Williams v. Mayor & City Council

⁶ MOYLAN, Judge. The appellants, Mary Williams, et al., 1 challenge two Orders of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City issued by Judge John C. Themelis and Judge Gary I. Strausberg, respectively, whereby 1) the appellants’ claim against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore was dismissed and 2) summary judgment was granted in favor of Baltimore City Police Officer Edward Colbert. On appeal, the appellants contend: 1. that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Officer Colbert based on its finding that Officer Colbert was entitled to qualified immunity; and 2. that the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore are subject to suit for the actions of Baltimore City police officers under the Local Government Tort Claims Act. The Factual Background The factual circumstances giving rise to this case are that as of July of 1995, eighteen-year-old Valerie Williams had been involved for approximately four years in an abusive relationship with Gerald Watkins.

On the morning of July 19, Mary Williams, the mother of Valerie Williams, was at work when she received a frantic telephone call from her daughter. Arriving home and finding that Valerie had again been beaten by Watkins, Mary Williams called 911. Officer Colbert responded. After arriving at the scene, Officer Colbert took statements from both Mary and Valerie Williams and was informed by both of a history of abuse suffered by Valerie at the hands of Watkins.' Even as Officer Colbert was interviewing Valerie, Watkins telephoned the house and spoke to both Valerie and to her mother.

At that point in the narrative, the parties’ versions of events diverge dramatically. Because we are reviewing the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in ⁷ favor of Officer Colbert, we shall recount only Mary Williams’s version of events, as we are required to view the facts, including all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party against whom the court granted the judgment, to wit, in the light most favorable to the appellants. According to the deposition of Mary Williams, Valerie informed her that in the course of Watkins’s first telephone conversation, he threatened to come back to the house. He called a second time and Mary Williams herself picked up the phone.

After learning that the caller was Watkins, Mary Williams briefly expressed her anger to him and then hung up the phone. By looking at the Caller I.D. box, she ascertained that he had called from the Alameda Liquor Store. She reported that fact to Officer Colbert, who dispatched a police car to that location. According to Mary Williams, Officer Colbert said to Valerie, “You stay here, I’ve got to call for a camera.” Mary Williams had a brief conversation with Officer Colbert about going to a neighboring house, that of the baby-sitter, so that she could pick up her grandson, Valerie’s son by Gerald Watkins.

With Officer Colbert’s approval, she went and picked up the baby and then returned to 622 Melville Avenue. When she got back to the house with the baby, she noticed that Officer Colbert was no longer there. Valerie informed her that the officer “went out to the car.” Mary Williams went out and spoke briefly to the officer, who was sitting in the police cruiser. After she said, “What’s next?,” he replied that he had to “write the report.” Mary Williams returned to the house.

A few minutes later, she glanced out the window and saw Watkins running up the front steps. At that same time, she noticed that Officer Colbert was no longer parked in front of the house. Watkins kicked open the door and shot both Valerie and Mary Williams before turning the gun on and killing himself. Valerie Williams was killed as a result of the gunshot wounds.

Mary Williams survived but is partially paralyzed. Myreq Williams, ⁸ Valerie’s infant son by Watkins, was also present but was not injured in the course of the shooting. The Procedural Background On November 6, 1996, the appellants filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against (1) the State of Maryland under the Maryland Tort Claims Act; (2) the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore under the Local Government Tort Claims Act; and (3) Officer Colbert. The Complaint specifically alleged that Article 27, § 11F and Baltimore City Police Department General Order 10-93 divested Officer Colbert of any discretion in carrying out his statutory duty to protect Valerie and Mary Williams and Myreq Watkins and mandated that he do so.

The Complaint also alleged that Officer Colbert, through his actions and his express promise of protection, had established a “special relationship” with the appellants that imposed upon him a duty of protection beyond that which he would ordinarily owe to citizens threatened by crime. On January 17, 1997, a hearing was held in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, at the conclusion of which Judge Themelis dismissed the Complaints against both the State of Maryland 2 and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, ruling that neither could be sued under the respective tort claims acts. On January 30, 1998, a hearing was held before Judge Strausberg on Officer Colbert’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On February 27, Judge Strausberg granted the motion, ruling that, as a matter of law, Officer Colbert was acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, at the time of the incident and was, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity as a government official.

Special Focus on Former Art. 27, § 11F The success or failure of the appellants’ claim against Officer Colbert will be controlled by our interpretation of the ⁹ intended scope of a law enacted by the Legislature as Chapter 307 of the Acts of 1979 and codified as of the date of the assault in this case as Article 27, § 11F. 3 As of July 19, 1995, the critical date for our purposes, § 11F provided, in pertinent part: (b) Assistance to victim. — (1) Any person who alleges to have been a victim of abuse and who believes there is a danger of serious and immediate injury to himself or herself may request the assistance of a local law enforcement agency. (2) A local law enforcement officer responding to the request for assistance shall: (i) Protect the complainant from harm when responding to the request; and (ii) Accompany the complainant to the family home so that the complainant may remove: 1. The personal clothing of the complainant and of any child in the care of the complainant; and 2. The personal effects of the complainant and of any child in the care of the complainant that are required for the immediate needs of the complainant or the child.

(c) Immunity of law enforcement officer from civil liability. —Any law enforcement officer responding to such a request shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-326 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. With respect to that immunity referred to in subsection (c), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-326, in turn, provided: 4 A law enforcement officer who responds to a request under Article 27, § 11F of the Code for assistance by an individual who alleges to have been a victim of spousal ¹⁰ assault shall be immune from civil liability in complying with the request if the law enforcement officer acts in good faith and in a reasonable manner. (Emphasis supplied). The appellants’ critical reliance on what was then § 11F is two-fold.

They claim first that that statutory provision imposes on a law enforcement officer responding to a domestic violence call a specific duty to protect a victim threatened with domestic violence above and beyond those duties ordinarily incumbent on a law enforcement officer responding to any other type of complaint or call for assistance. Intertwined with that first claim is the further subclaim that the statutory duty is so specific and so mandatory that the officer’s function is thereby transformed from one that is ordinarily of a “discretionary” character into a mechanistic and merely “ministerial” function, a transformation that would ipso facto divest the officer of his accustomed immunity as a governmental official. The second claim is that § 11F provides an officer responding to a domestic violence complaint with only a constricted immunity far less plenary than that enjoyed by law enforcement officers in performing other aspects of their duties. Ordinarily an officer, even if he be negligent in the performance of his duties, enjoys official immunity so long as he does not act maliciously.

The appellants argue that, because of § HF(c), Officer Colbert was divested of his ordinary government official immunity unless, in the special context of responding to a domestic violence call, he acted not only 1) non-maliciously but also 2) reasonably. Before turning attention to those two alleged exceptions to the ordinary rule, it behooves us briefly to set out the context of the ordinary rules themselves. We must ask ourselves initially what the result in this case would have been if, on July 19,1995, § 11F had not existed. Duty of Police Officers Generally Generally, police officers do not, as an aspect of tort law, owe a duty of individualized protection to any particular ¹¹ person.

The duty of protection, rather, applies to the public as a whole. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 626-27, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986); Holson v. State, 99 Md.App. 411, 414 , 637 A.2d 871 (1994); Jones v. Maryland Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 82 Md.App. 314, 325-26 , 571 A.2d 859 (1990). The appellate courts in Maryland have on several occasions addressed the duty police officers owe to the public, most frequently in the context of handling drunken drivers. Ashburn, 306 Md. 617 , 510 A.2d 1078 ; Holson, 99 Md.App. 411 , 637 A.2d 871 ; Jones, 82 Md.App. 314 , 571 A.2d 859 .

In Ashburn , the Court of Appeals recognized the general rule that, absent a “special relationship” between police and victim, liability for failure to protect an individual citizen against injury caused by another citizen does not lie against police officers. Rather, the “duty” owed by the police by virtue of their positions as officers is a duty to protect the public, and the breach of that duty is most properly actionable by the public in the form of criminal prosecution or administrative disposition. 306 Md. at 628-29 , 510 A.2d 1078 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). The risk involved in attempting to hold police officers privately responsible for the negligent performance of their public duties was clearly pointed out by the Court of Appeals in Ashburn, 306 Md. at 629-30 , 510 A.2d 1078 : “[I]f the police were held to a duty enforceable by each individual member of the public, then every complaint— whether real, imagined, or frivolous would raise the spectre of civil liability for failure to respond. Rather than exercise reasoned discretion and evaluate each particular allegation on its own merits the police may well be pressured to make hasty arrests solely to eliminate the threat of personal prosecution by the putative victim.

Such a result historically has been viewed, and rightly so, as untenable, unworkable and unwise.” ¹² (quoting Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1311 (D.C.1983) (citation omitted)). The Ashbum Court further noted that a policy which places a duty on a police officer to insure the safety of each member of the community would create an unnecessary burden on- the judicial system. Under such circumstances, the slightest error of a policeman would give rise to a potential law suit. Presently, the police officer is subject to disciplinary proceedings or criminal prosecution for any dereliction of duty, and these proceedings are better suited to review charges against the police officer for the breach of a duty which is his job, rather than his responsibility as a member of the public, imposes on him.

Moreover, as stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Morgan , while public prosecution does little to console those who suffer from the mistakes of police officials, on balance, the community is better served by a policy that both protects the exercise of law enforcement discretion and affords a means of review by those who, in supervisory roles, are best able to evaluate the conduct of their charges. 306 Md. at 630 , 510 A.2d 1078 (citations omitted). As a general proposition, Officer Colbert owed no special duty of protection enforceable in tort law to either Valerie or Mary Williams. Whether Officer Colbert by his words or actions in this case created a duty that otherwise would not have been his involves a distinct and fact-specific possible basis for finding a duty, which we will address infra. At the moment, we are simply establishing the framework for deciding whether § 11F itself statutorily and generically established an extraordinary duty of individualized protection in this special context that otherwise would not exist.

In the absence of § 11F, it is clear that there would have been no duty of particularized protection owed to either Valerie or Mary Williams. There could have been, therefore, no liability based on the allegedly negligent performance of a non-existent duty. As explained by this Court in Jones v. ¹³ Maryland Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 82 Md. App. at 320 , 571 A.2d 859 : Three basic elements are necessary to state a cause of action in negligence. First, the defendant must be under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury.

Second, the defendant must fail to discharge that duty. Third, the plaintiff must suffer actual loss or injury proximately resulting from that failure. (Emphasis supplied); see also Holson v. State, 99 Md.App. at 414 , 637 A.2d 871 ; Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236 , 492 A.2d 1297 (1985). Only after those three basic elements have been established can an individual be held liable in tort for his negligence.

In W.Va. Central R. Co. v. Fuller, 96 Md. 652, 666 , 54 A. 669 (1903), Judge McSherry stated for the Court of Appeals over ninety years ago: [Tjhere can be no negligence where there is no duty that is due; for negligence is the breach of some duty that one person owes to another. It is consequently relative and can have no existence apart from some duty expressly or impliedly imposed. In every instance before negligence can be predicated on a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which duty would have averted or avoided the injury....

As the duty owed varies with circumstances and with the relation to each other of the individuals concerned, so the alleged negligence varies, and the act complained of never amounts to negligence in law or in fact; if there has been no breach of duty. (Emphasis supplied). In Ashburn, 306 Md. at 627 , 510 A.2d 1078 , the Court of Appeals repeated that theme: Judge McSherry’s comments remain viable today: negligence is a breach of a duty owed to one, and absent that duty, there can be no negligence. “Duty” in negligence has been defined as “an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform ¹⁴ to a particular standard of conduct toward another.” Pros-ser and Keeton, supra, § 53. There is no set formula for this determination---- As one court suggested, there are a number of variables to be considered in determining if a duty exists to another, such as: the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied). In the absence of § 11F, Officer Colbert owed no special duty of protection to any of the appellants that could serve as the basis for a successful tort action against him. Our further inquiry, therefore, will be whether the enactment of § 11F requires a different result. Immunity of Police Officers Generally The second general context that must be established before we can decide whether § 11F created an extraordinary exception to the ordinary rule concerns the immunity from civil suit that is traditionally enjoyed by a law enforcement officer in the course of performing official duties.

We must ask ourselves what Officer Colbert’s immunity status would have been if, on July 19,1995, § 11F had not existed. The seminal opinion setting out the required elements that must be established for an individual to enjoy immunity from liability as a public official is that by Judge Digges for the Court of Appeals in James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 323-24 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980), superseded by Rule on other grounds, Prince George’s County v. Fitzhugh, 308 Md. 384 , 519 A.2d 1285 (1987): ¹⁵ Before a governmental representative in this State is relieved of liability for his negligent acts, it must be determined that the following independent factors simultaneously exist: (1) the individual actor, whose alleged negligent conduct is at issue, is a public official rather than a mere government employee or agent; and (2) his tortious conduct occurred while he was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts in furtherance of his official duties. Once it is established that the individual is a public official and the tort was committed while performing a duty which involves the exercise of discretion, a qualified immunity attaches; namely, in the absence of malice, the individual involved is free from liability. The rationale underlying this grant of immunity “is that a public purpose is served by protecting officials when they act in an exercise of their discretion.” (Emphasis in original; footnote and citations omitted).

See also Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 104 , 271 A.2d 547 (1970). And see the excellent discussion of public official immunity by Judge Eyler in Thomas v. Annapolis, 113 Md. App. 440, 450-57 , 688 A.2d 448 (1997). The Maryland case law establishes unequivocally that police officers in the course of their public duties are public officials within the contemplation of the qualified immunity law. Judge McWilliams stated in Robinson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 346-47, 278 A.2d 71 (1971): “In Maryland governmental immunity is extended to all non-malicious acts of public officials ... when acting in a discretionary ... capacity.” ...

It is clear that policemen are “public officials” and that when they are within the scope of their law enforcement function they are clearly acting in a discretionary capacity. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied). Chief Judge Murphy wrote to the same effect in Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 302-03 , 396 A.2d 255 (1979): ¹⁶ We have held that a police officer is a “public official” when acting within the scope of his law enforcement function. As a “public official,” a police officer is protected by a qualified immunity against civil liability for non-malicious acts performed within the scope of his authority.

It is clear from these authorities that a police officer, to enjoy immunity, must act without malice and within the scope of his law enforcement function. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied). In Clea v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 672 , 541 A.2d 1303 (1988), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that police officers are public officials: In Maryland, a limited category of governmental personnel, including police officers, are entitled under certain circumstances to qualified immunity from tort liability for their negligent conduct. (Emphasis supplied).

In Clea , a Baltimore City police officer, after he led a team of eight armed officers in an egregious forcible entry into the family home of innocent persons, was sued for negligently having caused the search warrant to be executed at the wrong address. Notwithstanding the acknowledgment by the Court of Appeals that the “mistake may have been the product of negligence,” 312 Md. at 679 , 541 A.2d 1303 , the opinion of Judge Eldridge held that the officer was nonetheless a public official performing a discretionary act and was, therefore, entitled to immunity so long as he had acted without malice: It is undisputed in this case that Officer Leonard was a public official and that his tortious conduct occurred while he was performing discretionary acts in furtherance of his official duties. It is further conceded by the plaintiffs that the non-constitutional torts here alleged are all ones falling within the scope of the immunity if Officer Leonard acted without malice. 312 Md. at 673 , 541 A.2d 1303 (emphasis supplied). If a police officer is performing a discretionary act in the course of his official duties, the only qualifying limitation ¹⁷ on his otherwise plenary immunity from a suit for negligence is that his actions or omissions must have been non-malicious.

As the Court of Appeals stated in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 622 , 510 A.2d 1078 (1986): Since Cocking [v. Wade, 87 Md. 529 , 40 A. 104 (1898) ], the rule which we have applied to tort claims against a governmental representative is that the actor will be relieved of liability for his non-malicio'us acts where: (1) he “is a public official rather than a mere government employee or agent; and (2) his tortious conduct occurred while he was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts in furtherance of his official duties.” (Emphasis in original). The Court then reaffirmed that a police officer “is a public official when acting within the scope of his law enforcement function.” Id. In Williams v. Prince George’s County, 112 Md.App. 526, 550, 685 A.2d 884 (1996), Judge Davis spoke for this Court in stating that the actions of law enforcement officers in the course of their duties are discretionary acts and that only a showing of malice will defeat an officer’s qualified immunity in the course of performing such acts: Unquestionably, the actions of police officers within the scope of their law enforcement function are quintessential discretionary acts. In the absence of any showing of malice, public officials acting within the scope of their official duties while performing discretionary functions are thus free from liability.

(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied). The principles undergirding the qualified immunity that normally shields a law enforcement officer in the performance of official duties were recently well summarized by Judge Adkins for this Court in Lovelace v. Anderson, 126 Md.App. 667, 692 , 730 A.2d 774 (1999): Unquestionably, a law enforcement officer is not a mere government employee; rather, the officer, under oath, holds a continuing public duty which calls for the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power of the State. Addition ¹⁸ ally, an officer who acts within the scope of employment is performing a discretionary act. Thus, a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified public official immunity.

That immunity for Maryland police officers, as well as other public officials, is codified at Md.Code (1974,1998 RepLVol.), § 5-511(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. This section provides: Immunity generally. —... an official of a governmental entity, while acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice and within the scope of the official’s authority is immune as an official or individual from civil liability for any act or omission. (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied). Judge Adkins not only set forth the operative principles of qualified immunity law, she also provided a clear statement of the salutary purpose served by insuring such immunity for law enforcement officers: A cause of action against a police officer grounded in negligence often results in the officer asserting a defense of qualified immunity.

The purpose of granting an official immunity is to limit the deleterious effects that the risks of civil liability would otherwise have on the operations of government. ... Conferring a qualified immunity upon a law enforcement officer allows the officer “the freedom to exercise fair judgment, protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” “Moreover, permitting unwarranted lawsuits against officers would entail substantial social costs including inhibition and fear of potential liability among peace officers and would further consume much of the officer’s time preventing him or her from performing his or her duties.” Thus, the goal of official immunity is to halt most civil liability actions, except those in which the official is clearly in violation of the law, well in advance of the submission of facts to a fact finder. 126 Md.App. at 689-90 , 730 A.2d 774 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). ¹⁹ When the affirmative conditions for qualified immunity-are satisfied, the only qualifier limiting such immunity is the presence of malice on the part of the officer. With respect to the quality of malice necessary to defeat immunity, Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md.App. 442, 480 , 497 A.2d 159 (1985) was clear: The actual malice needed to defeat official immunity requires “an act without legal justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and wilfully injure the plaintiff.” See also Lovelace v. Anderson, 126 Md.App. 667 , 730 A.2d 774, 788 (1999); Branch v. McGeeney, 123 Md.App. 330, 349 , 718 A.2d 631 (1998); Thomas v. Annapolis, 113 Md.App. 440, 454-57 , 688 A.2d 448 (1997); Williams v. Prince George’s County, 112 Md.App. 526, 550-51 , 685 A.2d 884 (1996); Davis v. DiPino, 99 Md.App. 282, 290-91 , 637 A.2d 475 (1994), rev’d on other grounds, 337 Md. 642 , 655 A.2d 401 (1995); Arrington v. Moore, 31 Md.App. 448, 464 , 358 A.2d 909 (1976). When Officer Colbert responded to the domestic violence call at 622 Melville Avenue on July 19,1995, he indisputably was a governmental official exercising a portion of the sovereign power of the State.

He indisputably was acting within the scope of his employment and, therefore, performing a discretionary act. There was, moreover, no remote suggestion that he was acting or failing to act with any sort of actual malice, with evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, or with the purpose deliberately and wilfully to injure the appellants. 5 ²⁰ In the absence of § 11F, therefore, Officer Colbért unquestionably would have enjoyed immunity from liability for any alleged negligence on his part. Our further inquiry, therefore, will be whether the enactment of § 11F requires a different result. The Inapplicability of Art. 27, § 11F To the Circumstances of this Case With respect to both 1) the allegedly expanded duty of Officer Colbert to provide continuing protection to Valerie Williams and 2) the alleged diminution of the qualified immunity enjoyed by Officer Colbert as a government official, we hold that the enactment of § 11F had no effect whatsoever.

As an examination of its legislative history readily reveals, § 11F deals with a very limited situation that was not at all involved in the present case. There was prior to 1979 a sensitive and potentially dangerous situation, not clearly covered by any preexisting law, wherein the victim of a “spousal assault” (now a “victim of abuse”) might need to request the assistance of a law enforcement officer. The “assistance” requested was for the officer to accompany the complainant to the “family home” in order to retrieve certain personal effects. Both the protection to be provided the complainant and the immunity to be provided the officer by the new law were in the course of “responding to ²¹ the request for assistance.” As originally enacted by Ch. 307 of the Acts of 1979, Art. 27, § 11F provided: (a) Any person who alleges to have been a victim of spousal assault and who believes there is a danger of serious and immediate injury to himself or herself may request the assistance of a local law enforcement agency.

A local law enforcement officer responding to the request for assistance shall: (1) Protect the complainant from harm when responding to the request; and (2) Accompany the complainant to the family home so that the complainant may remove his or her personal clothing and effects and also the personal clothing and effects of any children that may be in the care of the complainant. The personal effects to be removed shall be only those required for immediate needs. (b) Any law enforcement officer responding to such a request shall be immune from civil liability in complying with the request as long as the officer acts in good faith and in a reasonable manner. (Emphasis supplied).

Section 11F was obviously not a broad-scale attack on spousal abuse generally. Its exclusive concern was with implementing that one very particular “request for assistance.” We know precisely what the “request for assistance” is limited to, because subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) expressly direct what the officer shall do in “responding to the request for assistance.” Section 11F clearly dealt with a very narrow and limited situation. Between 1979 and July 19, 1995, the critical date for this case, only three changes had been made in § 11F, two of them inconsequential. There was a modest re-wording with respect to the “personal clothing” and “personal effects” which the “complainant,” accompanied by the “law enforcement officer,” might remove from “the family home.” There was, however, no change whatsoever in substance.

The second inconsequential change was that in 1979, § 11F expressly spelled out the ²² immunity provision, whereas by 1995 it simply made reference to § 5-326 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Substantively, however, the immunity provision remained unchanged. Between 1979 and 1995, however, there was one significant change with respect to the class of persons who were entitled to the assistance of the law enforcement officer. As originally enacted, the law only extended special assistance to a person who alleged that he Or she had been “a victim of spousál assault.” Ch. 728 of the Acts of 1994 broadened the class of persons entitled to assistance under § 11F.

That Act changed the subtitle of § 11F from “Spousal Assault” to “Domestic Violence.” The Act broadened the class of those entitled to assistance from “victim[s] of spousal assault” to “victim[s] of abuse.” A “victim” was, in turn, defined as a “person eligible for relief’ under § 4-501(h) of the Family Law Article. By virtue of that change, Valerie Williams came within the ambit of persons entitled to police assistance in retrieving personal effects from “the family home.” Prior to the change, she would not have been so entitled, for she was not and never had been the legal spouse of Gerald Watkins. Her entitlement to such assistance under the post-1994 expanded coverage was only by virtue of the fact that she was, as of July 19, 1995, “an individual who [had had] a child in common with” Gerald Watkins. Family Law Article, § 4-501(h)(6).

As we turn our attention to the situational applicability of § 11F to the events of July 19, 1995, we note that both 1) the provision requiring that the officer “protect the complainant from harm when responding to the request” and 2) the provision conferring immunity from civil liability on an “officer responding to such a request” are substantively the same today as they were when the law was originally enacted to cover cases of “spousal assault.” It was in that context of spousal assault that what became § 11F was enacted to deal with a particular situation not clearly covered, if covered at all, by existing law. ²³ What was, in Holmes’s words, the “felt necessity of the time” to which § 11F was the response? In the context of spousal abuse, two closely related situations were particularly perplexing with respect to both 1) the responsibility of the police to take some action and 2) the authority of the police to take action. Those situations were: 1) where the fighting spouses were still inside the family home but where someone had called for assistance and 2) where one of the spouses had thrown the other out of the family home and where re-entry by the expelled spouse was desired but fraught with potential peril. An officer, of course, could always make a warrantless arrest for a crime, assaultive or otherwise, committed in his presence.

Beyond that, however, the police authority to intervene in a family fight was highly problematic. Once the violence had actually subsided, the aggrieved spouse, out on the street or otherwise, was generally left with no recourse but to go to District Court and to apply for a warrant of arrest. The police officer was powerless to help. The sponsors and other supporters of what became Ch. 307 of the Acts