Willis v. Ford

BERGER, J. This case arises out of an automobile accident involving two vehicles. One vehicle was owned and driven by appellant, Cherice Willis (“Ms.Willis”); the other vehicle was owned and driven by appellee, Derrick Ford (“Mr.Ford”). At the time of the accident, co-appellee Tylisha Ford (“Ms.Ford”) was a rear seat passenger in Mr. Ford’s vehicle. 1 The Fords filed a complaint for negligence against Ms. Willis on September 9, 2010 in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. After a two day trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the Fords, and awarded costs for medical bills and non-economic damages.

Ms. Willis filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and a Motion for New Trial. The circuit court denied the motions. This appeal followed. Ms. Willis presents two questions for review, which we have rephrased as follows: 1.

Whether the circuit court erred by denying Ms. Willis’ Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial. 2. Whether the circuit court erred by failing to provide a jury instruction regarding “Acts in Emergencies.” For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND An automobile accident occurred on or about May 8, 2010 at approximately 1:30 a.m. The accident occurred on Pennsylvania Avenue, at or close to the intersection of Walters Lane, in Suitland, Maryland.

Pennsylvania Avenue is a divided highway with two travel lanes on each side, as well as separate ⁷¹² lanes dedicated to right and left turning vehicles. The speed limit is 50 or 55 miles per hour. There are street lights along Pennsylvania Avenue, but it is not brightly lit. Pennsylvania Avenue is a busy highway at all times, both day and night.

On the night of the accident, Mr. Ford was driving a white Crown Victoria automobile with three passengers. One of the passengers, Ms. Ford, was seated in the right rear passenger seat. Mr. Ford drove with his exterior lights illuminated, and the car was operating properly. The Fords were traveling in the left travel lane on Pennsylvania Avenue when their vehicle stopped behind three other vehicles for a red traffic light at the intersection of Walters Lane.

There were two traffic lanes on the right side of Mr. Ford’s vehicle: a travel lane and a right turn lane. There was one traffic lane on the left side of Mr. Ford’s vehicle, which was a left turn lane. Beyond the left turn lane there was a grass median. Other vehicles traveled down the same lane of traffic and stopped behind Mr. Ford’s vehicle for the red traffic light.

When the traffic light turned green, Mr. Ford’s vehicle stalled. Mr. Ford testified that he turned on the vehicle’s hazard lights. Ms. Ford testified that she could hear the hazard lights clicking as she waited for Mr. Ford to restart the vehicle. 2 During that time, the traffic lights went through approximately three cycles. Numerous motorists drove around Mr. Ford’s stalled vehicle during that time.

The Fords (and the other passenger) remained inside the vehicle while Mr. Ford attempted to restart the vehicle. The Fords testified that they believed it was safer to stay in the vehicle than to step out into the roadway. Ms. Willis was driving a dark colored vehicle down Pennsylvania Avenue at a rate of speed of approximately 50 miles per hour. Ms. Willis testified that she was traveling behind a vehicle in the left lane on Pennsylvania Avenue.

She further testified that she observed the driver in front of her slam on ⁷¹³ the brakes and quickly swerve into the right lane. At that time, Ms. Willis saw the Fords’ vehicle stopped in the same lane ahead of her. Ms. Willis testified that she had no choice but to collide with the Fords’ vehicle. Ms. Willis’ vehicle then hit Mr. Ford’s vehicle from behind. 3 Both Mr. Ford and Ms. Ford testified that Ms. Willis was operating her vehicle without headlights while she was traveling down Pennsylvania Avenue.

Ms. Willis testified that her vehicle’s headlights were turned on prior to the collision, and that the lights went out after the collision because “the air bags went out, and that causes the car to go dead.” An independent witness, Beverly Yarborough (“Ms.Yarborough”), testified through taped testimony. 4 She testified that at the time of the accident, she was stopped in her vehicle on Walters Lane at the intersection of Pennsylvania Avenue. Ms. Yarborough observed Mr. Ford’s vehicle stopped in the left travel lane without any hazard lights or headlights. Ms. Yarborough testified that while she was stopped, she observed an SUV traveling in the left lane, which swerved into the right lane to avoid Mr. Ford’s stopped vehicle. Immediately after the SUV swerved, Ms. Willis’ vehicle collided into Mr. Ford’s vehicle from behind.

Ms. Yarborough testified that she did not believe Ms. Willis could see Mr. Ford’s stopped vehicle because of the SUV traveling in front of her. On or about September 9, 2010, the Fords sued Ms. Willis for negligence. The case proceeded to trial before a jury on January 23, 2012 and January 24, 2012. On January 24, 2012, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Fords and against Ms. Willis.

The jury awarded $4,800.76 for Mr. Ford’s medi ⁷¹⁴ cal bills, as well as $4,200 for Mr. Ford’s noneconomic damages. The jury further awarded $1,292.53 to Ms. Ford for medical bills, and $5,000 to Ms. Ford for non-eeonomic damages. Ms. Willis filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (“JNOV”) on February 3, 2012. She also filed a Motion for New Trial on February 6, 2012.

The circuit court denied both of the motions by written orders dated March 8, 2012, and March 12, 2012, respectively. Ms. Willis filed this timely appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The standard of review of a court’s denial of a motion for JNOV is ... whether on the evidence presented a reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence.” Univ. of Md. Medical Sys. Corp. v. Gholston, 203 Md.App. 321, 329 , 37 A.3d 1074 (2012) (citing Washington Metro.

Area Transit Auth. v. Djan, 187 Md.App. 487, 491-92 , 979 A.2d 194 (2009)). “The standard of review of the denial of a motion for new trial is abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Miller v. State, 380 Md. 1, 92 , 843 A.2d 803 (2004)). DISCUSSION A. Denial of Motions for JNOV and New Trial Ms. Willis argues that the trial court erred by denying her motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial on the basis that the Fords should have been found contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The Fords contend that there was competent evidence to support the Fords’ claims, and that there was more than one reasonable inference that a jury could make concerning the issue of contributory negligence.

Accordingly, the Fords argue, Ms. Willis failed to show that there was only one factual and legal conclusion available from the evidence. For these reasons, the Fords posit that the circuit court did not err in denying Ms. Willis’ ⁷¹⁵ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. We agree with the Fords. Pursuant to Md. Rule 2-532(a), a party may move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if that party made a motion for judgment at the close of all of the evidence pursuant to Md. Rule 2-519. 5 A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict “tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 326 , 389 A.2d 887 (1978).

The court “must determine whether the record contains legally relevant and competent evidence, however slight, from which a jury rationally could have found in [the plaintiffs] favor.” Southern Management Corp. v. Taha, 137 Md.App. 697, 714 , 769 A.2d 962 , rev’d on other grounds, 367 Md. 564 , 790 A.2d 11 (2002). In considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court must assume the truth of all credible evidence on the issue. Impala Platinum Ltd., 283 Md. at 328 , 389 A.2d 887 . The trial judge must adopt all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.

Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville, 418 Md. 496, 503 , 16 A.3d 159 (2011). In short, the trial court must determine whether “the facts and circumstances only permit one inference with regard to the issue presented.” Id. On appeal, a challenge to the trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is confined to whether the evidence rose above speculation, hypothesis, and conjecture in order to support the jury’s verdict. Id.

Ms. Willis carried the burden of proof at trial to demonstrate that the Fords were contributorily negligent. See Moodie v. Santoni, 292 Md. 582, 586 , 441 A.2d 323 (1982). “Ordinarily, the issue of contributory negligence is a question of fact for the jury to resolve.” Faith v. Keefer, 127 Md.App. 706, 746 , 736 A.2d 422 (1999) (internal citations omitted). ⁷¹⁶ Here, Ms. Willis sought judgment as a matter of law. To obtain judgment as a matter of law, Ms. Willis was required to show that there was no evidence from which the jury could find that the Fords acted reasonably under the circumstances. Lindenberg v. Needles, 208 Md. 8, 14 , 97 A.2d 901 (1953) (“contributory negligence cannot be found as a matter of law [] unless the evidence permits but one interpretation which shows some prominent and decisive act in regard to which there is no room for ordinary minds to differ”).

Maryland Rule 2-533(a) provides that any “party may file a motion for a new trial within ten days after entry of judgment.” A new trial may be granted where the verdict is against the evidence or the weight of the evidence. Thodos v. Bland, 75 Md.App. 700, 708 , 542 A.2d 1307 (1988). Here, Ms. Willis contends that the Fords were contributorily negligent because they remained inside the vehicle while Mr. Ford attempted to restart the vehicle, rather than getting out of the vehicle and moving to the median of the road. Ms. Willis cites Martin v. Sweeney, 207 Md. 543 , 114 A.2d 825 (1955) in support of her position.

In our view, however, Martin is distinguishable. In Martin, 207 Md. at 552 , 114 A.2d 825 , the Court of Appeals held that a party was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In that case, on a rainy evening, a couple was driving on a highway that was separated by a grass parkway. Id.

The couple’s car went off the road after attempting to stop behind vehicles that had slowed down due to road construction. Id. The couple’s vehicle stopped on the grass median, but had spun around so that it was facing the way it had come. Id.

After five minutes, the couple attempted to drive back onto the road, but was unable to do so because the grass was wet. Id. The driver let some air out of the tires to gain traction. Id.

The driver then drove onto the roadway, into the fast lane, in the direction of oncoming traffic. Id. at 546 , 114 A.2d 825 . The driver’s plan was to make a U-turn and then proceed in the direction he had been going before he skidded off the road. Id.

However, when he got back on the highway, the ⁷¹⁷ driver realized that traffic was coming towards him, so he stopped the car, took a flashlight, and attempted to signal vehicles to go around his parked vehicle. Id. The passenger remained in the vehicle. Id.

An oncoming vehicle then collided with the couple’s parked vehicle. Id. Both the driver and passenger in Martin testified that they were aware that they were entering a place of danger by driving off the grass and into oncoming traffic. Id. at 546-47 , 114 A.2d 825 .

The Court of Appeals observed that, “where one leaves a place of safety to venture into a place or posture of danger, and is harmed; in such cases, the venturesome one often has been held to be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.” Id. at 547 , 114 A.2d 825 . (citations omitted). “Conversely, where one who remains in a place of danger with time and the physical ability to leave, and is harmed, the courts have often held such failure to act to be contributory negligence as a matter of law.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals observed that the driver in Martin could have worked his way along the grass parkway until he was able to drive on to the side of the road going in the same direction as traffic.

Id. at 546 , 114 A.2d 825 . Instead, the driver “chose and executed the most dangerous of the alternatives in driving onto the road ...” and the passenger merely “stood by” while this happened, which directly contributed to her injury. Id. at 547 , 114 A.2d 825 . Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the couple was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

Id. at 552 , 114 A.2d 825 . Ms. Willis contends that Martin is persuasive in light of two key facts. First, Ms. Ford testified that one of the reasons that she did not get out of the vehicle is because she was wearing high heeled shoes. Second, Ms. Ford testified that she observed Ms. Willis’ vehicle approaching for approximately 60 seconds before the collision (although Ms. Ford also testified that she could not tell which lane Ms. Willis was driving in). ⁷¹⁸ In our view, however, Martin is inapposite.

The couple in Martin had reached a place of safety—the grass median—and then chose to drive into oncoming traffic—a place of danger. The passenger had ample time to remove herself from the vehicle or object to the driver, but she nevertheless did nothing. By contrast, here, Mr. Ford’s vehicle stalled on the highway. The Fords, therefore, were in a place of danger.

This distinction is critical. Because the Fords were not in a place of safety, they were faced with two potential courses of action, each of which carried an inherent risk. The parties could remain in the vehicle, try to restart it, and hope to continue on their way. Alternatively, the parties could have exited the vehicle, walked across one lane of traffic on the highway to the grass median, and left the vehicle on the roadway.

The question is whether it was so