Whitmire v. State

WEANT, Judge. On 23 March 1984, a Prince George’s County jury convicted the appellant, Ronald Jerome Whitmire, of burglary and theft of goods worth less than $300. The court sentenced Whitmire to a ten-year term of imprisonment for the burglary and two years, concurrent, for the theft. Distressed with his lot, Whitmire appeals.

In this case we must decide whether physical evidence was properly admitted on the ground that it would ultimately or inevitably have been discovered, notwithstanding a possible violation of the appellant’s constitutional rights. Our consideration embraces the following facts. As Joseph Dove entered his apartment on the evening of 3 December 1980, he saw an unfamiliar person leaving apartment 203 directly below. Apparently realizing that he ⁵⁵¹ had been observed, the individual ducked back inside the apartment.

Dove rushed to the balcony of his own apartment and watched the intruder leap over the lower floor balcony to a spot near a white, late-model car. Dove jotted down the license plate number and telephoned the police. That body immediately issued a radio bulletin advising that a breaking and entering was in progress at 2309 Olsen Street; it described the getaway car. Minutes later Officer Eugene Howard stopped a vehicle corresponding to that description near Olsen Street.

After a backup unit arrived, Howard ordered the driver and passenger (appellant) out of the conveyance. Directing them to place their hands on the car roof, Howard “patted” both men down. He felt a hard cylindrical object in one of appellant’s trouser pockets that was subsequently discovered to be a roll of dimes. A rosary and assorted papers were removed from appellant’s remaining pockets.

Checking the vehicle for weapons, officers discovered a pewter disk, screwdrivers and flashlight under the front seat. The police detained both occupants until Dove arrived and identified appellant as the man he had seen entering and leaving the downstairs apartment. Both men were arrested and charged. The items recovered from the appellant were identified by the resident of apartment 203, Ms. Johnson, as her possessions.

Prior to trial Whitmire sought to have the evidence recovered from his person suppressed as fruits of an illegal search. He argued that the seizure of the articles could not be justified as the product of a search incident to arrest because he had not been formally arrested until after the search when Dove identified him. Whitmire does not contest Officer Howard’s right to stop the vehicle or detain and question its occupants. If he had, the Supreme Court’s recent decision authorizing police to make a Terry 1 stop where they have a “reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was ⁵⁵² involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony,” would preclude any challenge on this ground.

United States v. Hensley, — U.S. —, —, 105 S.Ct. 675, 681 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (emphasis added). The fact that Officer Howard relied on a radio bulletin in making the stop would not alter the result. Id. at---, 105 S.Ct. at 680-82 . On the facts of the case sub judice, the police had more than enough information to support the reasonable suspicion necessary to permit an investigatory stop.

Neither does the appellant contend that the officer was not entitled to conduct a limited search for weapons. Terry, supra. He maintains, however, that, after the frisk, the officer conducted a general exploratory search for evidence rather than a limited search for weapons. In explaining his rationale for seizing the