Wheaton Dodge City, Inc. v. Baltes

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. A Montgomery County circuit court jury found that Michael Baltes had been damaged by $2500 from a ¹³⁰ fraudulent misrepresentation by Wheaton Dodge City, Inc. that a used van sold to him was new. Appealing here, Wheaton contends that there was insufficient evidence to show misrepresentation because Baltes had failed to prove one or more of the elements of actionable fraud in such cases, as indicated in Thomassen Lincoln-Merc. v. Goldbaum, 45 Md. App. 297 (1980). Appellant errs in argument, however, in each of the four issues it raises by failing to distinguish the difference between evidentiary sufficiency and evidentiary weight.

The former determination is whether there is any evidence, even inferential, from which a rational mind could conclude the desired result; the latter is a matter of persuading the rational mind to reach a desired result. In the case before us, Mr. Baltes bought a van from Wheaton which abundant evidence indicated was represented as new. It had, however, been previously purchased by a Mr. Burroughs who had air conditioning added, assumed possession and temporary registration, drove it over 50 miles (which were not registered on a defective odometer), returned it for numerous repairs pursuant to the warranty book given him, then rescinded the sale. Mr. Baltes, who subsequently sought to purchase a new van from appellant, was sold the rejected Burroughs’ van as new.

Appellant first claims that the statutory definition of a new vehicle in Md. Trans. Code Ann. § 11-138 — " 'New vehicle’ means a vehicle: (1) The owner of which is a manufacturer, distributor, or licensed dealer, and (2) That never has been used to destroy its newness or to convert it into or make it a used or secondhand vehicle, as these terms are commonly used or understood in trade or business.” — mandates a holding that the van was new because of the "plethora of testimony presented at the trial of the instant case that the statute is the only definition relied upon by experts in the automotive retails [sic] sales and service field.” But appellant overlooks the simple fact that what is ¹³¹ "commonly used or understood in trade or business” depends upon the evidence produced, and that evidence may be believed, disbelieved, or weighed in the balance by a jury. Here, it is apparent that the jury simply did not believe appellant’s "plethora” of testimony. Appellant’s next argument on the issue of new or not new seems to rely somehow upon the value of the van when purchased by Baltes vis-a-vis its value when sold to Burroughs.

"The sales contracts for the two transactions show that the Burroughs sales price before taxes and tags was $5,962.86. The Baltes sales price was $7,978.45. However, Burroughs did not have a trade-in vehicle, as did Baltes, which, according to Mr. Cash, meant that the deal was negotiated on a cash basis with no trade. That negotiation was made on discount only.

Baltes, on the other hand, had a trade allowance of his 1975 Pontiac Grand Prix. According to Mr. Cash a trade allowance is a combination of the trade itself plus the discount. Those two figures added together represent the total trade allowance. In this case Baltes’ trade-in car was actually valued at $2,900.00 but he was given an additional discount of $1,849.55, making a total trade in allowance of $4,749.55 on a car actually worth $2,900.00.

After Wheaton Dodge paid off the lien on the Grand Prix, the net allowance on the trade-in was $3,530.81 leaving a cash due of $4,898.06, less the $10.00 deposit Baltes paid. Therefore, in actuality, Baltes paid less than Burroughs for the van if the trade-in allowance is factored into the total sales price.” Although we fail to see the relevance of that argument, we cannot help but comment that our reaction is that Baltes was charged $2,000 more for the used van than Burroughs ¹³² had been charged before it was used, however the figures are juggled. This transaction may well have been placed by the jury in the credibility balance of the testimony by appellant’s salesmen-agents (who professed no knowledge of the Burroughs’ circumstances), and included among the circumstances from which it inferred an intent to