Williams v. State

EYLER, DEBORAH S., J. A jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County convicted Melvin D. Williams, the appellant, of possession of cocaine and ⁶²⁶ resisting arrest. He was sentenced as a subsequent offender to a term of incarceration of eight years, all but four years suspended, for the possession of cocaine conviction and a consecutive term of incarceration of two years, all but one year suspended, for resisting arrest. On appeal, he poses two questions for consideration, which we have rephrased: I. Did the circuit court commit reversible error by failing to comply with Maryland Rule 4—215(e)?

II

Was the evidence legally sufficient to convict the appellant of resisting arrest? For the following reasons, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS In the late evening of September 15, 2008, Harford County Sheriffs Office Deputies Grant Krulock and Robert Schultz, who were on uniformed bike patrol, observed the appellant walking down the middle of the street in a high crime area with “his left hand down in his shorts.” The deputies mounted their bikes and approached the appellant, who still had his left hand in his pants. Deputy Krulock asked the appellant to stop, engaged him in conversation, and asked him to remove his hand from his pants.

The appellant became agitated and argumentative. When he finally removed his hand from his pants, he turned away from the deputies. As the appellant brought his hand back down to his side, Deputy Krulock saw a small clear plastic bag fall from the appellant’s hand to the ground. Deputy Krulock ordered the appellant to put his hands behind his back.

At first, the appellant complied, but when the deputy touched his arm, he ran. Deputy Krulock yelled for the appellant to stop, but the appellant kept running. Deputy Schultz deployed his taser at the appellant, but did not hit him. The deputies chased the appellant on foot around a residence and back out to the street, where a bystander tackled him and held him down.

The appellant continued to ⁶²⁷ struggle to get away, however. Multiple times Deputy Krulock ordered the appellant to “get down on the ground,” but the appellant continued to resist. Even though Deputy Krulock warned the appellant that if he did not comply with the deputies’ directions, he would be tased, the appellant continued to try to get away from the citizen who was holding him. Deputy Krulock then tased the appellant and placed him in handcuffs.

In a search incident to arrest, Deputy Krulock recovered from the appellant’s wallet a plastic bag containing a small yellowish piece of rock, later determined to be cocaine. Deputy Krulock contacted Deputy Chad Layton, also of the Harford County Sheriffs Office, to transport the appellant to the station house in a patrol vehicle. Deputy Layton searched the back seat of his vehicle before placing the appellant there. The appellant’s hands still were cuffed behind his back.

The drive to the station house took two minutes. Deputies Krulock and Schultz returned to the station house on their bikes. When Deputies Krulock and Schultz arrived at the station house, the appellant still was in the back seat of Deputy Layton’s patrol car. Deputy Layton removed the appellant from his vehicle and transferred him back into Deputy Krulock’s custody.

Deputy Layton then searched the back seat of his patrol car and found a plastic bag containing several individually bagged small white rocks and a green plant-like substance; the items later were confirmed to be cocaine and marijuana, respectively. There was fecal material on the outside of the recovered package. Deputy Layton gave the package he had found in the back seat of his patrol car to Deputy Krulock, who itemized the evidence, submitted it for analysis, and prepared a report of the arrest. Deputy Krulock then transported the appellant to the Harford County Detention Center.

All the above was adduced as evidence during the State’s case at the appellant’s jury trial. The appellant testified on his own behalf. He stated that at the relevant time he was a resident at a recovery house that treats people with mental health and substance abuse prob ⁶²⁸ lems. On the day of the incident, he had a pass to visit family and friends at his uncle’s house in Edgewood.

He went to his uncle’s house, but he left when he was offered drugs. He then walked in the street, where “those bags ... are probably everywhere.” He saw a bag and picked it up, hoping it contained drugs he could use to get high. He put the bag in his pocket. According to the appellant, as he walked by the deputies, they started following him and asked him his name.

At that point, he pulled the bag out of his pocket and dropped it on the ground. He claimed to have panicked because he felt too confined and wanted to get back into an open area, “like the middle of the street,” and so he ran. As he was getting to the middle of the street and preparing to give up, he was tackled by a bystander. He gave up, was arrested and handcuffed, and was placed in the back of a patrol car.

He denied that he had any other drugs on him when he was placed in the back of the patrol car and testified that he did not leave anything in the vehicle. Even though the appellant was arrested on September 15, 2008, his trial did not take place until May 4 and May 5, 2011. The lengthy delay was attributable primarily to assessing the appellant’s competency to stand trial. As noted, the appellant was found guilty of the offenses of possession of cocaine and resisting arrest. 1 Additional facts will be provided as necessary to our discussion.

DISCUSSION I. Request To Discharge Counsel At all times in this case, the appellant was represented by John Janowich, Esquire, of the Office of the Public Defender. ⁶²⁹ On January 27, 2010, the appellant wrote a letter to the court, which was received and filed on January 29, 2010. The letter, without any grammatical or stylistic changes, states: My name is Melvin Williams JR Im writting to request New representation From the Public defender’s office. Pending me being able to afford an attorney. MR John Janowich has truly No interest on my behalf, in trying to help me on my case.

I truly feel Im being mis-represented. May U please remove him from my case. I’ll be truly appreciated. Sincerely Melvin Williams The appellant sent a copy of the letter to Mr. Janowich.

A written notation on the letter indicates that copies of the letter were sent by court personnel to the State’s Attorney’s Office and the Office of the Public Defender. The circuit court did not address the contents of the appellant’s letter at any pretrial proceeding or at trial, or in any way. The appellant contends the circuit court violated Rule 4-215(e) by failing to address his January 27, 2010 pro se written request to obtain “new representation from the Public defender’s office.” He suggests that the circuit court became obligated to address his request to discharge counsel and obtain new counsel upon receipt of the letter, on January 29, 2010. The appellant acknowledges that there were several proceedings before the court between January 29, 2010, and the May 4-5, 2011 trial, and that he neither asked the court for permission to discharge Mr. Janowich as his counsel during that period or at trial, nor did he make reference to the court during that period or at trial about his January 27, 2010 letter.

He asserts, however, that he remained dissatisfied with Mr. Janowich but assumed because he had gotten no response to his January 27, 2010 letter that any additional complaints or requests would be futile. The appellant further complains that the court never inquired at any of the “perfunctory” pretrial proceedings whether there were any outstanding additional matters pending. The State counters that the court did not err in failing to address the appellant’s pro se written request to discharge ⁶³⁰ counsel and obtain a new attorney. Specifically, the State asserts that neither the appellant nor Mr. Janowich ever informed the court on the record in open court of the appellant’s continued desire to discharge Mr. Janowich, even though the appellant and Mr. Janowich appeared before the court for four pretrial hearings and at trial.

The State maintains that the appellant’s pro se written request was by itself insufficient to trigger the requirements of Rule 4—215(e), and that the appellant subsequently waived the issue by not seeking any action from the court regarding his request to discharge Mr. Janowich. The right of a criminal defendant to be represented by competent counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, and by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Brye v. State, 410 Md. 623, 634 , 980 A.2d 435 (2009). The purpose of Rule 4-215 is to protect that right.

Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 281-82 , 523 A.2d 597 (1987). With respect to discharge of counsel, Rule 4-215 provides at subsection (e): Discharge of counsel—Waiver. If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel.

If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel____ The requirements of Rule 4-215 are mandatory and require strict compliance. Pinkney v. State, 427 Md. 77, 87 , 46 A.3d ⁶³¹ 413 (2012). A trial court’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Rule constitutes reversible error. Id. at 88 , 46 A.3d 413 (citing State v. Hardy, 415 Md. 612, 621 , 4 A.3d 908 (2010); Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175, 182 , 931 A.2d 1098 (2007); Williams v. State, 321 Md. 260, 272 (1990)).

Rule 4-215(e) is not self-executing, however. State v. Davis, 415 Md. 22, 32 , 997 A.2d 780 (2010). Its requirements are triggered only when a defendant or another person present before the court informs the court of the defendant’s “present intent to seek a different legal advisor.” Id. at 33 , 997 A.2d 780 . The defendant’s request need not be “artfully worded” or include any “talismanic phrase” to trigger the processes set forth in Rule 4-215(e).

Id. at 31 , 997 A.2d 780 (quoting State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 632 , 870 A.2d 217 (2005)); id. at 32 , 997 A.2d 780 (“Any statement that would reasonably apprise a court of defendant’s wish to discharge counsel will trigger a Rule 4-215(e) inquiry regardless of whether it came from the defendant or from defense counsel.”); Hardy, 415 Md. at 623 , 4 A.3d 908 (“A defendant makes such a request even when his or her statement constitutes more a declaration of dissatisfaction with counsel than an explicit request to discharge.”); Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 124 , 486 A.2d 163 (1985) (“ ‘[A]ny statement by the defendant from which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant desired self-representation would be sufficient.’ ”)(quoting Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 127 , 406 A.2d 98 (1979)); Joseph v. State, 190 Md.App. 275, 288 , 988 A.2d 545 (2010) (concluding that the prosecutor’s statement was sufficient to trigger a Rule 4-215(e) inquiry; “all that is required to trigger the mandated inquiry from the court is that the court be put on notice of a defendant’s desire to discharge counsel.”). State v. Northam, 421 Md. 195 , 26 A.3d 344 (2011), is somewhat similar to the case at bar. In that case, on February 26, 2008, the defendant mailed a letter to the clerk of the circuit court saying that he was “dropping [his] public defender” and requesting that he be provided with a “Probono [sic] Lawyer.” Id. at 198 , 26 A.3d 344 . The next day, the defen ⁶³² dant mailed a letter to the local District Court, recounting his dissatisfaction with his attorney and again stating that he wanted to discharge counsel and be assigned a new legal advisor.

At an “appearance” hearing in the circuit court on March 5, 2008, at which the defendant appeared with his public defender, the judge advised the defendant to reconsider his decision to discharge his counsel. The court explained to the defendant that, contrary to his misunderstanding, public defenders are lawyers. The defendant remained represented by the same public defender, including at a motions hearing on July 9, 2008. On July 18, 2008, the clerk of the circuit court received from the defendant a pro se motion for change of venue, which included as the last line a statement invoking his “right” to be “represented by a firm who has represented thereselves [sic] with Integerty [sic] and Justice.” Id. at 202 , 26 A.3d 344 .

After the motion for change of venue was denied, the defendant filed a second pro se motion for change of venue, which included the same language with the addition, “My Lawyer[’]s files are updated but he has made no contact with me and trial is set at Sept 24[.] I’m requesting a Court appointed attorney and Change of Venue.” Id. at 202-03 , 26 A.3d 344 . The second motion was denied by the court, as well. Thereafter, at a pretrial hearing on September 12, 2008, the defendant appeared, represented by the same attorney. He did not raise the issue of discharging his attorney during the hearing.

One of the issues addressed at the hearing was a potential conflict caused by defense counsel’s previous representation of one of the State’s witnesses. Docket entries reflect that both the State and the defendant expressly consented to continued representation of the defendant by his attorney. Id. at 203-04 , 26 A.3d 344 . Defense counsel appeared and represented the defendant at a second pretrial hearing on September 24, 2008.

At the conclusion of that hearing, when the court inquired whether there were any other motions to be addressed, the defendant ⁶³³ did not bring up his previous requests to discharge his attorney. The defendant was subsequently tried before a jury and found guilty of the offenses for which he was charged. On appeal in this Court, he argued that the circuit court had erred by failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 4-215(e). In an unpublished opinion, we reversed the convictions.

The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was granted on the issue of requested discharge of counsel. State v. Northam, 415 Md. 337 , 1 A.3d 467 (2010). The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of this Court, reinstating the defendant’s convictions. It reasoned that, even though the defendant had submitted written requests for appointment of new counsel, because neither he nor his counsel ever brought the issue to the court’s attention on the record in open court, the defendant had waived his right to have the court address his request.

The Court of Appeals further concluded that Rule 4-215(e) was not triggered by the defendant’s pro se motions; the Court quoted this Court’s opinion in White v. State, 23 Md.App. 151, 155-56 , 326 A.2d 219 (1974), emphasizing that it is the duty of a defendant to bring undecided motions to the trial court’s attention. Id. at 206 , 326 A.2d 219 . The Court further quoted White for the proposition that to “stand mute in the face of repeated requests by the judge for all pending motions to be decided” constitutes a clear waiver of the defendant’s right to a ruling on a neglected motion; and if a request is so unimportant that the defendant forgets to seek a ruling from the court, then the trial judge cannot be faulted for not searching the entire record on behalf of the defendant to make sure the defendant has not neglected to pursue a previously undecided motion. Id.

The Northam Court pointed out that it is the responsibility of an attorney representing a criminal defendant to bring to the attention of the court his or her client’s present desire to obtain new counsel or to represent himself. The ⁶³⁴ Court observed, nevertheless, that criminal defendants often will experience fleeting desires for new counsel: During the period of time in which there is an attorney-client relationship between a criminal defendant and his or her lawyer, it is not unusual for the defendant to express a desire for representation by a different lawyer. For that reason, defense counsel is not obligated to tell the trial court about every conversation in which a client has indicated an interest in changing counsel. A transitory wish for a different lawyer at various points in time prior to trial is, however, distinguishable from a considered decision to request that the trial court permit the defendant to discharge defense counsel.

Therefore, when a lawyer has been told by a criminal defendant that the defendant wants to be represented by some other lawyer, unless the defendant thereafter consents to the lawyer’s continued representation, the lawyer is obligated to advise the trial court of the defendant’s wishes. Id. at 208 n. 4, 26 A.3d 344 . The Court declined to infer that the defendant’s public defender had known that the defendant wanted to discharge him but had