Wilson v. State

DAVIS, J. The genesis of this appeal was the senseless quintuple murders and the criminal proceedings leading to the arrest and conviction of appellants. Appellants Ismail 1 Malik Wilson, Travon McCoy, and Robert Lamont Bryant were jointly ⁶¹⁰ charged by indictment dated December 5, 1999 for (1) first degree premeditated murder of five victims — Levanna Lynette Spearman, Makisha Jenkins, Mary Helen Collein, Trennell Alston, and Mary McNeil Matthews, (2) use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, (3) wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun, (4) openly wearing or carrying a dangerous and deadly weapon, and (5) wearing or carrying a concealed dangerous and deadly weapon as to each victim. They were separately indicted for conspiring to murder the above-named victims. 2 In two nine-count indictments, appellants were charged with (1) robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, (2) robbery, (3) first degree assault, (4) second degree assault, (5) stealing property belonging to the complainant, (6) wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun, (7) use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, (8) openly wearing or carrying a dangerous and deadly weapon, and (9) wearing or carrying a concealed dangerous and deadly weapon as to two of the victims — Alvin Eugene Thomas and Mary McNeil Matthews. They were charged in separate indictments for conspiring to rob Thomas and Matthews with a dangerous and deadly weapon.

As to Thomas, they were additionally charged with conspiring to kidnap and, in a six-count indictment, they were further charged with two counts of kidnapping, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun, openly wearing or carrying a dangerous and deadly weapon, and wearing or carrying a concealed dangerous and deadly weapon. Wilson filed pre-trial motions on February 2, 2000 demanding, inter alia, a speedy trial and a request for discovery and production of documents. On March 17, 2000, Wilson filed a motion to compel discovery. Bryant filed similar motions on April 7, 2000.

Motions for demand for a speedy trial and appropriate relief were filed by Wilson on June 23; 2000 and ⁶¹¹ again on August 15, 2000. Wilson filed motions to compel discovery, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4 — 263(g), on February 26, 2001, one of which requested the State to produce physical evidence related to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing. McCoy filed a motion in demand of a speedy trial on May 31, 2001. The State filed a motion for appropriate relief concerning the Fifth Amendment lights of witness Ronald Lee McNeil on June 5, 2001.

On June 11, 2001, each appellant renewed his exceptions to previous rulings denying the motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. In addition, Wilson filed a motion pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-253(c) to sever in order to be heard in a separate trial. Various other motions and responses thereto were filed before trial began. Relevant pre-trial motions will be discussed, infra.

All of the pre-trial motions were heard on January 23-25, 2001 and June 11, 2001 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The trial before a jury commenced in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on June 12, 2001 and, on June 29, 2001, the jury convicted all three appellants and they were sentenced on September 24, 2001. Both Bryant and McCoy were found guilty of five counts each of use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, conspiracy to commit murder, first degree murder and felony murder of Spearman, Jenkins, Collein, Alston, and Matthews. Bryant and McCoy were found not guilty of carrying a dangerous and deadly weapon with the intent to injure.

Wilson was found guilty of five counts of first degree felony murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, and conspiring to murder. He was neither found guilty of carrying a dangerous and deadly weapon with the intent to injure nor first degree murder of the five victims. Wilson, Bryant, and McCoy were found guilty of two counts each of robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, use of a handgun in commission of a felony, and conspiracy to rob with a deadly weapon, and one count each of conspiring to kidnap and kidnapping. Wilson was sentenced to five consecutive life sentences, without the possibility of parole, for the counts of felony ⁶¹² murder.

The trial judge merged the felony murder convictions with the convictions for use of a handgun in commission of a felony. For the five counts of conspiracy to murder, Wilson was sentenced to one term of life imprisonment (with the possibility of parole) consecutive to the other sentences. The trial judge merged all of Wilson’s conspiracy to murder convictions into one. Wilson was sentenced to twenty years, consecutive to the other sentences, for robbery with a deadly weapon of Thomas.

Wilson was sentenced to an additional twenty years, the first five years to be served without the possibility of parole, for use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence. Wilson was sentenced to another twenty-year consecutive sentence for conspiring to rob Thomas, thirty years consecutive for kidnapping Thomas, and thirty years consecutive for conspiracy to kidnap Thomas. For the additional crimes against Matthews, the trial judge merged the convictions for conspiring to rob, robbery with a deadly weapon, and the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence with the convictions for felony murder. Bryant and McCoy were sentenced to five consecutive life sentences, without the possibility of parole, for the five counts of first degree murder.

The judge merged the felony murder convictions with the first degree murder convictions. The lower court sentenced them to twenty years’ imprisonment for the charge of using a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, five of which were without the possibility of parole, to be served consecutive to the other sentences. Bryant and McCoy were sentenced to life, which merged with the other four counts of conspiracy to murder, for one of the five counts of conspiracy to murder. With respect to the indictment charging crimes against Thomas, they were sentenced to twenty years for robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, twenty years — five without the possibility of parole — for use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, thirty years for ⁶¹³ kidnapping, and thirty years for conspiring to kidnap, which the judge merged with the conspiracy to rob conviction.

They were sentenced to twenty years for robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon of Matthews and twenty years for use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence. The conspiracy to rob with a dangerous and deadly weapon was merged with the conspiracy to murder convictions. In his timely appeal, filed September 25, 2001, appellant Wilson raises seven questions for our review, some of which we have rephrased as follows: I. Did the trial court err in denying appellant his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial?

II

Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that appellant was denied his rights to a speedy trial?

III

Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion for severance?

IV

Did the trial court err in excluding evidence which implicated an alternative suspect? V. Did the trial court err by not propounding appellant’s requested voir dire questions?

VI

Did the trial court err in allowing the State to argue in its closing argument that appellant failed to call witnesses in his defense?

VII

Is appellant entitled to reversal of all but one conviction and sentence for conspiracy? Appellant McCoy filed his notice of appeal on September 26, 2001. Therein, he raises six questions for our review, some of which have been rephrased as follows: I. Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that appellant was denied his rights to a speedy trial?

II

Did the trial court err by imposing more than one sentence for conspiracy? ⁶¹⁴ III. Did the trial court err in allowing the State to argue in its closing argument that appellant failed to call witnesses in his defense?

IV

Did the trial court err in excluding evidence which implicated an alternative suspect? V. Did the trial court err in admitting letters written by a non-testifying party?

VI

Did the trial court err in denying appellant his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial? On October 3, 2001, appellant Bryant filed his notice of appeal, and he has raised eight questions for our review, some of which we have rephrased as follows: I. Did the trial court err by implicitly endorsing the testimony of a witness for the State?

II

Did the trial court err in declining to give the jury instructions requested by appellant?

III

Did the trial court err in excluding evidence which implicated an alternative suspect?

IV

Did the trial court err in denying appellant his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial? V. Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that appellant was denied his rights to a speedy trial?

VI

Did the trial court err by not propounding appellant’s requested voir dire questions?

VII

Did the trial court err in allowing the State to argue in its closing argument that appellant failed to call witnesses in his defense?

VIII

Did the trial court err by imposing more than one conviction and sentence for conspiracy? We answer Wilson’s question VII, McCoy’s question II, and Bryant’s question VIII in the affirmative and the remaining questions posed by appellants in the negative, thereby vacating the convictions for conspiracy, except for the conviction for ⁶¹⁵ conspiracy to commit murder; we affirm the remaining judgments of the circuit court. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Alvin Thomas 3 testified that, on December 5, 1999, at approximately 6:00 p.m., he arrived at 1231 Gusryan Street, Baltimore, Maryland. 4 When Thomas knocked on the front door, Wilson answered and grabbed Thomas by the coat, pulling him into the house. Thomas further testified that he was struck on the head after which Wilson and Bryant pushed him down the stairs.

McCoy and Tarek were also on the premises at this time, and all four men were armed. They demanded drugs and money. Thomas surrendered the three hundred dollars he had on his person. Appellants removed Thomas’s leather jacket from his body and took his diamond watch, diamond bracelet, diamond ring, wireless phone, and pager.

Appellants then discussed whether Thomas was lying about not having any drugs or more valuables and contemplated going to Thomas’s residence. Thomas called a friend — Darnell Collins — at appellants’ request in order to obtain drugs, valuables, or money. Thomas and Collins agreed to meet at the McDonald’s Restaurant on Greenmount Avenue. Follow ⁶¹⁶ ing Thomas’s conversation with Collins, Bryant asked Thomas, “What’s over Lo’s House?” 5 Although Thomas responded that he did not know, appellants retrieved Thomas’s keys from his coat and placed Thomas in the back seat of his own car at gunpoint.

They all proceeded to Matthews’s home at 3535 Elmley Avenue in Thomas’s car; Bryant drove. Appellants walked Thomas to the front door, still at gunpoint, placed him at the front of the group, and rang the doorbell. Jenkins — Thomas’s niece — came to the door. Bryant, who had been crouching down behind Thomas, stood up and placed a gun to Thomas’s head.

Bryant then opened the door and told Jenkins “to back up.” All of the appellants and Thomas entered the home. McNeil and Spearman were also on the premises. Appellants demanded that McNeil lay on the floor and, when he did not immediately comply, they began kicking him. Appellants led Thomas and McNeil downstairs and, consequently, found Spearman lying on a bed in the basement.

Spearman left the bed at their request. Bryant slapped her and told her to go upstairs to the first floor. Thomas, Jenkins, Spearman, and McNeil were instructed to lie down. Bryant inquired as to what, if any, drugs, money, or valuables Matthews had in the house.

No one knew ostensibly because Matthews routinely locked her bedroom door, to which only Matthews and one other individual had keys. Bryant further inquired as to which room belonged to Matthews. He subsequently led Jenkins upstairs. Wilson led Thomas upstairs, but stopped him on the steps.

Thomas watched as Bryant and McCoy kicked Matthews’s bedroom door in and began “looking around in there [and] throwing stuff.” Appellants were unable to find anything of value and began inquiring as to the whereabouts of the two individuals who occupied the room. Thomas was instructed to call Matthews ⁶¹⁷ and, when he complied by calling her wireless phone, Matthews reportedly told Thomas that she was on her way back to the house. When Matthews arrived at 3535 Elmley Avenue, Thomas opened the door and Bryant placed a gun to Thomas’s head. Bryant pulled Matthews into the house by her shirt.

Thomas further testified that, as Collein walked up the stairs approaching the door, she was looking away and did not see what was happening in the door way. Wilson instructed Collein to come inside the house. Alston also did not foresee the danger ahead and, as she was carrying bags into the house, McCoy went outside and instructed her to “get up here.” Collein’s car, in which the victims had been traveling, was double parked outside the house with the car door still open. According to Thomas, appellants had everyone inside at this point lying on the floor.

Bryant asked Matthews, “Where the shit at [sic]?” 6 In response, Matthews repeatedly asked, “What’s going on?” When Matthews did not tell appellants where to find drugs, money, or valuables, they threatened to shoot her daughter — Jenkins. Thomas asked them to take whatever they wanted in exchange for the safety of his family and then instructed Matthews to give appellants whatever she had. Appellants subsequently escorted Matthews upstairs; when they returned, Bryant was “pushing” money into his pockets. Appellants then ordered the victims downstairs.

Bryant went outside to move the car to the back of the house. Matthews made an attempt to talk with appellants and offered to take them to the bank. They declined and Bryant responded, “I didn’t forget that shit you did to me.” The exchange continued briefly and ended when appellants began laughing. Thomas further testified that Wilson then escorted him upstairs upon Bryant’s instruction.

Wilson and Bryant then took Thomas outside and they entered Thomas’s car, which was parked at the rear of the house near the walkway. ⁶¹⁸ Bryant and Wilson exchanged firearms and Bryant went back into the house. Approximately thirty seconds later, Thomas testified, he heard four gunshots coming from the house. Shortly thereafter, Thomas saw appellants run from the house and enter the car. Bryant asked, “Who capped Lo?” 7 McCoy answered, “I did.

I did.” They proceeded to a nearby McDonald’s Restaurant on Greenmount Avenue. Two of the passengers exited the car awaiting Collins’s arrival. Appellants asked Thomas, “Where’s he at [sic]?” Thomas responded, “He’s coming.” They drove to a telephone booth in order for Thomas to call Collins again. Both telephones were out of service, however, and Collins arrived before Thomas had an opportunity to telephone him.

Collins backed his car into a parking space. Bryant drove close to Collins’s car, blocking the car’s movement and preventing Collins from leaving. Thomas testified that Collins observed Bryant’s driving and, when Wilson exited the car, Collins quickly alighted from his car and ran. Wilson and Bryant exchanged guns again and Wilson began chasing Collins.

Bryant ordered Thomas to search Collins’s car; Thomas complied. As Thomas searched underneath the seats of Collins’s car, Bryant asked, “Where is it? Where is it?” Thomas heard gun fire at this time and assumed that Collins had been shot and killed by Wilson. Thomas indicated to Bryant that what he was looking for could possibly be located inside the trunk of the vehicle.

Thomas pulled the latch to the trunk from inside the car and began looking inside the trunk while Bryant continued to hold a gun to Thomas’s head. Thomas suggested that the drugs might be located on the side where Bryant was standing. When Bryant looked down, Thomas threw clothing from the trunk over Bryant’s head, and began to run with Bryant' chasing him. Thomas heard Bryant’s gun fall to the ground.

He also heard Bryant utter expletives. Bryant, while calling ⁶¹⁹ for Wilson’s assistance, caught up with Thomas and they began “tussling.” Thomas eventually escaped into a nearby bar and the owner telephoned the police. Additional pertinent facts will be provided as warranted. LEGAL ANALYSIS I Wilson, Bryant, and McCoy contend that their Sixth Amendment 8 right to a public trial has been abridged because a deputy sheriff assigned to the courtroom denied access to spectators attempting to enter the courtroom as the jury was rendering its verdicts.

As a consequence, appellants aver, they are entitled to reversal or at a minimum a limited remand. In response, the State first argues that this issue has not been properly preserved as it pertains to McCoy. 9 The State additionally argues that appellants’ contention is without merit because the trial court never closed the courtroom and, assuming, arguendo, there was a closure, it was “ ‘narrowly tailored’ and served ‘an overriding governmental interest.’ ” At trial, counsel made a motion for a mistrial and for a new trial, which was denied on the basis that that the courtroom had not been closed. On September 24, 2001, the day that appellants were sentenced, the following exchange took place between Wilson’s counsel, who argued the motion, and the court: ⁶²⁰ [WILSON’S COUNSEL]: And then the last and final ground on which I base my motion for a mistrial — for a new trial, Your Honor, is the fact that the Sheriffs Department again took it upon themselves to close the courtroom. It is my understanding — and I have submitted an affidavit from another attorney in my office, Angela Shelton — that when we received word that a jury had reached a verdict, everyone came back to the courtroom.

I admit and I concede that the courtroom was crowded. I do not know whether it was standing room only, but I do concede that every seat in the courtroom was full. However, when Ms. Shelton tried to enter with a group of other people, the sheriff denied them entrance to this courtroom prior to the verdict being taken and other people were also turned away while she was turned away. Taking— THE COURT: I guess my problem with that is, one, obviously I did not give an order for the courtroom to be closed. [WILSON’S COUNSEL]: That’s correct.

THE COURT: And my recollection is that people were coming and going throughout the proceeding, so I’m not — I cannot find as a fact that the courtroom was, in fact, closed. I don’t know what specific interaction Ms. Shelton had with any individual deputy— [WILSON’S COUNSEL]: What I was saying is that when we were coming to take the verdict there was another huge jury pool in here to select another jury, so there was mass confusion with this huge crowd leaving as this huge crowd was coming in. But, nevertheless, when the verdict was taken in court there were people who sought access to this courtroom. Ms. Shelton has submitted an affidavit, and if the [c]ourt needs further evidence we’re trying to track her down.

I don’t see her in the courtroom yet. She did try to gain access. If even one person ⁶²¹ of the public is denied access to a courtroom, that has essentially shut off the courtroom. Once the courtroom— THE COURT: I don’t think any appellate court has adopted the one person who has limited access to the courtroom is a courtroom of a closed trial, [appellant’s counsel]. [WILSON’S COUNSEL]: Well, it’s not just one person, Your Honor.

We don’t know the names of other people, but in Ms. Shelton’s presence other potential spectators who also sought access to the courtroom were denied their ability to enter. THE COURT: Uh-huh. [WILSON’S COUNSEL]: Now, under the case law as I read it this court would have had the right to close the courtroom because there weren’t any more seats; however, it’s not the sheriffs job to do that, it is the [c]ourt’s job to do that, and the [c]ourt under the case law, has to make findings as to why the public is being denied access to the courtroom because it is overcrowded and then issue an appropriate order. Because the sheriff took it upon himself to act -without consulting with the [c]ourt, he essentially closed the courtroom to the public and he denied my client the right to a public trial guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment and under the Declaration of Rights, the Maryland Constitution. THE COURT: Well, noting that the courtroom was crowded with people, noting that there was press access, noting and recording deference to my recollection that people came and went throughout the proceedings, I find as a fact that the courtroom was not closed.

The State, on September 24, 2002, asked the court for clarification regarding the matter. The following colloquy took place: [THE STATE]: Your Honor, I would also say, in support of the [c]ourt’s finding, that obviously the verdict, assuming it is, in fact, a part of the trial that we need to be ⁶²² concerned with, that the public was here, both in terms of the general public, the press, and any family members. THE COURT: The courtroom was crowded. I’m not sure you could have gotten any more of the public in.

But, as I said, if they — my recollection is that during the verdict there were people coming and people coming in to take standing positions at various times, so I did not order the courtroom closed, first of all, although I think there would have been sufficient basis for ordering closed, perhaps given the capacity which had certainly been exceeded in the courtroom, but I did not order the courtroom closed, and I think as a factual matter the courtroom was not closed. In support of their contentions, appellants cite Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984); Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38 , 612 A.2d 1288 (1992); Holt v. State, 129 Md.App. 194 , 741 A.2d 519 (1999); Walker v. State, 125 Md.App. 48 , 723 A.2d 922 (1999); and Walker v. State, 121 Md.App. 364 , 709 A.2d 177 (1998), which are all distinguishable from the instant case. We explain. In Waller , the Georgia State Police placed wire taps on specific telephone lines for approximately six months during the year 1981.

The information received as a result led to the indictment and prosecution of charges related to a lottery operation which serviced bets placed on the trading volume of the New York Stock Exchange. One of the parties accused moved to suppress the information obtained from the wiretaps and all of the evidence acquired by searches conducted by the officers. The State moved to close the suppression hearing to all members of the public. The State argued that introducing the evidence in the presence of the public had the propensity of infringing upon the expectation of privacy of those other than the defendants involved in that specific case. 10 The trial court granted the State’s motion and the courtroom was closed to ⁶²³ the public with the exception of the defendants and their respective counsel, witnesses, and court personnel.

The tapes were played for two and one-half hours during a hearing that lasted seven days. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court properly balanced the privacy rights of others against the accused right to a public hearing and affirmed the convictions. In reversing the holding of the state court, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment applies to suppression hearings. The Court explained that, [u]nder Press Enterprise [Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501 , 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) ], the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.

Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 . Waller and the principles promulgated therein do not apply to the instant case because the trial court never closed the courtroom. The State, in Waller , made a motion and supporting arguments as to why the courtroom should be closed. The trial court agreed with the State’s arguments.

In the case sub judice, there were no motions or arguments in support thereof. The trial judge concluded that the courtroom was not closed. In Watters , appellant was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses. He was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

The facts surrounding the trial, like the instant case, were highly publicized. The first morning of the trial consisted only of voir dire and jury selection, during which time a deputy sheriff denied the public access to the courtroom unbeknownst to the trial judge. The deputy sheriff only allowed courtroom personnel, witnesses, and prospective jurors to enter, although there were ⁶²⁴ empty seats in the courtroom. Acting on his own initiative, without the instruction of the trial judge, he refused entrance to appellant’s relatives.

The record did not disclose dispositively whether members of the press were also denied access. Counsel moved for a mistrial and the trial judge denied the motion because, the judge explained, “it was done as a matter of court security because of the crowded conditions of the courtroom, and it is not denying him his right to a public trial.” Watters, 328 Md. at 43 , 612 A.2d 1288 . Citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 , 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984), the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he circumstances at this trial did not present a compelling need for excluding members of the defendant’s family as well as the press and the public. The record, although lacking in desirable particulars, establishes that there were seats available during the voir dire and jury selection.” Id. at 45.

The Court further noted that “the more concrete benefits to the defendant of a public trial ... ‘in addition to ensuring that judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly, a public trial encourages witnesses to come forward and discourage perjury.’ ” Id. at 47 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 ). The facts in Watters are somewhat similar to the case sub judice because both cases were highly publicized and the Sheriffs Department was acting with neither the instruction nor consent of the trial judge. Notwithstanding, Watters is also dissimilar to the case sub judice. The deputy sheriff excluded the public as a whole including the defendant’s family and the press, despite the fact that there were empty seats.

In the instant case, the record clearly reflects a crowded, noisy, frenetic courtroom. The public, as a whole, was present. Appellant’s counsel conceded this fact at trial. “I admit and I concede that the courtroom was crowded. I do not know whether it was standing room only, but I do concede that every seat in the courtroom was full.” Watters is not on point with the instant case. ⁶²⁵ In Holt v. State, 129 Md.App. 194 , 741 A.2d 519 (1999), the State moved to have the courtroom closed to avoid any intimidation of the State’s witness.

The trial judge granted the motion without any supporting evidence. On appeal we explained, citing Walker v. State, 121 Md.App. 364 , 709 A.2d 177 , cert. denied, 351 Md. 5 , 715 A.2d 964 (1998), that, “Absent such supporting evidence ... it is unclear whether the trial judge’s order was narrowly tailored to the exigencies of the case.” Holt, 129 Md.App. at 206 , 741 A.2d 519 . We expounded, stating “that a trial judge may not encroach upon a defendant’s right of confrontation by clearing the courtroom of a defendant’s family members ‘without conducting an examination to ascertain the accuracy or validity of the State’s proffer.’ ” Id. (quoting Walker v. State, 121 Md.App. 364 , 709 A.2d 177 (1998)).

We concluded: The case ... suffer[ed] from the same omission as the other cases cited. The trial court acted upon the suggestion by the State that one witness had been threatened by the defendants and could not be located for trial.... As the proponent of the closure motion, however, it was incumbent on the State to produce evidentiary support that [would have] provide[d] the basis for the court to construct a naiTowly tailored order to warrant closure. Id. at 207, 741 A.2d 519 .

The appellant, in Walker v. State, 121 Md.App. 364 , 709 A.2d 177 (1998), was convicted of child abuse and second degree sexual offenses. During trial, the judge ordered appellant’s family members to leave the courtroom while the victims, who were the daughters of his former girlfriend, testified. On appeal, appellant sought review of his convictions averring that he had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. We held: It is incumbent upon the trial judge to make more than a general finding that all children suffer trauma when testifying or, as in this case, not to encroach upon the defendant’s right of confrontation by clearing the couxtroom of all of the defendant’s family members without conducting an examination to ascertain the accuracy or validity of the State’s ⁶²⁶ proffer.

We hold that, in the absence of such evidence, we cannot determine from this record whether the trial judge’s order was narrowly tailored to the exigencies of the case at hand and, as a consequence thereof, the court abused its discretion. Walker, 121 Md.App. at 373-74 , 709 A.2d 177 . Finally, in Walker v. State, 125 Md.App. 48 , 723 A.2d 922 (1999), appellant’s family members became upset and began to scream after a State’s witness attacked appellant during trial. As a consequence thereof, the trial judge barred the family members from the remainder of the court proceedings.

On appeal, the appellant contended that he had been denied a public trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. We held that “the courtroom fracas, when considered in light of all the circumstances and the fundamental importance of the right to a public trial, did not justify the broad closure order imposed by the court.” Id. at 67 , 723 A.2d 922 . We further held that the trial judge abused her discretion by excluding the defendant’s family from the entire trial. Consequently, we reversed the judgment of the trial court.

The standard one must consider when closing a courtroom is clear. “The public may only be excluded ... ‘pursuant to a narrowly tailored order necessary to protect an overriding State interest.’ ” Walker, 121 Md.App. at 373 , 709 A.2d 177 (quoting Watters, 328 Md. at 45 , 612 A.2d 1288 ). As are the other cases cited by appellant pertaining to a defendant’s right to a public trial, Holt, Walker, and Walker, supra, are easily distinguished from the instant case. A closure order narrowly tailored to the exigencies of the case is only required when the public has been excluded. Recalling that spectators were “coming and taking standing positions at various times” during the taking of the verdict and the fact that the seating capacity of the courtroom had been exceeded, the trial judge stated that, “as a factual matter,” he did not order the courtroom closed.

Although the rendering of the verdict is clearly a part of the proceedings and should be open to the public as should be every other phase of the proceed ⁶²⁷ ings, contrary to the doubts expressed by the prosecutor, notably, appellants’ complaints are directed at only a very limited period of time — the rendering of the verdict. The circumstances of the case at bar present neither the vagaries of the Star Chamber or secret tribunal atmosphere. Nor were the judge, prosecutor, and witnesses shielded from the illuminating glare of public scrutiny as they performed their respective duties. The guarantees of an open and public trial were not violated in the proceedings below.

II Each appellant contends that he was denied his constitutional Sixth Amendment 11 right to a speedy trial and, therefore, the trial judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss. In response, the State argues that each appellant was “afforded a timely trial.” The following is the chronology of the proceedings: 12 Dec. 5, 1999 — Offenses committed. Dec. 7,1999 — Wilson arrested. Dec. 8,1999 — McCoy arrested.

Dec. 16, 1999 — Bryant arrested. Feb. 2, 2000 — Defense Attorney Bridget Shepard enters her appearance for Wilson, and files motions for, inter alia, speedy trial, document production, and request for discovery. Mar. 7, 2000 — Defense Attorney Arcangelo Tuminelli enters his appearance for Bryant. Mar. 17, 2000 — Appellants arraigned.

Date of trial set for July 6, 2000. Counsel for Wilson files motion to compel discovery. ⁶²⁸ Defense Attorney William Purpura enters his appearance for McCoy. Apr. 7, 2000 — Counsel for Bryant files motions for speedy trial, production of documents, and request for discovery. Apr. 18, 2000 — State files Supplemental Disclosure I. 13 May 5, 2000 — State files Supplemental Disclosure II.

May 11, 2000 — State files Supplemental Disclosure III. May 12, 2000 — State files notice of intent to use DNA as evidence. June 7, 2000 — Counsel for Wilson files motion for discovery relating to DNA evidence. June 12, 2000 — Initial July 6, 2000 trial date postponed.

Over appellants’ objection that the State had waited six months to submit evidence for DNA testing, Administrative Judge David Mitchell found good cause for postponement on the basis of unavailability of DNA results, and counsel for two of the co-appellants were scheduled to try. cases in federal court. June 14, 2000 — State files Supplemental Disclosure V. June 20, 2000 — State files Supplemental Disclosure IV. June 23, 2000 — Counsel for Wilson files motions in demand of a speedy trial and appropriate relief. June 30, 2000 — Discovery hearing conducted by Judge John N. Prevas.

The State informed the court that the crime laboratory had not completed its work, so DNA discovery was not possible. The court set schedule for disclosure of, inter alia, DNA and fingerprint evidence. July 3, 2000 — State files Supplemental Disclosure VII. July 6, 2000 — Judge Prevas’s Order from the June 30, 2000 hearing filed. ⁶²⁹ State files Supplemental Disclosure VIII.

July 31, 2000 — State files Supplemental Disclosure IX. Aug. 11, 2000 — Hearing before Judge Roger W. Brown. Wilson’s counsel moved to suppress evidence due to State’s delay in initial submission of DNA materials, and failure to comply with Judge Prevas’s scheduling order. Wilson moved for a postponement due to inability to prepare for trial without discovery.

Judge Brown denied the postponement request and directed parties to litigate before the trial judge the admissibility of the belatedly-disclosed evidence. Aug. 15, 2000 — Counsel for Wilson files second demand for speedy trial and motion for appropriate relief. Aug. 17, 2000 — Supplemental DNA discovery provided, but [a]ppellant asserts before Judge Carol Smith that “raw data,” “first-generation materials,” and technicians’ bench notes were required to be provided, but had not been. Aug. 18, 2000 — State files Supplemental Disclosure X. Aug. 30, 2000 — Discovery hearing regarding the results of the DNA testing.

Sept. 5, 2000 — Case postponed in advance of scheduled September 19, 2000 trial date until January 23, 2001 due to Bryant’s counsel being in a federal trial and Wilson’s request. McCoy objects to the postponement. Good cause found by Administrative Judge, David B. Mitchell. Sept. 19, 2000 — Next scheduled trial date.

Postponed at appellants’ request because discovery had still not been fully provided. Oct. 5, 2000 — Supplemental disclosure by the State. Dec. 21, 2000 — State’s supplemental disclosure XII. Jan. 10, 2001 — State’s supplemental disclosure XIII.

Jan. 17, 2001 — State’s supplemental disclosure XIV. Jan. 23, 2001 — Wilson moves to dismiss for speedy trial violation. Judge Ross denies the motion on the basis that the 13~y¿ month delay to that point was not of constitutional dimension. Judge Ross sends case to Judge Mitch ⁶³⁰ ell (administrative judge) with a recommendation that it be postponed because the State had delayed disclosure of McNeil’s statements to Harrison and Figueroa, which were at least arguably exculpatory.

Not guilty pleas entered Jan. 24, 2001 — Judge Mitchell, noting that the State had played discovery ‘close to the vest,’ that ‘this is the consequence,’ and that the parties were coming dangerously close to a speedy trial violation, reluctantly granted postponement. The court expressly declined to make a finding of good cause. 14 Jan. 24, 2001 — Motion to sequester -witness is granted; motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial is denied; motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct is denied; motion to sever is denied; motion for DNA discovery is granted. Feb. 26, 2001 — Wilson files motions to compel discovery. Mar. 5, 2001 — State responds to motion to compel discovery.

Mar. 6, 2001 — State responds to second motion to compel discovery. June 4, 2001 — State provides supplemental disclosure. June 11, 2001 — Motion to dismiss on Sixth Amendment and Rule 4-271 grounds renewed before Judge Quarles, and denied. ⁶³¹ June 11, 2001 — Trial begins with the presiding judge hearing pre-trial motions. To be sure, the time that transpired between the dates on which appellants were arrested and the date on which trial began, satisfies the threshold requiring review of the delay.

The length of the delay is but one factor in our determination of whether appellants’ constitutional rights to a speedy trial have been abridged. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (explaining that the Supreme Court “find[s] no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months”). Instead, we must be guided by the balancing test set forth in Barker and its progeny. The State, as well as each appellant, agree, as they must, that our analysis is pursuant to Barker and the principles promulgated therein.

In determining whether appellants were denied a speedy trial, we first look to the four Barker factors. A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express then in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.

Id. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . See also Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211 , 792 A.2d 1160 (2002). We discuss each factor in turn. LENGTH OF DELAY In the case sub judice, the delay was more than eighteen months, which is deemed “presumptively prejudicial” and certainly a sufficient amount of time to “trigger” an analysis of the issue using the Barker factors.

Glover, 368 Md. at 223-24 , 792 A.2d 1160 (citing Divver v. State, 356 Md. 379, 389-90 , 739 A.2d 71 (1999); Brady v. State, 291 Md. 261 , 434 A.2d 574 , (1981); Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1 , 367 A.2d 1, ⁶³² (1976); Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 111 , 345 A.2d 62 (1975); Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 686 , 414 A.2d 1266 (1980)). Generally, a delay exceeding one year and fourteen days is presumptively prejudicial. However, citing Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 223 , 792 A.2d 1160 (2002); Ratchford v. State, 141 Md.App. 354, 360 , 785 A.2d 826 (2001); State v. Tortolito, 124 N.M. 368 , 950 P.2d 811, 814-15 (1997); Hull v. State, 687 So.2d 708, 730 (Miss.1996); State v. Davis, 903 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo.Ct.App.1995); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 , 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1345 (1994); and Smith v. Deppish, 248 Kan. 217 , 807 P.2d 144, 150 (1991), the State argues that eighteen months is not an unreasonable amount of time given the complexity of the case. In discussing the first prong of the Barker factors, the Court of Appeals, in Glover , reasoned that “the delay that can be tolerated is dependent, at least to some degree, on the crime for which the defendant has been indicted.” Glover, 368 Md. at 224 , 792 A.2d 1160 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

The Court of Appeals contrasted Divver v. State, 356 Md. 379 , 739 A.2d 71 (1999), in which appellant was being tried for driving under the influence and a delay of twelve months and sixteen days was held unreasonable. Notwithstanding, the fact that trial did not commence for over eighteen months is not dispositive. The Court of Appeals held, in Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 547 , 350 A.2d 640 (1976), that “delay is the least conclusive of the four factors identified in Barker.” Erbe, 276 Md. at 547, 350 A.2d 640 (quoting United States v. Brown, 354 F.Supp. 1000, 1002 (E.D.Pa.1973)). Indeed, in Barker , the delay was in excess of three years, yet not held unreasonable when balanced with the other factors.

In Ratchford v. State, 141 Md.App. 354 , 785 A.2d 826 (2001), appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, one count of second degree murder, and other related offenses. We held that a delay of eighteen months was not particularly remarkable in light of the other factors, most notably, the reason for the delay. Were we to conclude that ⁶³³ there were extenuating circumstances embodied in the three remaining prongs, infra, an eighteen-month delay would not be inordinate. REASON FOR DELAY In Glover , appellant, who was arrested and indicted for murder, was confined for over fourteen months and the trial date was postponed three times before trial actually commenced.

The delay was due to the unavailability of a presiding judge and jurors as well as circumstances surrounding DNA testing. The trial court held that appellant’s right to a speedy trial had been infringed. We reversed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed our holding.

The unavailability of a judge was held to be a neutral factor. The unavailability of DNA results was held “valid justification” under the circumstances. The State, however, was partially responsible for the delay because it failed to comply with the disclosure guidelines of the DNA testing. Notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals explained that, [d]espite our admonition for the State’s lack of diligence when the case was postponed for the third time, the delays in petitioner’s case, as a whole stem largely from neutral reasons.

In addition, the State appears to have been as concerned with the delays as the petitioner and there is not the slightest implication that the State failed to act in good faith. Glover, 368 Md. at 228 , 792 A.2d 1160 . In Ratchford , the Court characterized the case as complex because multiple co-defendants were charged with the deaths of three murder victims. Additionally, there were many witnesses and DNA test results to examine.

Some of the delays were attributable to the State and others to the defendant. We held that appellant “was not ready to go to trial on those serious charges.” Ratchford, 141 Md.App. at 362 , 785 A.2d 826 (noting that “It is not a case in which a defendant, ready and eager to resolve the charges against him, was unconstitutionally denied his right to a speedy trial.”). ⁶³⁴ In the case sub judice, the crimes at issue include multiple counts of conspiracy, robbery, murder, and other related offenses. There are multiple victims, multiple defendants, and numerous witnesses. To be sure, the prosecution was required to gather and prepare for presentation reports of the autopsy examination, ballistic, fingerprint, and DNA examinations.

The fact that the case involved three co-defendants and five victims would surely account, to some degree, for an extended period of time necessary for preparation. We are not convinced, however, that the case was of such complexity as to require eighteen months for it to be brought to trial. Initially we note that, on May 12, 2000, three months after Wilson filed his motion for speedy trial and one month after Bryant filed his motion for speedy trial, the State filed its notice of intent to use DNA evidence. The initial trial date, June 12, 2000, was postponed over appellants’ objections that the State had waited six months to submit evidence for DNA testing.

Although the initial July 6, 2000 trial date was postponed because of the unavailability of the DNA results — a reason chargeable to the State for not ordering same — the administrative judge also postponed the case for good cause on the basis that counsel for two of the co-appellants were scheduled to try cases in federal court. After the State filed its fourth and fifth supplemental disclosure on June 14 and 20, 2000, Wilson renewed his motion for a speedy trial on June 23, 2000 and, on June 30, 2000, the State informed the court at the discovery hearing that the results of the DNA tests were not ready. On July 6 and 31, 2000, the State filed its supplemental disclosure VIII and IX. A motion to suppress DNA evidence for failure to comply with Judge Prevas’s scheduling order was filed on August 11, 2000.

Wilson moved for a postponement due to inability to prepare for trial without discovery. On August 17, 2000, counsel complained that the supplemental DNA discovery that had been provided did not include the “raw data,” “first-generation materials,” and the technicians’ bench notes. The next day — August 18, 2000 — the State filed ⁶³⁵ its supplemental disclosure X. The sixty-day delay between the initial trial date of July 6, 2000 and September 5, 2000 was the result of the State’s failure to provide DNA evidence and to otherwise comply with disclosure. We note, however, that Wilson had filed his motion for production of documents and request for discovery on February 2, 2000 and Bryant had filed his motion for production of documents and request for discovery on April 7, 2000, seven months and five months, respectively, after the requests for discovery.

Had the prosecution made timely requests to the laboratory for the evidence needed to prepare for trial, the prosecution could have obviated one obstacle to a speedy trial. On September 5, 2000, the scheduled trial date of September 19, 2000 was postponed four months to January 23, 2001 at the request of appellant Wilson and the fact that Bryant’s counsel was engaged in a federal trial. McCoy, however, objected to the postponement. The four-month delay as to Bryant and Wilson is chargeable to the defense.

In the interim between September 19, 2000 and January 23, 2001, the State filed supplemental disclosure XI (October 5, 2000), State’s supplemental disclosure XII (December 21, 2000), State’s supplemental disclosure XIIT (January 10, 2001), and State’s supplemental disclosure XIV (January 17, 2001). The motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial was denied on January 23, 2001 on the basis that the thirteen and one-half month delay to that point in time was not of constitutional dimension. On that same day, the case was referred to the administrative judge with a recommendation that it be postponed because the State had failed to disclose arguably exculpatory statements of McNeil to Harrison and Figueroa. On January 24, 2001, Judge David Mitchell observed that the State had played discovery “close to the vest” and that the parties were coming dangerously close to a speedy trial violation.

Notably, he expressly declined to make a finding of good cause. The postponement “reluctantly” granted on January 24, 2001, was made to permit appellants to file motions to compel discovery on February 26, 2001, which the State answered on March 6, 2001 and June 4, 2001. The four and ⁶³⁶ one-half month delay from January 24, 2001 until the trial began on June 11, 2001 is clearly chargeable against the State for having, as the administrative judge characterized it, “played discovery too close to the vest.” Thus, three months under Barker v. Wingo for a complex case would be considered necessary for normal preparation and may be viewed as neutral; four months are chargeable against the defense because counsel requested the postponement for their convenience; six months are chargeable against the State for failure to secure promptly the DNA and other evidence necessary for trial; and three and one-half months are heavily weighed against the State for its lack of diligence in complying with discovery requirements related to ostensibly exculpatory evidence. On balance, we are constrained to conclude that the State acted dilatoriously and therefore much of the reason for the delay must be laid at the doorstep of the prosecution.

Appellant Wilson also argues that, had the circuit court severed his case and consolidated it with the fourth co-defendant Tariq Malik, he could have been afforded a speedy trial without being hampered by the schedules of counsel for his co-defendants who requested postponements because of conflicts in their trial schedules. Ideally, in retrospect, severance and consolidation with the fourth co-defendant may very well have served the purpose of more expeditiously bringing Wilson to trial; however, one could not know the trial schedule for Malik or whether the same impediments created by having his trial joined 15 to the trials of Bryant and McCoy would have persisted with one co-defendant. With regard to the reasons for the delay, we are troubled that the State requested DNA testing six months after appellants filed motions for discovery. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that the State’s actions constitute misconduct or bad faith.

Conflicts with the schedules of the other two defense counsel is a neutral reason for delay. The State’s ⁶³⁷ noncompliance with the discovery schedule is clearly the most egregious violation. ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT The record clearly indicates that Wilson filed motions persistently, asserting his right to a speedy trial. Wilson requested a postponement after the long wait for the DNA results on the basis that the State’s failure to comply with discovery hampered trial preparation.

Our review of the record discloses no specific arguments from Bryant. McCoy, on the other hand, objected to each postponement. Thus, Wilson and McCoy strenuously asserted their Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial. As to Bryant, the Supreme Court, in Barker , spoke directly to the need to make known the sincere desire to have one’s case decided expeditiously: More important than the absence of serious prejudice, is the fact that Barker did not want a speedy trial.

Counsel was appointed for Barker immediately after his indictment and represented him throughout the period. No question is raised as to the competency of such counsel. Despite the fact that counsel had notice of the motions for continuances, the record shows no action whatever taken between October 21, 1958, and February 12, 1962, that could be construed as the assertion of the speedy trial right. On the latter date, in response to another motion for continuance, Barker moved to dismiss the indictment.

The record does not show on what 'ground this motion was based, although it is clear that no alternative motion was made for an immediate trial. Instead the record strongly suggests that while he hoped to take advantage of the delay in which he had acquiesced, and thereby obtain a dismissal of the charges, he definitely did not want to be tried. Barker, 407 U.S. at 534-35 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (footnotes omitted). Bryant is foreclosed from any challenge of his conviction on the basis of the denial of the right to a speedy trial by virtue of his failure to assert the right. ⁶³⁸ PREJUDICE Appellants argue that they were prejudiced by the length and nature of their pre-trial incarceration.

They were placed on “lockdown” because of the nature of the crimes for which they were accused and, consequently, only permitted to leave their cells for one hour each day. McCoy was in solitary confinement for the majority of his incarceration. Appellants further argue that the value of their witness testimony was diminished in value as a result of the delay. Discussing the weighing of prejudice in a Barker analysis, the Supreme Court observed: A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant.

Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pre[-] trial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his [or her] case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious.

There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant, past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. Id. at 582 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . The Court continued, explaining how préjudice is measured: Two counterbalancing factors, however, outweigh these deficiencies.

The first is that prejudice was minimal. Of course, Barker was prejudiced to some extent by living for over four years under a cloud of suspicion and anxiety.... But there is no claim that any of Barker’s witnesses died or otherwise became unavailable owing to the delay. The trial transcript indicates only two very minor lapses of memory— ⁶³⁹ one on the part of a prosecution witness — which were in no way significant to the outcome.

Id. at 534 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . Of course, appellants endured anxiety and concern, as any normal defendant would react to the uncertainty of pretrial status and the prospect of incarceration. Further, they, undoubtedly, experienced oppressive pre-trial incarceration and were ineligible for pre-trial release due to the heinous nature of the crimes charged and the threat they posed were they to be granted pre-trial release. The most important factor establishing prejudice, however, is the inability to prepare one’s defense.

Beyond a general complaint that the value of their witness testimony “was diminished,” neither Wilson, Bryant, nor McCoy contend that witnesses died or specifically had faded memories due to the delay. Nor do they point to any other hindrance occasioned by their inability to have their cases tried more promptly. In view of the complexity and gravity of the case, we accord great weight to the lack of any significant prejudice resulting from the delay. BALANCING OF THE FOUR FACTORS Under Barker , because Bryant failed to demand that he be accorded a speedy trial, he cannot complain.

Accordingly, Bryant’s failure to demand his right to a speedy trial precludes him from now seeking a dismissal of the charges against him on that basis. As we have noted, both Wilson and McCoy vigorously asserted their rights to be brought promptly to trial. Although the initial trial date of July 6, 2000 had to be postponed because of the State’s failure to submit evidence for DNA testing, counsel for Bryant and McCoy were unavailable because of trial scheduled in federal court. The next scheduled trial date, September 19, 2000, was postponed at Wilson’s request and because Bryant’s counsel was scheduled for trial in federal court; McCoy objected to that postponement.

Although Wilson repeatedly asserted his right to a speedy trial, he requested or acquiesced in postponement ⁶⁴⁰ requests that resulted in delays from July 6, 2000 to February 26, 2001. Notwithstanding Wilson’s request for postponements during that period, much of the delay was caused by the State’s failure to provide the DNA evidence. The delay from February 26, 2001 until the trial commenced on June 11, 2001 was exclusively the result of the State’s failure to provide discovery as requested. As to Wilson, twelve months of the delay are chargeable to the State, with the last four months heavily weighed against the State for its failure to comply with discovery.

As to McCoy, the delay between July 12, 2000 and September 19, 2000, in part, resulted from his request for a postponement because he was engaged in trial in federal court. The delay from September 19, 2000 to June 11, 2001 is chargeable against the State. In our view, the lack of diligence in providing counsel for Wilson and McCoy discoverable materials, including the six month delay in submitting evidence for DNA testing, would warrant a dismissal of the charges against them were they able to establish demonstrable prejudice. As we have mentioned, Wilson arid McCoy are unable to establish that the delay, clearly of constitutional dimension, in any way impaired their ability to present their defense.

We are troubled at the State’s handling of this case, as was Judge David Mitchell, who noted that the State “had played the discovery close to the vest” and “that the parties were coming dangerously close to a speedy trial violation.” Nevertheless, because the delay was occasioned, in part, by the request of counsel for postponements and because of the complexity and gravity of the case, we hold that the eighteen-month delay did not deny appellants their rights to a speedy trial. Ill The trial judge convicted appellants of conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. Appellants argue that only one conviction and sentence for conspiracy as to each appellant can ⁶⁴¹ stand. In support of their argument, they quote footnote eleven from Campbell v. State, 325 Md. 488 , 507-08 n. 11, 601 A.2d 667 (1992), which states: “A conspiracy may have more than one object.

However many objects a conspiracy may have, only one sentence may be imposed. Where a defendant is found guilty of conspiracy to commit two crimes, the crime that carries the more severe penalty is the guideline offense for purposes of sentencing.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) The State agrees with appellants’ argument, citing Jordan v. State, 323 Md. 151, 161 , 591 A.2d 875 (1991) (citing Tracy v. State, 319 Md. 452, 459 , 573 A.2d 38 (1990)). “It is well settled in Maryland that only one sentence can be imposed for a single common law conspiracy no matter how many criminal acts the conspirators have agreed to commit.” Therefore, all of the sentences for conspiracy with the exception of one must be vacated. In accord with the principles of Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204 , 596 A.2d 1024 (1991), the most severe sentence imposed for the crimes of conspiracy should remain. In the case sub judice, the most severe