Williams v. McHugh

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Maryland’s Workmen’s Compensation Commission has been legislatively provided limited procedural rule-making authority which includes the right to "prescribe the time within which adjudications and awards shall be made. . . .” Md. Ann. Code (1979) Repl. Vol.), Art. 101, § 10. While it is clear that this was intended to permit the Commission to determine its own minimum standards for ⁵⁷¹ deciding cases to which it would be expected to adhere, it is equally certain that the Legislature had no intention that such rule or rules were to be so strictly enforced as to curtail the rights of a claimant.

In fact, the Legislature made it explicitly clear that "all such rules and regulations shall conform to the provisions of this article.” Id. One of the provisions of "this article” is an unique legislative directive to the Commission and to the courts, in § 63, that the Act should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes, and that any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant. The Commission enacted Rule 15A, which states that: "When a claim has been scheduled for a hearing and notices have been served upon the claimant by mailing in due course a copy to his last known post office address two successive times, and the claimant has failed to appear, the claim shall be held in abeyance by the Commission for one year from the date of the last scheduled hearing. If within the said year the claimant does not make a further request for hearing, the claim shall be automatically dismissed, or decided on the record, as the case may be.” This was obviously a procedural guideline permitting the Commission to clear its dockets of abandoned cases, while leaving some discretion to decide a questionable case within the construction guides of § 63.

It clearly did not intend to restrict itself so as mandatorily to curtail its right — or duty — to modify or change its former orders or findings when it felt justified, within five years of a compensation payment as legislatively authorized in Art. 101, § 40 (c). Indeed, if the Commission had intended to restrict further its discretionary modification authority to the possible detriment of a claimant, such rule would have been ultra vires to that ⁵⁷² extent and purpose, as failing to conform with § 40 (c) and § 63. Art. 101, § 10. In the case at bar, the parties entered into a Joint Stipulation of Fact for purposes of the appeal from the Workmen’s Compensation Commission to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

The pertinent elements of the stipulation were that appellant (who was the appellee below) had sustained a compensable injury on October 3, 1978 and obtained a temporary total disability award by order dated November 16, 1978.. Appellant’s attorney requested a hearing and the appellees filed issues that same month. Appellant’s attorney lost contact with him, and on two occasions, neither appeared at scheduled hearings. The claim was placed on the stet docket on April 4, 1979, and remained there until November 12, 1980, when appellant notified the Commission that he had retained new counsel.

The appellees raised the issues of nature and extent of disability and "limitations based on the stet docket rule” on that very day. Significantly, the Commissioner decided "that the above