White v. Workers' Compensation Commission

ALPERT, J. Christina White, appellant, is an employee of appellee, the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission (“WCC”). On February 6, 2003, White was suspended without pay for five days. She appealed the suspension on the ground that the appointing authority, WCC Chairman Thomas O’Reilly, did not impose the suspension within five (5) work days following the close of her last shift after acquiring knowledge of the misconduct for which she was suspended, as required by Md.Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. (“SPP”) § 11 — 106(c)(1).

On June 20, 2003, Administrative Law Judge Eleanor Wilkin ⁴⁸⁵ son (“ALJ”) rescinded White’s suspension, finding that her suspension was untimely. WCC filed a petition for judicial review seeking reversal of the ALJ’s decision to rescind White’s suspension. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversed the decision of the ALJ and this appeal followed. The sole issue presented for our consideration is whether the ALJ’s decision to rescind White’s suspension was supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.

Finding that it was, we shall reverse the decision of the circuit court. Factual Background The basic facts of this case are not in dispute. At all times relevant to this appeal, White was employed as an Assistant Commissioner II with the WCC. On November 19, 2002, she testified at a hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) regarding the duties of some of her co-workers.

Subsequently, on January 14, 2003, at a staff meeting called by an administrator, Judith Johnston, White made some comments that led Johnston to question whether White had given truthful testimony at the November 19th meeting at the OAH. On January 14, 2003, Johnston informed Chairman O’Reilly, both verbally and in a written memorandum, that White’s statements at the meeting were contrary to her sworn testimony at the OAH. In response to the information received from Johnston, O’Reilly “immediately ordered the transcript” of the OAH hearing. He received that transcript on January 31, 2003.

After reviewing the transcript, O’Reilly concluded that White had not told the truth when she testified before the OAH. O’Reilly met with White on February 4, 2003, to discuss the matter of her testimony at OAH and her statements at the meeting of January 14th. Two days later, O’Reilly informed White that she was to be suspended without pay for five days, from February 7-13, 2003. In a Notice of Disciplinary Action ⁴⁸⁶ dated February 6, 2003, White was advised that she had violated the following provisions of COMAR: 17.04.05.04(B)(3)(being guilty of conduct that has brought, or if publicized, would bring the State into disrepute); 17.04.05.04(B)(8)(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentations, or illegality); and, 17.04.05.04(B)(10)(willfully making a false official statement or report).

The Notice of Disciplinary Action also advised White that the date of the incident prompting her suspension was January 14, 2003. On appeal, the ALJ found that O’Reilly acquired knowledge of White’s misconduct on January 14, 2003, and that the close of White’s next shift was on January 15, 2003. The ALJ concluded that in order for White’s suspension to be timely imposed pursuant to SPP § 11 — 106(c)(1), it would have had to have been imposed by the close of business on January 23, 2003. Since the suspension was not imposed until February 6th, the ALJ concluded that White’s suspension was not imposed in a timely manner and must be rescinded.

Appellee filed a petition for judicial review with the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which reversed the ALJ’s decision. This timely appeal followed. Standard of Review In reviewing a contested case decision made by an administrative agency, our role “ ‘is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised on an erroneous conclusion of law.’ ” Adventist Healthcare Midatlantic, Inc. v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 350 Md. 104, 120 , 711 A.2d 158 (1998)(quoting United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577 , 650 A.2d 226 (1994)). In Adventist Healthcare Midatlantic, Inc., the Court noted: “This standard of review is both narrow and expansive.

It is narrow to the extent that reviewing courts, out of defer ⁴⁸⁷ ence to agency expertise, are required to affirm an agency’s findings of fact, as well as its application of law to those facts, if reasonably supported by the administrative record, viewed as a whole. The standard is equally broad to the extent that reviewing courts are under no constraint to affirm an agency decision premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Id. (quoting Insurance Com’r for the State v. Engelman, 345 Md. 402, 411 , 692 A.2d 474 (1997) (citations omitted)). When we review an administrative decision, “we perform precisely the same role as the circuit court.” Ocean City Police Department v. Marshall, 158 Md.App. 115, 121 , 854 A.2d 299 (2004)(and cases cited therein).

We look only at the decision of the agency, and not that of the circuit court. Id. Ordinarily, we are constrained to affirm the agency decision only for the reasons given by the agency, but where a pure question of law is involved, we may substitute our judgment for that of the administrative agency. Id.

The case sub judice presents an issue of statutory construction. In Smack v. Dep’t. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298 , 835 A.2d 1175 (2003), the Court of Appeals reviewed the well settled and oft repeated canons of statutory construction: The predominant goal of statutory construction “is to ascertain and implement, to the extent possible, the legislative intent.” We begin the interpretive analysis with the words of the statute and, when they are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to search further. “[WJe look first to the words of the statute, on the tacit theory that the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.” In that regard, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, “not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense.” Moreover, statutes are to be interpreted so that no portion is rendered superfluous or nugatory. Words may not be added to, or removed from, an unambiguous statute in order to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature chose to use, “[n]or ⁴⁸⁸ [may we] engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.” When the statute is ambiguous — the words do not clearly disclose the legislative intention or, while clear and unambiguous viewed in isolation, the terms are ambiguous when it is part of a larger statutory scheme, we look for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other sources extraneous to the statute itself, as well “as the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws ... its general purpose, and the ‘relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.’ ” We pointed out in Witte [v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525 , 801 A.2d 160 (2002)] that “[o]ne aspect of examining these indicia is the presumption, which itself is a rule of construction, that the Legislature ‘intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law,’ such that no part of the statute is rendered meaningless and nugatory.” In that regard, where the statute to be construed is a part of an entire statutory scheme, construction of the provisions of the scheme must be done in the context of that