Webster v. State

BELL, Chief Judge. The issue this case presents involves the State’s right to appeal a trial court’s reduction of a mandatory sentence, entered pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1992 RepLVol., 1993 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 6436(a), 1 which, at the time of ⁴⁶⁹ sentencing, included daytime housebreaking in the list of predicate crimes of violence, when, at the time of the reduction, that statute had been amended to delete that offense as a predicate offense. Important, if not critical to the resolution of that issue, is the propriety of the trial court’s action. Rejecting the State’s contention that it enjoyed a right of appeal pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1995 RepLVol.) § 12-302(c)(2), 2 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, State v. Webster, 119 Md.App. 585, 596 , 705 A.2d 151, 157 (1998), the Court of Special Appeals held that the State had a common law right of appeal, which was authorized in that case, since “Given the sole reason for the sentence modification tendered by appellee and the circuit court, the trial court possessed no authority to deviate from this legislative mandate [that a mandatory sentence be imposed] via the sentence modification/review process, and thus, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction.” Id. at 599 , 705 A.2d at 158 .

We granted the petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. We shall reverse in part, and affirm in part. ⁴⁷⁰ I The petitioner was convicted July 15, 1993 by a Howard County jury of daytime housebreaking and felony theft. At that time, daytime housebreaking was a crime of violence pursuant to § 643B (a). The State having both timely, in accordance with Maryland Rule 4-245, 3 notified the petitioner and the court of its intention to seek a mandatory sentence pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 RepLVol.) Art. 27, § 643B (c), 4 and established the predicate for the imposition of such sentence, the court, on January 25, 1994, merged the convictions and sentenced the petitioner to 25 years imprisonment without parole.

On January 26, 1994, the day after the ⁴⁷¹ petitioner was sentenced, Senate Bill 322 was introduced. That bill proposed to delete daytime housebreaking, among other offenses, from the list of crimes of violence, set out in § 643B (a), for the purpose of imposing mandatory minimum penalties on subsequent offenders. Thereafter, the petitioner timely filed, pursuant to Rule 4-345(b), 5 a Motion for Modification or Reduction of Sentence. Subsequently, Senate Bill 322 was enacted, effective October 1,1994.

See 1994 Md. Laws, Chap. 712. Just as had been proposed, the bill removed daytime housebreaking from § 643B(a) as a crime of violence for purposes of § 643B(c). The trial court held a hearing on the petitioner’s motion to modify or reduce his sentence on December 19, 1996 and, based on amended § 643B (a), on May 9, 1997, vacated the mandatory sentence it earlier had imposed, in favor of concurrent ten year sentences for the housebreaking and theft convictions. The State noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals pursuant to Maryland Code (1973, 1997 Repl.Vol.) § 12-302(c)(2), of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.

That court issued an opinion reinstating the mandatory sentence. Webster, 119 Md.App. at 599 , 705 A.2d at 158 . We granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which the petitioner filed in this Court, to consider the important issues this case presents. Webster v. State, 350 Md. 274 , 711 A.2d 867 (1998). ⁴⁷² II The petitioner argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the State had any right to appeal the trial court’s order granting the petitioner a reduction of sentence.

Specifically, the petitioner asserts that the State had no statutory right of appeal. He argues that, under § 12-302(c)(2) of-the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, the State may appeal final judgments only. With this, the Court of Special Appeals agreed. Webster, 119 Md.App. at 596 , 705 A.2d at 157 .

In addition, the petitioner rejects the State’s claim that it has a common law right of appeal in this -case. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear the timely filed motion for reconsideration, and the legality of the sentence imposed, the petitioner argues, may be addressed by either the doctrine of plain error or by the inherent power of an appellate court to correct error. Next the petitioner argues it was error to hold that the trial court had no authority to reduce his sentence and impose a sentence that was lawful at the time of resentencing. Although the sentence on resentencing would not have been lawful when the petitioner’s initial sentence was imposed, the petitioner submits that, because resentencing took place after the effective date of the revision to § 643B (a), the trial court was not obliged to reimpose the mandatory sentence.

Also, the petitioner maintains that Maryland Rule 4-345(b) gives the trial court broad discretion to revise a defendant’s sentence; thus, the petitioner concludes on that basis as well, that imposition of a lesser sentence under the revised § 643B (a) was proper. The State argues that the petitioner’s initial sentence was not subject to reinterpretation, that the trial court had no authority to reduce a sentence legally imposed pursuant to mandatory sentencing provisions, simply because the Legislature amended those provisions to remove the qualifying conviction. This is so, it argues, because § 643B (a), as amended, ⁴⁷³ is, by its terms, prospective in operation, and clearly so, 6 and, therefore, limits the court’s ability to impose more lenient sentences on those defendants initially sentenced before its effective date. Ill We must first decide whether the State may appeal when it alleges that the court exceeded its authority in sentencing the defendant.

The petitioner maintains, relying on Telak v. State, 315 Md. 568 , 556 A.2d 225 (1989), and Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161 , 642 A.2d 232 (1994), that the State may not. In Telak , we held that the State’s appeal, pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.) § 12-401(a) 7 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, filed more than 30 days after the judge rendered a verdict, was untimely. 315 Md. 568 , 556 A.2d 225 . There, the defendant was convicted of Driving Under the Influence, but, notwithstanding that the defendant previously had been placed on probation before judgment, in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1984 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 641(a)(2), 8 the trial court struck the guilty verdict ⁴⁷⁴ and imposed probation before judgment. Id. at 569, 556 A.2d at 225 .

Rather than appealing the court’s action, the State filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Only after that motion was denied did the State file an appeal pursuant to § 12-401. By then, however, the 30 day appeal period had expired. The State argued that its appeal was timely because it was filed within 30 days of the denial of its collateral motion.

See id. at 574, 556 A.2d at 228 . Examining the legislative history of §§ 12-401 and 12-302, we rejected the State’s argument that the 30 day deadline for filing an appeal started to run after the collateral motions timely filed in the case had been decided. Concluding that “an order placing a defendant on probation before judgment ... was a final judgment in the criminal case for purposes of appeal,” id. at 577, 556 A.2d at 229 , we stated: “The language and the framework of Ch. 49 of the Acts of 1976 demonstrate that the appealable order is the order which imposes a sanction upon the defendant and which ordinarily represents a disposition of the criminal case. The final judgment in a criminal case consists of the verdict and, except where there is an acquittal, the sanction imposed, which is normally a fine or sentence of imprisonment or both.

See e.g., Christian v. State, 309 Md. 114, 119 , 522 A.2d 945 (1987); Jones v. State, 298 Md. 634, 637 , 471 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1984); Sigma Repro. [Reproductive] Health Cen. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665 , 467 A.2d 483, 485 (1983); Lewis v. State, 289 Md. 1, 4 , 421 A.2d 974, 977 (1980); Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 596 , 399 A.2d 578, 583 (1979). An order denying a later motion to correct an ⁴⁷⁵ illegal sentence is not the final judgment in the criminal case.” Id. at 575-76, 556 A.2d at 228-29 . Based on this reasoning and citing Valentine v. State, 305 Md. 108 , 501 A.2d 847 (1985), overruled, State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 184 , 742 A.2d 508, 516 (1999), the petitioner argues that no right of appeal would lie from the allegedly illegal granting of a collateral motion such as the defendant’s motion for reconsideration of sentence. 9 ⁴⁷⁶ The petitioner also relies on Chertkov , on which the State, interestingly, relies for the opposite proposition. In that case, we held that the State’s appeal pursuant to § 12-302(c)(2) was improper where the sentence its appeal challenged was one allowed by Maryland law.

At issue in Chertkov was the trial court’s modification of a sentence entered pursuant to a written plea agreement which contemplated a specific sentence. 335 Md. at 165 , 642 A.2d at 234 . After the defendant had pled guilty and the agreed sentence had been imposed, she timely filed, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(b), a motion for reconsideration of that sentence. The court granted the motion more than 90 days later, after she had served the unsuspend-ed portion of the sentence, striking the previously entered guilty findings and imposing probation before judgment. Id. at 165 , 642 A.2d at 234 .

On appeal, the State argued that the court’s modification of the sentence was an extrajudicial act, in that the court failed to impose a sentence specifically mandated by the Code. Id. at 166 , 642A.2d at 234-5. Rejecting that argument, we explained: “The trial court sentenced the petitioner in accordance with the parties’ plea agreement. That sentence was not illegal and, hence, the State, could not allege at that time, ‘that the trial judge failed to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code, or in conformity with the Maryland Rules of Procedure.’ That allegation could only have been made after the trial court modified the sentence.

That occurred long after the appeal time for challenging the original sentence had expired.” Id. at 168 , 642 A.2d at 235 . A decisive factor in our decision in Chertkov , as the State points out, was that the sentence being appealed in that case, “fell within the permitted range of sentences for the particular offense; but for the plea agreement, the modified sentence ⁴⁷⁷ would be immune from attack on illegality grounds.” Id. at 170 , 642 A.2d at 236 . On that point, we said: “[S]ection 12-302(c)(2) ‘specifie[d] the type of illegality which must be alleged for the State to be entitled to appeal.’ Telak, 315 Md. at 574 , 556 A.2d at 228 . And it did so clearly and unambiguously; when it referred to a failure to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code, it was not referring to the Maryland Rules or anything else other than the statutory law of this State.

There is no justification, therefore, for expanding the meaning of section 12-302(c)(2) to encompass more.” Id. at 169, 642 A.2d at 236 . The case sub judice is identical to the factual posture in Chertkov and distinguishable from that in Telak in a critical respect. Here, the collateral motion, the motion for reconsideration, was granted, and resulted in the imposition of a new sentence. Therefore, unlike the case in Telak , this case does not involve an appeal from the denial of such a motion.

As the State points out, “the action of the trial court served to alter the sentence previously imposed upon [the petitioner].” This Court has recognized that the modification of a defendant’s sentence revises the final judgment previously entered, although it does not result in the entry of a wholly new judgment. See Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 29, 41 , 333 A.2d 37, 43-44 (1975). Assessment of a new sentence resurrects the penalty portion of a judgement; it replaces the prior sentence. The new sentence “imposed a sanction upon the defendant and ... represents a disposition of the criminal case.” Telak at 575 , 556 A.2d at 228 .

Thus, the sentence imposed as a result of the granting of the motion for reconsideration is the appeal-able order, and the State, under § 12-302(c), properly and timely filed its appeal. 10 ⁴⁷⁸ Because we conclude that the State has a right of direct appeal, we do not reach, or address, its alternative argument that, under Cardinell v. State, 335 Md. 381 , 644 A.2d 11 (1994), 11 the State has a common law right of appeal.

IV

We now address whether the Legislature intended that the mandatory sentences imposed in accordance with § 643B (a) before its amendment be inviolate notwithstanding that amendment and its purpose. The purpose of amending § 643B is stated in a Committee Note, as follows: “[The deletion of daytime housebreaking from the definition of ‘crime of violence’] is a substantive change that is intended to enhance the fairness and uniformity of sentencing practices in the State. The Committee believes that the mandatory minimum sentences established in this section should be applicable only to crimes against persons or crimes that directly involve a threat to human life. In addition, the deletion of the crime of daytime housebreaking is a logical change because this bill eliminates the distinction between daytime and nighttime housebreaking and doubles the penalty for this offense.

See new § 29. Under Section 3 of this bill, this change will apply prospectively to cases in which a defendant is sentenced after the effective date of the bill.” ⁴⁷⁹ Laws of Maryland (1994) 3158-59. Also of critical importance is the meaning of § 3 of Chapter 712, providing “that the changes that are made to Article 27, § 643B of the Code by this Act shall apply prospectively only to defendants who are sentenced after the effective date of this Act and may not be construed to apply in any way to defendants who are sentenced before the effective date of this Act,” in particular, the word, “sentence.” That is a question of statutory construction. The applicability of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.

Vol.) Art. 1, § 3, 12 the general savings clause, to this case must be considered as well. We shall hold that the Legislature did intend for the modified statute to apply to all sentences occurring after its effective date. a. The paramount object of statutory construction is the ascertainment and effectuation of the real intention of the Legislature. Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998); Gordon Family Partnership v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 137 , 702 A.2d 753, 757 (1997); Harris v. State, 344 Md. 497, 510 , 687 A.2d 970, 976 , cert. denied, sub nom. ⁴⁸⁰ Koenig v. Maryland, 522 U.S. 1017 , 118 S.Ct. 605 , 139 L.Ed.2d 492 (1997).

The process of statutory construction is straight-forward and, when the statute is clear and unambiguous, requires resort only to the words of the statute. Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 352 Md. 31, 39 , 720 A.2d 912, 916 (1998). When that is the case—when, giving the words of the statute their ordinary and natural meaning, see Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 647-48 , 689 A.2d 610, 612-13 (1997), the meaning of the statute is clear—and that meaning is consistent with both the broad purposes of the legislation, and the specific purpose of the provision being interpreted, the search for legislative intent is at an end. Lewis, 348 Md. at 653 , 705 A.2d at 1131 .

On the other hand, where the meaning of the plain language of the statute, or the language itself, is unclear, “we seek to discern legislative intent from surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history, prior case law, and the purposes upon which the statutory framework was based.” Id. at 653 , 705 A.2d at 1131. We have explicated the rules applicable when resort to surrounding circumstances is required: “When the words of a statutory provision are reasonably capable of more than one meaning, and we examine the circumstances surrounding the enactment of a legislative provision in an effort to discern legislative intent, we interpret the meaning and effect of the language in light of the objectives and purposes of the provision enacted. Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435 , 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994); see Kaczorowski v. [Mayor and City Council] of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513-16 , 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987). Such an interpretation must be reasonable and consonant with logic and common sense.

Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 56 , 673 A.2d 221, 229 (1996). In addition, we seek to avoid construing a statute in a manner that leads to an illogical or untenable outcome. Greco [v. State], 347 Md. [423,] 429, 701 A.2d [419,] 422 [ (1997)]; Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174 , 680 A.2d 1052, 1062 (1996).” Id. at 654, 705 A.2d at 1131. While we have defined “ambiguity” as “reasonably capable of more than one meaning,” Greco ⁴⁸¹ v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429 , 701 A.2d 419, 421 (1997), we have also recognized that “[ljanguage can be regarded as ambiguous in two different respects: 1) it may be intrinsically unclear ...; or 2) its intrinsic meaning may be fairly clear, but its application to a particular object or circumstance may be uncertain.” Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648-49 , 689 A.2d 610, 613 (1997), quoting Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins.

Co., 102 Md.App. 45, 54 , 648 A.2d 1047, 1051 (1994) (quoting Town & Country v. Comcast Cablevision, 70 Md.App. 272, 280 , 520 A.2d 1129, 1132 , cert. denied, 310 Md. 2 , 526 A.2d 954 (1987)). Thus, a term which is unambiguous in one context may be ambiguous in another. See Sullins v. Allstate, 340 Md. 503, 508 , 667 A.2d 617, 619 (1995); Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 74 , 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986).

An ambiguity in a criminal penal statute, in accordance with the rule of lenity, ordinarily is to be construed against the State and in favor of the defendant. See Gardner, 344 Md. at 651 , 689 A.2d at 614 ; Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 539 , 546 A.2d 465 (1988); Johnson v. State, 75 Md.App. 621, 631 , 542 A.2d 429 , cert. denied, 316 Md. 675 , 561 A.2d 215 (1989). In other words, courts are prohibited from extending “punishment to cases not plainly within the language” of the statute. State v. Archer, 73 Md. 44, 57 , 20 A. 172, 172 (1890).

See Gargliano, 334 Md. at 437 , 639 A.2d at 679 . For the rule of lenity to be applicable, the statute being interpreted need not itself be a penal statute; what is required is that the interpretation given the statute have a significant impact on the sentence that the defendant receives. See Maryland House of Correction v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 267 , 703 A.2d 167, 178 (1997) (applying the rule of lenity in construing a statute dealing with good-conduct credits). b. At the outset, we must decide whether the general savings clause applies to the case sub judice.

The State maintains that it does apply and, therefore, “the applicable penal law continues to be that which was in effect at the time of sentencing.” Accordingly, it concludes that the trial court ⁴⁸² had no authority to modify the petitioner’s mandatory sentence. The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the general savings clause is inapplicable by its very terms. Acknowledging that it provides that, in the absence of a provision in the revised statute so providing, a revision of a statute would not affect any penalty already incurred, the petitioner submits that that is the situation here, that the revising statute “expressly so provides.” He points out that § 3 of Chapter 712 expressly saves the mandatory sentence under the prior statute only in the case of those defendants who were sentenced before October 1,1994. It is clear that the Legislature’s intent was that the amendment deleting daytime housebreaking from the list of crimes of violence in § 643B “apply prospectively only.” It went on, however, to define what it intended by use of the term “prospective” and it did so by reference to when the defendant was sentenced—if the defendant was sentenced before the effective date of the act, the sentence imposed at that time was “saved,” the amendment would have no applicability to him or her, but if the defendant was sentenced after the effective date of the act, the amendment would apply and the defendant’s sentence would so reflect.

Since the Legislature made prospectivity to depend upon the date of the defendant’s sentencing, the critical question is the meaning of the word, “sentence,” as used in § 3 of Chapter 712. c. The meaning of “sentence” in the criminal context is clear— it refers to the act of the court in pronouncing sentence, announcing the sanction that is being imposed on the defendant. It is that part of the final judgment that postdates the rendition of a verdict of guilty. But a trial court may modify a sentence.

See Maryland Rule 4-345(b), 13 which gives a Circuit ⁴⁸³ Court “revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition ... (2) ... whether or not an appeal has been filed.” That raises the question of how the court’s action in modifying a sentence is characterized, a question that we must address because the answer is relevant to the construction of § 8, Chapter 712. If a modification of sentence is a resentencing and, thus, a sentencing, § 3 is ambiguous—the statute does not purport to distinguish between initial sentencings and those occurring after modification of a previously imposed sentence—thus implicating the rule of lenity. In that event, the rule of lenity would mandate a construction in favor of the petitioner and against the State.

Although it has not before confronted this issue, this Court has addressed the effect of a modification of sentence in various contexts. In Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423 , 701 A.2d 419 , this Court held: “Consonant with Rule 4-345(b), a criminal defendant may file a request for modification or reduction of sentence within 90 days of the imposition of that sentence. If the sentencing court grants a motion for modification and reduces the sentence, this subsequent sentence then becomes the effective sentence. See Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 435 , 109 A.2d 96, 100-01 (1954) (concluding that a motion to modify must be timely in order to ‘strike out’ the original sentence); Hurwitz v. State, 200 Md. 578, 581 , 92 A.2d 575, 576 (1952) (‘On motion of appellant, this sentence was stricken out, and he was resentenced....’); Czaplinski v. ⁴⁸⁴ Warden, 196 Md. 654, 655-56 , 75 A.2d 766, 766-67 (1950) (noting that the original sentence ‘was reconsidered and stricken out ... and the applicant was re-sentenced’); Collins v. State, 69 Md.App. 173, 193 , 516 A.2d 1015, 1025 (1986) (‘The effect of the modified or clarified sentence was to strike out the [initial] sentence and any infirmity attaching to it.’), cert. denied, 308 Md. 572 , 520 A.2d 1328 (1987).

Thus, a reimposition of sentence in these circumstances is the equivalent of an ‘imposition’ [of] sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(b). Accordingly, we hold that, when a sentencing court grants a timely request for modification or reduction of sentence, the defendant may file another request for modification or reduction of sentence within 90 days of the date of the subsequent imposition of sentence.” Id. at 433, 701 A.2d at 424 . The issue in that case was whether a motion to modify a sentence was timely if filed more than 90 days after the original imposition of sentence, but within 90 days of the granting of a motion to modify the original sentence. Id. at 428 , 701 A.2d at 421 .

In answering that question, we focused on the meaning of “imposition” as used in Rule 4-345(b), id., and rejected the State’s alternative arguments that the unambiguous language of the rule contemplates that “a sentence can only be ‘imposed’ once” and that, if ambiguous, the history and purpose of the rule indicate that a motion to modify must be filed within 90 days of the initial imposition of sentence, rather than a subsequent modification. Id. at 427-28 , 701 A.2d at 421 . Noting that “[p]rior Maryland case law strongly suggests that the modification of a sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(b) is an imposition of sentence for the purposes of that rule,” id. at 429 , 701 A.2d at 422 , the Court discussed McDonald v. State, 314 Md. 271 , 550 A.2d 696 (1988) and Collins v. State, 321 Md. 103, 105 , 581 A.2d 426, 427 (1990), appeal after remand, 326 Md. 423 , 605 A.2d 130 (1992), concluding that they confirmed the suggestion. Greco, 347 Md. at 432 , 701 A.2d at 423 .

Moreover, it concluded that ⁴⁸⁵ “In interpreting Rule 4-345(b), no sound basis exists to distinguish between the reimposition of a sentence subsequent to the revocation of probation, and the reimposition of a sentence subsequent to the granting of a motion to modify the original sentence.” Id. at 432-33 , 701 A.2d at 423 . The question presented in McDonald was whether “a circuit court’s authority to review, de novo, a District Court’s revocation of probation extend to a de novo determination of disposition.” There, a judge of the District Court placed McDonald on probation, which the judge later revoked, directing execution of the sentence originally suspended. 314 Md. at 273 , 550 A.2d at 696-97 . McDonald’s appeal of the revocation of probation judgment was heard de novo in the Circuit Court, which affirmed the finding that she had violated probation, but refused her request for de novo hearing on disposition, believing that only alleged violations were subject to de novo review. Id. at 273 , 550 A.2d at 697 .

For the same reason, the court denied McDonald’s Rule 4-345(b) motion for modification of sentence. Id. at 284 , 550 A.2d at 702 . The Court held that de novo review of a probation violation in the Circuit Court extends to disposition as well as to the determination whether the violation occurred. Id. at 277-78 , 550 A.2d at 699 .

Although that resolved the appeal, we addressed McDonald’s contention that it was error for the Circuit Court to deny her motion for modification, concluding, consistent with its holding, that the revocation of her probation returned McDonald to her original sentencing status, with the result that “ ‘[b]e-cause Rule 4-345(b) applies to any sentence, it must