Witt v. Ristaino

CATHELL, Justice. David Seely Witt, appellant, was granted a divorce from Madonna Ristaino, appellee, by a Judgment of Absolute Divorce entered on 29 July 1996 in the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County. The Judgment provided, inter alia, that appellee be awarded legal custody of the parties’ three minor children and that the minor children continue their education at St. Mary’s, a private, Catholic elementary school, with appellant to pay all costs and tuition “if he could afford it.” Appellant subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Revision of Judgment. Appellant argued the parties had no formal agreement as to the children’s attendance at St. Mary’s and there was no evidence presented at trial that attendance at the private school was necessary to meet the particular educational needs of the children.

A hearing on the motion was held on 6 September 1996. At the hearing, the court found “that the minor children have particular educational needs” and ordered that appellant pay sixty-five percent and the appellee pay thirty-five percent of all costs of tuition and expenses for the three minor children to attend St. Mary’s. Appellant timely appealed. Appellee filed an untimely cross-appeal, which was dismissed on 16 May 1997. ¹⁵⁸ FACTS The facts in this case are not in significant dispute.

The parties were married on 2 December 1985. Three children were born during the marriage, David, Tony, and “Little Madonna,” ages 9, 8, and 4, respectively. Appellee also has a fourteen-year-old son from a previous marriage, Vince, who lived with the parties while they were married. Prior to the divorce, Tony and David were enrolled in St. Mary’s of Annapolis.

At the time of trial, Little Madonna was not of school age, but the parties had planned on enrolling her in kindergarten at St. Mary’s the following year. Tony and David expressed to the court that they liked their school and were earning high marks of A’s and B’s. Testimony was given by appellee that although the children had no special educational needs, such as a learning or physical disability, she preferred they attend St. Mary’s over the local public school because “they are Roman Catholic children ... [, it offers them] religion ... [and] other students ... with the same backgrounds ... both socially, and religiously.” Appellant also testified that he “would rather keep them in St. Mary’s if ... it’s affordable.” The trial court found that appellant, a private contractor in business for himself, had a monthly income of $2100, while appellee, a full-time architecture student at Catholic University, had monthly income of $650 from working part-time. 1 In accordance with the Maryland Child Support Guidelines, 2 the judge ordered appellant to pay appellee $613 per month in child support. Appellant presents three questions for our review, which we consolidate and rephrase as follows: I. Did the trial court err in its determination that, under the Child Support Guidelines, appellant must pay the ¹⁵⁹ costs of his minor children’s private school to meet their “particular educational needs,” as provided in § 12-204(i)(l), where the children did not have learning disabilities or special education needs?

II

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering that appellant pay sixty-five percent and appellee pay thirty-five percent of the costs of the private school education? DISCUSSION I. The Maryland Child Support Guidelines were enacted in 1989 by an emergency measure. Their original purpose was to “establish[ ] child support guidelines ... [which were] advisory only and g[a]ve rise to no presumption or inference” of correctness. 1989 Md. Laws, Chap. 2. Amendments to the Family Law Article later mandated the use of the Guidelines and established a “rebuttable presumption” that the application of the Guidelines yielded the correct amount of child support to be awarded.

See 1990 Md. Laws, Ch. 58; see also § 12-202(a); Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 460-61 , 648 A.2d 1016 (1994); Walsh v. Walsh, 333 Md. 492, 498 , 635 A.2d 1340 (1994). The presumption can be rebutted with evidence that applying the Guidelines would render an unjust or inappropriate result in an individual case. Section § 12-202(a)(2) sets out the criteria to be used in making this determination. If the court determines “that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate, it must make a written or oral finding on the record explaining its departure from the established guidelines.” Petrini, 336 Md. at 461 , 648 A.2d 1016 (citing Walsh, 333 Md. at 501-02 , 635 A.2d 1340 ). 3 ¹⁶⁰ In the case at hand, the trial court’s original order required appellant to pay $613 per month for the support and maintenance of his three minor children according to the Guidelines.

In addition to this monthly support, the court ordered appellant, “unless he [was] unable to afford it,” to pay the full cost of the children’s private education at St. Mary’s, a private, Catholic elementary school in Annapolis. There was evidence that, without school aid and with the youngest child, Little Madonna, to join her older brothers in school the following year, the total tuition and costs for all three children could reach as high as $9,000 for one year. Under the court’s original order, appellant would have been responsible for the entire $9,000 in addition to appellant’s support payments of about $7,000 per year. Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, contending, as he does here on appeal, that the children did not have “particular educational needs” to attend a private school and, as such, the court could not order appellant to pay the costs of the private school under 12 — 204(i)(1).

After a hearing, the court found the children did have particular educational needs. At the hearing, the court stated: I’m going to find that there is a need for the children to go to the school. They’ve always gone to this school. It’s a tradition in that family.

The children went to that school before. The father wants them to go to that school, at least he wanted them to go there before. They had an agreement before the ... children were going to that school---And so I ... think there is a particular educational need for these children. The court then went on to discuss how the parties would divide the tuition and costs of the school: And what I’m going to do is ...

I’m not going to go according to the income, but I’m going to make it sixty-five percent he’ll pay and she pays thirty-five percent. It’s ¹⁶¹ based on taking all into consideration because of the fact that his income was twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) and so forth.... And [they will] work it way up there. They’ll[ 4 ]tell us whether it’s right or wrong.[ 5 ] As a result of this order, appellant is responsible for approximately $5,850 of the $9,000 cost of his three children’s attendance at St. Mary’s.

This case presents an issue of first impression in Maryland. Specifically, there have been no cases interpreting the meaning of “particular educational needs” as utilized in section 12-204(i)(l). That section provides: By agreement of the parties or by order of court, the following expenses incurred on behalf of a child may be divided between the parents in proportion to their adjusted actual incomes: (1) any expenses for attending a special or private elementary or secondary school to meet the particular educational needs of the child. § 12-204(i)(l). Appellant argues this language was intended to address children with “exceptional” or “separate and distinct needs,” such as a child who has a physical or learning disability or who is in an accelerated program.

Appellee, on the other hand, contends the statute should not be read so narrowly and instead asserts that the court should look at a myriad of factors of, among other things, continuity in the children’s attendance and the standard of living the children enjoyed before the divorce. ¹⁶² In interpreting the meaning of a statute, it is a fundamental principle that we must effectuate the Legislature’s intent by first reviewing the language of the statute. In Baltimore County v. Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass’n, 110 Md.App. 585, 599-600 , 678 A.2d 100 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 347 Md. 125, 149 , 699 A.2d 434 (1997), we summarized the rules of statutory interpretation: The fundamental goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 [ 660 A.2d 423 ] (1995). The primary source for determining legislative intent is the language of the statute.

In re Douglas P., 333 Md. 387, 392 [ 635 A.2d 427 ] (1994); Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 329 Md. 461, 466 [ 620 A.2d 340 ] (1993). We will read the statute in a natural and sensible fashion, assigning the words of the statute their ordinary and commonly understood meanings, absent evidence that the General Assembly intended a different meaning. Board of Trustees of Maryland State Retirement and Pension Systems v. Hughes, 340 Md. 1, 7 [ 664 A.2d 1250 ] (1995); In re Roger S., 338 Md. 385, 391 [ 658 A.2d 696 ] (1995). “[W]hen there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the statute, there is no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the legislative body.” Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523 [ 636 A.2d 448 ] (1994). In the absence of an ambiguity, the courts “ are not at liberty to disregard the natural import of words with a view towards making the statute express an intention which is different from its plain meaning.’ ” Fikar v. Montgomery County, 333 Md. 430, 434-35 [ 635 A.2d 977 ] (1994), quoting Potter v. Bethesda Fire Department, 309 Md. 347, 353 [ 524 A.2d 61 ] (1987).

When the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, courts must look beyond the words of the statute and to other evidence of legislative intent. Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 438-39 [ 639 A.2d 675 ] (1994). The court should then consider, “not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but [also] their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of ¹⁶³ the enactment.’ ” Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672 [ 659 A.2d 1347 ] (1995), quoting Gargliano, 334 Md. at 436 [ 639 A.2d 675 ]. We may thus “consider the consequences resulting from one meaning, rather than another, and adopt the construction which promotes the most reasonable result in light of’ the statute’s purpose.

Rucker v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 315 Md. 559, 565 [ 555 A.2d 1060 ] (1989). In all cases, however, “[c]are must be taken to avoid construing a statute by forced or subtle interpretations.” Houston v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Md.App. 177, 184 [ 674 A.2d 87 ] (1996) [,rev’d on other grounds, 346 Md. 503 , 697 A.2d 851 (1997)]. In the case at hand, the parties disagree as to the meaning of “particular educational needs of the child” as used in the Child Support Guidelines. As we have noted, there are no Maryland cases interpreting this portion of the Guidelines.

In applying the rules of statutory construction, we look to the language of the statute itself for aid in interpretation. There are no statutory definitions, however, to assist in determining the meaning, and in no other sections of the statute is this phrase used. Furthermore, there is no plain or clear meaning to these words in that they are subject to multiple interpretations. Correctly focusing on the meaning of the word “particular,” appellant points out that the dictionary defines “particular” with words such as “special rather than general” and “distinguished or different from others or from the ordinary.” Random House Dictionaey 1052 (1983).

From this appellant gleans that because a private school offers the same mandatory instructional guidelines and curricula as public schools and the children have no learning, emotional, or physical disabilities, the statute does not contemplate ordering him to pay for their attendance at a private parochial school when a public school adequately will meet their general, as opposed to particular, educational needs. 6 The dictionary definition of ¹⁶⁴ “particular,” however, also can be used to support the argument that private schools do meet “special” or “other than general” needs of children because of a religious atmosphere, sometimes smaller class sizes, or other unique characteristics. Just because a child’s educational needs do not include a disability does not necessarily mean his or her needs are not “particular.” Because the plain meaning of § 12 — 204(i) is ambiguous, we must look to other sources for aid in interpretation. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987). As both parties note, the legislative history surrounding the Child Support Guidelines yields no assistance in interpreting this provision.

An exploration of Maryland opinions written before the passage of the Guidelines, however, gives us some general guidance in this area. In O’Connor v. O’Connor, 22 Md.App. 519 , 323 A.2d 632 (1974), the father appealed from a modification increasing his child support obligations where some of the increase was to pay for the parochial school education of the parties’ children. The father raised no objection at trial to the children’s attendance at the school but objected to paying for the education. Holding for the mother, we said “the law in a child support case is always what is in the best interest of the child, i.e., the needs of the child in view of the child’s station in life, tempered only by the financial ability of the parents to provide the requisites of the child.” Id. at 522 , 323 A.2d 632 .

We went on to hold: While we do not endeavor at this time to formulate any general rule or principle regarding the responsibility of a father to provide his child or children with an education in the private secondary school sector ... ,we believe that in the factual posture of this case, the chancellor below was not clearly erroneous in increasing the support payments for the minor children, knowing that a part of those funds ¹⁶⁵ would be expended to finance the education of the parties’ minor children in parochial schools. Both the father and the two older children had gone to secondary parochial schools. At the time the divorce proceedings were instituted, Gary had been enrolled at St. John’s and the younger children were attending elementary parochial schools. The mother testified that she wanted the boys to attend St. John’s in part because it was a military school under the direction of men and she desired the boys to have this atmosphere because their father was not at home to supervise and discipline them.

She concluded by stating that she was simply following the pattern of education for the children which had been pursued for years during the time she and her husband were married. We think these are salutary reasons which have been advanced by the mother and demonstrate an intelligent concern for the welfare and educational needs of the children. The obvious financial ability of the father to pay for his childrens’ [sic] private schooling, the pattern of education which had been set for the children prior to the divorce, the station in society occupied by the parties and the educational needs of the children create a set of circumstances, when considered in their totality, which clearly justify, in our opinion, the increased child support payments ordered by the chancellor. Id. at 525-26 , 323 A.2d 632 (citation omitted)(footnote omitted).

Another pre-Guidelines case, Holston v. Holston, 58 Md.App. 308, 473 A.2d 459 (1984), dealt with the same issue of whether a trial court could award as a part of child support obligations the cost of private school education for the divorced parties’ minor children. In that opinion, we specifically rejected using the factors set out in O’Connor as a rigid test. Rather, we stated, “O’Connor ... presented certain factors which are permissible considerations in ruling on the issue of child support.” Id. at 316, 473 A.2d 459 . Furthermore, “[t]he proper inquiry ... is what is in the best interest of the child.

In reaching that conclusion, the chancellor must balance the ¹⁶⁶ needs of the child against the parent’s financial ability to meet those needs.” Id. at 317 , 473 A.2d 459 . Accordingly, when considering the matter of public or private education before the Guidelines were in place, the paramount concern was the “best interests of the child.” In addition to the pre-Guidelines cases, another helpful area in reviewing this statute is a brief survey of cases interpreting similar provisions from other states. Twenty-seven states, including Maryland, use the Income Shares Model in determining child support responsibilities. Barbara R. Bergmann & Sherry Wetchler, Child Support Awards: State Guidelines vs. Public Opinion, 29 Fam.

L.Q. 483 , 485 (1995)(surveying the discrepancies between what the Maryland Child Support Guidelines actually award and what the Maryland public feels is appropriate). Two states, Colorado and Louisiana, have enacted statutes similar to Maryland’s with language closely resembling the provision at issue. 7 Both states have cases reviewing their respective provision. Colorado opinions evaluate facts and issues similar to those evident in the case sub judice. In In re Marriage of Payan, 890 P.2d 264 (Colo.Ct.App.1995), the trial court determined the cost of sending the parties’ two minor children to a private school should not be included in the father’s child support obligations because “there was no evidence that the children ¹⁶⁷ had a learning disability or other special need which makes private school education required.’ ” Id. at 265 .

Reversing the trial court, the Colorado Court of Appeals held this interpretation of “particular educational needs” was too narrow. Instead, the court said the trial court should consider, when calculating child support, the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved. In this context, the means of meeting the “particular educational needs” of a child are not limited to providing private schooling only when a child has a learning disability or otherwise qualifies for a program of special education. Here, the record indicates that both children had been attending the private school for a number of years before the dissolution of the marriage.

That factor may properly be considered by the trial court in determining whether continuing enrollment at the school therefore meets the children’s particular educational needs. Id. More recent Colorado cases continue in this interpretation. See In re Marriage of Elmer, 936 P.2d 617, 622 (Colo.Ct.App. 1997)(“The means of meeting the particular educational needs’ of a child are not limited to providing private schooling only when a child has a learning disability or otherwise qualifies for a program of special education.

Rather, the standard of living that the child would have enjoyed if the marriage had not been dissolved must be considered.”); In re Marriage of Eaton, 894 P.2d 56, 59 (Colo.Ct.App.1995)(“The particular educational needs of the child’ are not to be construed narrowly as only encompassing learning disabilities. Rather, child support may include an amount to allow a child to attend private school if circumstances warrant.”). Louisiana has reviewed its analogous statute and interpreted “particular educational needs” a number of times with an outcome similar to that of Colorado. In a recent case, a father appealed the trial court’s ruling which ordered him to pay eighty-five percent of the tuition for the private school of the parties’ children, claiming there had been no showing of particular educational need requiring the children attend that ¹⁶⁸ school.

Valure v. Valure, 696 So.2d 685, 687 (La.Ct.App.1997). The trial court noted evidence that the father had never objected to the children’s attendance and continued to pay for the costs and tuition after he and his ex-wife had separated. The trial court also found that the children had always attended the private school and because of the trauma of their parent’s divorce, the children were undergoing a great deal of stress and needed a sense of stability in their lives. Holding for the mother, the appellate court concluded: A particular educational need of a child to remain in private school includes consideration of the child’s history of attending a private school and whether a continuation of the child’s education in that setting is in the child’s best interest.

A child’s successful continuation of his or her education in a proven academic environment is generally found to be in his or her best interests. Id. at 688 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Other Louisiana cases hold likewise. See Buchert v. Buchert, 642 So.2d 300 (La.Ct.App.1994) (explaining that “particular educational needs” includes considering a child’s history of attendance at the private school, whether continuing would be in their best interests, which can be demonstrated by academic success, and whether the parties had previously chosen to send their children to a private school); Jones v. Jones, 628 So.2d 1304 (La.Ct.App.1993)(holding the trial court properly included private school expenses in husband’s child support obligation where the children had been attending private school and the husband admitted that he would prefer his children attend private school if he could afford it).

Prom our review of Maryland cases prior to the enactment of the Child Support Guidelines and of cases from other jurisdictions interpreting a similar statutory provision, it is clear the law in Maryland prior to the Guidelines can be reconciled with the new statutory language. Prior to the Guidelines, we declined to give a hard and fast rule for determining whether a non-custodial parent should be obligated to pay for his or her children’s private school education. Rather, we noted, trial courts should evaluate various factors ¹⁶⁹ on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the best interests of the child “tempered only by the financial ability of the parents” to pay for the education. O’Connor, 22 Md.App. at 522 , 323 A.2d 632 ; accord Holston, 58 Md.App. at 308 , 473 A.2d 459 .

In O’Connor , for instance, we considered such factors as the children’s history of education, their “station in society,” as well as their educational needs. O’Connor, 22 Md.App. at 525-26 , 323 A.2d 632 . Although these cases were not rejected by the Legislature when it enacted the Guidelines, we realize that we must give the trial courts further guidance in interpreting what are a child’s “particular educational