Wimbrough v. Wimbrough

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The bill in this case was filed in the Circuit Court for Worcester County on the 11th of October, 1913, by Walter T. Wimbrough, of that county, the appellant, to annul a marriage between him and the appellee on the ground that it was the result of duress “practiced upon him” by the father of the appellee. It alleges that on the 19th of March, 1913, “an alleged marriage took place in the town of Berlin, in Worcester County,” between the plaintiff and defendant; that the plaintiff “was compelled to go through a marriage ceremony with the defendant only because of duress practiced upon him by John T. Adkins, the father of the defendant, and because of fear of instant death or grievous bodily harm at the hands of the said Adkins by reason of threats then and there made by” him “against” the plaintiff if he “should refuse to go through the marriage ceremony with the defendant”; that he left the defendant at her father’s house immediately after the ceremony, which took place there, “and has not since lived,” cohabited with, seen or communicated with her in any way, and that the marriage was procured as aforesaid without his consent, “and under his protest, uttered at the time of the performance of the ceremony in the presence and hearing of the defendant,” her parents, “and the minister of the Gospel who performed the ceremony.” The answer of the defendant admits that the plaintiff left her at her father’s house immediately after the marriage, ⁶²¹ and that he has not lived or cohabited with her or seen her since; bnt it denies that he never consented to the marriage, or that he was compelled to go through the marriage ceremony by duress practiced upon him by her father, or because of fear of death or bodily harm at the hands of her father, or that the marriage was procured by fraud, force or duress, and avers that the marriage license was procured by the plaintiff; that the minister who performed the ceremony was secured by him, and that “he expressed not only his willingness but a desire to marry the defendant, only at the last moment asking that the ceremony be deferred for a day, which the defendant then declined to do.” The answer further alleges “that since said marriage a child has been born, the offspring of the plaintiff”; that since the birth of the child on the 5th of July, 1913, the plaintiff has contributed “nothing to its support,” or “towards the maintenance of the defendant” since the marriage beyond the sum of sixteen dollars paid her shortly thereafter. Chancellor Bland says in Fornshill v. Murray, 1 Bland, 479 , that, “Marriage has been considered among all nations-as the most important contract into which individuals can enter, as the parent not the child of civil society,” and a reference to some of the authorities bearing upon the important and delicate questions involved, will greatly aid us in the examination of the evidence in the case.

While section 14 of Article 16 of the Code of 1912 provides that the Circuit Courts of the counties and the Superior Court of Baltimore City, upon petition of- either of the parties, and the Circuit Courts of the counties and the Criminal Court of Baltimore, on indictment, may inquire into, hear and determine the validity of any marriage, “and may declare any marriage contrary to the table of this article, or any second marriage, the first subsisting, null and void,” the authority of courts of equity in this State to determine the validity of a marriage charged to have been procured by abduction, terror, fraud or duress, rests upon their general ⁶²² jurisdiction to set aside contracts affected by fraud, etc. Fornshill v. Murray, supra; Le Brun v. Le Brun, 55 Md. 496 ; Ridgely v. Ridgely, 79 Md. 298 . Tbe caution, however, with which courts exercise this jurisdiction is clearly and forcibly stated in Le Brun v. Le Brun, supra, where Judge Milled says: “But while the •courts are thus clothed with jurisdiction, the peculiar nature of the subject to be dealt with, requires that the power «should be exercised with extreme caution, and only where the allegations of the bill are sustained by clear, distinct and ■satisfactory evidence. This position is sustained by an unbroken current of authority. Marriage has been considered, among all civilized nations, as the most important contract into which individuals can enter, as the parent, not the ■child, of civil society.

The great basis of human society throughout the civilized world is founded on marriages and legitimate offspring; and where an existing marriage is ■proved, it is not to be exposed to the danger of being set aside by any species of collusion, or by the mere declarations •of either of the parties, and should only be brought into question upon the most undisputed proofs.” After referring to the presumptions in favor of the validity of a marriage where there is issue, or where it is assailed upon the ground 'that a former marriage of the woman is still subsisting, he •says further: “We can not, therefore, pass a decree in this •case which will bastardize the issue and impute crime to the woman, unless the fact that her former husband was alive, at the date of her second marriage, is clearly established by such proof as all of the authorities upon the soundest of reasons indicate and require.” In the case of Seyer v. Seyer, 37 N. J. Eq. 210, the Vice-Chancei/loe said: “And as to this branch of the case, it may be said that when the Court is satisfied that ante-nuptial incontinence has taken place, the charge of threat or menace unlawful, or fraud or duress, must be most fully and satisfactorily established before the Court will annul the marriage.” In Rooney v. Rooney, 54 ⁶²³ N. J. Eq. 231, 34 Atl. 682 , the Chakoeeeor said: “It is hardly necessary to cite authority for the position that a .complainant who comes into court under the circumstances above stated, and asks a decree of nullity, the result of which is to declare one whom he has sworn to love and cherish as a wife to be no more than a concubine, and her offspring, the fruit of the unlawful communion (born pending the suit), a bastard, must prove his case with the utmost strictness. The same rule applies in such a case as on an indictment for bigamy. The Court in such cases is hound to act as the guardian of the helpless infant, and watch his rights and interests with jealous care”; and it is said in 26 Oyc. 913: “The burden is on the plaintiff to sustain his material allegations, and in view of the peculiar nature of the contract ■of marriage and the grave consequences of dissolving it, the courts will not grant a decree except upon the production of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. * * * According to the generally accepted rule, such a decree will not be given on the mere admissions or confessions of the parties alone without satisfactory extraneous evidence, or upon the uncorroborated testimony of plaintiff.” In Todd v. Todd, 149 Pa. St. 60, 17 L. R. A. 320, where the statute of Pennsylvania authorized a divorce where the marriage was procured by fraud, force or coercion, the Court said: “It is not alleged that there was any force used to compel the marriage, and, in order to justify a divorce, under the statute, upon the ground of threats, they must be . -such threats, against the life or to do bodily harm as would overpower the judgment and coerce the will.

There must be such a mental condition as a result of the threats that the libelant did not and could not in reality consent to the marriage,” and it is said in 14 Cyc. 596, “A divorce will not be decreed on the ground of duress unless it appears that the marriage was contracted under force or threat of bodily harm.” Where a man marries to escape arrest or imprisonment for seduction or bastardy he cannot avoid the marriage ⁶²⁴ on the ground of duress, nor is a marriage induced by threats of lawful prosecution, arrest or imprisonment, to redress or punish a wrong open to impeachment on that ground. 1 Bishop on M. & D., sec. 543; 26 Cyc. 906; Sickles v. Carson, 26 N. J. Eq. 440; Todd v. Todd, supra; Collins v. Ryan, 43 L. R. A. 814, and note; Ingle v. Ingle, 38 Atl. Rep. 953 ; Frost v. Frost, 6 Atl. Rep. 282 ; Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige, 43 . The plaintiff testified that he had several talks with Mr. Adkins about marrying defendant; that on Monday previous to the marriage, which took place on Wednesday evening, Mr. Adkins and his wife came to his father’s shop and told the plaintiff in the presence of his father and his brother that he had to marry the defendant “else he would die by me”; that “it wasn’t need for me to try to get away,” for if he did “they would put an officer on my track”; that he went around to Mr. Adkin’s house that night and they arranged for Mr. Adkins to get -the license the next day and for the marriage to take place at. seven o’clock Wednesday evening; that the threat Mr. Adkins made on the Monday referred to was the only threat he made before the evening of the marriage; that he also went to see the defendant Tuesday evening before the marriage.

That on Wednesday evening at the time appointed for the marriage he went to the defendant’s house, and when he knocked on the door Mr. Adkins came to the door, and that he then told him that he could not decide until the following evening whether or not he would marry the defendant; that Mr. Adkins called his wife to* the door and told her what the plaintiff had said, and that they invited him in the house; that Mr. Van Dyke, the minister, and the defendant were there; that as soon as they got inside of the house Mr. Adkins flew into a rage and told Mr. Van Dyke that he had refused to marry the defendant, and said I would “have to marry her” before I went out of the house; that he, plaintiff, then said that if he had to marry her he would do it, but that he would not live with her or support her unless he had to do it; that Mr. Van Dyke did ⁶²⁵ not want to perform the ceremony under those conditions, hut that Mr. Adkins insisted, and that they were married and that he left the house immediately afterwards; that he did not want to marry the defendant and did it to save his life; that