Williams v. McCardell

Markell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for mandamus commanding respondents, the Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement System, to approve petitioner’s application for accidental disability benefits from December 11, 1948. In 1927 petitioner, then twenty-five years old, entered the Baltimore City Fire Department. In 1938 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant.

On December 11, 1948 he was retired by the Department as totally and permanently unfit for duty. He is a member of the Employees’ Retirement System. Section 6 of the Employees’ Retirement System ordinance (Ordinance No. 553, approved February 21, 1926; ³²² Baltimore City Code, 1927 Edition, Article 30, section 6) provides: “* * *-ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY. BENEFIT (5) Upon application of a member, * * * any member who has been totally and permanently incapacitated for duty as the natural and proximate result of an accident occurring while in the actual performance of duty at some definite time and place, without wilful negligence on his part, shall be retired by the Board of Trustees, provided that the medical board shall certify that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty, that such incapacity is likely to be permanent, and that such member shall be retired.

ALLOWANCE ON ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT (6) Upon retirement for accidental disability a member * * * shall receive an accidental disability retirement allowance which shall consist of .[a specified annuity and pension]” [Italics supplied.] Petitioner made application for accidental disability benefits. On June 21, 1949 and September 22, 1949 his application was heard by respondents, on testimony and other evidence and arguments of counsel. On October 19, 1949 the application was denied, with a written opinion, on the ground that “the' Board does not find that the incapacity of the applicant is the natural and proximate result of an accident occurring in the actual performance of duty at some definite time and place. This conclusion is based on the testimony and evidence presented to' the Board and upon a consideration of the applicable authorities.” Petitioner alleges that respondents’ action in denying his application “is unwarranted and contrary to the applicable facts and law”', and that in denying the application respondents “acted capriciously, arbitrarily, illegally and unreasonably * * The application for mandamus was heard on the testimony and other evidence before the Board.

The petition was dismissed on two grounds, stated in Judge Tucker’s opinion, [1] “There was very substantial evidence before the Board of Trustees of the Retirement System to support their decision that the incapacity of the petitioner ³²³ was not the natural and proximate result of an accident; and for that reason alone their decision may not be disturbed by the court.” [2] “There is another reason, however, that the petitioner may not obtain the relief for which he has prayed. The contention of the petitioner, which, he claims is supported by the testimony of his witnesses, Doctors. Skolnick and Serra, is that during his 21 years of services in the Fire Department he sustained various injuries, some of which were accidental, and was subjected to considerable responsibility in protecting property and the lives of people, and it was the combination of these events and conditions that caused his eventual incapacitation. But, even if this contention were supported by uncontradicted evidence it would not entitle the petitioner to the special benefits under the above provisions of the ordinance, because the incapacity would not be the result of ‘an accident occurring * * * at some definite time and place’. * * * There is no substantial evidence to show that the petitioner’s incapacity resulted from ‘an accident at some definite time and place’.” Judge Tucker held that by the ordinance “the cause of incapacity is limited to one accident at a definite time and place”.

Petitioner’s disability is due to coronary thrombosis. Petitioner contends this was caused — or aggravated— by accident; respondents contend it was not, and could not be, caused by accident. The Board “does not find” that it “is the natural and proximate result of an accident occurring in the actual performance of duty at some definite time and place”. Judge Tucker holds that [1] “There was very substantial evidence before the Board * * * to support their decision” that it was not the natural and proximate result of an accident and [2] “there is no substantial evidence” that it resulted from one “accident at some definite time and place”.

Petitioner testified to four “accidents” in the performance of duty, on October 20, 1928, January 18, 1940, August 28,1942, and December 6,1948, and six occasions, on April 22, 1942, January 9, 1943, February 12, 1943, ³²⁴ November 17, 1948, November 29, 1948 and December 11, 1948, when he was examined (and in five of these instances went off duty) on account of pains in the chest or the chest and back. He offered the testimony of one physician and a letter from another. Dr. Skolnick, medical consultant of the International Fire Fighters Association, testified, “It is my opinion based on evidence as I heard it today that Lieutentant Williams has now a heart condition resulting from the accidental nature of his fire fighting duties”; that the exertion and excitement which petitioner testified to in connection with the various occurrences mentioned could produce the results which the doctors in their report had stated had been reached; “I feel that his final condition of heart disease is the result o'f his fire fighting duties”; “Under discussion today I am chiefly concerned as to how his heart disease came about * * *”; “I began a study in 1936, and continuing through 1945 when I wrote a conclusion based on that compilation that there were three, possibly four, important factors responsible for heart disease in fire fighting duties. I list those as follows: 1.

The effects from smoke with or without asphyxiation depending upon the severity. 2. The stresses and strains of an unusual nature. Now in stresses and strains we can sub-divide that in various ways. It is not generally known among the population that a fireman can be under terrific stress. and strain, when a non-fireman or a layman is in his mode of relaxation.

I can explain it this way. There is no guarantee that in fighting fires, in fire fighting duties, that once a fireman returned from any type of fire— let’s assume it is a severe strain — he is not called upon to return to another fire of equal or greater strength. That is what we call the emergency response. That is required only in fire fighting, hardly any other profession.

Then another factor are those factors of stresses and strains on a heart that is already weakened by previous experience. As I sat and listened to this recitation of these various symptoms that Lieutenant Williams complained of, it just emphasized the fact that here was ³²⁵ an individual, a fireman, who during certain periods of his fire fighting duties was re-injured, so to speak, during those times, and especially during those times when he complained of, as he described it, when his duties included straining and smoke and things of different natures. In other words, it might appear to the Board questionable as to why did Lieutenant Williams in 1948 suddenly become disabled. It is my contention that that disability that Lieutenant Williams has been finally, and I also believe correctly, described as a disability, is a complete and final disability, had also existed in other forms, in possibly a less severe form in his previous years of fire fighting.

We could be sitting here in 1943 under the same conditions that we are now sitting here in 1949, in which we could be discussing the same problem. It just so happens that Lieutenant Williams’ physical condition was undiagnosed until 1949 or ’48. * * * So the problem doesn’t change. We are today describing a condition that was first diagnosed as heart disease in 1948, although I feel sure it had existed because of fire fighting duties from his other incidents, especially the tirade of incidents of the ’42-’43 period, and that we are now talking about a man who finally comes to our attention with a medical acknowledgement that he has heart disease, and should not fight any more fires.” When questioned by Dr. Williams, a member if the Board, he testified that you could get the same coronary thrombosis as reported by the doctors without any fire fighting experience whatsoever. Dr. Serra, in a letter, said, “It is well known that emotional upheavals in the nature of anger or fear seem to predispose to the development of this condition.

However, it is impossible to say, unequivocally, that the various stresses associated with the occupation of firemen were the basic causative factors in this case, and by the same token it is possible that the severity and frequency of the attacks may have been aggravated by them. Realizing that this condition is not uncommonly seen in individuals who are subjected to considerable responsibility, one may well ³²⁶ contend that being a lieutenant, he had the responsibility of protecting property and the lives of his men and this may have played a part in the development of his illness. This is a fact which cannot be proven or disproven readily.” Respondents offered the testimony of five