Wimbish v. State

KRAUSER, C.J. Convicted, after a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Howard County, of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, and multiple weapons offenses, 1 appellant, Daymar Lydell Wim-bish, presents the following questions for our review: ²⁴⁶ I. Did the circuit court err in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police?

II

Did the circuit court err in admitting evidence of his gang affiliation?

III

Did the circuit court err in instructing the jury that he had previously been convicted of a “crime of violence”?

IV

Did the circuit court err in propounding certain questions during voir dire? V. Did the cumulative effect of “inadmissible and admissible prejudicial evidence” deny him a fair trial?

VI

Did the circuit court err in failing to merge his three convictions arising out of his possession of a firearm? For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse the judgment of the conviction for possession of a regulated firearm by a person under the age of twenty-one and affirm all other judgments. : Background Early on the morning of May 17, 2008, appellant, a member of the “Bloods” gang, led members of that gang in an attempted armed robbery of the occupants of a vehicle driven by a Jason Batts. The attempted robbery ended in the shooting and killing of that young man. But, Batts was not the intended target of the shooting.

A passenger in Batts’s car named Elijah Jackson was. He had purportedly given information to police about another member of the Bloods, Ronald McConnell. The events leading up to the shooting began when McConnell learned that Elijah Jackson was “snitching” on him to the police. So, on the evening of May 16th, McConnell, who lived in Columbia, Maryland, telephoned his cousin, Lamont Johnson, while Johnson was at appellant’s apartment, in Baltimore County, with another member of the Bloods, Ms. Jazmiea Johns.

McConnell instructed Lamont Johnson to come to Columbia for the purpose of robbing Elijah Jackson. Johnson and Jazmiea Johns then met McConnell and other Bloods at a Columbia apartment which was used as a staging area for ²⁴⁷ drug- and gang-related activities. There, McConnell gave Johnson a “12-gauge sawed-off’ shotgun, which would later be used in the shooting. Later that evening, during a telephone conversation, Lamont Johnson asked appellant to meet him in Columbia.

Appellant left for Columbia, taking with him another member of the Bloods, Kevin Jennings. On the way to Columbia, appellant told Jennings that the purpose of the trip was to “handle business” that related to someone who had “snitched on our OG’s[ 2 ] cousin.” Although the precise rank of each of the gang members is not entirely clear, the testimony suggested that appellant occupied a higher position in the Bloods than either Jazmica Johns, Lamont Johnson, or Kevin Jennings. Once in Columbia, the group telephoned Elijah Jackson. In an attempt to find out where he was, they told Jackson that they wanted to buy drugs from him.

When Jackson indicated that he was not interested, appellant, Johnson, Jennings, Ms. Johns, and an unidentified fifth Blood set out in Jennings’s car to try to find him. Appellant decided that Lamont Johnson would carry the gun because, as appellant put it, Johnson knew “how to handle a shotgun.” After driving around Columbia for approximately thirty minutes, the group spotted Elijah Jackson, in a car, with two other people. When that car pulled into a parking lot, Jennings followed and parked nearby. At that point, appellant instructed Ms. Johns to approach the vehicle and “distract” its occupants by asking to use a cell phone.

As directed, Ms. Johns walked to the parked vehicle. As she approached the passenger’s side of the car, Batts was in the driver’s seat, Elijah Jackson was in the front passenger’s seat, and Jackson’s sister was seated behind him. While Ms. Johns was speaking to the occupants of Batts’s car, Lamont Johnson and appellant approached, walking to opposite sides of the vehicle. Pointing the shotgun at Elijah ²⁴⁸ Jackson, through the car’s open window, Johnson said, “You know what time it is.” Then, after telling Elijah Jackson not to “fing move,” Johnson fired the shotgun, twice, through the car window.

Missing Jackson, one of the two blasts struck Batts in the back, severing his spinal cord. Ms. Johns, Lamont Johnson, and appellant then ran back to Kevin Jennings’s car, and the group fled in that vehicle. As they drove away, appellant rebuked Johnson, as he would again later that evening, for shooting before they could extract any money from the occupants of Batts’s car. When the group returned to the apartment in Columbia, appellant instructed the others not to tell anyone what had happened.

Expecting a lot of police activity in response to the shooting, he added that he, Johns, Johnson, and Jennings would “wait it out” at the apartment before driving back to Baltimore. When police arrived, at the location of the shooting, they found Batts dead and Elijah Jackson and his sister “close to ... hysterical.” Eventually, their investigation into the shooting led them to appellant, and, on July 2, 2008, they arrested him. Although charged with one count of first-degree murder, among numerous other counts related to the weapon and attempted robbery, a jury found appellant guilty only of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, the attempted armed robbery of Elijah Jackson, and each of the three weapons counts, that is, possession of a regulated firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence, possession of a regulated firearm by a person under age 21, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. The circuit court thereafter sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment for attempted armed robbery, fourteen years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and five years’ imprisonment for each of the weapons offenses.

Each sentence was to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of forty-three years. ²⁴⁹ Discussion I. Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statement he made during his custodial interrogation by police. Insisting that he made two “requests” for an attorney at the outset of his interrogation, he maintains that the police ignored both requests and then interrogated him for nearly three hours. At a hearing on appellant’s suppression motion, the circuit court heard testimony from the interviewing officers and from appellant and watched a video recording of the interview. The court then rejected appellant’s claim, finding that he had not invoked his right to counsel until three hours into the interview; at which point, the officers ended their interrogation.

Concluding that he had, therefore, waived his Miranda rights, the court denied his motion to suppress. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider “only those relevant facts produced at the suppression hearing that are most favorable to the State as the prevailing party on the motion.” Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 84 , 771 A.2d 389 (2001). While we accept the factual findings of the trial court, unless those findings are clearly erroneous, we “make our own independent constitutional appraisal as to whether an action was proper by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case.” Billups v. State, 135 Md.App. 345, 351 , 762 A.2d 609 (2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court put into place “ ‘certain procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation.’ ” Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 149 , 12 A.3d 1238 (2011) (quoting Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 1203 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

If a suspect knowingly and intelligently waives his ²⁵⁰ right to counsel during a custodial interrogation, “law enforcement officers are free to question him.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-76 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)). “But, if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.” Id. (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). In Davis , the Supreme Court considered whether a suspect had invoked his right to counsel when, in the course of a custodial interrogation and after waiving his Miranda rights, he stated, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” 512 U.S. at 455 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 . Although the interviewing agents inquired as to what Davis meant, they did not cease the interrogation at that point.

Id. The subsequent statements made by Davis were, thereafter, admitted into evidence at trial, after Davis’s motion to suppress them was denied. Id. In holding that Davis had not invoked his right to counsel before giving the statements at issue and that, therefore, the statements were admissible, the Supreme Court promulgated the standard to be applied in determining whether such an invocation has been made: Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.

But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.... [He] must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. ²⁵¹ 512 U.S. at 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 (emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The inquiry as to whether a suspect has actually invoked his right to counsel, the Court stressed, is an “objective” one. Id.

And, in the absence of a clear statement invoking the right to counsel, the police are not required to ask “clarifying questions” as to the suspect’s intended meaning. Id. at 461 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 . 3 But, as Davis only involved an ambiguous invocation by a suspect of his right to counsel, after he had waived his Miranda rights, the Court did not address whether the same standard would, likewise, apply to an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel before such a waiver had occurred. Later, in Braboy v. State, 130 Md.App. 220, 234-35 , 745 A.2d 471 (2000), where the issue was whether Braboy had invoked his right to counsel before executing a waiver of his Miranda rights, we applied the Davis standard and concluded that, because Braboy had not “unequivocally and ‘unambiguously’ ” requested counsel, he had not effectively invoked his right to counsel. We did not address the question of whether the Davis standard would apply to a pre-waiver invocation of counsel.

But we did address that issue, four years later, in Freeman v. State, 158 Md.App. 402, 424-29 , 857 A.2d 557 (2004). In that case, Freeman went, on her own, to a police station and spontaneously admitted to having shot someone. Id. at 408-09 , 857 A.2d 557 . When an officer advised her of her Miranda rights and asked if she wished to waive them, Freeman said nothing.

Id. at 409, 857 A.2d 557 . Shortly thereafter, the officer asked Freeman “what happened,” and she replied that she “[didn’t] want to talk about it right now.” Id. Only ²⁵² later did Freeman execute a waiver of her Miranda rights. Id. at 411, 857 A.2d 557 .

On appeal, after looking at how other jurisdictions had decided the issue of the applicability of the Davis post-waiver standard to a pre-waiver purported invocation of rights, 4 we concluded that the Davis standard, “requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel,” applied only in a “situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.” Id. at 429, 857 A.2d 557 . We therefore declined to apply the Davis standard when, as in Freeman , the invocation “occurred in a pre-waiver context.” Id. 5 Consequently, we held that Freeman’s pre-waiver silence, though arguably ambiguous, was nonetheless an invocation of the right to remain silent and that, although the police “could have sought to clarify whether [the suspect] intended her silence as an invocation of her rights, with questions limited to the effort to clarify,” they “should not have ignored [her] silence” and continued the interrogation. Freeman, 158 Md. App. at 433 , 857 A.2d 557 . 6 Thus, in attempting to provide guidance, in the absence of any clear indication from the Supreme Court as to Davis’s reach, we stated, in Freeman , that the Davis post-waiver standard, requiring an unambiguous invocation of a right, was inapplicable in the context of ²⁵³ pre-waiver invocation of rights and that, when a suspect ambiguously invokes a Miranda right before actually waiving those rights, the police may do no more than ask clarifying questions. 158 Md.App. at 424-25, 433 , 857 A.2d 557 . In 2010, however, the Supreme Court decided Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010), which, it appears, calls the conclusions we reached in Freeman into question.

In Berghuis, 7 the Supreme Court applied the Davis standard, requiring an unambiguous post-waiver invocation of a Miranda right, to a pre-waiver invocation. In that case, the police brought Thompkins, a murder suspect, to the police station and presented him with a Miranda waiver form, which he declined to sign. 130 S.Ct. at 2256. Thereafter, the police interrogated Thompkins. Although he remained “[l]argely silent” for nearly three hours, he answered “yes” when an officer asked him whether he prayed “to God to forgive [him] for shooting that boy down.” Id. at 2256-57.

That response, Thompkins maintained, was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Applying Davis , the Supreme Court concluded that Thomp-kins’s “persistent silence” was an ineffective invocation of his right to remain silent, because it was not an unambiguous invocation of that right. Id. at 2258-60. In so holding, the Court, for the first time, applied the Davis standard, requiring an unambiguous invocation of a Miranda right, to a pre-waiver situation.

Although the Supreme Court, in the Berghuis majority opinion, did not expressly acknowledge its extension of the Davis standard, a dissenting opinion by Justice Sonia Sotoma-yor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, did: [T]he suspect’s equivocal reference to a lawyer in Davis occurred only after he had given express oral and written waivers of his rights. Davis’ holding is explicitly predicated ²⁵⁴ on that fact. [See 512 U.S. at 461 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 .] (“We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.”). The Court ignores this aspect of Davis , as well as the decisions of numerous federal and state courts declining to apply a dear-statement rule when a suspect has not previously given an express waiver of rights. Id. at 2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (parallel citation and footnote omitted). 8 There is no dispute that appellant’s interview with police was a custodial interrogation, requiring Miranda warnings, which were, in fact, given.

But there is disagreement as to whether appellant, before executing a written waiver of his Miranda rights, did, in fact, invoke his right to counsel. Arguing that he did invoke that right, appellant directs our attention to two references to a lawyer that he made before he executed the Miranda waiver. The first of appellant’s references—‘What about my lawyer?”—was made approximately twenty seconds into the interview. The second—“can I get a lawyer?”—was made several minutes later, while the detectives were explaining appellant’s Miranda rights to him and before they asked any questions about the shooting.

We shall discuss those purported invocations chronologically, as the temporal progression of appel- ²⁵⁵ 1 ant’s references to legal representation provides a helpful context for our analysis. After his arrest, appellant was interviewed at the Howard County police station by Detectives Aaron Dombrowsky and Joseph King. At the outset of the interview, Detective King, before he was joined in the interview room by Detective Dombrowsky, began by providing appellant with background on the Miranda warnings that were to come: [DETECTIVE KING]: What we’re gonna do, even though, um, because you’re technically in our custody right now, we gotta read you a couple of forms to go through. And then once we get past those forms. [APPELLANT]: What about my lawyer? [DETECTIVE KING]: We’re dealing with everybody.

We’ll be able to talk to you, answer any questions. Because I can’t really answer any of your questions until we go over that form. So, so you could have a hundred questions for me right now, and I really can’t, and I’m willing to answer them, but until we go over that form, I can’t. I know you were saying, that you were saying that, you know, this was all about a murder. [APPELLANT]: That that that’s what the papers said.

(Emphasis supplied.) At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, after watching a DVD of the interview and hearing testimony from appellant and both detectives, the circuit court began its analysis by explaining why appellant’s first reference—“What about my lawyer?”—was not an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel: With regard to the first page [of the transcript], Defendant says, “What about my lawyer?” To me, that’s tantamount to, you know, maybe a lawyer; can I have a lawyer; do I get a lawyer. And what the officers [sic] are saying are [sic], “Let me read you these rights. I’m obliged to read you these rights.” I don’t find that to be an unequivocal statement that “I want a lawyer here. I’m not talking to you ... until you get me my lawyer.” ²⁵⁶ In reviewing appellant’s claim, we find instructive the Court of Appeals’s recent opinion in Ballard v. State, 420 Md. 480, 491-93 , 24 A.3d 96 (2011).

There, the Court of Appeals contrasted a statement made by Ballard to an interrogating officer—“You mind if I not say no more and just talk to an attorney about this”-j-with statements in three cases in which the reviewing court had concluded that the suspect’s statement was ambiguous: Davis, 512 U.S. at 462 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 (“Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”); Minehan v. State, 147 Md.App. 432, 444 , 809 A.2d 66 (2002); (“Should I get a lawyer?”); and Matthews v. State, 106 Md.App. 725, 738 , 666 A.2d 912 (1995) (“Where’s my lawyer?”). In the latter case, “[w]hen Matthews asked ‘Where’s my lawyer?’ a reasonable officer,” the Ballard Court observed, “could and likely would infer either that Matthews was wondering about his lawyer’s whereabouts or, perhaps, whether a lawyer had been provided for him.” 420 Md. at 492 , 24 A.3d 96 . Ballard’s statement, in contrast, “transmitted] the unambiguous and unequivocal message that he wanted an attorney” because his phrasing “express[ed] a desire ... to ... have something occur.” Id. When appellant asked, at the outset of the interview, “What about my lawyer?” a reasonable police officer could infer, as in Matthews , that appellant was “wondering about his lawyer’s whereabouts: or, perhaps, whether a lawyer had been provided for him.” Ballard, 420 Md. at 492 , 24 A.3d 96 (citing Matthews).

In other words, his statement was not, as in Ballard , an “unambiguous and unequivocal message that he wanted an attorney.” Id. Hence, Detective King was not required to end the interrogation. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 . Nor was he limited to asking clarifying questions to ascertain appellant’s intended meaning.

Id. at 461 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 . But, even if Detective King could do no more than ask clarifying questions, that is, even if we were to apply the stricter Freeman rule to appellant’s ambiguous pre-waiver reference to a lawyer, the transcript makes clear that the detectives’ questions and statements, after appellant inquired, ²⁵⁷ “What about my lawyer?” did no more than assist appellant in understanding his Miranda rights. That is, the detectives asked questions, in the words of Freeman , “limited to the effort to clarify”: [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: ... Did Detective King kind of tell you about ... [w]hat we have to cause you’re here with us? [APPELLANT]: Yeah he said a little bit.

I’m not understanding. [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: Okay.... Because you’re in our custody? You have to be given what’s called Miranda rights. [APPELLANT]: Oh, I know, I, I’m, I’ve read them rights. And them, uh, that means I waive my rights to talk. [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: No, it’s just saying I got to read them to you.... [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: For us to talk you have to say you want to talk to us, but at any time you can stop talking.

Does that make sense? [DETECTIVE KING]: Or if we ask you questions, you can say, I, I really don’t want to answer that question. Then, after the detectives read the Miranda warnings aloud, appellant made his second reference to a lawyer: [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: ... Do you understand the rights that, that I read off to you? Do you understand what they mean? [APPELLANT]: Yeah.

Basically. [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: Okay. [APPELLANT]: That’s what I was saying. I don’t, can I get a lawyer? Cause. [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: It’s always your option. I mean, it, if you ask for a lawyer we’re not going to talk. [APPELLANT]: Right, but if I don’t then I’m gonna incriminate myself.

Which I ain’t do nothing but. ²⁵⁸ [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: Like I said, these are your constitutional rights. You have the right to all these if you wish. If you don’t waive these rights and agree to talk to us? Then our conversation today is over and done with.

So it’s gonna be up to you whether you want to talk to us or not talk to us. [APPELLANT]: What did, all right, listen. All right, but. [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: ... If you’re not willing to talk to me about that then you’re not willing to talk to me about that____ But if you don’t want to it’s your ... constitutional right. But for, in order for you to be entertaining us with your questions, it has to be waived.

There has to be some kind of waiver of your rights in order to talk with us. Does that make sense? [APPELLANT]: So if I waive my rights, then. [DETECTIVE KING]: That mean [sic], if, to simplify it. If you waive your rights right now and you circle that form that says yes, I’m willing to talk. Yes, I’m willing to ánswer questions, and I understand these rights, and you do that.

At that point we sit right here and we continue to talk. You ask us questions, we ask you questions____ [APPELLANT]: That means I got to answer. [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: And if there’s, if there’s a point, no. No. [DETECTIVE- DOMBROWSKY]: ... At any time if you don’t want to talk to us and we ask you questions that you don’t like and don’t want to answer?

You don’t have to answer them. At any time during the interview you want to stop, you can stop. [APPELLANT]: Okay. Where do I sign at? ²⁵⁹ [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: You sign on, the bottom right hand corner. Like I said, I’m not trying to push you either way.... [APPELLANT]: I unders. [sic] Look, I ain’t. [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: All right?

We’re straight? [APPELLANT]: Yeah, we good. [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: Does it make sense? [APPELLANT]: Yeah, I’m just making sure I notice everything. (Emphasis supplied.) We agree with the circuit court’s finding that, here, appellant did not make an unequivocal statement expressing a desire to have a lawyer present. Rather, a reasonable inference could be drawn that appellant was inquiring further as to the meaning of specific Miranda warnings as each was being explained. He was not, as in Ballard , “transmitting] the unambiguous and unequivocal message that he wanted an attorney.” See Ballard, 420 Md. at 492 .

If appellant’s comment indicated that he might want a lawyer provided, that was not enough, under Davis , to require the detectives to end the interview. As they did with respect to appellant’s first reference to a lawyer, the detectives responded by simply clarifying what appellant meant and reiterating that it was “always [his] option” to have a lawyer present and that he could stop the interview by “ask[ing] for a lawyer.” Appellant responded by acknowledging that he understood those options. And, after having his Miranda rights carefully explained (and, indeed, having his misunderstanding, that he was required to answer every question, corrected), appellant waived those rights. Only then did the detectives ask questions that pertained to the attempted robbery and shooting.

Thus, there was no constitutional violation even if we were to apply the Freeman rule limiting the detectives to clarifying questions only. ²⁶⁰ Then, more than three hours into the interview, appellant made an unambiguous request for an attorney: [APPELLANT]: Why why why ... you keep ... I’m not gonna talk no more. Where my lawyer at? Can I get a lawyer?

Can I call my lawyer? Now you you can’t deny me, I just want you to deny me that. [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: You can do whatever you wanna do. [APPELLANT]: You all can’t talk to me no more because I’ve asked for my lawyer. [DETECTIVE DOMBROWSKY]: If that’s what you’re doing. Is that what you want? [APPELLANT]: (Nodding head). (Emphasis supplied.) Presented with what was an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, the detectives discontinued the interview.

Before that point, however, they were not required to do so. Consequently, the circuit court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the statements that he made during his custodial interrogation.

II

Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in permitting the State to present evidence of his gang affiliation because there was. “no real connection” between that affiliation and the charged offenses. But, because, as the .State observes, appellant did not object when that evidence was introduced at trial, he has failed to preserve this issue for our review, even though he had, earlier, moved to exclude that evidence. “It is well established that a party opposing the admission of evidence ‘shall’ object ‘at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds for objection become apparent. Otherwise, the objection is waived.’ ” Ware v. State, 170 Md.App. 1, 19-20 , 906 A.2d 969 (2006) (quoting Md. Rule 4-323(a)) (additional citations omitted); see also Md. ²⁶¹ Rule 5-103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits ... evidence unless the party is prejudiced by the ruling, and ... a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record....”). Moreover, “objections must be reasserted unless an objection is made to a continuing line of questions.” Ware, 170 Md.App. at 19 , 906 A.2d 969 (citing Brown v. State, 90 Md.App. 220, 225 , 600 A.2d 1126 (1992)).

That is, to preserve an objection, a party must either “object each time a question concerning the [matter is] posed or ... request a continuing objection to the entire line of questioning.” Brown, 90 Md.App. at 225 , 600 A.2d 1126 . The requirement of a contemporaneous objection at trial applies even when the party contesting the evidence has made his or her objection known in a motion in limine: “Whether the motion in limine is made before trial or during trial, a court’s ruling which has the effect of admitting contested evidence does not relieve the party, as to whom the ruling is adverse, of the obligation of objecting when the evidence is actually offered. Failure to object results in the non-preservation of the issue for appellate review.” Reed v. State, 353 Md. 628, 637 , 728 A.2d 195 (quoting Hickman v. State, 76 Md.App. 111, 117 , 543 A.2d 870 (1988)). Here, appellant moved, in a pre-trial motion in limine, to exclude evidence of his gang affiliation.

After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion, concluding that there was “overwhelming” evidence that appellant was a member of the Bloods gang and that his membership was relevant to the case: “[Appellant is] loyal to his Blood family members, so much so that he would go to Columbia to take care of business for another Blood member.” Then, at trial, although appellant objected to certain statements by several witnesses with respect to his gang affiliation, he failed to object to other testimony relating to that affiliation. Since he did not request a continuing objection to the gang affiliation testimony, his objection was waived. See ²⁶² Ware, 170 Md. App. at 19-20, 906 A.2d 969 ; Brown, 90 Md.App. at 225 , 600 A.2d 1126 . But, even if the issue were preserved for our review, we would have no trouble concluding that it is without merit.

Under Maryland Rule 5-404(b), evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts,” is not admissible to “prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” But, such evidence is admissible “for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Md. Rule 5-404(b). Evidence of gang membership falls within the definition of '“other crimes, wrongs, or acts” in Rule 5-404(b). Ayala v. State, 174 Md.App. 647, 658 , 923 A.2d 952 (2007). The Court of Appeals has explained that, for evidence to be admissible under the motive exception in Rule 5-404(b), “the prior conduct must be committed within such time, or show such relationship to the main charge, as to make [the] connection obvious.” Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 605 , 762 A.2d 125 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The evidence at the motions hearing established (1) that appellant was in a leadership role in the Bloods; (2) that McConnell, a fellow member of the Bloods who lived in • Columbia, was concerned that Jackson was giving information to the police about him; (3) that McConnell