Wiggins v. State

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr. (Ret.), Specially Assigned, Judge. The specter of the dread disease AIDS 1 hovered over the trial of Bernard Wiggins in a criminal cause before a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The trial judge refused to exorcise it. The jury convicted Wiggins of felony murder (life imprisonment); robbery with a deadly weapon (20 years consecutive); and felony theft (merged into the murder conviction).

Wiggins claims that the menacing spirit denied him a fair trial. He seeks a new trial free of that prejudice. I The tragedy played in this case is peopled with homosexuals and lesbians. Wiggins, a homosexual, Juan Demetrious Gough, a homosexual, and Jacquelyn M. Cooper, a lesbian, lived together in an apartment in the District of Columbia.

In a pub on the night of the murder, Bjorn Haug solicited Cooper, thinking she was a male. She suggested that he meet Wiggins. Haug went with Cooper and Wiggins to their ménage á trois. Gough and his lover, one Eric Jennifer, were there.

Wiggins and Haug went into Wiggins’ bedroom. Wiggins was heard to say that he “was going to knock the guy off and take the car...." There was a loud crash and Gough saw Haug in the bedroom “knocked out” and “bloody." Wiggins, Gough, Jennifer, and Cooper carried Haug to his car and put him in the trunk. After driving around for a time (Wiggins was at the wheel), they ²³⁶ heard thumping from the trunk. Wiggins pulled over to a vacant lot in Prince George’s County, Maryland, and let Haug out of thé trunk.

At Wiggins’ repeated urging Gough and Cooper tried without much success to beat Haug with sticks. They returned to the car. Gough saw Wiggins “swing down” at Haug. Leaving Haug, Gough, Cooper, and Jennifer went to Haug’s apartment and removed a number of items.

Subsequently, Haug was found on the lot. He was dead. A length of pipe was imbedded in his face. 2 II When Wiggins’ case came on for trial in November 1987, he was escorted into the courtroom by guards wearing rubber gloves. The jury was present.

At a bench conference there was the following colloquy: THE COURT: For the purposes of the record, I was informed this morning that there is a strong possibility or probability — I don’t really know because nobody knows— that there is a question as to whether or not the defendant has the disease called AIDS. I have given the clerk of the court and the sheriff of this court the authority to wear gloves. I also do not intend to jeopardize the safety of any jurors in this case and, accordingly, the exhibits in this case will not be handled by the jury. Now, after that put on the record anything you want to put on.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I would object to the defendant being brought into the courtroom by the sheriffs in gloves. The sheriffs on previous occasions have brought him into the courtroom without the benefit of gloves or any other procedures to protect themselves. ²³⁷ I appreciate the concern of the Court. However, if there was a concern whatsoever in terms of this particular individual being in a courtroom, then it would have been more appropriate, I believe, to check with the Detention Center to determine whether or not he had been tested for AIDS and to determine whether or not he in fact has been diagnosed as having AIDS. The judge asked the State’s Attorney to “put on the record what you know about this man’s medical condition.” The State’s Attorney replied: Your Honor, what the State knows is that, one, the victim [Haug] has been diagnosed as having AIDS by the Medical Examiner.

Two, one of the codefendants Juan Gough has also been diagnosed as at least carrying the virus. He doesn't have the actual disease yet but has been diagnosed as carrying whatever they call the virus. As far as the defendant is concerned, it is my understanding that he had been hospitalized recently for at least a week. But the State’s Attorney did not know “the status of his condition as to whether or not he has AIDS____” The State’s Attorney explained “the hospital doesn’t give our office that information so I am unable to confirm it.” The judge said: “Fine.

It is all on the record. Let’s go.” The trial proceeded. The second day of the trial, Wiggins was brought into the courtroom before the jury was seated. But the guards, dressed in their rubber gloves, took their position immediately behind Wiggins.

There was another conference at the bench. Defense counsel said: Your Honor, at yesterday’s proceeding I objected to the procedure of the deputies bringing the defendant in wearing gloves. Today we have eliminated that to a certain extent in that the defendant was brought in prior to the jury being brought in. However, the deputies are still wearing gloves.

I would object to the procedure of the deputies wearing gloves in the courtroom seated behind the defendant as a ²³⁸ result of any inferences that they may draw concerning him and any thoughts that they may have in that regard. I would alert the Court that I have reviewed some of the law, and I believe that it may be a basis for a motion for a mistrial, which I would make at this time, if the Court does not direct that the deputies after they have brought him in do not remove their gloves to avoid any adverse effects on the defendant’s rights. The judge was adamant: I have no intention of ever removing their gloves, and, therefore, your motion for a mistrial is denied. At a motion for a new trial tendered after the verdicts were entered, defense counsel brought up the matter again.

After discussing other reasons requiring a new trial, he said: Additionally, I think if you couple with that the matter of Mr. Wiggins being paraded back and forth in front of the jury with the deputies wearing gloves, I believe that procedure in and of itself was so inherently prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial in this case. That coupled with the co-defendant testimony was that resulted in a conviction in this particular case. For those reasons, I believe that Mr. Wiggins is entitled to a new trial. The judge simply said: “All right.

That’s denied.” The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the trial judge erred in his denial of the objection to the wearing of rubber gloves by the guards in the presence of the jury. Wiggins v. State, 76 Md.App. 188, 198-199 , 544 A.2d 8 (1988). The court reached that conclusion on the basis that the wearing of gloves was unnecessary for the well-being of the guards. It asserted: “The wearing of gloves by courtroom security personnel is wholly inconsistent with the current theories concerning AIDS transmission.” Id. at 198 , 544 A.2d 8 . 3 We agree that the trial judge erred, but ²³⁹ we see no need at this time to enter the debate as to how AIDS is transmitted.

We follow a different route than did the Court of Special Appeals in concluding that the judge erred. The general rule, well settled in Maryland, is that “the conduct of a criminal trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge____” Hunt v. State, 312 Md. 494, 506 , 540 A.2d 1125 (1988). Accord, Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 31 , 537 A.2d 612 , cert. denied, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 90 , 102 L.Ed.2d 66 (1988); Smith v. State, 299 Md. 158, 179 , 472 A.2d 988 (1984); Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431, 451 , 404 A.2d 244 (1979), and cases therein cited. The discretion of a trial court in the overall direction of the trial ranges far but it is not infinite.

Its reach stops when it is abused, and then the reviewing court will disturb it, as the cases above cited make clear. Even though the trial judge “ 'runs the court,’ the right of an accused to a fair trial, although not a perfect trial is paramount.” Crawford v. State, 285 Md. at 451 , 404 A.2d 244 . The Supreme Court said in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976): The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment____ The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. Long ago this Court stated: “The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Coffin ²⁴⁰ v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 [ 15 S.Ct. 394, 402 , 39 L.Ed. 481 ] (1895).

To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. 425 U.S. at 503 , 96 S.Ct. at 1692 (citations omitted). If the exercise of discretion results in the denial of a fair trial to a defendant, the discretion is certainly abused. When the trial judge here in the exercise of his discretion authorized the guards to wear gloves, he did not “really know because nobody knows” whether Wiggins had AIDS.

The judge acted on an unidentified source of information that there was “a strong possibility or probability” that Wiggins had the disease. As far as the record shows, the judge made no effort to ascertain the true status of Wiggins’ health except to ask the State’s Attorney. When the State’s Attorney said that he did not know, the judge was satisfied. It seems that the judge proceeded on the assumption that since Haug had AIDS and since Gough carried the virus, Wiggins either had the disease or carried the virus.

We believe that this was not enough to justify the judge’s action. It was at the least premature. Without sufficient justification and over Wiggins’ persistent and vehement protests, the judge forced Wiggins into a compromising position before those who were to decide his fate. In the circumstances the judge abused his discretion. 4 ²⁴¹ The question is whether the error tainted the trial.

The Court of Special Appeals was “not persuaded that the trial judge’s cautious actions require reversal.” 76 Md.App. at 199 , 544 A.2d 8 . It pointed out that the inferences claimed by Wiggins — that he had AIDS or the HIY virus, that he was a homosexual, and that he was an intravenous drug user — were in fact prejudicial was “not supported by any evidence in the record.” Id. The court observed that during the voir dire there was no response from the jury when the judge informed the jury that “[t]his case has touches of homosexuality in it,” and asked: ‘Would that prejudice any member of the jury so that they could not fairly and impartially decide the case based solely on the evidence they are going to hear in this courtroom? If that applies to anybody, come up and tell me about it here.’ Id.

The intermediate court also noted that there was evidence adduced that Wiggins and Haug went to the apartment to have sexual relations and that Wiggins, Cooper, Jennifer, and Gough were drug users. Id. at 199-200 , 544 A.2d 8 . The court concluded that the error was harmless. Id. at 200 , 544 A.2d 8 .

We do not agree. The rationale of the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion skirts the issue. The reason the trial court authorized the wearing of gloves by the guards was not because Wiggins was a homosexual or a drug addict. The reason was the possibility that he had AIDS or was infected with the virus.

It would be too much to assume that the jury’s curiosity was not aroused upon seeing the guards wearing rubber gloves in this particular case and that the members of the jury were so unsophisticated that they did not know of the existence of AIDS and the dire consequences of the disease. This is not to say, however, that a representative juror would be aware of the opinions of the experts and the results of the studies by ²⁴² various committees and task forces which promoted the view that AIDS is not passed by casual, nonsexual contact. See note 2, supra. Or, indeed, if the juror was aware of that view that he subscribed to it.

Despite the experts and the studies, a climate of fear still surrounds the disease. An editorial on AIDS appeared in The Capital, a daily newspaper published in Annapolis, Maryland, under date of 17 February 1989. It noted that there had been 51 victims of AIDS, “a disease with no cure,” in Anne Arundel County. The most recent victim was a baby whose mother passed along the virus.

Id., p. A10. Statewide, the editorial declared, almost 1,500 people have died from the disease. Although most people have progressed beyond the days when creating AIDS leper colonies was seriously discussed, a panicked public is uncertain about how tough laws should be on HIV virus patients. The public doesn’t know whether to trust AIDS activists who say laws that crack down too hard on AIDS patients will drive them underground, spreading the disease faster.

Id. The editorial called for legislation which “balane[ed] individual rights with the health, safety and welfare of society.” Id. The Baltimore Sun of 17 February 1989, § D, pp. 1-2, under the by-line of Jonathan Bor, reported that two beauty salons agreed to serve clients with AIDS virus only after a two-year battle engaged in by the Maryland Human Relations Commission. The woman involved, according to the paper, said that the ruling “may not change attitudes toward the disease but will at least give infected individuals some legal ammunition if they are faced with discrimination.” Id.

The attitude of the general public is usually recognized by its representatives in the General Assembly. The feelings of the general public regarding AIDS is reflected in the array of bills — 28 as of 16 February 1989, that have been filed with both houses of the Maryland legislature ²⁴³ “aimed at preventing the spread of AIDS and protecting people at risk of contracting the disease through their jobs.” The Baltimore Sun, § F, pp. 1 and 5, 16 February 1989 by Jonathan Bor. At a public hearing on the bills, AIDS patients recounted their difficulties finding doctors to treat them. “With anger and tears, a bevy of corrections officers [at the same hearing] urged state lawmakers” to approve effective legislation that would require inmates to be tested for antibodies for AIDS virus in certain situations. Id.

A Maryland Correction Commissioner cited “a recent study by the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions showing that about 7 percent of inmates at the Maryland Penitentiary are infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes AIDS. Some 70 percent of the state’s inmates, he said, have histories of drug use — and most of them injected drags intravenously, an activity that places them at high risk for HIV infection.” Id. Legislation is being sought to require that school children be instructed concerning prevention against AIDS. District of Columbia public health officials plan an AIDS educational campaign that features posters, one of which declaims: “AIDS.

IT CAN HAPPEN TO ANYBODY.” The Washington Post of 22 February 1989, § B, pp. 1 and 8. The news media has given extensive national coverage about the movie star who died from AIDS. His lover sued his estate claiming that “the late actor had concealed that he was suffering from the deadly disease.” The Washington Post of 20 February 1989, § D, pp. 1 and 11 in an article entitled “AIDS ANXIETY: The Message in the Hudson Verdict,” by Carla Hall. The jury awarded $21.75 million in compensatory and punitive damages.

Ms. Hall observed that “[l]egal observers speculated that it was a measure of the public fear of AIDS” that the jury awarded a sum of that magnitude. A West Coast attorney who had litigated cases involving sexually transmitted diseases was quoted as “astounded.” He thought “the magnitude could be seen as demonstrating how much the jury empathized with [the lover’s] anxiety about getting AIDS.” Id. See the “Stay ²⁴⁴ ing Ahead” column in The Baltimore Sun of 20 February-1989, § C, p. 19 by Jane Bryant Quinn. The column noted: “AIDS, or the fear of it, may raise the price you pay for life insurance.

The industry’s dread of this disease is touching people with other kinds of illnesses.” See also the article in The Baltimore Sunday Sun of 19 February 1989, § F, pp. 1 and 6, by Gail Caldwell of the Boston Globe, headed “Taking on Taboos.” The article discusses a book by Susan Sontag entitled “AIDS and its Metaphors,” the premise of which is “to demystify and destigmatize” the illness, without minimizing its horrific effects. Id. All of the above gives clear indication that in the public mind AIDS has yet to be demystified or destigmatized. AIDS prevails in a climate of fear.

We believe that the jury, viewing the officers guarding Wiggins, would not be without curiosity as to the guards’ protective attire. We think that it is not improbable that the jury would assume, in light of the widespread and continuous publicity devoted to AIDS, that Wiggins was infected with the disease. We are of the opinion that the wearing of the gloves, without a sound basis shown for doing so, undermined the fairness of the fact-finding process and diluted the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. The witnesses to the events leading to the murder and the murder itself were by no means exemplary citizens.

They were active participants in the crimes but had struck a plea bargain. Their background was the same as that of Wiggins — sexual deviants and drug abusers. We are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the wearing of gloves by the guards, which placed before the jury an unexplained factor irrelevant and extraneous to the issue of Wiggins’ guilt or innocence, did not contribute to the guilty verdicts. For the error here to be harmless we must be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that it may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdicts.

Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976). We are not so satisfied in the circumstances here. It is not a ²⁴⁵ big step in logical inference, considering the contemporary climate, from seeing the guards protected in their contact with the defendant to the thought that he might have AIDS. The error was not cured by the voir dire question.

It is a far cry from not being prejudiced because the case “has touches of homosexuality in it,” and not being prejudiced because the defendant may have AIDS. Inquiry with respect to the latter was not made. The reason why the guards wore gloves in this particular case was left to the speculation of the jury. Regardless of the credence the jury gave the testimony of the witnesses, or how it weighed the evidence, it is not far-fetched that the jury, observing the gloves, thought it better, in any event, that Wiggins be withdrawn from public circulation and confined in an institution with others of his ilk. 5 Ill Wiggins also claims he is entitled to a new trial because he was denied his right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed him by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

After Wiggins, Gough, Cooper, and Jennifer left the body of Haug on the lot, they went to Haug’s apartment and ransacked it. They took the stolen articles to the apartment shared by Wiggins, Gough, and Cooper. The morning after ²⁴⁶ the murder, Haug’s employer telephoned the maintenance supervisor of