press-Enterprise, the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 , 104 S.Ct. at 2216 . The problem here is that no request was made by either party to exclude the public from the courtroom.

Hence, the trial judge was not confronted with balancing an overriding interest against the right to public access or given an opportunity to consider alternatives. Instead, he was faced with a determination of whether the unilateral actions of the sheriff rose to the level of a constitutional deprivation. Although we have never addressed this precise issue, some of our sister jurisdictions, when confronted with similar circumstances, have held that the defendant’s right to a public trial was not denied. In State v. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542 , ²³⁷ 5 S.W. 257 , 330 (1887), error dismissed, 124 U.S. 394 , 8 S.Ct. 443 , 31 L.Ed. 454 (1888), overruled on other grounds, State v. Imboden, 157 Mo. 83 , 57 S.W. 536 (1900), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hathhorn, 65 S.W. 756 (1901), two men stationed at the entrance of the courtroom refused to admit anyone into the courtroom except jurors, witnesses and officers of the court during the impaneling of the jury.

The exclusion only continued through the afternoon of one day and the morning of the next day. When the matter was brought to the court’s attention, it stated that no order had been made stationing men at the door and then announced that anyone who wished to come into the courtroom could do so until the seats were filled. On appeal, no violation of the defendant’s right to a public trial was found. Brooks, 5 S.W. at 263-64.

Similarly, in Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1975), the bailiff refused to allow persons to enter or leave the courtroom during counsels’ arguments to the jury. The exclusion lasted a short time and was changed by the trial judge when advised of the bailiffs actions. The Fourth Circuit stated that the incident was “entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional deprivation.” Snyder, 510 F.2d at 230 . In Commonwealth v. Burton, 459 Pa. 550 , 330 A.2d 833 (1975), the district attorney, without the trial court’s knowledge, requested court personnel to keep the defendant’s wife and all members of the Black Panthers out of the courtroom during the testimony of a witness.

Pursuant to the district attorney’s request, other members of the defendant’s family were also accidentally excluded. When the defendant’s counsel became aware of what occurred, he moved for a mistrial, claiming that the defendant was deprived of his right to a public trial. After the trial judge was made aware of the situation, he ratified the district attorney’s action, excluding the defendant’s wife and the Black Panthers. He did, however, permit the admission of the rest of the defendant’s family.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that under those circumstances the de ²³⁸ fendant was not denied the right to a public trial. Burton, 330 A.2d at 837 . We find these cases persuasive in the resolution of the question which appellant presents. As in the above cases, the exclusion of the public in the instant case was for a short time.

In addition, there was no evidence of favoritism or partiality as to who was prohibited from entering. Moreover, as far as we can determine, the public was not excluded from the trial itself, but only from the voir dire proceeding. In view of the intense publicity surrounding the trial, access to the courtroom undoubtedly raised the potential of overcrowding. In light of this potential, Phillips took it upon himself as head of security to limit entry into the courtroom to only prospective jurors and witnesses.

Although this type of unilateral action by the sheriff is not appropriate, we do not find that appellant was denied his Sixth Amendment right of