Wilson v. State

WILNER, Chief Judge. Appellant was tried in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County for first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure. He was acquitted of first and second degree murder but convicted of and sentenced for voluntary manslaughter and the weapons charge. He presents a number of issues in this appeal, but we need consider only one.

We conclude that the court erred in not permitting a character witness called by appellant to testify to his opinion of appellant’s character trait of veracity. Appellant shot and killed his stepfather, Reginald Ferguson, on the night of November 21-22, 1992. The issue at trial was whether there was justification or mitigation for the shooting. Appellant and his mother testified to a ten-year history of abusive behavior by Ferguson toward the two of them.

Appellant testified that he believed Ferguson owned a gun and that Ferguson kept knives under his mattress and other ⁷²⁴ weapons, including a crowbar and a hammer, under his bed. Appellant’s mother stated that, on November 21, 1992, Ferguson repeatedly threatened her and appellant and that she eventually left the house to look for help. Appellant testified that Ferguson then grabbed, pushed, and choked him and that appellant “panicked,” took a shotgun from his closet, and went to Ferguson’s room. He said that he saw Ferguson reaching under the bed and believed he was reaching for a gun and was going to shoot him.

Appellant fired the shotgun; Ferguson leaped toward him; appellant fired again. Appellant turned himself in to the police a few hours later. The police found no weapons in the room. Appellant testified in his own defense about the history of the abuse he and his mother had suffered and about the circumstances surrounding the shooting.

He was cross-examined extensively on those matters. Following that testimony, defense counsel called Ernest Tuck as a character -witness. Mr. Tuck was a computer specialist, a martial arts instructor, secretary-treasurer of his mother’s business, and a Methodist minister. Mr. Tuck said that he met appellant in mid-November, 1992, which would have been within a week or so before the date of the offenses.

He said that he had maintained contact with appellant since then but had become “really close” with him only “within the past year,” meaning presumably since March, 1993 (his testimony was given on March 16, 1994). He testified about the things he and appellant did together, ranging from Bible study to martial arts. After declaring himself appellant’s friend and teacher, Mr. Tuck was asked whether he had an opinion as to appellant’s “character trait for truthfulness.” The State objected to any line of questioning on opinions of character traits for truthfulness “or peacefulness, if that is going to be elicited.” The basis of the objection was that the witness “didn’t even meet [appellant] until the same night that this incident happened, so all of these character traits are based on the defendant’s post-incident activity, and that is simply not rele ⁷²⁵ vant here.” The court sustained the objection on the basis that a trait for veracity had nothing to do with the crime. Counsel never inquired with respect to whether Mr. Tuck had an opinion as to appellant’s character for peacefulness.

Appellant now contends that the court erred in excluding testimony with respect to his traits for veracity and peacefulness. The second of these complaints is easily resolved. As noted, counsel never asked Mr. Tuck about the trait of peacefulness; the record, therefore, does not indicate that Mr. Tuck had any opinion as to that trait. Nor did the court ever, in any way, rule on such an inquiry.

It simply sustained an objection to the question inquiring about appellant’s character for veracity. In Sahin v. State, 337 Md. 304 , 653 A.2d 452 (1995), the Court pointed out that, where the defendant is charged with a crime that is not regarded as a crimen falsi offense, evidence of a character trait for truthfulness is only indirectly relevant and that, accordingly, it is not admissible as circumstantial evidence of innocence in lieu of a more directly relevant character trait. That is the case here; whether appellant is ordinarily a truthful person is not relevant in establishing whether he committed murder or manslaughter, or