Williams v. State

Moylan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Quincy Olden Williams, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County by Judge Kenneth C. Proctor, sitting without a jury, of 1) possession of marihuana with intent to distribute and 2) possession of heroin. Upon this appeal, he raises four contentions: (1) That a comment by the judge during the course of the ²⁰⁶ trial indicated such a prejudgment of the appellant’s guilt as to constitute reversible error; (2) That he was denied the equal protection of the law in the imposition of sentence; (3) That the trial court erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State’s case; and (4) That the physical evidence should have been suppressed as the product of unconstitutional searches and seizures. We dispose of the first three contentions summarily.

We treat the fourth more fully. Judicial Prejudice The appellant was one of four persons arrested and jointly indicted. One of the co-defendants, Joseph Edward Mateycik, entered a plea of guilty. The other three, including the appellant, proceeded to a joint trial.

At the end of the State’s case, co-defendant Steven Brockmeyer was granted his motion for acquittal. The appellant made a similar motion and it was denied. The remaining defendant, Edward Paul Dieumegarde, also moved for acquittal. As to the count charging possession of a sufficient amount of marihuana to indicate an intent to distribute, the motion was granted as to Dieumegarde.

As to the count charging simple possession, the motion was denied. The exchange between Dieumegarde’s counsel and Judge Proctor was as follows: “(Mr. Mann) We are at the end of the State’s case and I would like to make a motion for acquittal certainly concerning count number one, an intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled dangerous substance in a sufficient quantity. (The Court) I’ll grant the motion as to Dieumegarde on that. (Mr. Mann) All right.

(The Court) In my judgment it’s debatable as to whether it’s a sufficient amount of Marihuana to have an intent. In my judgment what happened, ²⁰⁷ Williams was peddling and this was purchased by Dieumegarde. (Mr. Mann) Well, you’re overruling my motion on count two, of course, possession of Marihuana? (The Court) Yes.” (Emphasis supplied) The appellant urges upon us the proposition that Judge Proctor thus revealed that he had prejudged the appellant’s guilt as a “peddler” of marihuana even before the appellant had had the opportunity to present a defense.

Notwithstanding the fact that the appellant neither entered objection at the time nor made a motion for a mistrial, we eschew reliance upon Maryland Rule 1085, because of our firm conviction that the appellant’s proposition is totally without merit and that the trial judge’s conduct was totally unoffending. There was, of course, in the instant case no jury to be influenced by anything said in the exchange between the court and counsel. It is to avoid just such a possibility of inadvertent influencing that the trial judge generally, in a jury trial, excuses the jury from the courtroom during any period of extended legal argument. The trial judge himself, on the other hand, can never relinquish his responsibilities as judge, even when he plays the additional role of fact finder.

He cannot isolate himself in one capacity from his required ratiocination in his other capacity. He is called upon to make judgment as to whether the State, at a midpoint in the trial, has established a prima facie case as to each and every defendant as to each and every count. He is called upon to decide whether each defendant need bear the burden and the risk of going ahead and presenting a defense and, if so, as to what charges. Such judgments are final when made in favor of the defense but are, by definition, only tentative rulings when made in favor of the State.

The rulings, moreover, are not that the State, at that stage, has convinced the judge, sitting as a jury, of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but only that the State has presented legally sufficient evidence to permit such findings. The appellant might just as well urge upon us that Judge ²⁰⁸ Proctor prejudged the case by denying the appellant’s own motion for a judgment of acquittal; implicit in that ruling was precisely the same tentative appraisal of the facts as was made explicit in ruling upon the motion of Dieumegarde. To reach such tentative decisions, when appropriate motions are made, is not simply the prerogative of the trial judge, but, indeed, his bounden duty. The exercise of that duty in no way indicates that a defendant will be denied an impartial judgment when final deliberation is made by the judge as ultimate fact finder.

The appellant’s position that the fact finder’s mind must remain a blank until the moment of formal decision is a psychological absurdity. Any fact finder, judge or jury, who is neither sleeping nor daydreaming, is continuously making appraisals and tentative judgments, subconsciously and consciously, throughout the shifting course of a trial and with every ebb and flow of testimony. All that is required is that the judicious mind remain ever open to change and that final judgment not be made until every weight is upon the scales. The Appellant’s Sentence and Equal Protection The appellant makes the bald insinuation that only racism could account for the fact that he, the lone black man among the four arrestees, was sentenced to a term of five years, whereas “all the. white occupants were released on probation or acquitted.” As to the co-defendant who was acquitted, no further' comment is necessary.

Vis-a-vis the remaining co-defendants, the appellant conveniently ignores that he was convicted of possession of a large quantity of marihuana, indicating an intent to distribute, whereas the other two were convicted of simple possession of small quantities of marihuana. The appellant conveniently ignores that the trial judge found him, as a matter of fact, to have been a peddler of marihuana, whereas the other two were found to be mere customer-consumers. The appellant conveniently ignores that he was additionally found guilty of possession of heroin, whereas the other two were not. The ²⁰⁹ appellant conveniently ignores that he had a prior criminal record, whereas the other two had not.

To attribute the very natural disparity in sentencing to racial discrimination is rank opportunism. We find the contention utterly devoid of justification. The Denial of the Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal The appellant claims that the trial judge was in error in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s case. The easy answer to the contention is that, after the motion was denied, the appellant took the stand in his own defense.

It is long settled that when an accused offers evidence, his motion for a judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s case is treated as withdrawn. Maryland Rule 755 b; Wilkins v. State, 11 Md. App. 113 , 273 A. 2d 236 . The Search and Seizure The search and seizure question presented by the appellant is more intriguing. At approximately 11:30 p.m. on April 10, 1972, the automobile in which he and his three companions were riding was stopped by Baltimore County Police Sergeant Billy R. Baker at Sollers Point Road and Yorkway in Dundalk.

A brown paper bag, containing between one and two pounds of marihuana, 1 was observed by Sgt. Baker under the right rear seat of the automobile between the feet of the appellant. Immediately after the appellant was ordered out of the car, the bag was seized. The appellant and his companions were arrested and taken to the Dundalk Police Station.

The appellant was there searched more thoroughly. A keycase was removed from his body which contained heroin. Both seizures are at issue. We will look initially to the predicate for the seizure of the bag of marihuana.

Sgt. Baker was on routine patrol at ²¹⁰ between 11:20 and 11:30 p.m. He had received over his police radio an alert that a shooting had occurred at Gino’s on Wise Avenue. The sergeant was stationed at Dundalk Avenue and Sollers Point Road, a short distance from Wise Avenue.

The shooting at Gino’s had occurred between an hour and an hour and one-half before. The police bulletin notified all cars to be on the lookout for a “dark automobile with chrome mag wheels.” Armed with that information, Sgt. Baker observed a “black ’62 Chevrolet with chrome mag wheels sitting on the Walters Shopping Center lot.” He made a u-turn to follow the automobile and stopped it. He requested a back-up unit before approaching the stopped car.

It developed that neither the automobile nor any of its occupants had been involved in the shooting at Gino’s. It is unnecessary for us to face the issue of whether Sgt. Baker had probable cause to search the automobile or had probable cause to arrest any of its occupants, and our forbearance intimates nothing in those regards. It is enough to hold that the similarity between the car he stopped and the car described in the police bulletin gave him at least “a reasonable suspicion” or “a reason to believe” that the car and its occupants may have been “connected with criminal activity.” This was ample reason to “stop” the occupants of the automobile and to detain them “briefly for questioning” under the rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 , 88 S. Ct. 1889 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).

Gibbs v. State, 18 Md. App. 230 , 306 A. 2d 587 . Sgt. Baker was not acting upon “his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” but rather was “able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the] intrusion.” Terry, supra, 392 U. S. at 21-22. Initially it is to be noted that an occupant of an automobile is just as subject to a reasonable “stop” and to a reasonable “frisk” as is a pedestrian.

Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). And see People v. Cassese, 263 N.Y.S.2d 734 . We believe that when Sgt. Baker spotted four individuals on a parking