Weigand v. Fraternities Accident Order

Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action at law brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City by the appellant, the widow of Philip Weigand, of Baltimore City, against the appellee, a corporation conducting a fraternal beneficial insurance business for the benfit of. its members. It appears that the appellee on the 26th day of January, 1900, issued a certificate of membership to Philip Weigand ⁴⁵⁵ payable to the appellant as beneficiary, for a sum not exceed-ins three thousand dollars, in accordance with and under the provisions of the laws governing the order. Philip Weigand died on the 9th of June. 1900, and subsequently the appellant, the beneficiary, filed her clayn for benefits with the order, which was approved by the Grand Executive Committee for the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars.

The appellant declined to accept the amount as thus allowed, and on the 5th of December, 1901, instituted this suit to recover the sum of $3,000, the amount of the insurance stated in the policy. To the declaration, the defendant pleaded, first, never indebted as alleged; second, never promised as alleged, and third, a special plea. The first and second pleas were withdrawn and a demurrer was interposed to the third, and as this plea contains the defense relied upon by the company and presents the material question in the case it will be set out here. The plea is in effect, as stated by the appellee in his brief, as follows : 1st.

The appellee is a social and beneficial order having a lodge system and conducting itself for the sole benefit of its members with no attempt at profit making. .Its funds are raised by mutual and voluntary assessments.and contributions. 2nd. The contract between the appellant’s hu.%band and the appellee is embodied in his application for membership, the certificate of membership and the laws of the defendant order, the latter of which are declared to be binding upon the applicant and his beneficiary. 3rd. Under said laws the Grand Executive Committee of the order was required to pass upon and decide whether payment should be made of the claim of the appellant. 4th. That under section 32 of the laws of the appellee any beneficiary who considers the decision of said Grand Executive Committee against him in respect to a claim for benefits is unjust and not in accordance with the order, is required to appeal in the following manner, that is “from the decision of the Grand Executive Committee to the Grand Council within sixty days after the decision is rendered.” ⁴⁵⁶ 5th.

The appellee made application for the payment to her of benefits in the amount of three thousand dollars ($3,000). The Grand Executive Committee, acting-upon the application, came to a decision (upon the evidence offered to prove that the deceased died by such accidental means as was within the intent and meaning of the laws of the order) that, under the law.s of the order, the appellant was entitled to one hundred and fifty dollars ($150) and no more. 6th. The decision of the Grand Executive Committee was immediately-made known to-the appellant, and she was further notified that if she was not satisfied with the-decision she should appeal as prescribed in section 32 of the laws of the order. The appellee refused-to appeal, which, in effect, was a refusal to exhaust her remedies before the .tribunals of the defendant order.” The demurrer to this plea was overruled and judgment being entered for the plaintiff for the amount awarded, the plaintiff has appealed, The