Williams v. State

KENNEY, Judge. Appellant, Corey Anthony Williams, was indicted by a Grand Jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and charged with first-degree murder, felony murder, robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, and theft. A co-defendant, Fransharon Jackson, was tried separately. Hearings on pre-trial motions were held on January 9 and 14, 1998, and appellant’s case was continued until the conclusion of Jackson’s trial. 1 Appellant’s jury trial began on May 18, 1998, and, on May 21, 1998, the jury acquitted him of first-degree murder, but found him guilty of felony murder, robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, and theft.

On July 16, 1998, appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony ²¹² murder conviction, and the remaining convictions were merged. Questions Presented Appellant presents two questions for our review: 1. Was appellant’s confession voluntary under Maryland non-constitutional law, as well as under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights? 2. What duty, beyond the cessation of questioning, do the police have when a suspect requests an attorney?

We hold that the confession was voluntary. We decline to answer the second question, but we address the contention, raised in the body of appellant’s brief, that the police violated his constitutional rights as guaranteed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We reject this contention, and we affirm. Standard of Review In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider only the record of the suppression hearing and do not examine the record of the trial.

Trusty v. State, 308 Md. 658, 670 , 521 A.2d 749 (1987) (quoting Jackson v. State, 52 Md.App. 327 , 332 n. 5, 449 A.2d 438 , cert. denied, 294 Md. 652 ,(1982)). We grant great deference to the suppression hearing judge’s findings of fact and determinations of credibility. McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 282 , 600 A.2d 430 (1992); Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183 , 571 A.2d 1239 (1990); Perkins v. State, 83 Md.App. 341, 346 , 574 A.2d 356 (1990). The facts as found by the suppression hearing judge are accepted unless clearly erroneous.

Riddick, 319 Md. at 183 , 571 A.2d 1239 ; Perkins, 83 Md.App. at 346-47 , 574 A.2d 356 . In addition, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Riddick, 319 Md. at 183 , 571 A.2d 1239 ; Cherry v. State, 86 Md.App. 234, 237 , 586 A.2d 70 (1991). However, we make an independent constitutional determination of whether the confession was admissible by examining the law and ²¹³ applying it to the facts of the case.

Riddick, 319 Md. at 183 , 571 A.2d 1239 ; Perkins, 83 Md.App. at 346 , 574 A.2d 356 . Facts After a hearing on January 14,1998, the circuit court denied appellant’s motion to suppress an inculpatory written statement he gave while in police custody. Appellant contends that denial constituted error. There is some disagreement about the facts; we first recount those adduced from police testimony at the motion hearing, and then those presented by appellant.

The body of Claude Bowlin was found in Bowlin’s house in Essex on August 18, 1997. He apparently had been killed in the previous 24-48 hours. After an investigation, detectives arrested appellant and Jackson inside a house at 931 North Strieker Street in Baltimore City at 11:15 p.m. on August 22, 1997. Detective Milton Duckworth handcuffed appellant, placed him in a police car, advised him of his Miranda rights, and told him he was being charged with first-degree murder for Bowlin’s death.

Duckworth drove appellant to Baltimore County Police Headquarters in Towson, but did not ask any questions during the trip. They arrived at approximately 11:40 p.m. Appellant was immediately taken to an interview room on the tenth floor, where he was restrained with handcuffs and leg irons. Duckworth again told appellant he was being charged with first-degree murder, and asked appellant if he understood the Miranda rights explained to him in the car.

Appellant said that he did, and agreed to speak with Duck-worth. At the hearing, Duckworth did not testify about the statements appellant made at that point, except to say that appellant indicated he was aware of Bowlin’s death, and appellant was able to describe where he had been and what he had been doing on August 17,1997. Duckworth testified that he believed appellant was sober, because appellant’s speech was clear, coherent, and logical. At approximately 12:35 a.m., Duckworth read appellant an ²¹⁴ advice of rights form, which repeated the Miranda warning.

Duckworth then asked appellant if he would provide a written statement. Appellant declined, and stated that he wished to speak with an attorney before giving a written statement. Duckworth immediately terminated the interview. Duckworth completed an arrest report and then took appellant to the basement, where appellant was fingerprinted and photographed.

At 1:30 a.m., Duckworth took appellant back to the tenth floor interview room, took his clothing, and issued him a Detention Center jumpsuit. When taking appellant’s clothes, Duckworth, for the first time, noticed an odor of alcohol on appellant or his clothes, but Duckworth still believed appellant was sober. Duckworth testified that he did not ask appellant any questions at that point, but that appellant asked him “if I thought he should give a written statement.” Duckworth replied that he could not offer any legal advice on what appellant should or should not do. At 1:57 a.m., Duckworth left the room.

He testified that, as he did so, he asked Officer Sean Needham to enter the room “just to sit with” appellant while Duckworth talked to other detectives about the ongoing investigation, including Fransharon Jackson’s simultaneously occurring interview. 2 Need-ham had not been participating in appellant’s interrogation. Duckworth testified that his purpose in asking Needham to step into the room was “Prisoner security. I wasn’t going to be in the room with him and we can’t leave prisoners by themselves in the building.” Duckworth told Needham that appellant had requested an attorney and that all Needham had to do was sit with appellant. At 2:30 a.m., Needham left the interview room and told Duckworth that appellant wanted to make a written statement.

Duckworth immediately told Needham to “document ²¹⁵ what had transpired” during the time Needham was in the room with appellant. At the suppression hearing, Needham testified that after he went into the room at 1:57 a.m., he and appellant had an intermittent conversation, with pauses between exchanges. During the pauses, Needham was merely looking out the window. First, appellant said he was cold and asked for coffee.

Needham said there was no coffee made, but he would get appellant a drink after Duckworth returned. Appellant asked why the room was so cold, and Needham explained that the air conditioning ran all night because of the building’s computers. Appellant asked if Jackson was giving a written statement, and Needham said he did not know what she was doing. 3 Appellant asked Needham what Needham would do if he were in appellant’s shoes. Needham said he could not answer that.

Appellant asked Needham whether, if Needham were going to lie, he would do so in a verbal or written statement. Needham replied that he definitely would not lie in a written statement. Appellant said that he guessed he would be going away for a long time. Needham replied that he did not know and that it depended on what appellant had done.

Appellant asked if Needham drank a lot, and Needham replied that he did not. Needham asked if appellant drank a lot, and appellant said “Yes, you can see why.” Needham asked what appellant meant, and appellant said that had Needham been at the house when appellant was arrested and seen appellant’s uncle he would understand why appellant drank a lot. Needham testified that throughout the conversation appellant appeared upset and had obviously been crying. After mentioning his uncle, appellant “started to breakdown a little bit and cry.

He was kind of like shaking in his chair, just like rocking a little bit talking to himself.” Needham felt uncomfortable because appellant was crying, so he got up and walked over to the door to see if Duckworth was returning. Appellant asked if Needham could remove “these,” apparently ²¹⁶ meaning Ms handcuffs or leg irons. Needham asked, “For what?,” and appellant “gestured over to the table that he was going to write.” Needham helped appellant stand up, walk over to the table, and sit down. Needham slid him a writing pad and went to call Duckworth.

When Needham came out, at 2:30 a.m., and said that appellant wanted to write a statement, Duckworth went back in the room and confirmed that appellant wanted to do so. Before taking a statement, Duckworth had appellant complete a second advice of rights/waiver form, indicating appellant’s understanding and waiver of his Miranda rights. Unlike the previous use of this form, at 12:35 a.m., this time Duckworth had appellant sign his imtials next to each right after reading it, to indicate that he understood them. Appellant imtialed each right and signed this waiver form at 2:41 a.m.

Appellant then completed a written statement containing three parts. The first three and a half pages, transcribed by Duckworth, were questions concerning voluntariness that Duckworth asked orally, and to which appellant responded orally. Duckworth testified: I was trying to establish voluntariness on the part of Mr. Williams. He had earlier requested an attorney.

At that point I had terminated the interview with him and had no intention of attempting to take a written statement from him once he invoked his rights. However, when he indicated that he now wished to make a written statement, I wanted to make sure that he was clear in Ms mind that he understood what he was doing. After the imtial questions, which confirmed that appellant had previously declmed to give a written statement, but had now changed his mind, Duckworth asked: “Why do you now wish to make a written statement?” Appellant answered: “Because' I did not tell the complete truth in my oral statement.” Duckworth also asked, “Has anyone told you that it would be better for you to make a statement since that time?,” to which appellant replied, “No.” Appellant said that he had ²¹⁷ not been promised anything in return for giving a written statement. The following sequence was also transcribed by Duckworth: [By Duckworth] Q: Are you currently under the influence of any drug or narcotic?

A: No. Q: Are you currently under the influence of alcohol? A: Yes. Q: Are you currently intoxicated? A: I have a hangover.

Q: Are you currently sick? A: No. Q: Do you know where you are? A: Yes. Q: Do you know why you are here?

A: Yes. Q: Do you feel your mental capacity is currently impaired in any manner? A: Not by alcohol or any kind of drugs, no. Maybe emotionally.

Q: When you say emotionally, is that because of the charges facing you? A: No. It’s because of what happened, not because of the consequences, but because a life is gone. Q: Is it now your desire knowing that this statement can and will be used against you to provide a written statement as to what occurred on the evening of 8/17/97 into the early morning hours of 8/18/97 without the services thes [sic] of an attorney? A: Yes.

Appellant reviewed Duckworth’s transcription and initialed each line that represented a response from appellant. Starting at 8:02 a.m., appellant himself wrote a three-and-a-half page statement, in which he explained that he was angry with Fransharon Jackson, his girlfriend, for hanging out with ²¹⁸ “Chip” (apparently Claude Bowlin). Appellant alleged that Jackson and Bowlin were doing drugs and having sex together. After an argument between appellant and Jackson, Jackson told appellant that Bowlin had some valuable electronic equipment.

She suggested they steal the equipment, and she would then stop fraternizing with Bowlin. Appellant and Jackson went to Bowlin’s house, where Jackson began to have sex with Bowlin in a bedroom, while appellant first waited outside the house and then snuck into the kitchen. Jackson came to the kitchen and, unbeknown to Bowlin, spoke briefly with appellant, telling appellant that she had been unable to find cash that she believed Bowlin had hidden in the house. She suggested that appellant knock Bowlin out so that they could look for the cash without interruption and could take the other valuables.

Accordingly, Jackson returned to the bedroom and resumed having sex with Bowlin. Appellant took a stein or mug from the kitchen, snuck into the bedroom, and struck Bowlin on the head with the mug. According to appellant, Jackson left the bedroom and got a knife, then returned and started to strike toward Bowlin. Appellant wrote that he blocked her intended stabbing, but after they observed that Bowlin was still moving and groaning appellant struck him twice more with the mug.

Jackson then tied a cloth around Bowlin’s head. 4 The pair took valuables from the house, including a VCR and a portable stereo. 5 ²¹⁹ Appellant wrote that they did not intend to kill Bowlin and that he and Jackson had cried every day since the robbery. After Duckworth and Needham testified at the suppression hearing, appellant presented two witnesses. First, a Baltimore County Assistant Public Defender testified that at least one member of his office is on call 24 hours each day, and that the homicide department, where appellant was interrogated, was sent a schedule of the on-call public defenders and their phone numbers. Appellant then testified, saying that he was twenty-six years old, and had had numerous encounters with the criminal justice system, but had never been given Miranda warnings during any of his prior arrests.

He said that, in the hours immediately prior to his arrest, he had consumed almost one-half of a fifth of rum and an entire 40-ounce beer, and had smoked marijuana. He said he was about 5’5” tall, and weighed approximately 160 pounds. In the police car he felt “dizzy” from the alcohol and marijuana. Appellant remembered telling Duckworth, when first entering the interview room, that he understood his Miranda rights.

Appellant testified, however, that Duckworth initially asked for a statement; appellant said “I told him at first, no, I wanted a lawyer,” but Duckworth had no response. Appellant gave an oral statement about his whereabouts on August 17. Duckworth produced a form for appellant to review and sign as a prelude to a written statement. Appellant testified, “I told him I did not want to write anything out, I wanted a lawyer, because I was scared.” When asked why he would not sign the waiver of rights form, appellant testified, “Because I asked for a lawyer over and over again and he never gave me one.

I figured if I started signing this that I would probably be going to jail for a long time and everything.” The two men went to the basement for the fingerprints and photographs, then returned to the tenth floor and exchanged appellant’s clothes for the jumpsuit. Appellant testified that during this time, he asked to be allowed to make a phone call to check on his child and to ask a relative to get him a lawyer. ²²⁰ He said Duckworth did not respond to his requests. Appellant testified, however, that Duckworth’s testimony was accurate concerning the exchange in which appellant asked if he should give a written statement, and Duckworth replied that he could not advise appellant either way. Duckworth then left the room.

Appellant testified briefly about Officer Needham: [From defense counsel] Q: [D]id someone else come in the room? A: I know I fell asleep because my head was spinning and I remember I woke up and I seen at least who I thought was the officer who was sitting here. I can’t remember if he was the one or not, but it kind of looked like him. Q: Do you recall your conversation with him?

A: Yeah. Q: Did he testify as to what your conversation was? A: Yeah. Q: Did you, in fact, ask to give a written statement?

A: Yes. Appellant was then asked why, after not signing the waiver of rights form when it was presented to him at 12:35 a.m., he signed the form at 2:30 a.m. He testified: A: I kept asking for a lawyer over and over again. Every time I asked, I wasn’t given one.

So, I signed this time because I felt as though all the other times that I asked I wasn’t going to be appointed one anyway. So, I just went on and did it. THE COURT: You weren’t going to be appointed one? Is that what you said?

A: That’s the way it seemed, because at one time Detective Duckworth told me I wouldn’t be able to receive a Public Defender because he was going on vacation and I wouldn’t be able to receive one until five days after I got over to the Baltimore County Detention Center. [Defense counsel] Q: Do you recall when he told you that? ²²¹ A: He told me that when I asked for a lawyer before I had actually written this out. That is one of the reasons why I started writing it, because he said I wouldn’t be able to give him a statement or even see a lawyer or anything until five days after I got over to the BCDC. Q: Now, was that before you gave him the oral statement or this statement? A: That statement.

Q: And that’s the written statement? A: Yes. On cross-examination appellant admitted that he had been arrested numerous times, but still maintained that he had never been read his Miranda rights before. He said he asked Duckworth for a lawyer three times: in the police car (at approximately 11:30 p.m.), before the oral statement (approximately 12:30 a.m.), and when he gave the written statement (approximately 2:40 a.m.), but he never asked Needham for a lawyer.

Appellant first testified that Duckworth’s comment about not getting an attorney for five days was made after appellant’s oral statement, but then he said he wasn’t sure when the comment was made. Appellant also said that, although he initialed each line of the waiver of rights form at 2:40 a.m., he did not read any of the waivers. After argument from the parties, the trial court ruled that the written statement was admissible. The court found that appellant’s testimony was not credible, citing discrepancies in his testimony about the amount of alcohol he consumed and the time in which he drank it.

The court expressly disbelieved that appellant requested an attorney while in the police car. The court also did not believe appellant’s testimony that Duckworth said he could not get a lawyer for five days; the court pointed out that appellant was inconsistent about when that comment was made. The court found Duckworth’s testimony credible, and mentioned that appellant’s testimony often supported Duckworth’s. The court found that, after appellant asserted his Miranda rights and the police respected that assertion by ceasing questioning, appellant made a “free, ²²² voluntary and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.... ” Based upon all of these findings, the court denied the motion to suppress.

Discussion The Court of Appeals has stated: The introduction of a confession as evidence against the accused at trial is permitted only where it is determined that the confession was “(1) voluntary under Maryland non-constitutional law, (2) voluntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and (3) elicited in conformance with the mandates of Miranda.” Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 174 , 699 A.2d 1170 (1997), cert. denied, —