Whitfield v. State

Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Murphy, C. J., and Smith, J., concur in part and dissent in part. Murphy, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part at page 144 infra, in which Smith, J., concurs. We granted certiorari in this case to address what has been described as “probably the most difficult and frequently raised question in the wake of Miranda — what constitutes the ‘in custody interrogation’ or ‘custodial questioning’ which must be preceded by the Miranda warnings.” 1 Specifically, we are asked to decide: (1) whether, in the absence of Miranda admonitions, statements elicited from the petitioner, a prison inmate, during interrogations conducted by jail officials, in the circumstances present here, could properly be admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution of the inmate? and (2) •yvhether a belief by prison officials that a gun was hidden within the jail, creates an emergency which excuses a failure to give Miranda warnings and permits .the use of statements obtained from the questioned inmate in a criminal prosecution against him?

Because we conclude that the inquiry occurred in the type of custodial setting condemned by the Supreme ¹²⁷ Court in Miranda, and since we can find no exception to its requirements in emergencies such as the one that existed here, we vacate petitioner’s conviction and grant him a new trial. / The events which give rise to this appeal took place in the early part of July 1976. At that time, Nigel Little, 2 a cadet guard at the Baltimore City jail, surreptitiously delivered a handgun to petitioner Conrad Whitfield, who apparently intended to use the weapon to escape from the prison. The petitioner’s plans were thwarted, however, when Thomas Brown, a fellow resident at the jail, revealed to his attorney, Marshall Stewart, Esquire, that he had information concerning the presence of a pistol in the Baltimore City jail and wished to speak with someone about it. The attorney, who incidentally also represented Whitfield on unrelated criminal matters, told the authorities about this conversation, and the police relayed the information to the warden of the jail.

Upon learning of the gun’s presence within the jail walls and that Whitfield was somehow connected with it, 3 correctional officers Major Howard Parks, Captain Calvin Young and Lieutenant William Britton set out “to locate Mr. Whitfield [, who apparently was permitted to move unescorted around portions of the jail,] and confront him with the information.” Shortly after beginning their search, the three officers located the petitioner as he was alighting from a prison elevator with some fellow inmates. Without explanation, Whitfield was directed to accompany Officers Young and Britton to the isolation wing of the jail. Once inside the secluded confines of this area, which at the time was unoccupied by others, the officers immediately confronted ¹²⁸ petitioner with the fact that they knew “that he was in possession of a weapon within the institution.” Captain Young testified that no Miranda warnings were given to Whitfield prior to or during his interrogation. The captain justified this failure by stating that his “immediate objective” was “[t]o obtain the weapon and get it out of the institution”; consequently, the witness explained that he approached Whitfield in the following manner: “as if you emphatically know that they are guilty of a said situation ... [so that] the shock of your presenting it to them immediately will get a positive response.” When asked about the gun, Whitfield at first denied having any knowledge concerning it.

Britton and Young persevered with “that line of questioning for a few minutes,” but petitioner continued to insist that he did not know what they were talking about. Finally, Lt. Britton told [Whitfield] that Cadet Little and some police officers from the Baltimore City Police Department were in the Deputy Warden’s office and knew everything about the handgun being in the institution and it would be best for all concerned if he would turn the gun in and prevent anybody from getting hurt. 4 Whitfield responded to that statement by admitting knowledge of the weapon and told the officers “that he would have to retrieve the gun from a given area of the institution, and that he would have to go by himself to retrieve [it].” Permission was granted Whitfield to fetch the gun, and upon returning five to ten minutes later to the isolation wing he handed the weapon to Britton and Young. With the pistol safely in hand, Lt.

Britton escorted the petitioner to Major Park’s office for further questioning. There, the lieutenant offered Whitfield a cup of coffee, and, even though the full Miranda warnings were again not given to him, petitioner was informed that “he could contact his ¹²⁹ attorney.” The prisoner used the phone and apparently attempted to call Mr. Stewart, but was informed that at the time the attorney was not in his office. However, almost immediately after completing the phone call, and prior to any additional questioning, a Mr. Claus, Mr. Stewart’s office assistant, arrived at Major Park’s office. In Mr. Claus’s presence, the officer questioned petitioner concerning both the already recovered gun and the alleged escape plan.

During the ensuing five to ten minutes, Whitfield verbally “laid everything out, ... what was supposed to have transpired.” Subsequently he was indicted for a handgun violation, Md. Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 36B (b), and for conspiracy to escape, id. at § 139 (a). A pretrial hearing was held in the Criminal Court of Baltimore where, among other things, petitioner moved to suppress both oral statements made because of the failure of the jail authorities to comply with the dictates of Miranda. The court (Allen, J.) did not determine whether the statements sought to be suppressed were improperly elicited during a “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda, for in its view, “it would be stretching it a great deal if we required prison officials acting in a very dire emergency to accord to prisoners under their care the rights guaranteed by the Miranda case.” When subsequently he was convicted of the handgun and conspiracy charges, Whitfield appealed this ruling to the Court of Special Appeals.

That court affirmed the trial court’s decision because it agreed that the emergency facing the prison officials here excused compliance with Miranda's dictates. Whitfield v. State, 42 Md. App. 107, 125-28 , 400 A.2d 772, 783-85 (1979). In an attempt to accommodate its decision to the confines of Miranda, the court reasoned that: The questioning of Whitfield was not an interrogation, looking toward prosecution, but an on-the-scene investigation for a deadly weapon which presented a threat to the security of the jail----[A] fair reading of the record discloses that the correctional officers were preoccupied more so with the recovery of the gun, whether there were ¹³⁰ other guns inside the jail, and the details of the escape attempt, than with the apprehension and punishment of Whitfield. [Id. at 128, 400 A.2d at 784 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).] We disagree. II In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held: [W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.

Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.

But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. [Id. at 478-79.] These principles stemmed from the Supreme Court’s basic concern that the “compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings” may endanger an individual’s fifth ¹³¹ amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 457-58 . See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345-46 , 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 , 96 S. Ct. 1612 (1976); Mills v. State, 278 Md. 262, 267 , 363 A.2d 491, 494 (1976); Myers v. State, 3 Md. App. 534, 537 , 240 A.2d 288, 291 (1968) . See also Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S. Car.

L. Rev. 699, 700 (1974). While the warnings designed to overcome that danger are only “prophylactic rules” rather than constitutional dictates, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 , 41 L. Ed. 2d 182 , 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974), the purpose underlying these rules should nevertheless be kept in mind when applying Miranda to any given set of circumstances. In this regard, we observe that statements which are obtained from a defendant during questioning conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings, as concededly occurred here, need only be excluded from evidence if they “flow from a ‘custodial interrogation’ within the meaning of Miranda.” Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 374 , 402 A.2d 900, 903 (1979). Such interrogation is defined by the Supreme Court as any “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted).

This has been held by that Court to include “questioning which takes place in a prison setting during a suspect’s term of imprisonment on a separate offense, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 381 , 88 S. Ct. 1503 (1968), and to questioning taking place in a suspect’s home, after he had been arrested and is no longer free to go where he pleases, Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 311 , 89 S. Ct. 1095 (1969) .” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 , 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 , 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) (per curiam). In contrast to custodial inquiry is “the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime ... [to conduct] [g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process,” which does not require the use of the Miranda safeguards. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at ¹³² 477 . An on-the-scene investigation is normally envisioned as encompassing a general exploration into suspicious circumstances in order to determine if a crime has been committed; or as encompassing a probe into known crime which lacks an identifiable suspect.

See, e.g., United States v. Wiggins, 509 F.2d 454, 459-60 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Sadler, 458 F.2d 906, 908 (10th Cir. 1972); State v. Frizzell, 207 Kan. 393 , 485 P.2d 160, 163-64 (1971); Lederer, Miranda v. Arizona — The Law Today, 78 Mil. L. Rev. 107 , 135-36 (1978). See generally Annot., What Constitutes “Custodial Interrogation” Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect be Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation, 31 A.L.R.3d 565 § 3 (1970 & 1979 Supp.) (citing cases). As is often the case, the parties here have characterized the questioning of Whitfield as falling within one or the other of these mutually exclusive categories.

Thus, our primary task today is to determine whether the questioning of petitioner by officers Britton and Young was a “custodial interrogation.” However, prior to addressing this issue, we need to consider the State’s contention that Miranda is inapplicable to emergencies such as existed at the time of the questioning in the Baltimore City jail, for if this is so, then it will be unnecessary for us to delineate the type of interrogation that then occurred. Relying on dicta in Hunt v. State, 2 Md. App. 443, 447 , 234 A.2d 785, 787-88 (1967), as well as a handful of decisions from other jurisdictions, People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal. 2d 814 , 423 P.2d 800 , 56 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1967); State v. Archible, 25 N.C. App. 95, 212 S.E.2d 44 (1975); State v. Abbott, 21 Utah 2d 307 , 445 P.2d 142 (1968); State v. Persinger, 72 Wash. 2d 561 , 433 P.2d 867 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968); State v. LaRue, 19 Wash. App. 841 , 578 P.2d 66 (1978), the Court of Special Appeals, in upholding the trial court’s ruling, determined that compliance with Miranda by prison authorities is excused by the emergency erupting from the “unusual explosive circumstances” of a gun in the possession of an inmate.

Whitfield v. State, supra, 42 Md. App. at 126-28 , 400 A.2d at 783-85 . We find, however, that we cannot agree with this ¹³³ reasoning because to do so would allow the exigency needs of institutional security, although at the time permissible in resolving the emergency, to be later used so as to deprive a person of his constitutional rights in the course of providing a fair trial when that emergency no longer existed. We begin our discussion of why we reach this conclusion by noting that the United States Supreme Court itself has not placed any per se limitation on where and when the Miranda safeguards should be applied. In fact, they specifically expressed just the opposite position when explaining the need for such protections: Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any. significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. [Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).] Nor do we find the cases relied on by the intermediate appellate court persuasive in resolving the issue we now confront.

While these decisions do contain broad dicta to the effect that a threat to the security of a prison justifies non-compliance with Miranda and the subsequent use of any statements obtained in prosecuting their author, these holdings were based on the fact that the inmate-defendants in the situations present in those cases were not “in custody” or had not been “interrogated.” 5 See People v. Sanchez, ¹³⁴ supra, 423 P.2d at 806 (pre-Miranda decision; guard called to scene of stabbing and asked crowd of inmates “who did this and why” — held not “in custody” and no process of interrogation had yet been undertaken); State v. Archible, supra, 212 S.E.2d at 46 (questioning of guard; noncustodial inquiry into suspected criminal activity; freedom of movement not restricted since defendant was allowed to leave place of questioning); State v. Persinger, supra, 433 P.2d at 868 (defendant found on roof of prison asked why he didn’t follow other escaping inmate, purely “conversational inquiry,” product of “spontaneous, human curiosity”); State v. LaRue, supra, 578 P.2d at 69 (questioning not during accusatory stage). Additionally, these cases, as did Hunt v. State, supra, turned to a degree on an inappropriate interpretation of Miranda — that whether interrogation is proscribed under Miranda depends on the reason why the questions were asked — one rejected by the Supreme Court in a later case. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 381 , 88 S. Ct. 1503 (1968). For a fuller discussion, see Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is “Interrogation”?

When Does it Matter?, 67 Geo. L.J. 1 , 9 (1978). While it has often been stated that “as a general matter, lawful detention or imprisonment ‘necessarily makes unavailable [to an inmate] many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen,’ ” Thomas v. State, 285 Md. 458, 463 , 404 A.2d 257, 260 (1979) (quoting from Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 , 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 , 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974)), the only ¹³⁵ constitutional rights of an inmate which this Court, or the United States Supreme Court, has held to “be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment” are those protected by either the first or fourth amendments. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, supra, 285 Md. at 463, 468, 404 A.2d at 260,263 (prison security justified warrantless search); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-47, 550-59 , 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 472-74, 476-81 , 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1877-78, 1880-84 (1979) (restrictions on incoming publications reasonable under 1st amendment; searches of inmate living quarters reasonable under 4th amendment); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129-32 , 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 , 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977) (1st amendment not violated by restrictions on prisoner solicitations). 6 The limitations as to these rights of prisoners are based on the longstanding legal and historical interpretation of such guarantees: the first amendment right of free speech is subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. at 552 ; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-16 , 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 , 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972); and the protection of the fourth amendment results only when a person can claim a reasonable expectation of privacy that has been invaded by the government, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 226 , 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979); Thomas v. State, supra.

Limitations similar to these have never been imposed on the fifth and sixth amendment rights of citizens. Moreover, in the past, the Supreme Court has drawn distinctions between the fourth amendment rights of individuals and the guarantees contained in the fifth and sixth amendments, holding that the former may be more easily waived than the latter because [tjhere is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment____The protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth ¹³⁶ at a criminal trial. [Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241-42 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973).] Thus, the fifth amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination, being different in nature from other constitutionally established individual liberties, should not, in our opinion, be diminished by the needs of penal administration to the extent that such statements may be utilized in a criminal prosecution. At the suppression hearing in the trial court in this case, the State asserted that its position was not that the exigencies of prison life justified the extraction of incriminating information from inmates; rather, it urged that the appropriate test to be employed in determining if it may be used in the criminal prosecution was whether the statement had been voluntarily made, and not whether there was technical adherence to the warning requirements of Miranda . This argument, however, ignores one of the chief underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s rationale for requiring the warnings — statements made during an in-custody interrogation are inherently untrustworthy and “[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion ..., no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.” Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 457-58 .

See State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 36 , 375 A.2d 1105, 1108, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) (‘Miranda impressed procedural safeguards on the traditional test of voluntariness”). Finally, the State attempts to justify an extension of the balance struck in Thomas v. State, supra, to interrogations by contending that if it was required to inform an inmate, such as Whitfield in the circumstances here, that he had a right to remain silent and consult with an attorney, then their ability to adequately maintain the safety and security of the jail would be greatly hampered. While there is probably some validity to the State’s assertion that in some situations they would not receive the necessary information, we find it is unpersuasive. Implicit in their argument is the assumption that criminal prosecution of an inmate, following the end of ¹³⁷ the emergency, is also imperative to maintain prison security.

While we recognize that prison security may be enhanced through prosecution of those who attempt to penetrate it, this objective cannot be allowed to destroy the constitutional protections designed to ensure a fair trial. If the State feels that the emergency before it requires the use of the psychological techniques of persuasion employed here in order to obtain immediate information, then it may do so, but at the cost of foregoing the affirmative use of this information at a subsequent criminal trial. While this result to some may seem harsh, we believe it is necessary if we are to protect the fifth amendment rights of prisoners. Moreover, the choice which confronts the State here is no different from that which it makes when granting immunity — letting one individual go unprosecuted in order to obtain evidence to prosecute another individual or to accomplish some other societal benefit.

This analysis is similar to that followed by many of our sister states in attempting to accommodate the constitutional rights of prisoners and the law enforcement interests of the state when the facts of a case constitute both a violation of prison rules and a crime, i.e., permitting the State to discipline the inmate and also criminally prosecute him, while fully protecting his right to defend himself at the disciplinary hearing and yet maintain his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496 , 341 A.2d 629 (1975) (excellent discussion of the many court decisions around the country, as well as the issues involved in cases of this type). See generally Turner and Daniel, Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma of Prison Discipline and Intramural Crime, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 759 (1972). Thus, we hold that Miranda applies to prison inmates to the same extent that it does to all other citizens.

Having reached this conclusion, we now turn to the question of whether Whitfield was subjected to custodial interrogation within the meaning of that Supreme Court decision. Ill A determination of whether custodial questioning has occurred requires, in the first instance, a finding that the ¹³⁸ defendant was in “custody,” as that term is defined in the Miranda opinion. This is by far the most litigated aspect of Miranda , and an issue on which the Supreme Court has provided little guidance. Compare Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at 494-95 (parolee questioned at police station not in custody because he was free to leave) and Beckwith v. United States, supra, 425 U.S. at 347 (suspect in tax fraud investigation questioned at a private home where he occasionally stayed was not in custody) with Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 311 , 89 S. Ct. 1095 (1969) (suspect questioned in his bedroom was under arrest, not free to leave, and thus in custody) and Mathis v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at 4-5 (suspect questioned about tax fraud while imprisoned on another charge was in custody).

Petitioner contends, however, that one of these decisions — Mathis, supra — is dispositive on the issue of his custody within the meaning of Miranda , but, as we view Whitfield’s situation, it is unnecessary to so characterize the Mathis holding. In Mathis , the defendant was questioned by an agent of the Internal Revenue Service while he was in state prison serving a sentence on an unrelated matter, and his statements, made without receiving the Miranda warnings, were subsequently admitted against him in a criminal tax prosecution. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that (1) “custody” under Miranda was not dependent on the reason why the person questioned was in custody, and (2) the warnings are required to be given even if the interrogation that was conducted lacks prosecutorial intent at the time. Id. at 4-5.

Petitioner argues that a fair reading of Mathis requires a reversal of his conviction because, in his view, it stands for the proposition that being incarcerated, in and of itself, is sufficient restraint to require the Miranda warnings whenever any questions are asked of an inmate. Later decisions by the Supreme Court seem to support this interpretation, for when they discuss Mathis and the custody concept, the Court states that it “squarely grounded its holding on the custodial aspects of the situation,” i.e., being in prison. Beckwith v. United States, supra, 425 U.S. at 347 . ¹³⁹ See Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at 494 . While a few courts have been willing to interpret Mathis in this broad fashion — that prison