Williamsport & Hagerstown Turnpike Co. v. Startzman

Boyd, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant was incorporated by chapter 125 of the laws of 1832 to make a turnpike road from Williamsport to Hagerstown. Section 12 of its charter clothed it with certain rights and powers held by turnpike companies incorporated by the Act of 1804, chapter 51, and provided that it “ shall be governed by the same regulations and be subject to the same fines, penalties and restrictions as the said companies now are when the same are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.” The appellees filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Washington County in pursuance of section 242 of Art. 23 of the Code of Public General Laws, as amended by the Act of 1894, chapter 607, alleging that the appellant had failed to keep its road in good repair at points designated in the petition and seeking, such relief as they are entitled to under the laws of this State. By authority of the Court the sheriff summoned a jury of six persons, as directed by the Act of 1894, and returned an inquisition, executed by said jurors, in which they found the road was out of repair at the points named, and had been for such times as are stated in the inquisition.

The appellant then filed an answer in which it demurred to the petition on the ground that the provisions in the ³⁶⁵ Code, and the amendment thereto, could not affect its charter and also made a motion to quash. After hearing the parties the Court below overruled the motion to quash, confirmed the inquisition and ordered “ that tolls shall not be charged by the Williamsport and Hagerstown Turnpike Company at the gate mentioned in the petition in this cause until the Williamsport and Hagerstown Turnpike Road shall be put in good order and repair.” No reservation was made in the charter giving the State power to repeal or amend it, nor did the Constitution then in force reserve the right to alter or amend charters of corporations, as subsequent Constitutions of this State have done. Section 303 of Art. 23 of the Code confers upon all corporations, whether formed under general or special laws, the benefit of that Article, and also makes them subject to the processes, remedies or proceedings by that Article authorized to be taken, by or against the corporations therein referred to, so far as they may be applicable. Section 242, as amended by the Act of 1894, is therefore clearly applicable to this company, unless it in some material way infringes upon the protection guaranteed to it by the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits the States from passing any laws impairing the obligations of contracts.

The question to be determined, therefore, is whether the Act of 1894 has so far altered or amended the charter oi the defendant as to impair the obligation of the contract between the State and the appellant. By the charter the State conferred valuable rights upon the company and at the same time imposed certain restrictions and duties upon it. One of its duties, of most importance to the public, is to keep the road “in good and perfect order and repair,” during the continuance of the corporation, as is expressly required by the Act of 1804, made part of the charter. If then the Legislature has provided machinery by which the appellant can be compelled to live up to its part of the contract, or surrender its right to collect tolls while it is in default, there can be no question about the right of those in ³⁶⁶ terested to make use of such machinery, unless the use of it will impair the contract itself or be expressly or impliedly prohibited by the charter.

It has frequently been held by this and other Courts that although there is a clearly defined distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy by which it may be enforced, the State cannot take away a remedy that is necessary to the enforcement of the contract, without furnishing some other adequate one, and it cannot under the name or guise of a remedy authorize proceedings that substantially affect the contract itself unless such power has been reserved. If the State had contracted with the appellant that in the event of its default in keeping the road in repair the remedy to compel it should be by some named method and by no other, then it might insist upon that method alone being used against it, as it would be a part of the contract itself, but this charter does not attempt in terms to exclude other remedies. The company is liable to those using the road for injuries occasioned by the want of repairs (Crowther's case, 63 Md. 558 ; Cassell’s case, 66 Md. 419 ; B. & R. Turnpike Road v. State, 71 Md. 573 ); the State could proceed by scire facias for the forfeiture of its chatter for non-user or misuser (W. & B. Turnpike Company v. State, 19 Md. 239 ), or the appellant could be indicted if the defective condition of the road amounted to a public nuisance (B. & Y Turnpike Road v. State, 63 Md. 573 ). But those remedies are tedious and do not furnish such speedy and summary relief as a complaint of this character requires.

This company was granted the privilege of collecting tolls from those using the road in consideration of its keeping it in good order and repair. If it fails to do that for a longer period than allowed by its charter, it has no right to exact tolls, and therefore the Legislature has provided a speedy method by which it can be determined whether it is thus in default. By section 26 of chapter 51 of the laws of 1804, it was provided that if a company subject to that law neglect to keep its road in good and perfect order for a space of fifteen days, on infor ³⁶⁷ mation being given to a Justice of the Peace of the neighborhood he shall issue a precept to be directed to a constable, commanding him to summon three disinterested persons to meet at the place in the road complained of. The justice and the persons summoned were then to inquire into the