Williams v. State

Orth, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. A plea of guilty can be effectively accepted by a court only under the standard applicable to waiver of constitutional rights. To satisfy this standard the record must af ⁵⁷² firma.tively show that the plea of guilty was entered by an accused-: (1) voluntarily, that is not through coercion, terror, inducements, or subtle or blatant ■ threats; and (2) -with an intelligent understanding, that is 1 not through ignorance or incomprehension: (a)' of the nature of the offense to which he is pleading guilty; and ..(b) of the possible consequences of such a ' plea; and (3) unconditionally, that is without any condition or qualification. See Holloway v. State, 8 Md. App. 618 ; Obey and Thompson v. State, 8 Md. App. 716 ; Boykin v. State of Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 , applicable only to guilty pleas accepted on and after 2 June, 1969, Silverberg v. Warden, 7 Md. App. 657 , specified three constitutional rights which the record must affirmatively show the accused intelligently understood and waived: (1) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; (2) the right to trial by jury; and (3) the right to confront one’s accusers.

We construed Boykin as requiring also, as constitutionally mandated, that the record affirmatively show that there was a factual basis for the plea, and, we said, this factual basis must be accepted by the defendant. “[T]he record must affirmatively show the acts which the defendant admits which served as the basis for the court’s determination * * *.of the factual basis for the plea * * McCall v. State, 9 Md. App. 191, 199-200 . We pointed out that the determination of the factual basis for the plea was “predicated upon the conduct of the defendant which he admits.” The rationale was that the conviction upon the entry of a plea of guilty flows from an admission of conduct ahd thus it was essential that the conduct which the accused admitted constituted the offense charged. We distinguished a plea of nolo contendere from a plea of guilty in that, respect. “[S]inee the accused by a plea of nolo ⁵⁷³ does not admit conduct alleged, expressly asserting by such plea that he does not contest the charge and since conviction does not flow from the plea, it is not essential that conduct constituting the offense be admitted or accepted by [the accused]. Id., at 201 .

On 23 November 1970 the Supreme Court decided North Carolina v. Alford, 396 U. S. 807 , 8 Cr. L 3039. The opinion of the Court 1 stated: “Implicit in the nolo contendere cases is a recognition that the Constitution does not bar imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence.” Our holding in McCall is in accord with this. But Alford did not simply refuse to admit the crime.

Although he pleaded guilty, after the State’s case was placed before the judge, Alford denied that he had committed the murder with which he was charged, but reaffirmed his desire to plead guilty to avoid a possible death sentence and to limit the penalty to a 30-year maximum provided for second degree murder. The Court said, at 3042: “The fact that his plea was denominated a plea of guilty rather than a plea of nolo contendere is of no constitutional significance with respect to the issue now before us, for the Constitution is concerned with the practical consequences, not the formal categorizations of state law. * * * Thus, while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime. ⁵⁷⁴ Nor can we perceive any material difference between a plea which refuses to admit commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence when, as in the instant case, a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.” The precise holding in Alford was: “In view of the strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the State, and Alford’s clearly expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence, we hold that the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting it.” At 3043. The Court noted: “Our holding does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes so to plead.

A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court * * Id. It is apparent therefore that our belief that the determination of the factual basis for a plea of guilty was predicated upon the conduct of the defendant which he admits may be modified in the light of Alford . We do modify it. A plea of guilty may be accepted effectively when the record shows that it was made voluntarily, unconditionally, and with an intelligent understanding of the nature of the offense and the possible consequences of the effect of the plea even though the defendant denies his guilt, provided the State demonstrates a strong factual basis for the plea and the defendant clearly expresses a desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence.

In such circumstances the assertion of innocence does not necessarily negative any admission of guilt, which is normally central to a plea of guilty and the foundation of entering judgment. Basically the “standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” 2 Id. at 3040. ⁵⁷⁵ Gordon Roland Williams (appellant), Edward Francis Mallon and Frank Emmett Watts, Jr. were jointly indicted, charged with assaulting John Edward Owens with intent to murder him (1st count) and with the assault and battery of him (2nd count). Coming on for trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, appellant pleaded guilty to the assault with intent to murder, the plea was accepted and he was sentenced to 15 years. 3 He first asks if the record shows that his plea was entered intelligently and voluntarily but his argument is directed toward voluntariness only. When the indictment came on for trial appellant was rearraigned.

It was elicited by the Clerk that he was 33 years of age. Appellant offered a plea of guilty of assault with intent to murder and the court made personal inquiry of him concerning it. The canvass included questions with regard to the voluntariness of the plea. The transcript reads: “THE COURT: Do you understand that in making this plea no one can make any promises to you as to how I will dispose of the case?

That is, no one can promise you whether I will consider probation or send you to jail or for how long you will go to jail or for how much up to fifteen years ? THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir. THE COURT: Have any promises of any kind been made to induce you to plead guilty? THE DEFENDANT: No sir.

THE COURT: Have any threats of any kind been made to induce you to plead guilty? ⁵⁷⁶ ...-THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Is your.plea completely fr.ee and