Won Sun Lee v. Won Bok Lee

Fader, C.J. ⁴⁹ Won Sun Lee, the appellant, challenges the Circuit Court for Howard County's refusal to vacate a renewed judgment the court's clerk entered against him and in favor of his brother, Won Bok Lee. Before we can address the merits of this appeal, Mr. Bok Lee asks us to determine whether it is ⁵⁰ timely. We conclude that it is. The clerk's entry of the order from which Mr. Sun Lee appeals initially failed to comply with the requirements of Maryland Rule 2-601(b) because the docket entry available through the case search feature on the Judiciary website did not identify the date on which judgment was entered.

As a result, the appeal period did not start to run and Mr. Sun Lee's appeal was premature when it was filed. However, subsequent changes to the docket entry fixed the problem and Mr. Sun Lee's appeal is now properly before us. Turning to the merits, Mr. Sun Lee asks us to decide whether his brother's 2015 attempt to renew a judgment in the circuit court was effective. The answer to that question revolves largely around two others: (1) whether Mr. Bok Lee's 2004 filing ³ in the circuit court of notice of a 2002 federal court judgment created a new state court judgment or just a lien; and (2) if that filing created a lien only, whether it extended the period for renewal of the underlying judgment, which otherwise expired by operation of law in 2014.

We conclude that the 2004 filing created a lien, not a judgment, and so could not be renewed once the underlying federal court judgment had expired. We therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand with instructions to vacate the renewed judgment. BACKGROUND Initial Proceedings in Federal and State Court In 2002, Mr. Bok Lee obtained a judgment by default in the amount of $ 141,059.44 against Mr. Sun Lee in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. In May 2004, Mr. Bok Lee filed a "Request to File Notice of Lien" in the Circuit Court for Howard County based on the federal judgment.

On June 1, 2004, the circuit court entered a "Notice of Lien of Judgment Received From United States District Court" and made the following docket entry: "Judgment entered on 06/01/04." ⁵¹ The Howard County case remained dormant until July 23, 2015, when Mr. Bok Lee filed a "Request to Renew Judgment." The request stated that "[j]udgment in this case was entered on June 1, 2004," claimed that it had "not expired (12 years from entry)," and asked the clerk to renew it. The clerk promptly entered the renewed judgment on the docket. On March 24, 2016, Mr. Sun Lee moved to vacate the renewal. He argued that Mr. Bok Lee's 2004 filing had created a lien, rather than a new judgment, and so could no longer be renewed once the federal judgment had expired.

Although the circuit court agreed with Mr. Sun Lee that the 2004 filing had created a lien, not a new judgment, it also agreed with Mr. Bok Lee that it was nonetheless still subject to renewal. Three writings relating to the circuit court's ruling are central to our discussion below, so we present them in some detail. First, after a hearing, the court issued a one-page written order containing a single substantive sentence that identifies what the court considered (the motion to vacate, the opposition, and the arguments of the parties) and states that the motion to vacate is denied. The order is dated June 2, 2016 and bears (1) the signature of the judge, (2) a stamp identifying that it was "ENTERED" on June 3, 2016, (3) a true test certification, and (4) a notation of "6000" in the bottom right corner.

We refer to this order as the "June 2 Order." The second and third writings of significance are both docket entries. Each appears slightly differently in the circuit court's own system than it appeared as viewed through the case search feature on the Judiciary website at the relevant time-which, for purposes of determining the timeliness of the appeal, is the period between June 3 and July 6, 2016. The first, which we refer to as "Docket Entry 6000," appears in the court's case management system as: ^{52 4} At the relevant time, that same entry appeared through the case search feature on the Judiciary website as: 1 The second entry, which we refer to as "Docket Entry 14000," appears in the court's case management system as: At the relevant time, that same entry appeared through the case search feature on the Judiciary website as: We discuss both docket entries in more detail below. Mr. Sun Lee noted an appeal on July 6, 2016.

Mr. Bok Lee moved to strike the notice as late, arguing that the June 2 Order had been entered on June 3 and that any appeal-after accounting for weekends and a holiday-was due by July 5. The circuit court granted the motion and struck the notice of appeal. Mr. Sun Lee then appealed timely from the order striking his first notice of appeal. ⁵³ The First Appeal In an unreported opinion, a panel of this Court concluded that the record did not reflect when, or even if, Mr. Sun Lee's time to appeal had begun to run. ⁵ Lee v. Lee , No. 945, Sept. Term 2016, 2017 WL 3634056 , at ³ (Aug. 24, 2017). The panel identified three factors that are necessary for there to be a valid appeal: (1) under Rule 2-601(a), the final judgment must be "set forth on a separate document" that is signed by a judge or the clerk of court; (2) under Rule 2-601(b), the judgment must be entered on the court's electronic case management system; and (3) under Rules 2-601(d) and 8-202(a), an appeal must be noted within 30 days of the date on which the judgment was entered in that court's electronic case management system.

Lee , 2017 WL 3634056 , at ¹. Based on the record as it then stood, the panel found insufficient evidence to determine either (1) whether the separate document required by Rule 2-601(a) had been signed or (2) whether such a document had been entered on the court's electronic case management system. Id. at ². With respect to the separate document, the panel considered it plausible that the June 2 Order was the required separate document setting forth the judgment, but it was uncertain because of a perceived inconsistency between the date of that order and Docket Entry 14000.

That entry, although not made until June 6, seemed to contemplate that a separate order was still yet to come. Id. With respect to the entry of such a document, the panel first considered, and rejected, Mr. Bok Lee's contention that Docket Entry 6000 reflected the entry of the order in the court's electronic case management system. The panel's confusion in attempting to interpret this docket entry is perhaps best reflected in a footnote in which it observed that neither party had "ventured an explanation, nor can we invent one, to explain why the portion of the docket entry that says '06/03/16 copies mailed' was made on (or added to) the March 24 docket entry." Id. at ² n.3.

In the absence of any such explanation, the panel concluded that this could not possibly reflect entry ⁵⁴ of the separate document by which the court had entered judgment and, therefore, that "there is no way that June 3 can be the date of entry of judgment." Id. at ². As an alternative, the panel considered whether Docket Entry 14000 could constitute entry of the separate document on the court's electronic case management system. Id. The panel concluded that this docket entry might constitute entry of a separate order on the electronic docket, but was uncertain in light of the same perceived inconsistency as to dates between that June 6 entry-and its indication that an order still had to be submitted-and the June 2 Order.

Id. at ²-3. Out of that uncertainty, the panel posited three possibilities: (1) if a separate document had been executed before June 6 (such as the June 2 Order), and Docket Entry 14000 constituted its entry on the electronic case management system (on June 6), then Mr. Sun Lee's appeal would be timely; (2) if a separate document had been executed after June 6, then-still treating Docket Entry 14000 as the (premature) entry of that separate document on the court's electronic case management system-the appeal would be "ripe to proceed," with June 6 being its operative date; or (3) if a separate document was never signed, the judgment "has still not become final," and the appeal "was, and remains, premature." Id. at ². "Under none of these three possible scenarios," the panel concluded, "was Mr. Sun Lee's appeal late." Id. at ³. The panel therefore reversed the order striking the notice of appeal and remanded to the circuit court with the following mandate: JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT TO ⁶ DETERMINE DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR TO ENTER THE JUDGMENT ON A SEPARATE DOCUMENT.

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE. Id. Proceedings on Remand On remand, the circuit court asked the court clerk to explain his practices with respect to the relevant entries in the ⁵⁵ court's electronic case management system. The clerk's responsive memorandum explained that the June 2 Order is the separate document reflecting the court's judgment and that it was entered on the court's electronic case management system on June 3 as part of Docket Entry 6000.

With respect to the date of entry, the clerk's memorandum explained that: • "It is the clerk's practice that when the clerk enters a ruling/order from the Court, the Order is 'entered' stamped. Which in this case was June 3, 2016." • "It is the clerk's practice to update the original motion in [the court's electronic case management system]. In this case the clerk entered the ruling of Denied under docket entry 6000 as of June 3, 2016 and mailed copies of the Order on June 3, 2016." • "Adjacent to the ruling of Denied is the closed date of the motion of June 3, 2016 which also corresponds to the date of entry." 2 • "Therefore the written Order Denying the Motion to Vacate Judgment was entered by the clerk on June 3, 2016." Upon receiving the clerk's memorandum, the circuit court issued its own memorandum opinion in which it provided "an explanation of the process." The court explained that Docket Entry 6000, although a single entry bearing an "Entered" date of March 24, actually reflects at least three different events: the filing of the motion to vacate the judgment, the scheduling of a hearing on that motion, and the court's denial of that motion. March 24, 2016, the court explained, is the date the motion was filed.

The subsequent dates mentioned are the dates on which the two other events-scheduling of the hearing (April 20, 2016) and entry of the order (June 3, 2016)-were entered into the system. ⁵⁶ The court also sought to answer the uncertainty regarding Docket Entry 14000, explaining that it reflects "a hearing sheet[,] which is a summary of what occurred during a proceeding." Thus, the information in that entry reflects the court's statement in open court that it would deny the motion, not the entry of a written order. According to the court, "[t]he entry of the hearing sheet on June 6, 2016 is just that, the entering of the hearing sheet into the electronic case management system. It is not an order, nor does it have the effect of an order." In summarizing its response to the questions raised by the panel, the circuit court stated that it "issued a separate Order that was signed on June 2, 2016," and that "[t]he Order was entered by the clerk in the electronic case management system on June 3, 2016 ...." Alterations to the Docket Entries as Those Entries Appear Through the Case Search Feature on the Judiciary Website The status of the docket entries as discussed thus far was accurate through at ⁷ least July 31, 2016, as reflected in the filings of the parties in the circuit court and included in the record filed with this Court. When this Court independently queried the case search function available on the Judiciary website on January 11, 2019, however, Docket Entry 6000 appeared as: Although there is nothing in the record about this change, we presume it was made in connection with the transition of the Howard County Circuit Court to the Maryland Electronic Courts ("MDEC") system in April 2018.

For our present purposes, what is relevant is: (1) the change occurred after July 6, 2016; and (2) the entry now includes the following information: "Decision: Denied - 06/03/2016." ⁵⁷ DISCUSSION Based on the circuit court's findings, Mr. Bok Lee moved to dismiss Mr. Sun Lee's appeal as late. Mr. Sun Lee counters that this Court already conclusively determined that the appeal was not late and cannot revisit that determination. We conclude (1) that we are not precluded from considering whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal, (2) that Mr. Sun Lee's July 6, 2016 notice of appeal was premature when filed, but that the appeal is now ripe for decision, and (3) that the circuit court erred in denying Mr. Sun Lee's motion to vacate the renewed judgment. I. WE ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM CONSIDERING WHETHER MR.

SUN LEE'S APPEAL WAS LATE. We begin with the threshold principle that we have an independent obligation to assure ourselves that we have jurisdiction in every appeal that comes before us. See generally In re Joseph N. , 407 Md. 278 , 286, 965 A.2d 59 (2009) ("[T]he issue of appealability is a threshold one, which may be raised at any time by a party, even on appeal, and, indeed, which must be addressed, and will be, by the Court on its own motion, whether raised or not.") (quoting Office of State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, Inc. , 356 Md. 118 , 125, 737 A.2d 592 (1999) ); Murphy v. Steele Software Sys. Corp. , 144 Md. App. 384 , 392, 798 A.2d 1149 (2002) ("It is our duty ... to raise, and decide, issues of our jurisdiction over cases appealed to this Court.").

The timeliness of an appeal is jurisdictional. Under Rule 8-202(a), a "notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken." If not filed timely, "the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed." HIYAB, Inc. v. Ocean Petroleum, LLC , 183 Md. App. 1 , 8, 959 A.2d 808 (2008) (quoting Houghton v. County Comm'rs of Kent County , 305 Md. 407 , 413, 504 A.2d 1145 (1986) ). Since July 1, 2018, Rule 8-602(b)(2) has expressly mandated dismissal if "the ⁵⁸ notice of appeal was not filed with the lower court within the time prescribed by Rule 8-202." Mr. Sun Lee argues that the conclusion of the prior panel that his appeal was not late precludes us from even considering that jurisdictional issue now. We disagree.

Although "decisions rendered by a prior appellate panel will generally govern [a] second appeal at the same appellate level," ⁸ Holloway v. State , 232 Md. App. 272 , 279, 157 A.3d 356 (2017), we also recognize that this is not "an inflexible rule of law" that precludes an "appellate court ... from reconsidering an issue it previously decided." Goldstein & Baron Chartered v. Chesley , 375 Md. 244 , 253, 825 A.2d 985 (2003). There are three circumstances in which we have recognized that "an appellate court will depart from a prior decision": when (1) "the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different"; (2) "controlling authority has since made a contrary decision on the law applicable to such issues"; or (3) "the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Corby v. McCarthy , 154 Md. App. 446 , 479-80, 840 A.2d 188 (2003) (quoting Turner v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. County , 364 Md. 24 , 34, 770 A.2d 671 (2010) ) (quotation marks omitted). 3 Here, the evidence and record before us is substantially different now from the prior appeal because we now have explanations from the circuit court and its clerk of the June 2 Order and the docket entries about which the prior panel was uncertain.

We now know definitively that (1) the circuit court intended the June 2 Order to be the separate order entering judgment in this case, (2) the clerk intended to enter that order in the court's electronic case management system on June 3 by adding the word "Denied" to Docket Entry 6000, and (3) Docket Entry 14000 is merely a hearing sheet and ⁵⁹ does not reflect the entry of any written order. With this additional information and in light of our independent obligation to ensure that we have jurisdiction, we conclude that we are not precluded from revisiting the question of whether Mr. Sun Lee's original notice of appeal was late.

II

MR. SUN LEE'S APPEAL WAS INITIALLY PREMATURE, BUT NOW IS RIPE. We now turn to the merits of the motion to dismiss, which requires us to return to the two questions we asked the circuit court to answer on remand: (1) whether the circuit court or its clerk had signed a separate document setting forth the judgment in compliance with Rule 2-601(a) ; and (2) if-and if so, when-the clerk entered that judgment on the court's electronic case management system in compliance with Rule 2-601(b). As to the first question, the circuit court's memorandum establishes that the June 2 Order is indeed the "separate document" setting forth the court's judgment that is required by Rule 2-601(a).

The prior panel's uncertainty on that point arose from the notation in the later-dated Docket Entry 14000 indicating that an order was yet to come. With the court's explanation that the notation in Docket Entry 14000 reflects the situation that existed when the court closed the June 2 hearing, not the situation that existed when that docket entry was made on June 6, we consider that issue to be definitively resolved. The second question is more complicated. The prior panel thought that Docket Entry 14000 might reflect the entry of the judgment in the court's electronic case management system.

The circuit court's explanation that Docket Entry 14000 does not reflect the entry of any written order eliminates that possibility. Instead, the circuit court identifies Docket Entry 6000 as (1) reflecting entry of the judgment in the court's electronic case management system (2) on June 3, ⁹ 2016. We accept the circuit court's memorandum as resolving conclusively the first of ⁶⁰ these points-that the clerk actually entered the word "Denied" into Docket Entry 6000 on June 3, 2016, and that the clerk did so for the purpose of entering the judgment reflected in the June 2 Order. We also accept the circuit court's memorandum as establishing that the notation "06/03/16 copies mailed" in Docket Entry 6000 refers to the mailing of copies of the June 2 Order to counsel and that the "Closed" date of June 3 that appears in the court's case management system-though not in the docket then available on the Judiciary website-refers to the date on which the word "Denied" was added to Docket Entry 6000.

Our difficulty in accepting those facts as establishing June 3 as the trigger date for the appeal period lies in the fact that Docket Entry 6000 itself-and particularly the version of that docket entry that was available on the Judiciary website in June and July of 2016-failed to establish clearly when the clerk added the "Denied" notation to the entry. 4 Explaining why that issue is significant requires an exploration of the Court of Appeals's decision in Hiob v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co. , 440 Md. 466 , 103 A.3d 596 (2014), and subsequent amendments to Rule 2-601. A. The Court of Appeals's Decision in Hiob v. Progressive American Insurance Company In Hiob , the Court of Appeals undertook an extensive analysis of the evolution and interpretation of the then-extant version of Rule 2-601.

The Court's analysis there guides our determination here. The immediate question in Hiob was whether a line of dismissal signed only by parties satisfied ⁶¹ Rule 2-601's requirement that a judgment must be reflected in a "separate document" that the clerk enters on the docket. 440 Md. at 472 , 103 A.3d 596 . There, plaintiffs brought claims against two insurers-Erie and Progressive-arising out of a fatal automobile accident. Id. at 481 , 103 A.3d 596 .

The court entered judgment in favor of Progressive, leaving the claims against Erie pending. Id. Those claims were resolved 14 months later when the plaintiffs and Erie filed a joint line of dismissal. Id. at 481-82 , 103 A.3d 596 .

At the same time they filed the line of dismissal, the Hiob plaintiffs also moved the circuit court to reduce its earlier order of judgment in favor of Progressive to a final judgment. Id. at 482 , 103 A.3d 596 . The court did so, but not until 29 days later. Id.

One week after that-which was 36 days after entry of the line of dismissal-the plaintiffs noted an appeal. Id. In arguing that the appeal was late, Progressive contended that the 30-day appeal period began to run with the entry of the line of dismissal, which finally resolved all remaining claims in the case, not with the court's subsequent order entering final judgment. Id.

This Court agreed with Progressive, see Hiob v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co. , 212 Md. App. 734 , 71 A.3d 184 (2013), and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari. In reversing this Court's judgment, the Court of Appeals first engaged in a detailed ¹⁰ discussion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, on which Maryland Rule 2-601 was modeled; the 1997 amendments to Rule 2-601, in which that Court adopted the "separate document" requirement; and cases interpreting both. 440 Md. at 472 -80 , 103 A.3d 596 .

Addressing the federal rule, the Court observed that cases interpreting it had been guided by two overarching principles. "First, in order to provide the desired clarity, the 'separate-document rule must be mechanically applied in determining whether an appeal is timely.' " Id. at 474 , 103 A.3d 596 (quoting Bankers Tr. Co. v. Mallis , 435 U.S. 381 , 386, 98 S.Ct. 1117 , 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) ). "Second, because the rule 'is not designed as a trap for the inexperienced,' it is to be interpreted to preserve the right to an appeal." Hiob , 440 Md. at 475 , 103 A.3d 596 (quoting Bankers Tr.

Co. , 435 U.S. at 386 -87 , 98 S.Ct. 1117 ). ⁶² The Court summarized the requirements of our own Rule 2-601 as it was adopted in 1997: (1) a judgment must be reflected on a document that is "separate from an oral ruling of the judge, a docket entry, or a memorandum"; (2) that separate document must be signed by either the court or the clerk, depending on the type of judgment; and (3) the judgment is effective to trigger the time for filing an appeal "only if it is set forth in accordance with the requirements of Rule 2-601(a) and properly entered under Rule 2-601(b)." Hiob , 440 Md. at 478 -79 , 103 A.3d 596 . The Court further observed that in applying Rule 2-601, it had "employed the same principles as the federal courts in construing" the federal rule, id. at 480 , 103 A.3d 596 , including both mechanical application "in determining whether an appeal is timely," id. (quoting Byrum v. Horning , 360 Md. 23 , 32, 756 A.2d 560 (2000) ), and interpreting the requirement "in favor of the preservation of appeal rights," Hiob , 440 Md. at 480 , 103 A.3d 596 . Turning to the case before it, the Court of Appeals concluded that the line of dismissal failed to trigger the 30-day appeal period.

Id. at 503 , 103 A.3d 596 . The Court observed that the "separate document" required by Rule 2-601(a) must be in the form of a "judgment," which the Rules defined (and still define) as an "order of court final in nature entered pursuant to these rules." Rules 1-202(o); 2-601(a). The line was not an order of court at all, much less "an unqualified decision of the court as to which party has prevailed and what relief, if any, is awarded." Hiob , 440 Md. at 483-84 , 486 , 103 A.3d 596 . 5 Notably for our purposes, Progressive argued that the parties had not been prejudiced by the failure to enter a separate document because they were all aware of the effect of the stipulation in light of the earlier judgment. ⁶³ Id. at 495 , 103 A.3d 596 . The Court rejected that argument, concluding that it "ignores the need to provide the public, not just the litigants, with a clear indication of when judgment is entered." Id.

Moreover, although someone familiar with the case might have understood that the combination of the earlier judgment and the later stipulation of dismissal would have resolved all claims against all parties, "[a] determination that a final judgment exists based on assumptions of implied finality is not the type of clear indication that judgment has been entered envisioned by the current version of Rule 2-601." Id. at 496 , 103 A.3d 596 . ¹¹ The Court thus found the line of dismissal ineffective to trigger the time for appeal because it "does not clearly indicate to the parties and the public that the court has adjudicated the issues presented and rendered a final decision as to the claims against Progressive ...." Id. at 497 , 103 A.3d 596 . Also notable for our purposes, the Court then proceeded to address Progressive's contention that language in its earlier decision in Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams , 381 Md. 378 , 849 A.2d 504 (2004), stood for the proposition that a stipulated dismissal constituted a judgment that did not need to be signed by a judge. Hiob , 440 Md. at 498 , 103 A.3d 596 . The Court rejected that contention, at least with respect to its application to Rule 2-601, based on the plain language of the Rule.

Id. at 499 , 103 A.3d 596 . The Court went on to conclude that even if a stipulated dismissal could satisfy the separate document requirement of Rule 2-601(a), "the time for filing a notice of appeal does not begin until the separate document is entered on the docket consistent with 2-601(b)." Id. at 500 , 103 A.3d 596 . The Court observed that "the value of docket entries making public the disposition of each claim in a case cannot be overemphasized. Litigants and the public ought to be able to look at a case file or docket and determine when any judgment was entered." Id.

(quoting Tierco , 381 Md. at 393 -94 , 849 A.2d 504 ). Because the docket entry in that case reflected only the entry of a "Voluntary Dismissal (Partial)" as to Erie, it failed to provide information from which the public could discern that the court had entered final judgment. ⁶⁴ Hiob , 440 Md. at 500 , 103 A.3d 596 . Finding entry of such a dismissal to be adequate to start the appeal clock would "create[ ] a trap for the unwary and the inexperienced and [would] not promote the ability of the public to readily determine the disposition of every claim brought in the circuit courts." Id. at 501 , 103 A.3d 596 . In summarizing its conclusions, the Court stated: [F]or there to be an entry of an effective final judgment that triggers the time for filing an appeal, there must be an affirmative answer to the following questions: • Is there a final judgment? • Is there a separate document? • Is there a document in the court file separate from the docket entry? • Does the document reflect a judicial action that grants or denies specific relief in an unqualified way? • Has the separate document been signed by the judge or the clerk? • Has the clerk docketed the