Wilkins v. State

Murphy, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ³³⁶ The issue in this case is whether a person accused of committing a direct criminal contempt of court may be sentenced to a term in excess of six months’ imprisonment without having been afforded the opportunity for a jury trial. I Appellant was charged in the Criminal Court of Baltimore with rape and related crimes. Prior to the commencement of trial on December 8, 1980, the appellant sought an in-court identification proceeding, out of the jury’s presence, to determine whether the victim could identify him. The court granted appellant’s request and arranged to have approximately twelve young males seated in the courtroom.

Appellant was permitted to position them as he wished, and to select his own seat. Thereafter the victim entered the courtroom. When asked whether she could identify her assailant, she walked to the place where appellant was seated and identified him. The jury was thereafter selected and the trial began.

At a bench conference, appellant told the trial judge that he wanted to be removed from the courtroom and that if he was not, he would disrupt the trial. The judge declined to remove appellant from the courtroom, advising him that if he was disruptive, he could be cited for contempt of court. Appellant ignored the judge’s warning. He began talking in what the trial judge later characterized as "loud and vociferous tones” and continued to do so throughout the prosecutor’s opening statement to the jury.

On the second day of the trial, appellant again announced his intention to disrupt the proceedings. He refused to take his seat at the trial table when ordered to do so by the trial judge. When the judge instructed the sheriffs and guards to seat appellant at the trial table, appellant physically resisted the sheriffs and jailguards in front of the bench. It required four to six persons to finally subdue the appellant and to seat him at the trial table.

When appellant continued his cursing and use of loud, abusive language, the trial judge called a recess for a confer ³³⁷ ence in chambers. At the conference, appellant renewed his request to be removed from the courtroom, which was again denied. When trial resumed, appellant once again began to struggle with the guards. He was wrestled to the floor and was informed that he would be removed from the courtroom but could return if he agreed to behave in an appropriate manner.

Appellant was then removed from the courtroom. Following the appellant’s removal, the victim gave her testimony. In appellant’s absence, she was unable to make an in-court identification. She did testify, however, as to her pretrial courtroom identification of appellant on the previous day.

Upon completion of her testimony, the appellant returned to the courtroom and engaged in no further disruptive behavior. At the conclusion of the trial, the court cited appellant for four acts of direct criminal contempt. It elected to try the case summarily, without a jury, and on December 10,1980 found appellant in contempt of court. On December 11, 1980, the jury acquitted the appellant of the criminal charges.

On September 25, 1981 — over nine months after appellant’s convictions for criminal contempt — the trial judge conducted a sentencing hearing. He stated that sentence had been delayed for a presentence report and because the case was one requiring extensive research prior to ultimate disposition. Appellant, who had been incarcerated since the contempt convictions, argued that since he had not been afforded the right to a jury trial, the maximum sentence permitted by law was six months. He argued that by delaying final disposition for more than nine months, the trial judge had, in effect, already exceeded that maximum sentence.

The court, taking a contrary view of the law, sentenced appellant to a total of sixteen years for the four contemptuous acts, with credit for time served while awaiting disposition of the case. An appeal was thereafter noted to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari prior to decision by that court to consider the important constitutional issue presented in the case. ³³⁸ II Prior to 1964, the firmly entrenched common law rule was that courts could try criminal contempt cases without a jury, regardless of the severity of the sentence actually imposed. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-87 , 78 S. Ct. 632 , 2 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1958).

United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 , 84 S. Ct. 984 , 12 L. Ed. 2d 23 (1964), and Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 , 86 S. Ct. 1523 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1966), signaled a shift from this common law tradition. In Barnett , the Court ruled that there was no constitutional right to a jury trial in all criminal contempt cases, but left undecided the issue of whether a severe punishment might trigger the right to a jury trial. In Cheff , the Court held that a six-month term of punishment for contempt of a federal court permitted treating the case as a prosecution for "a petty offense,” which under previous decisions did not require a jury trial. However, the Court further held that "sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver thereof.” 384 U.S. at 380 .

In Bloom v. Illinois,