Williams v. Work

KENNEY, Judge. These consolidated appeals involve a single decedent and two suits with different plaintiffs, multiple defendants, and both wrongful death and under-insured motorist claims. Their resolution has led us into the “largely unmapped swamp” 1 of use plaintiffs in wrongful death actions and the appropriate protection of statutory beneficiaries in court-approved settlements that do not make provisions for all known beneficiaries. Steven Williams, a minor, through his mother and next friend Donna Schrack (“Donna”), and Michael C. Williams (referred to as “Steven” and “Michael”), appellants and cross-appellees, appeal the denial by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of their motion to reopen the judgment entered in Lori Williams v. Ace American Ins.

Co., No. 03-C-03-005338 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore County, May 17, 2005), No. 01652 (Sept. 2006) in this Court (“Williams I”), and to consolidate that action with their later filed action, Steven L. Williams, et al. v. Work, et al, No. 03-C-05-007925 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore County Sept. 27, 2006), No. 01653 (Sept. 2006) in this Court (“Williams II”). Williams I was an action involving the death of Michael Dwayne Williams (“the decedent”), in which the court approved a settlement that made no financial provision for Steven or Michael, two sons of the decedent. Williams II was also an action for the death of the decedent. Steven and ⁴⁴² Michael appeal the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the alleged tortfeasors and their insurance providers in Williams II.

In Williams II, Ace American Insurance Co. (“Ace”) has filed a cross-appeal of the circuit court’s denial of its motion for attorney’s fees and costs. We have consolidated and rephrased the questions presented. 2 Steven and Michael ask: I. Did the circuit court err by denying their motion to reopen the judgment in Williams I and consolidate the wrongful death claims of all the primary beneficiaries?

II

Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment in favor of all defendants in Williams II? Ace asks: Did the circuit court err in finding that Williams II was not brought in bad faith or without substantial justification and, ⁴⁴³ for that reason, denying Ace’s request for attorneys’ fees and other legal expenses related to defending Williams II? For the following reasons, we shall vacate the proposed settlement and the judgment based on that settlement in Williams I; reverse the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to all defendants and affirm the denial of attorney’s fees to Ace in Williams IP, and remand both cases to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On September 12, 2002, the decedent, an employee of Fireguard Corporation (“Fireguard”), stopped his work vehicle on the shoulder of 1-95 in Howard County, Maryland, and flagged down Charles Beatty, III (“Beatty”), whom he knew from prior employment.

Beatty was operating a truck provided to him by his employer, American Automatic Sprinkler Systems, Inc. (“American Sprinkler”). 3 Beatty stopped his vehicle on the shoulder of the highway behind the vehicle driven by the decedent. After the decedent exited his vehicle to speak with Beatty, another driver on the highway, William C. Work (“Work”), lost control of his vehicle and struck the decedent. The decedent died before emergency personnel reached the scene. At the time of the accident, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) insured Work; Ace insured Fireguard; and State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“State Auto”) insured American Sprinkler.

The decedent was survived by his wife, Lori Williams (“Lori”), and their children, Shane (three years old at the time of his death) and Jeremy (ten months old at the time of his ⁴⁴⁴ death). He was also survived by his children by a previous marriage to Donna: Michael (sixteen years old at the time of his death) and Steven (nine years old at the time of his death). After State Farm, on behalf of Work, offered the policy limit of $100,000, Lori, individually, as the personal representative of the decedent and on behalf of Shane and Jeremy, brought Williams I, 4 seeking payment of under-insured motorist benefits from Ace. 5 Steven and Michael were not named as plaintiffs or as use plaintiffs. Ace, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against Work for subrogation and in ⁴⁴⁵ damnification.

The court granted Work’s motion to strike the third-party complaint. 6 ⁴⁴⁴ to afford the tort feasor some repose from numerous lawsuits arising out of the death [which] would be defeated if these actions were allowed, as each defendant would have the right to hale the tort feasor into court anon. In this second action, the Schrack action, each of the defendants, as allegedly liable to the plaintiffs in contract, have the right to seek indemnnity [sic] against the original tort feasor; thus, despite his apparent earlier settlement, he remains answerable in tort, and at risk for a multitude of claims arising out of this incident, despite the mandate of the wrongful death statute. The application of the Wrongful Death Statute and Rule 15-1001 to an underinsured motorist contract claim was not raised or addressed in the circuit court and is not addressed in this Opinion. See Walker v. Essex, 318 Md. 516, 523 , 569 A.2d 645 (1990); Rules Committee, minutes, p. 12 (September 9-10, 1988). ⁴⁴⁵ Arguing that the decedent was not covered under the Omnibus Clause of the Ace insurance policy and that there was no evidence of “pre-impact fright” or “post-impact pain and suffering” to support recovery in a survival action, Ace moved for summary judgment.

Lori opposed that motion and moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of Work’s liability and the decedent’s contributory negligence. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Lori on the issues of coverage under Ace’s uninsured motorist policy for pre-impact fright and post-impact pain and suffering should either be awarded. Thereafter, the parties in Williams I entered into settlement discussions. The parties were aware that Steven and Michael were the decedent’s children, and, because the underlying liability of its insured involved the wrongful death of the decedent, in addition to a survival action, Ace, represented by Edward J. Lopata, insisted that all of the primary beneficiaries be joined in the action as required by the Maryland Wrongful Death Act.

See Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 3-904 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“Cts. & Jud. Proe.”). Brian Bennett, counsel for Lori, Shane, and Jeremy, drafted a Second Amended Complaint naming Steven and Michael as “use plaintiffs.” That complaint was mailed to Steven and Michael, and, on April 11, 2005, it was served on Schrack.

There is, however, no evidence that the Second Amended Complaint was actually filed with the court. The record does not include a Second Amended Complaint. There is no docket ⁴⁴⁶ entry of its filing, and Steven and Michael are not listed as “use plaintiffs” or parties of any sort in the docket entries. Ace filed an answer to the Second Amended Complaint on April 15, 2005, which is included in the record, but there is no docket entry for that, either.

On May 19, 2005, the parties to Williams I (Lori and her children as plaintiffs and Ace as the defendant) filed a Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement and Entry of Judgment. Relevant to this appeal, the Settlement Agreement included the following language: 9. The parties are in agreement that the Estate of Michael Williams does not have a viable claim given that he suffered an instantaneous death and had no conscious pain and suffering. In addition, all funeral expenses have been reimbursed from a related workmen’s compensation claim and that, as a result, the Estate of Michael Williams, has effectively no viable and compensable claim. 10.

The parties are also aware that a tortfeasor, William Work, tendered his policy limits of $100,000. The total recovery for the death of Mr. Michael Williams is, therefore, $850,000, with Defendant’s, [Ace], settlement of $750,000 and Defendant’s, William Work, previous settlement and payment of $100,000 to [Lori], individually and as mother and next friend of Jeremy Williams and Shane Williams, minors. 13. A Confidential Release and Settlement Agreement has been prepared by [Ace’s] counsel. The parties wish to enter into such an agreement, and request prior court approval because of the requirements of Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 3-904(c), regarding the proportionment of funds to potential “beneficiaries[,]” ie.

Claimants and/or “Use” Plaintiffs, and of the instructions of Walker vs. Essex, 318 Md. 516 , 569 A.2d 645 (1990), requiring the joinder of all potential beneficiaries to this single wrongful death action and their mutual consent to settlement or this court’s approval of the settlement. In this case, all Plaintiffs, ⁴⁴⁷ including “Use” Plaintiffs, Michael Williams and Steven Williams, have been formally notified of the pendency of this action, both by certified mail and by personal service of process; more than SO days elapsed since the service of that process; and the “Use” Plaintiffs have not sought or done any act to join this action. [Lon], individually and on behalf of her minor children, Jeremy Williams and Shane Williams, along with [Ace], seek to foreclose the possibility that the “Use” Plaintiffs, Michael Williams and Steven Williams, shall make future claims against either Defendant, [Ace] or William Work, or Plaintiffs, Lori Williams, Jeremy Williams, Shane Williams and/or the Estate of Michael Williams. (Emphasis added.) This language in the Settlement Agreement identified Steven and Michael as “use plaintiffs” in the action, but, again, nothing in the record documents that any complaint designating them as plaintiffs (of any kind) was ever filed. The Joint Motion stated that, of the “total recovery” of $850,000 “for the death” of the decedent, $283,333, in addition to $4,000 in costs, was to be paid to Bennett as counsel for Lori, Shane, and Jeremy.

The remainder would be divided as follows: 50% ($281,000) to Lori; and 25% ($140,500) each to Jeremy and Shane, by way of a structured settlement. No compensation was provided to Michael or Steven, the ostensible use plaintiffs, and, according to the Settlement Agreement, the parties intended “to foreclose the possibility” that Steven and Michael would bring any future claims against any of the parties. The court approved the settlement and entered judgment on May 19, 2005. The judgment is expressly in favor of Lori, Jeremy, and Shane, against Ace, and makes no reference to Steven or Michael.

The last paragraph states that, upon payment of open costs, “any and all claims stemming from the death of [the decedent], as a result of a motor tort ... on September 12, 2002, shall be and hereby will be deemed ‘SATISFIED IN FULL.’ ” The docket entries for Williams I reflect that copies of the judgment were mailed to the parties ⁴⁴⁸ pursuant to Rule 1-324. 7 Steven and Michael were not named on the record as plaintiffs or use plaintiffs, and they were not mailed a copy of the judgment. Lori filed a Line of Satisfaction of Judgment on June 16, 2005, requesting the Clerk of the Court to enter the judgment “against Defendant Ace American Insurance Company as ‘paid and satisfied.’ ” Five weeks later, on July 21, 2005, Bennett, now representing Steven, through Donna, as his next friend, and Michael, filed suit against Work, State Auto, and Zurich, seeking damages for the wrongful death of their father (Williams II). On August 15, 2005, an amended complaint was filed, adding Ace, Beatty, and American Sprinkler as defendants. Ace responded with a third-party complaint against Lori, who filed a motion for summary judgment.

Almost a year went by. On June 30, 2006, Bennett, on behalf of Steven and Michael, filed a motion in Williams I to reopen that case and to consolidate it with Williams II. They asserted that, as primary wrongful death beneficiaries, who did not receive any compensation and who had not consented to the settlement in Williams I, they are entitled to recover for the wrongful death of their father. Ace filed an opposition, as did American Sprinkler and Beatty.

On August 3, 2006, the court, without a hearing, denied the motion to reopen and consolidate. The order was docketed on August 8, 2006. On August 15, 2006, Steven and Michael filed a Motion to Alter or Amend, which the court denied, without a hearing, on September 9, 2006. On September 27, 2006, ⁴⁴⁹ Bennett filed a notice of appeal for Steven and Michael and in Williams I. In the meantime, in Williams II, discovery had been undertaken, including depositions of Donna and Michael.

Each testified that, upon receiving the ostensible Second Amended Complaint in Williams I, they contacted Bennett’s office but were told that, because he represented Lori, he could not speak to them about the case. 8 Eventually, they became aware that money had been paid to Lori, Shane, and Jeremy for the decedent’s death. They did not want to disturb that payment but they too wanted to recover (Donna for Steven and Michael for himself) for the death. They made plain that they never consented to a settlement in which they would receive nothing. Ultimately, in Williams II, Ace, American Sprinkler, Beatty and Zurich filed motions for summary judgment.

They argued that there can be only one cause of action for a wrongful death and, because Steven and Michael were aware of Williams I but did not act on their claims, their opportunity to recover for the wrongful death of their father was foreclosed. Ace also sought attorney’s fees under Rule 1-341, arguing that Williams II was commenced in bad faith or without substantial justification. 9 Steven and Michael opposed all of the ⁴⁵⁰ motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the court granted summary judgment to each defendant but denied Ace’s motion for attorney’s fees. Steven and Michael, still represented by Bennett, noted this appeal in Williams II. ⁴⁴⁹ Based on the specific language of Maryland’s Wrongful Death Statute ..., Maryland's Rule 15-1001, and the pleadings prepared and filed by [Lori’s counsel] in his earlier lawsuit, [Lori’s counsel] knew that ⁴⁵⁰ any claims that the two "use” plaintiffs may have had were extinguished by the earlier Court-approved judgment, the payment and satisfaction of that judgment, and the executed release.

WILLIAMS I DISCUSSION We begin with Ace’s contention that “the appeal by Steven and Michael [] of the denial of the motions to reopen and consolidate and to alter or amend the final judgment filed in ['Williams i\ must be dismissed.” Ace argues: “These motions necessarily involve the May 19, 2005, final enrolled judgment entered in [Williams 7] because it is only through disturbance of this judgment that [Williams 7] could be “reopened” so that [Williams 77] could somehow be litigated.” According to Ace, Steven and Michael’s appeal in Williams I is “simply impermissible under Maryland Rule 8-202(a) [which] requires that a ‘notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry and enrollment of judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.’ ” Steven and Michael argue that the circuit court should have reopened Williams I under its revisory power and Rule 2-535(b). They characterize the settlement in Williams I as “a type of extrinsic fraud upon the ability of [Steven and Michael] to litigate their otherwise viable wrongful death claim.” 10 According to Ace, “[t]hese allegations were not made in either the motion to reopen and consolidate or the motion to alter or amend judgment.” We agree that Rule 2-535 was not expressly invoked, but, at the time that the Motion to Reopen ⁴⁵¹ and Consolidate was before the circuit court, counsel for both Lori and Ace apparently assumed that the Second Amended Complaint had been filed and that Steven and Michael had been designated as “use plaintiffs.” 11 The Motion to Reopen and Consolidate referred to Walker, 318 Md. at 516 , 569 A.2d 645 , and the need for “the consent of ‘primary’ beneficiaries or court approval” of a settlement agreement. The arguments presented direct our focus to the effect of a complaint naming Steven and Michael as use plaintiffs that was either never filed or, if filed, was somehow lost or misfiled. In either case, the complaint was not included in the record and its filing was not entered on the docket.

Nowhere are Steven and Michael identified on the record as use plaintiffs or as parties of any kind. Ace’s answer to the Second Amended Complaint was included in the record, but there is no docket entry reflecting its filing. Had they been designated as use plaintiffs, Steven and Michael, presumably, would have been entitled to receive a copy of the judgment recorded on May 19, 2005, and that, in turn, would have provided them with an opportunity to file a timely motion to vacate that judgment under Rule 2-535(a). ⁴⁵⁰ Fraud, mistake, irregularity. On motion of any party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. ⁴⁵¹ Bennett, who, when he represented Lori, undertook to file the Second Amended Complaint and who represented to Ace and the settlement judge that it had been filed, now asserts on behalf of Steven and Michael that the Second Amended Complaint was not filed.

On behalf of appellants, he contends: “[T]he failure to properly identify appellants as ‘use plaintiffs’ prohibits the court [from] having subject matter jurisdiction” to terminate, extinguish, or bar “appellants’ claim under the [Wrongful Death] Act.” 12 To be sure, whether Bennett failed ⁴⁵² to file the Second Amended Complaint or the Clerk’s Office failed to properly process the pleading, Rule 15-1001(b) has not been satisfied because, “whether or not they join[ed] in the action,” Steven and Michael were never “named as plaintiffs” in accordance with the Rule. Whereas the earlier practice required that wrongful death actions be brought by the State on behalf of all statutory beneficiaries, wrongful death “suits under causes of action arising within [the] state must now be filed in the name of the real parties in interest, rather than in the name of the State.” Robinson v. Lewis, 20 Md.App. 710, 714 , 317 A.2d 854 (1974). As we see it, Rule 15-1001 is in the nature of a joinder rule or a condition precedent that requires that all known statutory beneficiaries, ie., the real parties in interest, be identified as parties to the litigation. The Court of Appeals, in Walker , traced the current Wrongful Death Statute to the cause of action created for wrongful death by the English Parliament in “the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, also known as ‘Lord Campbell’s Act.’ ” 318 Md. at 522 , 569 A.2d 645 (citing 9 & 10 Vict.

C. 93). The Court highlighted the difference between the English statute and Maryland’s Wrongful Death Statute: “Under the English Statute the suit must be brought by the executor or administrator of the deceased for the use of the parties mentioned, while under our statute the suit is brought in the name of a person entitled to recover, and to the use of all such parties who may have an interest.” Id. at 523 , 569 A.2d 645 . ⁴⁵³ Then, turning its attention to § 3-904(b), which instructs that, “if a recovery or verdict is obtained in this one action, the amount recovered shall be ‘divided among the beneficiaries in shares directed by the verdict,’ ” id. at 523, 569 A.2d 645 , the Walker* Court stated: The statutory language does not allow a judgment for one of the beneficiaries to be made a matter of record, as by its very nature, other claims are forever foreclosed or barred. The trial judge in this case considered the claims of the beneficiaries to be severable. The statute does not.

A judgment should not have been entered in the circuit court unless it included the interests of all of the known beneficiaries. Additionally, the beneficiaries were children of tender years. Marcus was just six years of age. The circuit court, accordingly, should have been concerned all minor beneficiaries shared in the judgment and the available proceeds.

The judge obviously would not want to foreclose the interest or claim of Marcus. The entry of judgment, however, had precisely this effect. Id. at 524 , 569 A.2d 645 . The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case.

Id. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland cited Walker in Johnson v. Price, 191 F.Supp.2d 626 (D.Md.2001). In that case, Meghan Price was driving her grandfather, Carl Johnson, when they were struck by Justin Steyer. Both Johnson and Price died as a result of the accident.

Eloween Johnson, in her personal capacity and as personal representative for the estate of Carl Johnson, brought a survival action and a wrongful death action against Steyer and Karlyn Price, the personal representative of Meghan Price’s estate, based on diversity jurisdiction. Steyer and Meghan Price were residents of Maryland. Eloween Johnson was a resident of West Virginia. Id. at 627 .

Steyer moved to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction. He contended that because Karlyn Price, a Maryland resident, was the daughter of Carl Johnson, she was required to be ⁴⁵⁴ named as a “use plaintiff” in the wrongful death action brought by Eloween Johnson. As a “use plaintiff,” Steyer argued, Karlyn Price was a “real party in interest” and, therefore, a plaintiff, for the purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction. If Karlyn Price, a Maryland resident, was considered a plaintiff, the complete diversity necessary for diversity jurisdiction was lost.

Id. at 627-28 . Stating “[t]he well-established rule” that “a court assessing diversity jurisdiction must consider only the citizenship of those who are real and substantial parties in interest, disregarding the citizenship of merely nominal or formal parties,” the court addressed the question of whether a party named as a “use plaintiff” in a Maryland wrongful death action was a “real party in interest.” Id. at 628 . In dismissing the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction, the Price Court looked to “Maryland’s wrongful death statute” as the “relevant substantive law,” id. at 629 , stating: An examination of the Maryland statute and related case law reveals that Price has a real, legally cognizable interest in this wrongful death case, and, further, that her rights to wrongful death benefits for the death of her father must be adjudicated as part of the wrongful death suit brought by her mother. Maryland’s wrongful death statute explicitly permits only one wrongful death lawsuit to be brought by the beneficiaries of a decedent.

See Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 8 — 904(f); see also Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52 , 626 A.2d 353, 359 (Md.1993); Walker v. Essex, 318 Md. 516 , 569 A.2d 645, 647 (Md.1990). In that single action, the beneficiaries of the decedent — including the decedent’s spouse, parents, and children, who are considered “primary beneficiaries” — share any damages that are awarded in proportion to the injuries they suffered as a result of the decedent’s death. Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.

Proc. §§ 3-904(a), (c), (e). Maryland law thus makes clear that all beneficiaries in wrongful death lawsuits are the real parties in interest in these suits. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lewis, 20 Md.App. 710 , 317 A.2d 854, 857 (1974) (explaining that wrongful death ⁴⁵⁵ actions “must ... be filed in the name of the real parties in interest”). Indeed, if one of a decedent’s beneficiaries is absent from a wrongful death lawsuit, Maryland law requires that a judgment rendered in favor of the beneficiary or beneficiaries who did prosecute the suit be vacated.

See Walker, 569 A.2d at 648-49 . Therefore, even though Price is refusing to seek wrongful death damages as a result of her father’s death, Mrs. Johnson’s wrongful death suit will adjudicate Price’s rights, extinguishing her claim as to Defendant Steyer. By definition, then, she is one of the real parties in interest on the plaintiffs side of this action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a). Cf.

United States v. Verrier, 179 F.Supp. 336, 341 (D.Maine 1959) (finding “use plaintiff’ who had enforceable right under state law to be a real party in interest under Rule 17(a)). Although Rule 15 — 1001(b) does not require the statutory beneficiaries to formally join the litigation, “all persons who are or may be entitled by law to damages by reason of the wrongful death shall be named as plaintiffs.” The words “to the use of’ simply identify plaintiffs who have not formally joined the action, but, as real parties in interest, they are plaintiffs whose interests must be acknowledged and protected throughout the litigation. Robinson v. Lewis, 20 Md.App. 710, 714 , 317 A.2d 854 (1974) (“It should be noted that since the adoption of Md. Rule Q41, suits under causes of action arising within this state must now be filed in the name of the real parties in interest, rather than in the name of the State.”); and see Benjamin v. Union Carbide Corp., 162 Md.App. 173 , 873 A.2d 463 (2005), aff’d sub nom, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59 , 904 A.2d 511 (2006). Although Rule 15-1001(b) does not require formal joinder, the failure to include a known statutory beneficiary as a plaintiff or a “use plaintiff’ in a wrongful death action and to settle without providing for that beneficiary can be analogized to the failure to join a necessary party in an action where joinder is required.

In our view, because of the one action rule, the failure to do so is a “defect” or “mistake” of jurisdic ⁴⁵⁶ tional proportions in the proceeding, which may be raised at any time. See S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Kevin Willes Constr. Co., 382 Md. 524, 550 , 856 A.2d 626 (2004) (“Failure to join a necessary party constitutes a defect in the proceedings that cannot be waived by the parties, and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal”).

That would be true whether the failure to name the statutory beneficiary as a plaintiff or use plaintiff is attributed to a failure to file or to a clerk’s error in docketing a filed pleading. In a situation where no financial provisions were made for known beneficiaries, the former is in the nature of a jurisdictional mistake and the latter is an irregularity of process or procedure. Either would permit, and, in the circumstances of this case, require, opening the judgment to protect the interests of those beneficiaries. Here, it appears that the parties did undertake compliance with Rule 15-1001.

A copy of the unfiled complaint was sent to the parties and, though not required by the Rule, it was “served” on Donna. But, even if we treated Rule 15-1001 as having been substantially complied with, the result would again be the same. Rather than looking to Rule 2-535(b), we would, instead, conclude that the judgment of May 19, 2005, was not a final judgment under Walker v. Essex, 318 Md. 516 , 569 A.2d 645 (1990). We explain.

As in this case, Walker involved a “settlement of a civil suit brought under the Wrongful Death Statute.” Id. at 521 , 569 A.2d 645 . The decedent, Lupe Willardo Hawkins, Sr., was killed while riding as a passenger in a car owned by Joanne Lynette Dove and driven by Walter Essex. Id. Essex, who was alleged to be intoxicated, crashed into a Pepeo utility pole.

Hawkins left behind two infant sons, “Lupe Jr.” and “Marcus,” each by different mothers. Id. Lupe Jr.’s mother, as next friend of Lupe Jr., sued Hawkins and Dove. Dairyland Insurance Co. (“Dairyland”), at its request, was made a party to the action, as their insurer.

Id. at 519 , 569 A.2d 645 . During the settlement negotiations between Lupe Jr. and Dairyland, Dairyland’s attorney stated by letter that “he ⁴⁵⁷ would be seeking court approval” for settlement in the full amount of the insurance coverage, $20,000. Id. After the “settlement negotiations had been concluded,” Dairyland learned of the existence of Marcus, “the potential second beneficiary,” and “resisted settlement.” When it did, Lupe Jr. filed a “Motion for Judgment,” seeking to enforce the alleged settlement agreement by obtaining a judgment for the settlement amount.

He then filed an amended complaint which, unlike the previous complaint, named Marcus as a potential beneficiary. At the same time, Marcus through his grandmother, Joan Walker, sought to intervene in the case. In an August 18, 1987 hearing, the judge granted Marcus’ motion to intervene and Lupe Jr.’s motion for judgment..... Id. at 519-20 , 569 A.2d 645 .

Marcus then filed “his own complaint and a ‘Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment.’ ” Id. He appealed the denial of that motion, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to consideration of the case by this Court. Id. Before addressing the “central dispute,” the Court first “considered] whether the entry of a judgment by the trial court, to the exclusion of a co-beneficiary, is a final appealable order under Maryland Rules 2-602.” Id. at 520, 569 A.2d 645 .

To determine the issue, the Court examined Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3 — 904(f), which directs that “[o]nly one action under this subtitle lies in respect to the death of a person,” and Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-904(c), which proscribes that “[t]he amount recovered shall be divided among the beneficiaries in shares directed by the verdict.” Id. at 521, 569 A.2d 645 . Acknowledging that Marcus, the appellant in Walker, claimed that “he ha[d] been prejudiced, or effectively put out of court, upon entry of judgment for the co-beneficiary, Lupe, Jr.,” the Court cited Doehring v. Wagner, 311 Md. 272 , 533 A.2d 1300