Woods v. Fuller

Stone, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case the executors of Richard Fuller filed a bill in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City against the legatees, in order to obtain the opinion of the Court as to the true •construction and meaning of the will of their testator. They say that they are prepared to close their administration, but that they are embarrassed because the will is •open to two constructions. One is, that the testator’s daughter Florence, and his' grandson Richard F. Kimball take under the will an absolute title to the property bequeathed to them.

The other is, that his daughter and grandson take only •a life estate in the property. They therefore ask the •direction and guidance of a Court of equity in making the distribution. The duties of the executors, the complainants, are only the ordinary duties that appertain to all executors. They are only required to reduce into possession the personal •estate of their testator, discharge his debts and the expenses of the administration, and pay over the legacies to the legatees.

They are charged with no ^special duties whatever, and have no trusts to execute, except the trust that necessarily belongs to every executor ; that is to say, ⁴⁵⁹ to pay the debts and expenses and pay over the legacies. Their duties are as simple and as uncomplicated as the duty of any executor can be, who undertakes to settle an estate. It is very certain that the supervision of trusts is the province of a Court of equity, and that an executor who has, in addition to his ordinary duties, a trust imposed on him by his testator, has always, if in doubt, the right to ask, and have the direction of a Court of equity as to how he shall discharge his trust. But it is equally certain, that the Orphans’ Courts of the State are the tribunals in which, ordinarily, the estates of deceased persons must be settled; and in order to give Courts of equity jurisdiction to superintend the settlement of an estate, or to distribute the legacies at the instance and request of the executor, he must show some special circumstances, such as a trust devolved upon him by the will, and about which he is doubtful, or at least something more than the mere payment over oí' a legacy after the debts are paid.

The executors in this case seem to have supposed that if the legatees, Florence and Richard, were entitled only to a life estate in their legacies, that then the duty of the executors would be to invest the legacies, and pay the interest over to the legatees for life. If we admit this to be so, still the legacies that fall within the operation of that rule are money or things ivhose use is conversion into money, and the rule does not by any means include all personal property. With regard to personal property, other than money, or such property whose only use is conversion into money, the duty of the executor is the same, whether the legatee takes for life or absolutely; in either case the executor must pay over the legacy to the legatee. If the person entitled to the remainder apprehends loss, by the act of the life tenant, he has his remedy against such life tenant. ⁴⁶⁰ The bill in this case does not disclose the nature of the personal