WOODMONT CC v. Mayor and City Council of Rockville

SAUSE, Judge. On October 4, 1993, Woodmont Country Club (Woodmont) filed petitions in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County requesting judicial review “pursuant to Maryland Rules 7-201 et seq.” and Article XI(d) of the Charter of Rockville of certain special assessments made by the City of Rockville (the City) in connection with the construction of Wootton Parkway 1 and an appurtenant water transmission system. 2 After hearing, the ⁷⁰² Court entered a memorandum and order by which “the appeals ... are hereby dismissed.” 3 This appeal is from that order. The facts On May 14, 1990, the City adopted an ordinance (# 12-90) whose primary effect was to establish a June 4, 1990, hearing in connection -with proposals for “extension of Ritchie Parkway between Seven Locks Road and Rockville Pike” and “that the abutting properties specially benefited by said improvements be assessed according to the front foot rule of apportionment or some other equitable basis.” A companion ordinance (# 18-90) established a concurrent hearing in connection with “construction of a water transmission main, fire hydrants, valves and related work and appurtenances” within the new roadway, again with a proposal that a portion of the cost be paid by way of special assessment upon abutting landowners. The proposed route of Wootton Parkway lay largely through property owned by appellant Woodmont. 4 Three weeks after the hearing on June 4, 1990, Woodmont conveyed to the City a total of 20.3 acres. 5 The purchase price, arrived at after negotiations which seem to have been ongoing for some time, was $6,400,000, together with a number of other ⁷⁰³ undertakings by the City. 6 Woodmont “waive[d], quitclaim[ed] and surrender[ed] any and all rights ... against the City for severance or other damages to the remainder of ... [the Club’s] property.” A second set of ordinances, authorizing construction of the road (# 18-90) and the water main (# 19-90), were adopted on July 9, 1990.

Both ordinances directed the City Manager “to cause appraisals of the properties specially benefitted by the proposed public improvements to be made prior to the commencement of the construction of the improvements ... and, in addition, to cause appraisals to be made upon completion of the improvements.” Upon completion of the projects—the road and water main were completed, for costs said to be $24,060,725 and $946,-952.79, respectively—public hearings were held on May 17 and June 21, 1993, with respect to the assessments to be levied in accordance with the ordinances of July 9,1990. By a third set of ordinances, adopted on September 27, 1993, the Mayor and Council “accepted and approved” the road and water main and “found and declared” that they were “of special benefit to ... properties shown on ... [an attached] list in the amounts assessed on said list”, such amounts being, as to Woodmont, $2,943,000, as a result of the road (# 13-93), and $61,319.38, resulting from construction of the water main (# 14-93). 7 If paid with interest over a period of 20 years, as allowed by the ordinances, the Club’s total obligations would be $5,212,297.27 and $108,601.71, respectively. ⁷⁰⁴ The parties’ contentions The Circuit Court synthesized the parties’ contentions into 5 issues: 1. Has the Club waived its right to complain about the special assessments because it made the first of 20 annual payments? 2. In determining the special benefit to the Club property, was the City correct in appraising the property at its highest and best use? 3.

Was the Club afforded due process in connection with the levy of special assessments against its property? 4. Has the Club met its burden of overcoming the presumption of validity attached to the City’s actions in determining a special benefit? 5. Was the special assessment for the construction of a water transmission main valid? The Court directly addressed only the first two issues.

The City’s claim that payment of a portion of the special assessment precluded Woodmont’s right to make any objection to the entire assessment process was found to be only “partially correct.” 8 After extended discussion of the second question, it was squarely held that “it was proper for the City to base its valuation of the special benefit on the properties’ ‘highest and best’ use.” The remaining matters were given shorter shrift: “Questions 3, 4 and 5 can be disposed of in short order ... [because] for the reasons set forth in the City’s brief, the Club’s contentions with respect to these questions are without merit.” For reasons hereafter stated, we agree with the lower court’s conclusion that this appeal is not precluded by Woodmont's having paid installments of the assessments due under ⁷⁰⁵ the ordinances 9 and affirm its decision with respect to the second. In our view of the case, however, Woodmont’s contention of denial of due process and the allied issue concerning the absence of any presumption to be accorded the City’s action under that circumstance (the third and fourth questions framed, although not directly addressed below) have controlling merit and require reversal of the action of the Circuit Court. As this will involve further hearings and findings impossible to anticipate, we do not reach other, somewhat hyperbolic arguments here advanced by Woodmont—principally, the supposed applicability of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2309 , 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). Partial payment as affecting judicial review The City argued below that, as stated by the Circuit Court, “the Club’s payment of a portion of the special assessments precluded it from challenging the assessments.” As noted, the Court ruled that “the City’s argument in this regard is partially correct”, in that Woodmont was not entitled to a refund of amounts already paid, but “The simple fact of the matter is that ... [the remaining installments] have not been paid”, and “there is simply a question of whether or not they should be paid.” The City here narrows the scope of its original argument: “The Club is barred from recovering that portion of the special assessments it paid prior to taking this appeal”—a clear adoption of the finding below and recognition of the propriety of at least some judicial review. 10 While we agree that judicial review is proper in this case, we should not be understood as endorsing the reasoning of the lower court.

The case relied upon by it and the City is Wash. Sub. Sanitary Comm’n v. C.I. Mitchell & Best Co., 303 Md. 544 , 495 A.2d 30 (1985), where the Court stated “the Maryland ⁷⁰⁶ common law rule under which voluntary payments, made under a mistake of law, of taxes or other public charges are not recoverable” by quoting (at 572, 495 A.2d 30 ) from Apostol v. Anne Arundel County, 288 Md. 667, 672 , 421 A.2d 582 (1980): It is firmly established in this State that once a taxpayer voluntarily pays a tax or other governmental charge, under a mistake of law or under what he regards as an illegal imposition, no common law action lies for the recovery of the tax absent a special statutory provision sanctioning a refund. This is true even if payment is made under protest.

Moreover, in these circumstances, no common law or declaratory judgment action lies to challenge the validity of a tax so paid. Where there is a special statutory provision sanctioning a refund, although no particular statutory remedy is provided, an action in assumpsit is available. However, where there is statutory authorization for a refund and a special statutory remedy set forth, that remedy is exclusive. As made clear elsewhere in the Mitchell & Best opinion, the rule is not without exception, albeit such is extremely limited and involves factual determination of whether the payment was made under compulsion. 11 We need not explore the matter here.

The rule involved is one which involves the existence of a cause of action for recovery of money which has been paid. This is a proceeding for judicial review of the action taken at the hearings in May and June 1993. Neither the Circuit Court (Rule 7-209) nor this Court (Rule 8-604) has any authority to direct repayment in this proceeding, and we have not been asked to do so. Matters relating to repayment ⁷⁰⁷ will await determination in such proper proceeding as may hereafter be instituted for that purpose.

Presumption of correctness Here, the City first asks that we spare ourselves the exercise of undertaking more than superficial examination of its action, since it claims that “the method by which a governmental entity assesses and apportions the cost for a public improvement is a legislative question subject only to constitutional limitations, and the exercise of such legislative discretion will not be reviewed by courts when there appears to be neither fraud nor mistake”, citing, inter alia, Williams v. Anne Arundel County, 334 Md. 109, 123 , 638 A.2d 74 (1994) where it is said that: The legislative judgment in levying benefit assessments ... is entitled to the highest deference. ‘In the absence of a showing of arbitrary action and plain abuse of power,’ the legislative body’s decision is final.... ‘And an assessment, if imposed according to a definite and just plan, will not be disturbed where neither fraud nor mistake appears’ ... [citations omitted]. 12 Numerous other cases (including virtually all of those hereafter cited) are to the same effect. There is even a more specific “general rule that the law presumes that street paving, which facilitates travel and affords better access to abutting property, confers a special benefit upon the abutting property owner as well as a general benefit upon the community.” Maryland & Pa.R.R. v. Nice, 185 Md. 429, 433 , 45 A.2d 109 (1945), and Silver Spring Memorial Post No. 2562, V.F.W. v. Montgomery County, 207 Md. 442, 452 , 115 A.2d 249 (1955). ⁷⁰⁸ These rules plainly presuppose at least facial regularity of the proceedings in which the action was taken—at the very least, “absence of a showing of arbitrary action and plain abuse of power.” It would be a strange doctrine indeed which would attach a presumption of correctness to a determination of any kind which was reached through an improper process. The rule must be, and is, as quite simply stated in Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 67 , 225 A.2d 294 (1966), that where a procedural right has been properly asserted, “its denial vitiated the proceedings.” Plainly, any presumption of regularity must give way if, in fact, a procedural right of due process has been denied. It is undisputed in this appeal that Woodmont was categorically denied the right to cross-examine the experts whose testimony formed the sole basis for the action taken by the City. 13 Whether that right is one required by procedural due process, as vigorously urged by Woodmont and denied by the lower court and the City, presents a justiciable issue of the highest order.

The hearing requirement The City next seeks to avoid Woodmont’s due process claims on the theory that “the hearings held in May and June 1993 were purely gratuitous” and thus no more was required than what the Council chose to allow. The predicate is that “The only hearings required by the City Charter were the 1990 hearings preceding the legislative determination to au ⁷⁰⁹ thorize construction of the two public improvements as special assessment projects.” It is difficult to imagine that the City has fully explored the ramifications of this proposition, since to do so would in our opinion call into serious question the ability of the City to make any assessment at all in 1993. Article XI of the Charter of the City of Rockville (“Special Assessments”) contains a single section, divided into paragraphs (a) through (h). Subsection (a) authorizes the Council “to grade, construct, reconstruct, pave, provide street lighting, landscaping, or other amenities, for ... any street ... public highway, or any public right-of-way or property ... to such extent and of such materials and in such manner as shall be provided by ordinance and to purchase, contract to purchase, lay or contract to lay water mains and truck and lateral sewers____” In order to “pay the costs of all such work”, it is also empowered to: ... assess said cost, or any part thereof, against the abutting property and any other properties benefited thereby as hereinafter provided in this section [emphasis supplied]. 14 Subsection (c) contains express procedures, and an express timetable to be followed by the Council: Before entering upon the construction of any work or improvement specified herein, the Council shall by ordinance designate [1] the location, extent and kind of work or improvement proposed to be done or made, [2] the kind of materials to be used, [3] the estimated cost of the improve ⁷¹⁰ ment and [4] the real property which will be benefited thereby and which it is proposed to assess to pay all or any part of the cost thereof ... [emphasis supplied].

The same paragraph requires the Council to “fix a time and place when and where the owner or owners of the property to be so assessed therefor can be heard in reference thereto”, in connection with which the Council is to “serve” by mail written notice upon such property owners and to publish notice twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the City. Subsection (d) provides that: If after the hearing the Council shall be of the opinion that the public health, safety, welfare, comfort, or convenience requires the work or improvement proposed to be done or made, it shall provide by ordinance for the same and may charge the expense thereof or any part of such expense against the property which it shall find to be specially benefited thereby according to the front foot rule of apportionment or some other equitable basis as may be determined by it.... 15 [¶] The Council shall also provide in said ordinance the time and terms upon which payment of said assessments for said work and improvements shall be made by said property owners, the rate of interest, if any, that shall be charged upon deferred payments and shall provide penalties for failure to pay any deferred payment when due. The ordinance may temporarily exempt certain properties from the assessment, in whole or in part, until a date certain and/or the occasion of a specific event or change in circumstance, provided that such exemption is made pursuant to legislation duly adopted by the Council which shall provide for, among other things, certain criteria and/or standards for properties entitled to an exemption. The same subsection (d) provides that “An assessment made pursuant to this Article shall be a lien upon the ⁷¹¹ property against which it is charged superior to all other liens from the date of the approval of such assessment by the Council [emphasis supplied].” The subsection concludes with the establishment of an “appeal ... to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ... according to the Maryland Rules set forth in Title 7” and “[a]ppeals of the decision or judgment of the Circuit Court ... to the Court ofd [sic] Special Appeals and Court of Appeals as prescribed by the Maryland Rules.” From the above review, it is manifest that the Charter makes detailed and specific requirements for the establishment of special assessments for public improvements of the type here involved. 16 Although all of those requirements are to be fulfilled “Before entering upon the construction of any work or improvement”, the City did not follow that timetable.

The initial set of 1990 ordinances, those of May 14, represented no more than formal expression of intention to consider the improvements and establishment of the hearings required by the Charter. They also contained, as to each of the projects, “Total estimated project cost”, 17 and “Estimated assessable costs.” 18 ⁷¹² The preambles of the second set of ordinances (# 18-90 and # 19-90, adopted July 9, 1990), 19 adopted after the first hearing, contain more substance in their recitation that in conformity -with Article XI of the Charter, (1) the Council had in the May ordinance (# 12-90) established “the location, extent and kind of work or improvements proposed to be done, the kind of materials to be used, the estimated cost of the improvements, the real property which will be specially benefited thereby, and which is proposed to be assessed, and fixed a time and place when and where the owners thereof could be heard in reference thereto”; (2) notice had been given by mail and publication, as required by subsection (c); (3) the hearing had been held; and (4) the first requirement of subsection (d) by the Council’s determination that “the work or improvements ... is required for the public health, safety or comfort of the City of Rockville” had been fulfilled. The first section of this second set of ordinances formally “ordained” that “the public improvements ... are ... authorized to be done and constructed.” A second, and last, section directed the City Manager “to cause appraisals of the properties specially benefited by the proposed public improvement to be made prior to the commencement of the construction of the improvements ... and, in addition, to cause appraisals to be made upon completion of the improvements.” What both preambles and operative provisions of the 1990 ordinances did not do 20 was to embody what was permissive under subsection (d): assessment “against the property which it shall find to be specially benefited thereby according to the front foot rule of apportionment or some other equitable basis.” The ordinances thus state the matter of assessment in the future tense and contain absolutely no current findings with regard to “property ... specially benefited.” As a result, ⁷¹³ they did not address the specific direction as to what “the Council shall also provide in said ordinance” in the event that assessment was made, namely, “the time and terms upon which payment of said assessments for said work and improvements shall be made by said property owners, the rate of interest, if any, that shall be charged upon deferred payments and ... penalties for failure to pay any deferred payment when due.” The fact of the matter is that all of the requirements of Article XI of the Charter were not addressed, much less resolved in 1990. We are offered, and have found, no other authority for the assessments here considered.

As a result, if we are to follow the invitation of the City to find that only those proceedings were required, we should be forced to conclude that the City had no authority thereafter to make an assessment. By the express language of Article XI, all proceedings which it authorized were to be taken “Before entering upon the construction of any work or improvement.” 21 The City’s suggestion is even at odds with its own conduct in this proceeding. The penultimate and final sentences of subsection (d) of Article XI of the Charter provide for an “appeal” by “Any person aggrieved by the levy of a special assessment in accordance with the provisions of this Article.” As recognized by the Circuit Court, this is the only provision which authorizes judicial review of any action taken by the City with respect to a special assessment. Again, we have found no other.

If the view of the City were correct, and the only relevant proceedings were those in 1990, Woodmont’s 1993 application for judicial review would have been untimely (Rule 7-203) and the proper course for the City would have been to seek dismissal, yet that is not even suggested. ⁷¹⁴ Manifestly, although such seems to be at odds with a strict interpretation of the language of the Charter requiring all action to be taken “Before entering upon the construction of any work or improvement”, what the Council intended to do— and what it actually did—was postpone matters relating to actual assessment, even including the final designation of those to be assessed, until after the work was completed. As flatly recognized in the ordinances adopted in 1993 which are here involved, the 1990 ordinances had only “proposed that the costs of said construction be assessed against the properties specially benefited thereby”, but without the slightest inference that the question had been addressed at the 1990 hearing even to that limited extent, much less that any firm determination had been made that such “special benefit” actually existed. The wisdom of that course was borne out by subsequent events. As ultimately reflected in the 1993 ordinances, the total project cost for the road was $24,060,725—some $11,071,-086 less than projected in 1990—and $946,952 for the water main—$336,329 less than the original estimate. 22 The final tabulation was, if anything, more dramatic with regard to assessment.

Assessment was ultimately made against only 3 of the 5 property owners identified in 1990. In terms of dollars, the total assessment for the road was to be $6,100,816 (less than 20% of the $31,131,811 estimated in 1990) and $154,295 for the water main (instead of the estimated $363,-299). 23 It is more than plain to us that the 1993 ordinances and the hearings upon which they were based were the culmination of the process authorized by Article XI of the Charter and an indispensable part of any special assessment. To say otherwise would render meaningless the opportunity for hearing afforded persons proposed to be assessed, both because the persons to be assessed and the amounts of the assessment ⁷¹⁵ were at best tentative and at worst inaccurate, and still more because the predicates for actual assessment (i.e. the amounts by which specific properties derived special benefit) were not addressed at all until 1993. We cannot by any stretch of the imagination adopt the City’s view that the 1993 hearings were unnecessary.

If Woodmont was entitled to notice and hearing, as it plainly is under Article XI of the Charter, it certainly was not afforded such in the 1990 proceedings. More to the point, and disastrous from the City’s standpoint, if the 1990 proceedings are to be viewed as fulfillment of the Charter requirements, the process was at an end without the City having made any assessment at all. As a result, a proper characterization of the 1993 hearings would not be “gratuitous”, but “illegal”, with the inescapable characterization of the assessments based upon them being “void.” For its part, Woodmont has made no suggestion that the 1993 proceedings themselves were unauthorized, and in the absence of such we adopt, at least for purposes of this case, the view that all parties, recognizing the common sense proposition that a final determination of assessment could not be accurately made until the project was completed, viewed the provision requiring all action to be taken prior to commencement of the project as merely directory and bifurcated the required proceedings. We therefore reject the City’s notion that the 1993 hearings were not part and parcel of what was required of the Council under Article XI of its Charter and turn to the matter of Woodmont’s right to cross-examination at those hearings.

The right of cross-examination We turn at last to the true substance of this appeal. The City’s ultimate contention is that, even if the hearings themselves were required, cross-examination was not, because the Council was engaged in what it regards as “the uniquely legislative determination as to the appropriate apportionment ⁷¹⁶ of the funding of a public improvement between the public treasury and benefiting property owners.” The seminal case of Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966), involved rezoning of a parcel of land by a county council and failure to allow cross-examination of witnesses. As here, it was argued that the council was acting in a legislative, or quasi-legislative,.capacity in which cross-examination was not required as a matter of right. The Court recognized the constitutional distinction between executive, legislative and judicial functions, but also noted within the latter two a further division: “functions, when they are not purely and completely judicial or legislative in nature, but have qualities or incidents resembling them, are referred to as quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative” ( 242 Md. at 61 , 217 A.2d 578 ).

In that regard, “the actual acts of zoning and rezoning are legislative or quasi-legislative in nature [emphasis supplied]”, but those “actual acts” are distinguishable from the procedures upon which they are based (at 62, 217 A.2d 578 ): Up to the present time, no one has been able to delineate, with precision and accuracy, an exact formula for determining the line of demarcation between the differences between legislative and judicial functions. These differences, on occasions, are particularly difficult of determination when mixed, blended, or combined functions are given, and exercised by, the same official, board, or agency ... which is frequently the case____ And when the same official, board, or agency performs, in one proceedings, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions, it is misleading and inaccurate to characterize the whole proceedings as judicial or legislative in nature [citations omitted]. In cases where a body, is required “to resolve disputed questions of adjudicative facts (as contradistinguished from legislative facts or judicial action) 24 concerning particular par ⁷¹⁷ ties ... it necessarily was performing a quasi-judicial function, even though its final action, in granting or denying the reclassification which was required to be based upon its findings of adjudicative facts, was quasi-legislative in character” ( 242 Md. at 64-65 , 217 A.2d 578 ). After review of a host of Maryland precedent, the Court had “no hesitancy in holding that the statutes and regulations [involved in that case] ... conferred quasi-judicial functions upon the Council in making its determination of facts at the hearing.” On the matter of the right of cross-examination under that situation, it was squarely held that “The authorities seem to be in accord that when an administrative board or agency is required to hold a public hearing and to decide disputed adjudicative facts based upon evidence produced and a record made, that a reasonable right of cross-examination must be allowed the parties” ( 242 Md. at 67 , 217 A.2d 578 ).

This Court recognized in Tran v. Prince George’s County, 69 Md.App. 256, 268 , 517 A.2d 113 (1986), that under these circumstances, cross-examination involves “a right, recognized and enforced in all courts wherein truth and justice is the objective, for the parties to the cause to be confronted with the witnesses against them, and an opportunity to test the correctness or truthfulness of the evidence by cross-examination.” The rule has been recognized and applied in, among other cases, Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 7-8 , 432 A.2d 1319 (1981); Dickinson-Tidewater v. Supervisor, 273 Md. 245, 254 , 329 A.2d 18 (1974); Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 129 , 314 A.2d 113 (1974); Birckhead v. Board of Co. Comm’rs, 260 Md. 594, 600 , 273 A.2d 133 (1971); Springloch Citizens Gp. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 252 Md. 717, 725, 251 A.2d 357 (1969); Gibson v. Talbot County, 250 Md. 292, 298-299 , 242 A.2d 137 (1968); Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., 247 Md. 137, 148-150 , 230 A.2d 289 (1967); Bayer v. Siskind, 247 Md. 116, 123-124 , 230 A.2d 316 (1967); Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 65-67 , 225 A.2d 294 (1966); Tron v. Prince George’s County, supra, 69 ⁷¹⁸ Md.App. 256, 261, 517 A.2d 113 (1986); Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. v. Friendship Heights, 57 Md.App. 69, 82 , 468 A.2d 1353 (1984); Potomac Valley League v. County Council for Montgomery County, 43 Md.App. 56, 61 , 403 A.2d 388 (1979); American Radio-Tel. Serv. v. P.S.C., 33 Md.App. 423, 435 , 365 A.2d 314 (1976). 25 To “farther support” its position that the rule should not be applied in this ease, the City conjures up a host of evils said to flow from the allowance of cross-examination. 26 Whatever else may be said, those fears are entirely imaginary, as it has been recognized, in and since Hyson , that cross examination may be reasonably restricted. Springloch Citizens Gp. v. Mont.

Co., supra, 252 Md. at 725 , 251 A.2d 357 ; Gibson v. Talbot County, supra, 250 Md. at 298-299 , 242 A.2d 137 ; Tron v. Prince George’s County, supra, 69 Md.App. at 266 , 517 A.2d 113 . 27 But, nothing in the cases suggests that it may be completely denied. ⁷¹⁹ We do note that an important qualification to the rule is that, as stated in Hyson , the right must be asserted in timely fashion. Schultz v. Pritts, supra, 291 Md. at 7-8 , 432 A.2d 1319 ; Bayer v. Siskind, supra, 247 Md. at 123-124, 230 A.2d 316 ; Gibson v. Talbot County, supra, 250 Md. at 299 , 242 A.2d 137 ; Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., supra, 247 Md. at 148, 230 A.2d 289 ; American Radio-Tel. Serv. v. P.S.C., supra, 33 Md.App. at 435 , 365 A.2d 314 . However, it is abundantly clear that such request was made in this case; 28 and the City does not contend otherwise.

The character of the 1993 hearings The City’s position is that Hyson and its progeny have no application, for the reason that the 1993 hearings regarding special assessment involved a “uniquely legislative determination as to the appropriate apportionment of the funding of a public improvement between the public treasury and benefit-ting property owners.” Primary reliance is placed upon Mont. Co. v. Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. 686 , 376 A.2d 483 (1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 1067 , 98 S.Ct. 1245 , 55 L.Ed.2d 769 (1978), which the City reads as holding that “No right of cross-examination exists at legislative hearings, and it is not a prerequisite to legislative findings, even when the ‘decision may dramatically affect an individual.’ ” Importantly, in that case, which involved consideration of a sectional zoning plan, the Court held ( 280 Md. at 712 , 376 A.2d 483 ): That the effect of a zoning authority’s decision may dramatically affect an individual is not determinative of the difference between adjudicative and legislative facts; rather, it is the nature of the decision’s fact-finding process, not the ultimate effect of the decision, that determines the party’s right to an adjudicatory hearing. [Emphasis supplied] ⁷²⁰ The Court found that “A real distinction exists between piecemeal [as in Hyson ] and comprehensive rezoning hearings; it lies in the nature of the basic function being performed by the zoning authority in each case” and concluded that, in the latter “comprehensive” type ( 280 Md. at 712-714 , 376 A.2d 483 ): The procedure is fundamentally legislative and no significant quasi-judicial function is involved. That the Council determined the zoning for each specific property owned by the various appellees and considered the impact of traffic and environmental constraints upon the scale of permissible development within the CBD does not alter the basic fact that the issues for determination were legislative, not adjudicative, and did not require a judicial or trial-type hearing. A similar distinction has been recognized in other contexts.

Union Investors v. Montgomery County, 244 Md. 585, 588-589 , 224 A.2d 453 (1966), proceedings for the sale of surplus public property are legislative; Albert v. Pub. Serv. Commission, 209 Md. 27 , 120 A.2d 346 (1956), no hearing required in proceedings involving issuance of taxicab permits, although the requirement does exist in proceedings for the suspension or revocation of a permit. In essence, the relevant inquiry here is thus the same as that in Hyson : “we must determine what is the type of public hearing which the Council was required to afford, and the nature of the functions exercised by the Council at such hearing, before the formal and final act of reclassifying the property or the denial of the application” and, if “the Council was considering and determining these adjudicative facts concerning particular parties, it necessarily was performing a quasi-judicial function, even though its final action, in granting or denying the reclassification which was required to be based upon its findings of adjudicative facts, was quasi-legislative in character” ( 242 Md. at 64-65 , 217 A.2d 578 ).

Great assistance lies in the recognized distinction between property taxes and special assessments. As recently noted by the Court of Appeals in Williams v. Anne Arundel ⁷²¹ County, 334 Md. 109, 118 , 638 A.2d 74 (1994), quoting Gould v. Baltimore, 59 Md. 378, 380 (1883): The right to make ... [special] assessments is undoubtedly an exercise of the taxing power, but an assessment thus made differs from a general tax levied for State and city purposes. The latter is a tax imposed on all persons within the territorial limits according to the value of their property, in consideration of the protection, which the government affords alike to all. A local assessment, on the other hand, is a tax levied occasionally as may be required upon a limited class of persons interested in local improvement, and who are presumed to be benefited by the improvement over and above the ordinary benefit which the community in general derive from the expenditure of the money.

In the payment of the assessment thus made, the adjacent owner is supposed to be compensated by the enhanced value of his property, arising from the improvement. As stated by this Court, in Baltimore County v. Batza, 67 Md.App.