Williams v. State

Opinion by Alpert, J. Deon Leroy Williams, appellant, was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Caroline County of three counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (heroin, hydrocodone, and marijuana); three counts of possessing each of those drugs; and six counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 1 Appellant raises four questions on appeal, which we have slightly reworded: I. Did the suppression court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the drugs and guns seized from his residence? ¹⁶⁵ II. Did the trial court err when it refused to accept defense counsel’s offer to stipulate to appellant’s prior disqualifying conviction?

III

Did the trial court err by failing to take any action when the defense informed the court that a juror had repeatedly fallen asleep?

IV

Did the trial court err when it denied appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on all charges? For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgments. BACKGROUND FACTS On the evening of September 17, 2018, Sergeant Leonard Nichols 2 , an 11-year veteran with the Maryland State Police, the last five years with the Caroline County Drug Task Force, executed a traffic stop of appellant for driving on a suspended and revoked driver’s license in the Easton area of Talbot County. The sergeant had been told earlier by a confidential informant that appellant would have drugs on him.

Pursuant to a search incident to arrest, however, no drugs were found on appellant or in his car, although he had a large sum of cash ($1,356) on his person and he was nervous. Appellant was transported to the police barracks in Easton in Talbot County where he was strip searched and a baggie was seen protruding from his anus. Pursuant to a search warrant, the baggie was removed by medical personnel. The baggie contained two additional baggies: one contained heroin, the other contained cocaine.

The sergeant then obtained and, about four hours later, during the early morning hours of September 18, executed a second search warrant for appellant’s residence at 7188 American Corner Road in Denton, in Caroline County. From the residence, the police seized drugs (heroin, hydrocodone and marijuana) and six guns—three handguns and three rifles. Appellant was subsequently charged in Caroline County with ¹⁶⁶ six drug counts and six gun counts relating to the seizure of the items from his residence. SUPPRESSION HEARING FACTS Prior to trial on those charges, appellant sought to suppress the drugs and guns recovered pursuant to the Caroline County residential search warrant.

In his written motions, appellant argued that the events in Talbot County were illegal and poisoned the search and seizure warrant issued for his residence in Caroline County—the traffic stop was invalid because it was pretextual, and the cavity search and the manner in which it was conducted were illegal. In a written response, the State argued that any issues concerning the initial vehicle stop and subsequent cavity search had already been heard and decided in the State’s favor in appellant’s Talbot County case. 3 At the subsequent suppression hearing, the State again raised the same argument—that the Talbot County Circuit Court had already determined that the initial vehicular stop, arrest, and subsequent cavity search were valid. Defense counsel seemed to agree but also argued, indistinctly, “something [ ] survived from Talbot County.” After some discussion, the suppression court stated that while there was no res judicata or collateral estoppel in this case, the issue before it ¹⁶⁷ was “very limited”—whether there was a substantial basis for the Caroline County magistrate to issue the warrant for appellant’s residence. The State then presented the testimony of Sergeant Nichols and admitted into evidence the 24-page affidavit in support of the residential search warrant.

Appellant testified in support of his motion. Sergeant Nichols testified that around 6:30 p.m., on September 17, 2013, he received a telephone call from a confidential informant (Cl# 3) about appellant. During the telephone call, the informant told the sergeant that appellant was attending a “Narcotics Anonymous ... or some kind of meeting,” and that when he left the meeting he would enter a described car that was parked behind the Wal-Mart on Teal Drive in Easton. Appellant would leave the area in the car and make drug “drops”—selling specified amounts of drugs to individuals.

After the sergeant received the call, he learned and confirmed through dispatch that appellant’s license had been suspended and revoked. The sergeant and his partner set up a surveillance of the area, and a short time later appellant was observed leaving the area in the described vehicle. The sergeant followed appellant’s car for about a ¼ of mile when the sergeant, who had prior contact with appellant, believed that appellant had spotted him. Appellant pulled into a parking lot and stopped.

The sergeant pulled his car next to appellant’s car and likewise stopped. The sergeant arrested appellant for driving on a suspended and revoked license. Pursuant to a search incident to arrest, the sergeant searched appellant and his car but found nothing of note, except $1,356 on appellant’s person. During the search, the sergeant noted that appellant was cooperative but nervous— his chest was rapidly “moving up and down,” the muscles in his neck “were visibly contracting,” and he was sweating, even though the temperature was a mild 75 degrees.

The sergeant testified that he believed “criminal activity was afoot” based on his prior contact with appellant, the information from Cl# 3, the large sum of cash, and appellant’s nervousness. The ¹⁶⁸ sergeant had appellant transported to the Easton Barrack where he could be processed for driving on a suspended and revoked license and strip searched. Appellant was taken to the “intoximeter room”—a multipurpose room of the Easton Barrack where DUI’s and fingerprints are processed, and a “secure” area of the barrack where the public is not allowed. Appellant, the sergeant and two, possibly three, other officers were present in the room.

Appellant was asked to take off his clothes, turn around, bend over, and spread his buttocks apart. According to the sergeant, appellant did as he was instructed, except he did not spread his buttocks so the sergeant could see appellant’s anus clearly. Nonetheless, the sergeant did see a plastic baggie protruding from appellant’s rectal area. The sergeant “tried” to spread appellant’s buttocks apart to retrieve the baggie but could not because appellant “clench[ed]” his muscles.

When the sergeant tried to handcuff appellant, a scuffle ensued between appellant and the officers. Once appellant had been handcuffed, the sergeant told appellant what he had seen but appellant refused to retrieve the baggie himself. The sergeant left appellant naked in the room for about an hour while he applied for and received a search warrant for medical personnel to remove the baggie from appellant’s anus. Appellant was then taken to a hospital where, around 12:50 a.m., a doctor physically removed from appellant’s anus a plastic baggie containing what was later determined to be a baggie of heroin and a baggie of crack cocaine.

Sergeant Nichols then applied for a search warrant for appellant’s residence at 7188 American Corner in Denton in Caroline County. Appellant had listed that address with the Motor Vehicle Administration, the Maryland Sex Offender Registry, and during a prior traffic stop and a prior arrest. In the application in support of the search warrant for the American Corner residence, the sergeant provided the following information: - Since 2002, the Caroline County Drug Task Force had received information that appellant was distributing drugs in and around Caroline County, and since 2011, informa ¹⁶⁹ tion concerning his drug distribution had “increased substantially.” In July 2011, a confidential informant made a controlled purchase of heroin from appellant in Caroline County. Appellant was arrested and pursuant to a search warrant, no drugs were found on appellant’s person.

Appellant is a registered sex offender and his address is listed as 7188 American Corner Road. Appellant is currently compliant with his sex offender registry, which still lists his address as 7188 American Corner Road. Sergeant Nichols confirmed with the officer responsible for tracking sex offenders that during several home visits at that address appellant had been present each time. At the end of May 2012, a confidential informant (Cl# 1) told members of the Caroline County Drug Task Force that on May 29, 2012, appellant had traveled to Annapolis to purchase heroin in a gold-colored four-door sedan with Maryland registration 99476Z.

Sergeant Nichols had observed appellant operating a gold-colored Mercedes Benz with that license plate during that time. In January 2018, Sergeant Nichols arrested a person for heroin distribution. The person told Sergeant Nichols that appellant supplied him/her with heroin and that appellant was “very cautious about his business and would never meet new persons.” The person stated that he/she had “never been allowed to go to [appellant’s] residence to meet him[.]” The person added that appellant got his supply of heroin from Annapolis, and that appellant took a different driver and car each time he went to Annapolis. On February 13, 2013, the police performed a traffic stop of a vehicle occupied by appellant, Byron Drummond, and another.

Sergeant Nichols came upon the traffic stop to assist. The police had information that the occupants were in possession of drugs. A K-9 scan of the car resulted in a positive alert, but a manual search of the car and the occupants uncovered no drugs. Appellant had approxi ¹⁷⁰ mately $1,000 on his person as did the female occupant.

Appellant stated during the traffic stop that his home address was the American Corner address. - A week later, on February 20, Sergeant Nichols arrested appellant for an “outstanding parole retake warrant.” Pursuant to a search incident to an arrest, Sergeant Nichols recovered a straw from appellant’s pants pocket and a folded dollar bill from his car, each of which contained suspected Oxycodone residue. Appellant was charged with possession of paraphernalia. - On July 23, 2013, a confidential informant (Cl# 2) told the Caroline County Drug Task Force that he/she had been buying heroin from appellant, that he/she never met appellant at his residence, and that appellant always told him/ her to meet on a back road (Clark Road) in Denton. - On August 6, 2013, an anonymous confidential informant (Cl# 3) called Sergeant Nichols and told him that appellant was the “largest” heroin supplier in Caroline County; that appellant got his heroin from Annapolis; that Drum-mond sometimes drove appellant to Annapolis; that appellant often uses different cars; that appellant lives at 7188 American Corner Road; and that he is usually home during the day and leaves during the night and early morning to distribute heroin. - On that same day, another confidential informant (Cl# 4) contacted a member of the Caroline County Drug Task Force and said that appellant was selling heroin around Caroline County, that he drove a green Ford F-150, and that the informant had purchased heroin from appellant on a back road (Clark Road) in Denton. - On August 9, 2013, an anonymous source contacted a member of the task force and said that appellant was selling “large amounts” of heroin in the Denton and Ridgely areas of Caroline County; that he lives with his father on American Corner Road; that appellant sets up his girlfriend, Becca Hutson, in a hotel in Denton to sell heroin for him; and that appellant drives a white Cadillac. ¹⁷¹ During this time a member of the task force observed Hutson exit a Best Western Hotel in Denton and meet appellant, who was driving a white Cadillac. On August 15, 2013, Sergeant Nichols, who had been in daily contact by cell phone with Cl# 3, spoke to Cl# 3 who said that appellant was in the Ridgely area, that he/she had witnessed appellant make two hand-to-hand transactions, and that appellant was sitting in a white Cadillac parked in front of an apartment complex. Sergeant Nichols went to the area to verify the information but by the time he arrived, he only observed appellant leaving the area in a white Cadillac.

On August 20, 2013, Sergeant Nichols was involved in the traffic stop of a car driven by Hutson in which appellant was a passenger. The car, however, did not stop immediately and a plastic bag was seen being tossed from the passenger side of the car before the car stopped. A K-9 positively alerted to the ear. A search of the car and the area where the bag was tossed yielded negative results.

Appellant was searched but no drugs were recovered, although appellant had over $1,000, mostly in $20 denominations, on his person. Appellant again provided the American Corner address as his home address. On September 17, 2013, Sergeant Nichols received information from Cl# 3 that appellant would be attending “drug classes” in a building behind the Easton Wal-Mart, that he would be driving a purple Jetta, and that he would be in possession of drugs. Sergeant Nichols set up a surveillance of the area, saw appellant enter a purple Jetta that the sergeant then followed.

The sergeant stopped the vehicle and arrested appellant for driving on a revoked license. Appellant and his car was searched but only $1,356 was recovered from appellant’s person. Appellant was taken to the Easton Barrack for processing and strip searched. Appellant was told to turn around, bend over, and spread his “butt cheeks.” When appellant did so, Sergeant Nichols observed a plastic baggie containing an off-white brown substance protruding from appellant’s ¹⁷² anus.

The sergeant was unable to retrieve the baggie because appellant clenched his buttock muscles. The sergeant obtained a search and seizure body cavity warrant, which was executed at a local hospital. A baggie, containing two additional baggies of heroin and crack cocaine, was removed from appellant’s anus. The application also stated that Cl #1, #2, and # 3, who were unaware that the others were providing information to the police about appellant, had provided information on other unrelated subjects that had been true and accurate and had never provided false or misleading information.

Additionally, Sergeant Nichols averred in the application that he knew, through his training and experience, that drug dealers often will not sell directly from their residence or the place they stash their supply and proceeds so as to insulate themselves from police, rival drug dealers, and customers. The affidavit also listed appellant’s criminal history: November 23, 2005, arrest in Easton for manufacture/distribute CDS; November 4, 2005, arrest in Wicomico for possession of marijuana and paraphernalia; February 27, 2003, arrest in Denton for disorderly conduct, and obstruct and hinder; October 9, 2001, arrest in Easton for possession of marijuana and paraphernalia; and June 5, 2001, arrest in Berlin for possession of CDS not-marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and handgun in a vehicle. The search warrant for appellant’s residence was granted at 3:25 a.m., and executed about an hour later. The house was unoccupied and the officers made a forced entry.

The sergeant testified that he believed that he had authority to execute the warrant. Drugs and firearms were recovered from the house. Appellant testified at the suppression hearing in support of his motion. He testified about the experience of the strip search.

He testified that following his arrest, he was taken to the Easton Barrack where he was told to remove his clothes. Four other officers were in the room, and they stared at him. He testified that he did initially spread his butt cheeks when asked, but when asked to do so again, he said no. At that point, officers grabbed his arms and “they” started “digging in ¹⁷³ my buttocks.” Appellant resisted.

He testified that the house on American Corner belonged to his father, and although it was “technically” his address and he “occasionally” stayed there, he “normally” stayed at his girlfriend’s home. At the conclusion of the testimony, defense counsel argued, among other things, that the traffic stop turned into an impermissible cavity search. The State disagreed. After hearing both parties’ arguments, the suppression court denied appellant’s motion to suppress.

The court found the sergeant’s testimony “to be credible[.]” The court found the stop and arrest valid. The court found the initial search of appellant and the car as a valid search incident to arrest. The court then stated that as part of the processing for the arrest, a strip search was performed. The court did not specifically state whether the strip search was legal but in conclusion stated that the issuing magistrate in Caroline County had a substantial basis to believe that items of illegality would be found at appellant’s residence.

I. Appellant argues that the suppression court erred in denying his motion to suppress the items seized pursuant to the execution of the residential search warrant. He argues that the strip search was illegal because the police did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that he had secreted drugs in his anal cavity and the manner in which the search was conducted was unreasonable. He argues that when the tainted strip search evidence (the drugs) is excluded from the residential warrant, the warrant lacks probable cause to support the search of his home. He argues that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply because “no reasonably well-trained police officer-could have relied on the warrant[.]” The State responds that neither the strip search nor the manner of the strip search were illegal, but even if they were, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.

Therefore, the suppression court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. ¹⁷⁴ A. Was the strip search legal? To answer the question presented on appeal, we must first untangle and wade through several different legal theories. We shall begin with the law regarding search warrants and work our way to the legality of the strip search. When confronted with whether a search warrant is legal, the question before us ordinarily is “whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis to conclude that the warrant was supported by probable cause.” Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 667 , 898 A.2d 961 (2006)(citation omitted).

To determine whether the issuing judge had a “substantial basis,” we do not apply “a de novo standard of review, but rather a deferential one.” Id. We apply a deferential standard because of the preference for search warrants. Because a search warrant provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, we have expressed a strong preference for warrants and declared that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall. Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according great deference to a magistrate’s determination.

Id. at 668 , 898 A.2d 961 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984))(quota-tion marks omitted). The different tasks of an issuing court and a reviewing court in this context have been explained as follows: The task of the issuing judge is to reach a practical and common-sense decision, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, as to whether there exists a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular search. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , ¹⁷⁵ 238-39 .., (1983). The duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the issuing judge had a “substantial basis for ... concluding] that probable cause existed.” Id. ...

The U.S. Supreme Court explained in Gates that the purpose of this standard of review is to encourage the police to submit to the warrant process. Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 n. 10[.] Id. at 667-68, 898 A.2d 961 (some citations omitted). When we review the basis of the issuing judge’s probable cause finding, we ordinarily apply the “four corners rule” and “confine our consideration of probable cause solely to the information provided in the warrant and its accompanying application documents.” Id. at 669 , 898 A.2d 961 (citations omitted). There are limited circumstances when we deviate from the rule and look to evidence outside of the warrant and its affidavit.

Those circumstances occur when a defendant makes a required showing for a Franks hearing 4 or where the warrant is undecipherable. Id. at 669 , 898 A.2d 961 . Additionally, “evidence derived as a result of a prior illegal search or seizure, or knowledge gained through such a search and seizure, cannot be used as a valid basis to justify the existence of probable cause in a subsequent application for a search and seizure warrant.” Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 481 , 337 A.2d 100 (1975)(citations omitted). See also Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 438-39 , 337 A.2d 415 (1975)(any information gathered from an earlier illegality cannot be exploited and used as derivative evidence in an application for a search and seizure warrant).

To do otherwise “would permit the prosecution to use knowledge acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment and ‘gained by its own wrong.’ ” Id. at 439 , 337 A.2d 415 . The Everhart court explained: The doctrine of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” extends the scope of the exclusionary rule to bar not only evidence directly seized, but also evidence indirectly obtained as a result of information learned or leads obtained in the unlaw ¹⁷⁶ ful search; in its broadest sense it prohibits the prosecution from using in any manner, prejudicial to the accused, information derived from facts learned as a result of the unlawful acts of law enforcement agents. Once a defendant, with requisite standing, has timely and factually asserted that the challenged evidence was derived from information obtained in an unlawful search and seizure, the court must afford him an opportunity to explore in detail the circumstances under which the evidence was acquired; if the defendant establishes that the evidence resulted from an unlawful search and seizure such evidence cannot be used at all unless the prosecution can convince the trial court that it had an independent origin or that the information gained in the unlawful search did not lead directly or indirectly to the discovery of the challenged evidence. Id. at 481-82 , 337 A.2d 100 (citations omitted).

Having set out the law regarding search warrants, we now turn to the legality of the strip search. There are at least three categories 5 of a strip search: A “strip search,” though an umbrella term, generally refers to an inspection of a naked individual, without any scrutiny of the subject’s body cavities. A “visual body cavity search” extends to a visual inspection of the anal and genital areas. A “manual body cavity search” includes some degree of touching or probing of body cavities.

Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341, 352 , 924 A.2d 308 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1071 , 128 S.Ct. 709 , 169 L.Ed.2d 571 (2007). A visual body cavity search “does not involve the police probing into such a cavity.” State v. Harding, 196 Md.App. 384, 412 , 9 A.3d 547 (2010), cert. denied, 418 Md. 398 , 15 A.3d 299 , cert. denied, 565 ¹⁷⁷ U.S. 826, 132 S.Ct. 118 , 181 L.Ed.2d 42 (2011). However, if an investigator attempts to retrieve a plastic baggy seen protruding from the anus or if an investigator attempts to spread “the cheeks of a recalcitrant searchee’s buttocks[,]” who “stubbornly refuses to perform that operation for himself[,]” the search is still a visual body cavity search because the seizure is “simply a permissible seizure under the Plain View Doctrine.” Id. at 412-14, 9 A.3d 547 . Cf.

Paulino, 399 Md. at 353-54 , 924 A.2d 308 (where officer manipulated the accused’s buttocks to allow for a better view of his anal cavity and in doing so observed a plastic bag containing drugs, the conduct amounted to a visual body cavity search)(footnotes omitted). In contrast, a manual body cavity search generally involves the intrusion of the anal or vaginal cavity and should be “normally entrusted only to a gynecologist or proctologist” because of hygienic and medical concerns. Harding, 196 Md.App. at 414-15 , 9 A.3d 547 . Here, a visual body cavity search occurred.

When a person has been arrested for a minor traffic offense unrelated to any drugs, and a search incident to arrest balloons into a strip search, to determine whether the strip search was legal we look to the four-factor balancing test set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 589 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Paulino, 399 Md. at 354-55 , 924 A.2d 308 . The four factors include: “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Id. at 355 , 924 A.2d 308 (quotation marks and citations omitted). We take a “flexible approach” in balancing the four factors, “one that takes into account the relative strength of each factor” and “balance[s] the need for a particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Id.

(quotation marks and citations omitted). As to the first factor, we agree with appellant that a visual body cavity search by its nature is intrusive and demeaning. See Paulino, 399 Md. at 356 , 924 A.2d 308 (“searches that entail the inspection of the anal and/or genital areas have been accurately described as demeaning, dehumanizing, undig ¹⁷⁸ nified, humiliating, embarrassing, repulsive, degrading, and extremely intrusive of one’s personal privacy”)(quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). We shall address together the second factor (the manner in which the search was conducted) and the closely associated fourth factor (the place where it was conducted).

Appellant argues that the search was not conducted in a reasonable manner because the barrack room was not "suitably private”: he was forced to disrobe in front of several officers; the officers engaged in physical force when they grabbed and bent him over the counter and dug into his buttocks resulting in the sergeant’s hand going into his anus; and he had to sit naked for the hour it took the sergeant to obtain a warrant to have medical personnel intervene. Although the suppression court recounted little detail in its fact finding concerning the strip search, we defer to the suppression court’s fact finding that the sergeant’s testimony was credible and that “[a]t a point where the officer or trooper asked the Defendant to spread his buttocks, the officer saw what he believed to be a foreign substance.” Additionally, we note that although there were four officers present, the search took place in a secure area of a police barrack, not a public area. Under the circumstances presented, we believe that the manner and place where the search took place was reasonable. Cf.

Moore v. State, 195 Md.App. 695, 719 , 7 A.3d 617 (2010)(up-holding visual body cavity search conducted in private room at the police station in the presence of two male officers), cert. denied, 418 Md. 192 , 13 A.3d 799 (2011), and Paulino, 399 Md. at 360 , 924 A.2d 308 (invalidating visual body cavity search conducted in a well-lit area at night near a car wash in public view). Turning to the third factor, we are persuaded that the strip search was justified—that there was “a particularized reasonable belief that evidence of the crime [would] be found on (or in) the body of the suspect.” Harding, 196 Md.App. at 421 , 9 A.3d 547 . See also State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 595-96 , 861 A.2d 62 (2004)(in determining whether the strip search ¹⁷⁹ was justified, we ask whether the police had reasonable articu-lable suspicion to believe that evidence of criminal activity would be found in the place searched). We shall briefly relate the law concerning reasonable articulable suspicion.

We are mindful that the concept of reasonable articulable suspicion is not governed by a particular test but is “purposefully [ ] fluid because ... [it] is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Holt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 459 , 78 A.3d 415 (2013)(quotation marks and citations omitted). Reasonable articulable suspicion has been described as “ ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 128 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)). It has also been described as a “ ‘common sense, nontechnical conception that considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent people act.’ ” Id. at 460, 78 A.3d 415 (quoting Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 507 , 970 A.2d 894 (2009))(quotation marks and citation omitted).

The required level of suspicion is less demanding than that for probable cause, but “nevertheless embraces something more than an ‘inchoate and unpartic-ularized suspicion or hunch.’ ” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). In determining whether an officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting illegal wrongdoing, we look to the “totality of the circumstances” of each case. Id.

This process involves “two interdependent analytical techniques[.]” Id. First, the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations ... and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions— inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person. ...

The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just ¹⁸⁰ described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court in Terry v. Ohio, [ 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)] ..., said that, “[t]his demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 460-61, 78 A.3d 415 (quotation marks and citations omitted). According to Holt : We therefore assess the evidence through the prism of an experienced law enforcement officer, and “give due deference to the training and experience of the ... officer who engaged the stop at issue.” Crosby, 408 Md. at 508 , 970 A.2d 894 ... Cartnail [v. State ], 359 Md. [272] at 288, 753 A.2d 519 [ (2000) ] ...

(quoting [U.S. v.] Cortez, 449 U.S. [411] at 418, 101 S.Ct. 690 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ](noting that the evidence “must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement”). We, of course, recognize that the deference we afford police officers is not without limits. We do not “rubber stamp conduct simply because [an] officer believed he had the right to engage in it” and “there must be an articulated logic to which this Court can defer,” Crosby, 408 Md. at 509 , 970 A.2d 894 [.] Id. at 461, 78 A.3d 415 (some quotation marks and citations omitted). In determining whether the strip search here was justified, we find the analysis in Harding, supra, and Nieves, supra, informative.

In Harding , Harding was strip searched following an arrest for possession of drugs. We were asked to decide on appeal whether the strip search was justified, specifically, whether there was reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that drugs would be found in or on Harding’s person. In that case, in September 2009, a detective in the Vice and Narcotics Section of the Baltimore County Police Department received information from a “ Very reliable informant,’ ” whom the police had used for five to six months and who had provided ¹⁸¹ reliable information in other eases that had led to numerous CDS arrests and search warrants, that Harding was selling crack cocaine from a blue Audi in the Towson area. Harding, 196 Md.App. at 436 , 9 A.3d 547 .

A detective in the same unit had received a complaint two to three months earlier that Harding was selling crack at a liquor store. We noted on appeal that both complaints identified Harding as a seller not a user, a factor in deciding whether there was reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that Harding was hiding his “stash on or in the body.” Id. at 436 , 9 A.3d 547 . Eight days after the September information, the police observed Harding driving the described Audi in a Towson neighborhood, and subsequently stopped him for traveling 50 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone. Id. at 389, 436 , 9 A.3d 547 .

As part of the routine traffic stop, a K-9 unit was called and twice, positively alerted to the presence of drugs in the car. Id. at 390 , 9 A.3d 547 . Although no drugs were found in the car or on Harding’s person, the police recovered $1,474 in cash from Harding’s pockets. Id. at 395 , 9 A.3d 547 .

Based on his training and experience that persons in possession of drugs will often secrete or conceal drugs on their body, the detective had Harding transported to a police station to insure maximum privacy during the strip search. Id. at 396, 437 , 9 A.3d 547 . As Harding removed his pants, a baggie of crack cocaine dropped out of the pants and fell to the floor. Id.

We found that the positive dog alert furnished probable cause for Harding’s subsequent arrest and subsequent strip search. Id. Accordingly, we stated that that under the circumstances presented, “[w]e have no difficulty in holding that the particularized suspicion standard for a strip search was satisfied in this case.” Id. at 435 , 9 A.3d 547 . See also Fontaine v. State, 135 Md.App. 471, 475-82 , 762 A.2d 1027 (2000)(we held a strip search was justified and reasonable where accused, who was arrested for driving on a suspended license, was fidgeting and attempted to place an object in his pants during the police encounter, during a search of the vehicle trace amounts of marijuana were found throughout the vehicle, and the police ¹⁸² had prior information that the accused normally concealed contraband in his pants).

In Nieves , the Court of Appeals found a strip search of Nieves unreasonable following his arrest for a minor traffic violation (driving without a valid driver’s license) where the only particularized belief for the strip search was that Nieves had prior drug arrests and, at the time of his arrest on the traffic violation, he was driving the truck of a missing female who had a history of drug involvement. Nieves, 383 Md. at 596-98 , 861 A.2d 62 . Turning to the facts of our case, we are persuaded that Sergeant Nichols had reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the strip search. The sergeant, who the suppression court found credible, testified that he believed criminal activity was afoot and decided to strip search appellant based on appellant’s nervousness, the large sum of cash found on his person, the information from the Cl# 3, and his prior contact with appellant.

Evidence of appellant’s demeanor (sweating even though the day was temperate, heavy breathing, and bulging neck muscles) while not sufficient in itself is but one reed on which the sergeant could rely in finding reasonable articulable suspicion. See State v. Darden, 93 Md.App. 373, 345 , 612 A.2d 339 , cert. denied, 328 Md. 447 , 614 A.2d 974 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 957 , 113 S.Ct. 2459 , 124 L.Ed.2d 673 (1993)(evidence that the accused was “shaking” and “sweating profusely” when stopped by the police is important in a reasonable articulable suspicion analysis, but by itself is “too slender a reed” to support reasonable articulable suspicion for investigatory stop of accused by police). Likewise, the sergeant’s recovery of a large sum of cash from appellant’s person pursuant to a search incident to arrest, is not sufficient by itself but one reed on which the sergeant could rely in forming reasonable articula-ble suspicion. Although the sergeant did not testify at the suppression hearing about any specific prior contact he had with appellant, the State argues that we should consider the “substantial ¹⁸³ information known to Sergeant Nichols at the time of the arrest” as found in the warrant application.

We agree that in the unusual circumstances presented we can rely on the sergeant’s contact and extensive knowledge about appellant at the time he arrested him as related in the application in support of the search warrant. This is because the sergeant was the directing officer of the arrest and strip search as well as the affiant on the residential search warrant which was admitted into evidence. We can clearly impute to the sergeant at the time of the strip search those items listed in the search warrant of which the sergeant had direct or personal knowledge. We further note that only a few hours elapsed between when the strip search occurred and the residential search warrant was obtained, and all of the information related in the warrant application was known before the strip search occurred. 6 The warrant application provided information about the sergeant’s personal contact with appellant.

Specifically, several months before the strip search, the sergeant arrested a person for drug-related crimes and that person informed the sergeant that appellant supplied him with heroin, and that appellant was very cautious about his business. A month later, the sergeant was involved in a traffic stop of appellant and Drum- ¹⁸⁴ mond and another where the officers had been tipped off that occupants were in possession of drugs. Although a K-9 made a positive alert for drugs, and all three occupants were nervous and had over $1,000 in cash on them each, a search incident to arrest produced no drugs. A week later, the sergeant arrested appellant on an outstanding warrant, and pursuant to a search incident to arrest found a straw and folded dollar bill that contained suspected Oxycodone residue on them.

Less than a month before the strip search, the sergeant caused appellant’s car to be stopped during which a plastic bag was thrown out of the passenger side. Again, a K-9 made a positive alert on the car but a search of the vehicle yielded negative results as did a search of the area where the plastic bag was thrown. Additionally, little more than a month before the strip search, the sergeant was contacted by Cl# 3 and remained in daily contact with him up until the time of appellant’s arrest. Cl# 3 told the sergeant that appellant was “the largest source” of heroin supplied in Caroline County and confirmed that Drummond was involved in appellant’s drug dealing activities.

A week or so later, Cl# 3 contacted the sergeant and stated that he had observed appellant make two hand-to-hand drug transactions in a described area and was now sitting in a described car. When the sergeant arrived, appellant was seen leaving the area in the described car. The facts of this case are much closer to Harding, supra, than to Nieves, supra. At the time of the arrest, appellant was nervous and had a large sum of cash on his person.

The sergeant had extensive knowledge of appellant and his drug dealing: he had information from two sources that appellant sold heroin; the sergeant was involved in two recent traffic stops of appellant where a K-9 had given positive alerts but no drugs were found; and the sergeant had recently discovered drug paraphernalia on appellant’s person. Additionally, Cl# 3, whom the sergeant had been working with, and had daily contact with for over a month, informed the sergeant that appellant would be making drug drops upon leaving a certain area at a certain time. When we take into consideration the modes or patterns of certain kinds of drug dealings, ¹⁸⁵ and weighing all the information as understood by someone versed in law enforcement, we are persuaded that this is not a situation where the sergeant had an “unparticularized suspicion or hunch” but where the sergeant had reasonable articu-lable suspicion to justify the strip search. Weighing the Bell v. Wolfish, supra, factors, three of the factors weigh in favor of the State—the manner in which the search was conducted, where the search was conducted, and that the search was justified—and only one factor—the intrusiveness of the search—weighs in favor of appellant.

Taking into account the relative strength of each factor and balancing the need to ferret out crime against the invasion of personal rights, we are persuaded that the strip search here was reasonable and legal. B. Did the issuing magistrate for the residential