Wells v. Turner

Tuck, J., delivered the opinion of this court. In cases like the present tile court of final resort should not express any opinion upon the facts, further than may be necessary to determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to warrant the conclusions of law asserted in the prayers, because, if the record be remanded for another trial, remarks by us upon the testimony might have weight with the jury, who aloue are competent to pass upon questions of fact. The action was instituted by the appellants against the appellee, to recover for work, labor and materials in and about the repairs of a steamboat. The correctness of the account is not denied by the defendant, but he insists that there was an association or partnership of persons in the steamboat; that he had no other relation to it than as being one of these persons, and that the plaintiffs were also partners, quite as active and participating as largely in getting up the enterprize for keeping open the harbor of Baltimore, as was the defendant himself.

From this alleged relation it is contended that the' plaintiffs cannot sue the defendant at law for work done for the benefit of the association, or to advance its interests. The propositions of law and fact, therefore, in the court below, resolved themselves into the question, whether the work ¹⁴² was done on the credit of the defendant, or on that of the association, at that lime in progress of being formed, and for whose use, as it is said, the boat was undergoing alterations and repairs. If Turner purchased the boat, and had her altered and repaired in the expectation of selling her to, or of having her employed by, the association mentioned by the witnesses, he ought to pay, whether she was so employed or not; but if the work was done upon an agreement, or understanding, between him and the plaintiffs, that the association was to pay, or that the plaintiffs should look to the association for payment, then the defendant is not liable in this action. The correctness of the rulings below must be tested by the application of these principles to the prayers offered by the parties.

The evidence is so contradictory, or we should rather say, that so much was said, written and done, during the time covered by the transactions detailed in the record, that the jury might have found one or the other of the theories asserted by the parties, according to the views they might have taken of the testimony, the credit to be attached to the witnesses, and the circumstances and motives under which these transactions took place. Each party had the right to call on ■the court for instructions, based on his view of the case, if ..the. evidence relied on was legally sufficient to warrant the conclusion sought to be deduced from it. If an illustration be needed, we may state the familiar distinction between a collateral and an original undertaking, where it is sought to .charge one person for the price of goods sold and delivered to .another, there being no writing to bind the party. The plaintiff may ask the court to say to the jury that they must find for him, if they believe, from all the evidence, that credit was given to the defendant, and so the defendant may claim the verdict if the jury find that credit was given to the party receiving the goods.

As we have said, the question .in this case was, to whom ;was the credit given, and if, as we think, the prayer of the plaintiffs placed their hypothesis of the testimony0fairly before the jury it ought to have been granted, and if granted with ¹⁴³ a proviso qualifying the instruction to the prejudice of the' party tendering the prayer, they have cause of appeal. It left the jury to find whether the repairs and