Wilmer v. Brice

McSherry, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether an order passed by the Circuit Court for Kent County striking out an entry declaring a judgment of record in that Court satisfied is correct. These are the facts: On the nineteenth day of October, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, a judgment was obtained by confession in favor of Harry L. Boyd against Wilmer and Brice. The foundation of the judgment was a promissory note which Brice had signed as surety for Wilmer.

Subsequently Brice, the surety, paid the judgment, and on July the eighth, eighteen hundred and ninety, it was entered to his use. On the twenty-sixth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, Brice signed an order to enter the judgment satisfied, and this is the order which, upon his application, the Court below struck out. That Brice did not intend to release the judgment is quite certain. Wilmer having come into the possession of some property, Brice called on him and requested him to pay the judgment.

Wilmer promised to pay but asked for a little forbearance. This state of things continued for a considerable time. Finally Wilmer informed Brice that the judgment had been entered satisfied, but he still promised to pay it These promises not having been kept, Brice consulted his attorney and learning that the entry of satisfied had really been made, a petition addressed to the Court was filed on October the nineteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and the Court was asked to strike out the entry of satisfied. Prior to the filing of this petition Wilmer had executed a mortgage upon the property, which came into his possession after the judgment had been entered satisfied.

Brice does not ask that the reinstatement of the judgment shall prejudice that mortgage lien, and he has ⁷³ accordingly filed a paper disclaiming priority over any lien acquired against Wilmer or upon his property after the judgment was released. Wilmer does not pretend that he has ever reimbursed Brice a single cent paid by the latter to the plaintiff in the judgment. He resists the application to strike out the entry of satisfied because, first, there was no mistake committed in making the entry, and because, secondly, Brice has been guilty of laches in seeking the redress he has invoked. What is sought by Brice is to have the judgment reinstated, but reinstated without prejudice to the rights of other secured creditors of Wilmer, if the liens of these latter creditors were obtained during the period that the judgment was entered satisfied.

That the Court has, upon such an application as this, the undoubted power to grant the relief asked, if the facts justify it, cannot be disputed. It has been so held repeatedly. We need do no more than refer to the case of Waters v. Engle, 53 Md. 179 in support of this doctrine. If a mistake was made in entering the judgment satisfied; if Wilmer has not repaid Brice what he justly and incontestably owed him on the judgment; if no third party will be injuriously affected by the entry being stricken out, and if the Court has the power to strike it out, why should the relief sought be denied ?

It is but common honesty that the debtor should pay his creditor; and it is far from equitable that the latter should be defeated upon sheer technical grounds wholly devoid of even the semblance of merit. So the controversy narrows down to two inquiries ; first, was the entry of satisfied made by mistake; secondly, has there been such delay in seeking relief as to j ustify a denial of the prayer of the petition ? First, then, as to the mistake. This is purely a question of fact.

If Wilmer never did repay Brice, what object could Brice have had in entering