Wells v. Price

Melvin, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In these proceedings the State’s Attorney of Baltimore City, in his official capacity, is seeking the aid of a court of equity to restrain the Warden of the Baltimore City jail from releasing prisoners in conformity with the State-wide law, rather than with the local law, pertaining to the maximum period of confinement for the nonpayment of fines and costs. The former is Chapter 479 of the Acts of 1943, codified as Section 4, Article 38 of the Annotated Code of Maryland 1943 Supp., prescribing three mónths as the maximum period, and the latter is Section 533 of the City Charter (1938 Ed.), prescribing six months. According to the record, the issue would affect the cases of about one thousand prisoners during the course of a year, depending upon the applicability of the general or the local law to the subject of their release.

The case was presented to the Chancellor on bill of complaint, answer and testimony, and resulted in an “Order” dismissing the bill, without an accompanying memorandum or opinion stating the grounds therefor. The State’s Attorney’s appeal to this Court is encouraged by the City Solicitor, the appellee’s legal advisor, ⁴⁴⁶ whose attitude on this point is thus expressed in his answer to the bill of complaint: “The respondent welcomes the filing of the bill of complaint; submits himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, and joins with the complainant in requesting an adjudication which may be appropriately reviewed by the highest court of the State so that the law may be made certain.” This is likewise the reason given in appellee’s brief for not questioning the right of the State’s Attorney to bring this suit, or of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to entertain it. In the language of the brief: “The ordinary conduct of the Baltimore City jail requires an authoritative adjudication of the principal question raised by the case, namely, whether the Act of 1943 or the Charter provision prevails. The appellee trusts that the Court will see fit, in its opinion, to settle this case regardless of technical procedural questions.” However, these two questions are seriously raised on this appeal in the brief filed by a member of the Baltimore Bar, as amicus curiae, and must be considered by the Court, for they present the main difficulties in the case.

For the reasons hereinafter stated, the members of this Court are unanimously of the opinion that the provisions of the Baltimore City Charter, rather than of the State statute, should govern the decision here, provided these jurisdictional difficulties can be overcome. First, what right has the State’s Attorney to bring this kind of a suit? While it has been expressly decided by this Court that he possesses no other powers than those prescribed by the Constitution or by statute (Hawkins v. State, 81 Md. 306, 310 , 32 A. 278 ), nowhere are these powers enumerated or defined. All that the Constitution says on the subject is that “The State’s Attorney shall perform such duties * * * as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by law.” Const., Art. 5, Sec. 9.

An examination of the statutes shows no mention at all of either the powers or the duties of this official, nor is there any precedent laid down by this Court by way of interpretation of his rights, powers or duties in a case ⁴⁴⁷ of this nature. The law is silent as to his authority to appear on behalf of the State and commence, prosecute or defend a cause in which the State, as a body politic, has a special interest, as in the case at bar. The allegations of the bill of complaint are, in substance, that the release of prisoners under the State-wide statute, instead of the Baltimore City Charter, would amount to a continuing violation of law, would be contrary to public interest, and could only be remedied through an injunction restraining the Warden from following the wrong statute. These allegations are not disputed by the answer to the bill of complaint, the sole issue on the pleadings being the construction of statutes, and the only testimony in the record is that of the Warden himself.

The pertinent parts of his testimony are: that he has been connected with the Baltimore City jail for nineteen years and has held the position of Warden for nine years; that he is familiar with the administrative practice concerning the discharge of prisoners committed there in default of fines and costs during that time; that up to the present controversy “the Baltimore City jail has always followed Section 533 of the Baltimore City Charter”; that if the State’s Attorney had not taken the present action in Court the jail would have been following the public general law of 1943 (this to conform to a recent ruling of one of the Judges of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City in the habeas corpus case mentioned in the bill of complaint, — Poehlman) ; that according to the City Solicitor’s advice, in view of the present Court proceedings the jail is continuing to operate under Section 533 of the City Charter, except in specific cases where the Judge would order otherwise; that in the course of a year more than one thousand prisoners would be affected by the difference between the operations under the one or the other of the two conflicting statutes. The witness’ testimony concludes with these sentences: “That there have been questions raised as to which of the Acts controls prior to the passage of the Act of 1943. ⁴⁴⁸ It has been raised in four or five proceedings, cases of habeas corpus since the last ten years, and in each case the Judge ruled that Section 533 of the Baltimore City Charter prevailed.” In this connection the record also contains a reference to a letter dated November 17, 1943, from an Assistant City Solicitor to the Warden (appellee), advising that “no legislation was passed at the 1943 session of the General Assembly which would affect.the provisions of the Baltimore City Charter.” The present controversy, therefore, results directly from the ruling to the contrary in the habeas corpus, case of Poehlman, above mentioned, rendered in the Baltimore City Court on February 11, 1944. The aforegoing is substantially the case as it comes before this Court. Not only is the authority of the State’s Attorney to bring this suit unquestioned by the parties to it but, because of their concurrence in the procedure for testing the point in controversy, they have offered no authority or precedent in law on any jurisdictional question.

The only authorities mentioned in the brief of amicus curiae on his point of “May a Maryland State’s Attorney, as such, institute a proceeding of this character”, are neither relevant nor helpful here. The first authority cited is Hawkins v. State, 81 Md. 306 , 32 A. 278 . That case went no further in this connection than to decide, in effect, that a State’s Attorney has no authority to institute proceedings in the nature of a quo warranto to oust an incumbent from a public office, and that he possesses no other powers than those prescribed by the Constitution or by statute, without pretending to define them. The other authority cited is that of Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375, 385 , which has nothing to do at all with the office of State’s Attorney.

The mention of the Attorney General in the opinion is simply to the effect that the bringing of that particular suit (injunction to restrain the collection of taxes under an unconstitutional ordinance) did not come within the duties of the Attorney General and that he was not a necessary party to it. ⁴⁴⁹ In brief, no authority has been cited, nor has any been found, that would deny the State’s Attorney the right to initiate this kind of a proceeding in the discharge of his official duties. If the issue be not raised by him it would necessarly, under the facts and circumstances prevailing here, have to remain unsettled, — at least, until the next session of the General Assembly — and a situation would result in which hundreds of prisoners would be released every year contrary to the law. To permit such a situation to continue without allowing the State the right to even challenge it would amount to a confession of complete impotency in the administration of our system of criminal law which the Court does not feel justified in making. Inherent in the office of State’s Attorney are certain obligations to the public and to the criminal court which the incumbent is as fully bound to discharge as he is to perform his routine duties as prosecutor.

He not only represents the State in the realm of law enforcement, but is also in a very special sense an officer of the court in which he serves, so that in this dual capacity he has, impliedly, both the right and the duty to help give effect to the law and the judgments under it as pronounced by the Court. His obligations as a public official representing these two related interests, — the State and the Court, — are not to be considered as fulfilled in a given case when the trial of it comes to an end and the defendant is sentenced. The sentence remains to be carried out, and carried out, moreover, in accordance with the particular law for such a case made and provided. If the public functionary to whose charge the defendant is committed (in the instant case the warden of the Baltimore City jail) should for any reason not follow this law but should mistakenly follow another, under which not only a particular prisoner would be prematurely released but hundreds of others likewise during the course of a year, the judgment of the court, as well as the operation of the applicable statute, would be thwarted.

That is precisely ⁴⁵⁰ the situation which confronted the appellant here, and as above indicated, it was both his right and his duty to take action to prevent this miscarriage of the law, especially as under our judicial system there is no one else in a position to do so. Whether or not the particular form of action adopted for raising the main issue is an appropriate one, presents the next jurisdictional question, namely: Is this a case for the granting of relief in equity? Here, again, no authority or precedent has been cited by either of the parties to this suit, for they concurred in the matter of procedure and in asking this Court to review and determine the point in controversy; “regardless of technical procedural questions.” Moreover, the authorities on this point cited in the brief of amicus curiae are in no respect decisive of the issue here. In pursuing the inquiry as to the Court’s jurisdiction in the premises it is of first importance to keep in mind the distinction between the term “jurisdiction” in its strict meaning, i.e., the power of the Court to hear and determine a cause, and as generally used in equity jurisprudence, i.e., the exercise of this power in a particular case.

As stated by Judge Offutt in Fook’s Ex’rs v Ghingher, 172 Md. 612 , at page 621, 192 A. 782 , at page 786: “The term ‘jurisdiction’, as used in defining the powers of courts of equity, has a different and narrower meaning than that ordinarily given to it, because of the peculiar nature of those courts and its use in contradistinction to ‘jurisdiction’ in general and ‘common law’ jurisdiction in particular. Pomeroy Equity Jr., Sec. 129, Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 228-230 , 28 Am.Rep. 129 .” See, also, 30 C. J. S., Equity, Sec. 9, p. 327. A.s further stated in Pomeroy Eq. Jur., Sec. 129: “The proceedings and judgment of a court of chancery, or of a court clothed with equity powers, are not necessarily null and void because the action is not one which comes within the scope of ‘equity jurisdiction’ in the common acceptation of that phrase, or, in other words, because the claim is one for which there is a full, ade ⁴⁵¹ quate and complete remedy at law * * *.

At the same time, if a court clothed with equity jurisdiction should hear and decide according to equitable methods a case which did not fall within the scope of the equity jurisprudence, because both the primary right invaded constituting the cause of action and the remedy granted were wholly legal, and belonging properly to the domain of the law courts, such judgment, however erroneous it might be and liable to reversal, would not necessarily be null and void. On the contrary, as will be more fully stated hereafter, the objection that the cause does not come within this so-called equity jurisdiction must ordinarily be definitely raised by the defendant at the commencement of the proceeding, or else it will be regarded as waived and the judgment will not even be erroneous.” Fooks’ Ex’rs v. Ghingher, supra. Therefore, while it is of primary importance in passing upon this case to consider the definition of terms and the distinction between them, it is apparent from the record that the Chancellor was fully justified, under the circumstances, in entertaining jurisdiction of it. Not only was this jurisdiction unchallenged at any stage of the proceedings before him, but the circumstances and exigencies of the case combined to support the exercise of his discretion to hear and determine the cause.

This position is further strengthened by a consideration of the consequences involved in granting or withholding equitable relief here. The general rule of law on this phase of the case is thus expressed by Mr. Justice Stone in Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n, 296 U.S. 64 , 80 L.Ed. 47 , 53: “While the consequences of the court’s grant of equitable relief cannot affect its power, they nevertheless have an important bearing on the exercise of the judicial discretion which must guide a court of equity in determining whether it should grant or withhold a remedy which it is within its power to give. Its discretion may properly be influenced by considerations of the public interests involved.” ⁴⁵² Viewing the consequences of granting or withholding equitable relief in the instant case, and giving due consideration • to the public interests involved, it is obvious that, on this ground alone the Chancellor had sound reason for entertaining jurisdiction.

The bill of complaint here is not dealing with the cases of any particular individuals, but is directed solely to preventing the release from day to day of an undeterminable number of prisoners, amounting in the course of a year to something like a wholesale jail delivery, and due directly to the illegal procedure of a public functionary acting under mistaken legal advice. That equity will interpose by injunction to arrest such a course is indicated in the case of Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Porter, 18 Md. 284, 302 , 79 Am.Dec. 686, in which further citation of authorities is given. Even the absence of precedent in this particular kind of a case would be no bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of equity and to the award of relief, for equity principles are broad and comprehensive and their application is not to be denied merely because of a new subject. McDougall v. Huntingdon, etc., Co., 294 Pa. 108 , 143 A. 574 .

Or, as stated in Briscoe v. O’Connor, 115 N.J.Eq. 360, 170 A. 884 : “Mere absence of precedent does not preclude equity court from granting relief required by circumstances.” This is in accordance with the maxim that “equity suffers no right to be without a remedy,” and is supported by the authorities generally. McGee v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal. 2d 390 , 57 P. 2d 925, 927 ; Rice v. Van Vranken, 132 Misc. 82 , 229 N.Y.S. 32, 37, 38 , affirmed 225 App.Div. 179 , 232 N.Y.S. 506 , affirmed 255 N.Y. 541 , 175 N.E. 304 ; Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379 , 31 P. 2d 971 ; Norman, Inc., v. Holman, 105 Colo. 294 , 97 P. 2d 739 ; Teachers’ Retirement Fund Ass’n of School Dist. No. 1, Multnomah County v. Pirie, 150 Or. 435 , 48 P. 2d 105 ; 30 C.J.S., Equity, Sec. 12, pages 331, 332. ⁴⁵³ Still further support for the exercise of jurisdiction in this kind of a case is to be found in the application of the principle that equity will act to prevent multiplicity of litigation. Pomeroy Eq.

Jur. (5th Ed.), Vol. 1, 462. “In fact”, states this eminent authority, “the ‘multiplicity of suits’ which is to be prevented constitutes the very inadequacy of legal methods and remedies which calls the concurrent jurisdiction into being under such circumstances, and authorizes it to adjudicate upon purely legal rights, and confer purely legal reliefs. On the other hand, the prevention of a multiplicity of suits is the occasion for the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction. The multiplicity of suits to be avoided, which are generally actions at law, shows that the legal remedies are inadequate, and cannot meet the ends of justice, and therefore, a court of equity interferes, and although the primary rights and interests of the parties are legal in their nature, it takes cognizance of them, and awards some specific equitable remedy, which gives, perhaps in one proceeding, more substantial relief than could be obtained in numerous actions at law.

This is the true theory of the doctrine in its application to the two jurisdictions.” While individual cases arising out of the factual situation before us might well be dealt with through habeas corpus proceedings, such procedure could go no further than to determine the rights of each relator or petitioner, thus not only giving rise to a multiplicity of suits, but, at the same time, leaving the main legal problem unsettled and the public interests unserved and unprotected. In such a situation the exercise of equity jurisdiction is fully justified, for in no other way could this relief be afforded. It is apparent, therefore, that in so far as the jurisdictional issues in the case at bar are concerned, there is no ground for dismissing the bill of complaint. This brings us to the substantive issue in the case, the decision of which by this Court is the avowed object of both parties in joining in the present appeal.

The ⁴⁵⁴ issue is whether or not Section 533 of the Baltimore City Charter, prescribing six months as the maximum period of imprisonment for the nonpayment of fines and costs, was repealed by Chapter 479 of the Acts of 1943, prescribing three months as the maximum period. While the Chancellor did not file an opinion or memorandum with his order dismissing the bill of complaint, it is to be assumed that he adopted the views expressed by the trial judge in the Poehlman habeas corpus case, and whose opinion is set forth as an exhibit in the record before us. The conclusion there was that the repeal in question was accomplished and that, consequently, the charter provision is no longer operative. With this conclusion we cannot agree, for it is unsupported by both the common-law rule that a local statute shall not be held repealed except-by clearly indicated purpose on the part of the legislature (Alexander v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 53 Md. 100, 104 ; State v. Falkenham, 73 Md. 463 , 21 A. 370 ); and by the fundamental rule of statutory construction that, in determining the legislative intent, the presumption