Worthington v. Herron

Alvey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the Orphans’ Court for Harford County, and the order appealed from was passed in a proceeding instituted under sec. 238 of Art. 93 of the Code, in regard to property of a deceased alleged to be concealed. There is a motion to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground that no right of appeal exists in such case to this Court, but that the right of appeal is confined exclusively to the Circuit Court of the county, by sec. 240 of the Article of the Code just referred to. The sections of the Code referred to were codified from the Act of 1831, chap. 315, sections 12 and 13 ; and in the original Act it was provided that in the cases contemplated by those two sections, 12 and 13, any party ,might appeal from the order of the Orphans’ Court to the County Court of the county in ■ which the Orphans’ Court should sit; and by the 240th section of the Art. of the Code referred to, the same provision is retained, giving the right of appeal to the Circuit Court of the county. ¹⁴⁷ The Orphans’ Court is a tribunal of special and limited authority, and the power conferred by the particular provisions of the statute, under which the present proceedings were taken, is of a special nature, not embraced within any previous jurisdiction possessed by that Court; and where such is the case, the right of appeal depends upon the terms of the statute, and if an appeal is provided for at all, it must be in the mode and to the tribunal designated in the Act, to the exclusion of all others.

Condon’s Case, 8 Gill & John., 443; Savage Man. Co. vs. Owings, 3 Gill, 497 ; Williams vs. Williams, 5 Gill, 88 ; Carter vs. Dennison, 7 Gill, 157 ; Lammott vs. Maulsby, 8 Md., 5 ; Balto & Havre de Grace Turnpike Co. vs. Nor. Cen. R. Co., 15 Md., 193 .

It is contended, in opposition to the motion to dismiss, that although the section 240 of Art. 93 of the Code provides for an appeal to the Circuit Court of the county, and not to this Court, yet the present appeal is authorized by the very comprehensive language of section 39 of Art. 5 of the Code, codified from the Act of 1818, chap. 204, section 1. And while it is true that the language of that section, authorizing appeals to this Court from all decrees, orders, decisions and judgments made by the Orphans’ Court, is very comprehensive, and would seem to be sufficiently broad to embrace this and all similar cases, yet the very point and the same arguments were presented in reference to the same comprehensive language, in the case of Lammott vs. Maulsby, 8