Williams v. State

HOLLANDER, Judge. In this case, we must consider, inter alia, whether the lower court erred by refusing to order the removal during trial of a Baltimore City Detention Center (“BCDC”) identification bracelet. A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Michael Williams, appellant, of possession of cocaine, for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eighteen months. On appeal, Williams presents the following questions, which we have rephrased slightly, for our consideration: I. Did the trial court err in refusing to permit appellant to remove a detention center identification bracelet and in ⁴⁴⁷ refusing to grant a mistrial once the jury panel observed the bracelet?

II

Did the trial court err in permitting improper prosecutorial closing argument? For the following reasons, we shall affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND At approximately 8:00 p.m on May 22, 2000, Baltimore City Police Officer Robert Neuens was patrolling the area of Rosedale Street and West North Avenue when he observed appellant walking along North Avenue. Officer Neuens recognized Williams from a previous attempt to obtain information from appellant about a shooting that had occurred several weeks earlier.

Because the officer had recently received information regarding drug activity in the vicinity, he asked appellant what he was doing in the area, whether he had obtained any information about the shooting, and whether he was “dirty,” a slang expression referring to controlled dangerous substances. In response to Officer Neuens’s inquiries, appellant admitted that he had recently “copped a little girl,” meaning that he had cocaine in his possession. Appellant also provided Officer Neuens with a possible suspect for the shooting. As a result of the information provided by appellant, Officer Neuens radioed for back-up.

When Officer Tashana Auberry arrived, Officer Neuens told her that appellant admitted that he had cocaine on his person. Officer Neuens then “reached” into appellant’s pants pocket and seized five vials of suspected cocaine. A subsequent analysis of the substance tested positive for cocaine. At trial, Officer Auberry corroborated Officer Neuens’s account of the events.

No witnesses testified for the defense. During the trial, appellant was required to wear a BCDC identification bracelet around his "wrist. Prior to the commencement of voir dire, appellant’s counsel approached the bench and asked the court to have the BCDC bracelet re ⁴⁴⁸ moved, so that the jury would not see it. The following colloquy ensued: THE COURT: I can’t take that off. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: I don’t want the jury to see it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I can’t take it off. I don’t have the authority to take off the [bracelet]. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, if you could just call downstairs and asks the officers? They have other— THE COURT: There’s the officer right there. [THE OFFICER]: The sergeant doesn’t want it taken off. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: All right. Your Honor, perhaps you can just— THE COURT: That’s an interesting point that you bring up.

I have not encountered that before. Let’s put it on the record now so that in the event there’s a need to review this case, the appellate court will understand what you’re talking about. You’re making a motion to the court to remove the [bracelet], which is the identification band of the defendant, in the [BCDC]. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Yes. THE COURT: All right. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Because I don’t believe— THE COURT: And my response to you was, I do not think that I have the power or the authority or that if I have it, I ought to utilize it, to remove that [bracelet] because that is the identifying information that BCDC has.

And right now his person is in the control of BCDC. I have removed the shackles. I have removed the handcuffs, but that can be a hospital band for all they [i.e. the jurors] know. But go ahead.

Put it on the record. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, just for the same reason that shackles are removed from a defendant before a ⁴⁴⁹ jury trial, is that the jury is not supposed to assume based on the fact that he’s committed that he— THE COURT: Have you ever been successful in getting the judge to remove that wristband? [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: It’s never been an issue before, Your Honor. THE COURT: But all of them wear them if they’re in custody. All right. Denied.

The next day, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, claiming the jury panel saw appellant’s bracelet. No information was provided to the court as to why defense counsel believed the jury had seen the bracelet. The court denied the motion. We shall include additional facts in our discussion.

DISCUSSION I. Appellant argues that the court erred in refusing to require the removal of the BCDC identification bracelet and in denying his motion for mistrial on that basis. We find no merit to these claims. Although we have not found a Maryland case that is precisely on point, the recent case of Knott v. State, 349 Md. 277 , 708 A.2d 288 (1998), is instructive. There, on the first day of his trial, Knott arrived at the courthouse dressed in a jail uniform.

Concerned that the jury would be prejudiced against him because of his “orange, prison-issued jumpsuit,” id. at 284 , 708 A.2d 288 , Knott requested a continuance so that he could obtain and wear street clothes. The court denied his request and the defendant was later convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed. On appeal, the State argued, inter alia, that “the record fail[ed] to show that the orange jumpsuit that Knott was wearing was identifiable as prison attire.” Id. at 291 , 708 A.2d 288 .

The Court disagreed, stating: ⁴⁵⁰ When Knott’s counsel presented her first reason for a continuance, the trial court immediately recognized where the argument was headed and described the attire as giving the jury a “hint” that Knott was being held in jail. Moreover, the trial judge’s ground for denying the opportunity to change into mufti was that the jurors would expect Knott to be in jail because of the severity of the charges and, hence, appearing in prison garb would not be prejudicial. Implicit in that analysis is that jurors could recognize Knott’s garb as that of a prisoner. Id.

(emphasis added)(footnote omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial judge “ ‘should have undertaken some effort to permit the appellant to sit before the jury in clothing that did not give the aura of “prisoner.” ’ ” Knott, 349 Md. at 285 , 708 A.2d 288 (citation omitted). In reaching its decision, the Knott Court relied on Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), a federal habeas corpus case that involved a criminal defendant who appeared for trial dressed in a prison uniform. There, the Supreme Court considered “whether an accused who is compelled to wear identifiable prison clothing at his trial is denied due process or equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 502 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 .

On the morning of trial, the defendant had asked an officer at the jail to allow him to wear civilian clothes, but his request was denied. Subsequently, at trial, neither the defendant nor his counsel made any objection to the identifiable prison attire worn by the defendant. The Supreme Court recognized that, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, a state cannot “compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes.” Id. at 512 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 . Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger explained: The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic ⁴⁵¹ component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the factfinding process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. The potential effects of presenting an accused before the jury in prison attire need not, however, be measured in the abstract.

Courts have, with few exceptions, determined that an accused should not be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption [of innocence] so basic to the adversary system.... This is a recognition that the constant reminder of the accused’s condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror’s judgment. The defendant’s clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial that, not unlike placing a jury in the custody of deputy sheriffs who were also witnesses for the prosecution, an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play. * * * Unlike physical restraints ... compelling an accused to wear jail clothing furthers no essential state policy.... Similarly troubling is the fact that compelling the accused to stand trial in jail garb operates usually against only those who cannot post bail prior to trial.

Persons who can secure release are not subjected to this condition. To impose the condition on one category of defendants, over objection, would be repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 503-06 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court determined that ⁴⁵² the defendant’s failure to timely object at trial to the prison garments constituted a waiver of his claim of compulsion.

Id. at 509-10, 513 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 . See United States v. Arellano, 137 F.3d 982 (7th Cir.1998)(holding that defendant who did not object to prison jumpsuit was not compelled to stand trial in prison clothes.) This case is unlike Knott or Estelle , in that we see no hint in the record that the bracelet worn by appellant branded him as a prisoner. To the contrary, the trial judge stated that the jurors might think the bracelet was a “hospital band.” In effect, then, the court made a factual finding that the bracelet was not readily identifiable as a type of prison attire. Significantly, appellant neither contradicted that assertion nor offered a different description of the bracelet.

Moreover, there is no evidence in the record as to the size of the courtroom or the distance between the jurors and appellant, which might have shed light on the question of the visibility of the bracelet. Therefore, we cannot tell from the record whether the jurors could necessarily see the bracelet. Nor do we know whether appellant wore the kind of clothing that would have helped to conceal the bracelet, or even if he asked for such clothing. The State, pointing out that appellant did not attempt to obtain a long-sleeved shirt, says: “A defendant cannot choose clothing which reveals the wristband and then claim that the State compelled him to reveal the wristband to the jury.” We also cannot overlook that, even if the bracelet revealed appellant’s status as a detainee, the BCDC has a compelling interest in maintaining the identification of those within its custody, and that interest outweighed the minimal indicia of custody caused by the bracelet.

When we consider the risk that the jury might view the wristband as prison attire, and compare that circumstance with BCBD’s needs for security and the ability to identify its prisoners, we agree with the State that the bracelet created an insignificant risk. Although a person in an orange jumpsuit might stand out like the proverbial sore thumb, the same cannot be said when a person wears an institution’s identification bracelet. ⁴⁵³ We are aware of only a few decisions in other jurisdictions that have addressed the question of the proper use of prison identification bracelets at trial. Those that have considered the issue have concluded that the use of such a bracelet does not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., Manning v. State, 864 S.W.2d 198, 204