Woznicki v. GEICO Morse v. Erie Insurance

GREENE, J. We are called upon to resolve an issue of critical importance for those traversing the many roads of Maryland, namely, the circumstances under which an insurer providing uninsured (“UM”) motorist coverage may disclaim any such liability ¹⁰⁰ owed to its insured. 1 Because of the common issues of law, we have consolidated two civil cases for the purpose of this opinion. We granted separate petitions for certiorari in Woznicki v. GEICO Gen. Ins., 439 Md. 694 , 98 A.3d 233 (2014) and Morse v. Erie Ins. Exch, 439 Md. 694 , 98 A.3d 233 (2014), to answer the following questions: (1) Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it held that, as a matter of law, the UM carrier did not waive its right to receive written notice of a pending settlement with the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier where there was unequivocal testimony from Petitioner’s counsel that he received oral consent to settle from a UM carrier claims representative?

(2) Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it held that the uninsured motorist (UM) carrier did not bear the burden of proving prejudice arising from Petitioners’ failure to give written notice of the pending settlement with the tortfeasors’ insurance carrier? As explained in greater detail below we shall answer each of the questions in the negative and affirm the respective judgments of the Court of Special Appeals. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Jessica N. Woznicki Woznicki’s dispute with GEICO arises out of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision between Woznicki and James Bowman Houston (“Houston”), which occurred on November 12, 2010. Woznicki was struck, while operating an automobile in Cecil County, after Houston failed to yield the right-of-way while making a turn.

It is undisputed that the accident was caused entirely by the negligence of Houston. ¹⁰¹ At the time of the accident, Houston was insured by Nationwide Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) under a motor vehicle liability insurance policy which carried a liability limit of $20,000. Woznicki was covered by a motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued by GEICO. 2 Under the insurance policy, GEICO provided uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage of $300,000. As a condition to UM coverage under the GEICO policy, Woznicki was required to notify GEICO of any settlement offer which would exhaust the tortfeasor’s liability insurance policy limits and obtain GEI-CO’s consent to settle prior to accepting any such settlement with the tortfeasor. For a discussion of the policy language see infra.

As a result of the injuries sustained during the accident, Woznicki asserted a claim against Houston, through her then-counsel, Ben T. Castle (“Castle”), a Delaware attorney. Nationwide offered to settle all claims for $20,000 — Houston’s liability policy limit — in exchange for a release of all claims against Nationwide and Houston at some time in March, 2011. In a letter dated March 29, 2011, Nationwide wrote to Castle stating “[t]he enclosed Release of All Claims document confirms our settlement with you/your client.” On the same day, Castle sent a letter to the GEICO claims adjuster handling the matter, Ms. Rebecca Davis, stating, in part: At this time it appears that the driver of the car that caused the accident injuring Ms. Woznicki, James Houston, has only limited liability coverage through Nationwide Insurance Company. We will provide more information as it becomes available.

The letter does not mention the Nationwide settlement offer letter received by Castle on the same day. Central to the dispute between Woznicki and GEICO before this Court, Castle contacted GEICO by phone at some point on or about July 7, 2011, 3 and obtained, what Castle and ¹⁰² Woznicki characterize as GEICO’s oral consent to settle without prejudice to any potential UM claim against GEICO. Castle, who was unable to reach Ms. Davis, the claims adjuster assigned to Woznicki’s case, could not recall who he spoke with about the matter. Castle only remembered that the person was a woman.

By letter dated July 7, 2011, Woznicki executed a Release of all claims against Houston. The same day, Castle wrote to GEICO, stating: The tortfeasor’s insurance carrier, Nationwide, has a limited bodily injury liability policy of $20,000 and has tendered those limits to the injured driver, Jessica Woznicki. We are writing to request GEICO’s consent to acceptance of the settlement. Enclosed for your file is a copy of the Nationwide Policy insuring tortfeasor, James B. Houston, and the Release in exchange for the $20,000.

GEICO responded on August 15, 2011, denying “any and all Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage to [Woznicki] ... because [Woznicki] failed to obtain our consent to settle, which is required by both [§ 19-511 of the Insurance Article] and [Section IV of] the policy contract.” Woznicki, represented by new counsel, filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against GEICO on April 8, 2012, for breach of the insurance policy. Woznicki sought to hold GEICO liable for damages in excess of the $20,000 she received from Nationwide. After filing its answer, GEICO moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Woznicki was precluded from receiving UM benefits under the insurance policy because she failed to obtain GEICO’s consent to settle as required by Maryland law and the insurance policy. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial judge granted GEICO’s motion.

Judge J. Frederick Price explained from the bench: It’s clear and undisputed that Section 19-511 was not complied with. In other words, there is — the plaintiffs attorney did not comply with that section. And that’s also refer ¹⁰³ enced — incorporated into the policy; therefore, the terms of the policy were not complied with. That’s undisputed, I believe.

But the court finds that there could be a question of waiver. And I believe that these matters could be waived. The question then arises is does the vague reference to a telephone conversation constitute — or viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, does that constitute sufficient evidence to be material in a decision. And quite simply, the court finds that under the facts of this case that that reference to a telephone call, with nothing more than has been put forth today, does not constitute sufficient evidence to be material, to affect the decision.

The Court of Special Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court. Woznicki v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 216 Md.App. 712 , 90 A.3d 498 (2014).

Specifically, the intermediate appellate court concluded that (1) an insurer could waive the requirements of Section 19-511 of the Insurance Article, (2) Woznicki failed to demonstrate a dispute as to material fact concerning whether GEICO had waived such requirements, and (3) GEICO was not required to demonstrate prejudice caused by Woznicki’s breach of Section 19-511 or the insurance policy in order to deny her UM coverage. B. Jeannine Morse Petitioner, Jeannine Morse (“Morse”), was injured in a motor vehicle collision on April 28, 2007 in New Castle, Delaware, when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Paula Smallwood (“Smallwood”). As a result of her injuries, Morse incurred medical expenses in excess of $22,500. At the time of the collision, Smallwood, the at-fault driver, carried automobile liability insurance with Nationwide Insurance Company (“Nationwide”).

Smallwood’s policy with Nationwide included a single incident liability limit of $15,000. Also at the time of the collision, Morse maintained UM/UIM coverage through her motor vehicle insurance policy with Bespondent, Erie Insurance Exchange (“Erie”), with bodily injury limits of $250,000. Morse’s “Uninsured/Underinsured Motor ¹⁰⁴ ists Coverage Endorsement” in her policy with Erie contained a condition that required Morse to notify Erie of any settlement offer which would exhaust the tortfeasor’s liability insurance policy limits and to obtain Erie’s consent to settle prior to accepting any such settlement with the tortfeasor. For a discussion of the policy language see infra.

After the accident, Morse retained a Delaware attorney, Beverly A. Bove, Esq. (“Bove”), to represent her. Upon demand from Bove, on October 18, 2008, Nationwide offered Morse its entire $15,000 policy limit in settlement of Morse’s claims against Smallwood. Nationwide also sent Bove a notarized letter confirming that Smallwood had no other insurance polices applicable to Morse’s claims.

On October 14 or 15, 2008, Bove contacted by telephone a claims adjuster at Erie to report Morse’s UM claim and the settlement offer from Nationwide. In a letter dated October 27, 2008, Bove sent Erie a copy of the Nationwide settlement offer letter. The letter to Erie was not sent by certified mail and was addressed to an incorrect P.O. box. Erie contends that it did not receive the letter until December 5 or 6, 2008.

Meanwhile, Morse accepted Nationwide’s settlement offer and signed a Release of All Claims on November 3, 2008. Accordingly, at the time of Morse’s acceptance of Nationwide’s settlement offer, Erie had not given its consent. Morse’s attorney wrote on the release: “[Njothing contained in this release waives, limits, or extinguishes any future claims for UM/UIM or PIP benefits.” On February 4, 2009, after accepting Nationwide’s settlement offer, Bove first informed Erie by telephone that she had accepted Nationwide’s settlement offer and signed a release. 4 ¹⁰⁵ Following the February 4th telephone conversation, Erie requested by phone and by mail a copy of the release on March 19 and 27, 2009, respectively. Erie did not receive a copy of the signed release until July 8, 2009, over seven months after it was executed, and nearly four months after Erie requested a copy of the release by letter.

On November 5, 2009, Rucker wrote Bove to advise her that Erie had denied Morse’s UM claim, because she failed to send written notice of the Nationwide offer and accepted the offer without Erie’s written consent. On June 17, 2011, Morse sued Erie in the Circuit Court for Cecil County for breach of contract. A jury trial was held on April 22-28, 2013, following which the jury returned a verdict in favor of Erie, finding that Erie did not breach its contract with Morse. Morse appealed.

In a reported opinion, a majority of the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the failure to comply with the consent to settle procedure contained in the insurance policy and § 19-511 does not trigger Maryland’s prejudice rules, and that, for the purposes of § 19-110, obtaining consent to settle is not the equivalent of providing notice. Morse v. Erie Ins. Exch., 217 Md.App. 1, 12 , 90 A.3d 512, 518 (2014). The author of the dissenting opinion would have reversed, because, in that judge’s view, construing the statute within the context and purpose of the statutory scheme, which is to maintain “balance between the insured’s right to speedy recovery and the protection of the UM carrier’s subrogation ¹⁰⁶ rights!,]” leads to the conclusion that the insurer must show prejudice before disclaiming liability. 217 Md.App. at 37 , 90 A.3d at 533.

II

DISCUSSION Ultimately at issue in this case is the extent to which an individual’s failure to comply with the settlement procedures outlined in Md.Code (1995, 2012 Repl.Vol., 2014 Supp.), § 19-511 (“Uninsured motorist Coverage-Settlement procedures”) of the Insurance Article affects that individual’s right to receive UM coverage from his or her UM carrier. 5 Accordingly, in reaching our conclusion, we must consider two sections of the Insurance Article. Under § 19-511: (a) If an injured person receives a written offer from a motor vehicle insurance liability insurer or that insurer’s authorized agent to settle a claim for bodily injury or death, and the amount of the settlement offer, in combination with any other settlements arising out of the same occurrence, would exhaust the bodily injury or death limits of the applicable liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities, the injured person shall send by certified mail, to any insurer that provides uninsured motorist coverage for the bodily injury or death, a copy of the liability insurer’s written settlement offer. (b) Within 60 days after receipt of the notice required under subsection (a) of this section, the uninsured motorist insurer shall send to the injured person: (1) written consent to acceptance of the settlement offer and to the execution of releases; or (2) written refusal to consent to acceptance of the settlement offer. (c) Within 30 days after a refusal to consent to acceptance of a settlement offer under subsection (b)(2) of this section, ¹⁰⁷ the uninsured motorist insurer shall pay to the injured person the amount of the settlement offer.

(d) (1) Payment as described in subsection (c) of this section shall preserve the uninsured motorist insurer’s subrogation rights against the liability insurer and its insured. (2) Receipt by the injured person of the payment described in subsection (c) of this section shall constitute the assignment, up to the amount of the payment, of any recovery on behalf of the injured person that is subsequently paid from the applicable liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities. (e) The injured person may accept the liability insurer’s settlement offer and execute releases in favor of the liability insurer and its insured without prejudice to any claim the injured person may have against the uninsured motorist insurer: (1) on receipt of written consent to acceptance of the settlement offer and to the execution of releases; or (2) if the uninsured motorist insurer has not met the requirements of subsection (b) or subsection (c) of this section. (f) Written consent by an uninsured motorist insurer to acceptance of a settlement offer under subsection (b)(1) of this section: (1) may not be construed to limit the right of the uninsured motorist insurer to raise any issue relating to liability or damages in an action against the uninsured motorist insurer; and (2) does not constitute an admission by the uninsured motorist insurer as to any issue raised in an action against the uninsured motorist insurer.

Secondly, we consider whether § 19-110 (“Disclaimers of coverage on liability insurance policies”) applies to an insurer seeking to disclaim UM coverage to its insured for the insured’s failure to comply with the requirements of § 19-511. Section 19-110 provides that: An insurer may disclaim coverage on a liability insurance policy on the ground that the insured or a person claiming ¹⁰⁸ the benefits of the policy through the insured has breached the policy by failing to cooperate with the insurer or by not giving the insurer required notice only if the insurer establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the lack of cooperation or notice has resulted in actual prejudice to the insurer. We review issues of statutory construction de novo. See Nesbit v. Gov’t Emps.

Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 72 , 854 A.2d 879, 883 (2004) (quoting Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392 , 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002)) (“When the trial court’s order ‘involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review.’ ”). It is well established that: The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.

In construing the plain language, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. Statutory text should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.... It is also clear that we avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. We analyze the contested provisions of Maryland’s Insurance Article in the context of the statutory scheme and construe the plain language so that the various sections of the article do not conflict with one another....

In addition, the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears. As this Court has stated, because it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered. Thus, not only are we required to interpret the statute as a ¹⁰⁹ whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. Stickley v. State Farm Fire & Cas.

Co., 431 Md. 347, 358-59 , 65 A.3d 141, 148 (2013) (citations and quotations omitted). A. Maryland’s Uninsured Motorist Statute Prior to addressing the questions raised before this Court, some background is appropriate. The settlement procedures of § 19-511 must be understood in the context of Maryland’s uninsured motorist coverage scheme, now codified at §§ 19-509-19-511 of the Insurance Article. “This procedure was enacted in the context of a broader statutory goal to enable recovery for injured victims.” Brethren Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Buckley, 437 Md. 332, 348 , 86 A.3d 665, 674 (2014) (“Buckley II ”). The General Assembly enacted Maryland’s UM statute in 1972, which provided originally, in relevant part, that: [EJvery policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued, sold, or delivered in this State ... MAY contain coverage, in at least the amounts required under Section 7-101 of Article 66% of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1970 Replacement Volume and 1972 Supplement), for damages which the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor vehicle. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeHaan, 393 Md. 163,171-72 , 900 A.2d 208, 213 (2006) (emphasis in original). Since its enactment, the UM statute has undergone several changes, the most salient of which was the decision of the Legislature, in 1975, to make UM coverage mandatory for all motor vehicle liability insurers issuing, selling, or delivering such policies in the State by replacing the term “may” with “shall.” 1975 Laws of Maryland 562.

UM coverage has steadily expanded in scope over the past several decades. Importantly, the General Assembly recognized “uninsured motor vehicles” as including “underinsured motor vehicles.” 1981 Laws of Maryland 510 (emphasis added). See also 1983 ¹¹⁰ Laws of Maryland 656 (permitting excess coverage insurers to offer UM coverage); 1989 Laws of Maryland 542 (requiring motor vehicle liability insurers to offer insureds, in writing, the option to purchase higher UM limits); 1992 Laws of Maryland 641 (requiring insurers to provide UM coverage “equal to the amount of motor vehicle liability coverage”); 1995 Laws of Maryland 515 (expanding the definition of “uninsured motor vehicles”). As this Court explained in Erie Ins.

Exch. v. Heffernan, 399 Md. 598 , 925 A.2d 636 (2007): The purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to provide minimum protection for individuals injured by uninsured motorists ... [the] statute creates a floor to liability not a ceiling. Consistent with the public policy of affording minimal protection for innocent victims, an insured can purchase “a higher amount of uninsured motorist insurance which will become available when the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage, as well his damages, exceed the liability coverage of the tortfeasor.” 399 Md. at 612 , 925 A.2d at 644 (citations omitted). See also Nationwide Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 737 , 436 A.2d 465, 474 (1981) (citation omitted) (“The courts have repeatedly stated that the purpose of uninsured motorist statutes is ‘that each insured under such coverage have available the full statutory minimum to exactly the same extent as would have been available had the tortfeasor complied with the minimum requirements of the financial responsibility Law.’ ”); Kritsings v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 189 Md.App. 367, 375 , 984 A.2d 395, 399 (2009) (“The effect [of the UM statute] [i]s to provide an injured insured with compensation equal to that which would have been available had the tortfeasor carried liability insurance in an amount equal to the amount of the injured insured’s UM coverage.”).

Given the remedial nature of UM coverage, the statute is “to be liberally construed to ensure that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents can be compensated for the injuries they suffer as a result of such accidents.” State Farm ¹¹¹ Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeHaan, 393 Md. 163, 194 , 900 A.2d 208, 226 (2006); Johnson v. Nationwide Mut.

Ins. Co., 388 Md. 82, 91-92 , 878 A.2d 615, 620 (2005); Dwayne Clay, M.D., P.C. v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 356 Md. 257, 265 , 739 A.2d 5, 9 (1999).

Liberally construing the statute, however, “does not permit a departure from the legislature’s intended application[.]” Matta v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 119 Md.App. 334, 344 , 705 A.2d 29 , 34 (1998). See also Webb, 291 Md. at 730 , 436 A.2d at 471 (“This Court has consistently rejected attempts by insurers, as well as insureds and the insurance commissioner, to circumvent the plain language of the required coverage provisions of the statutes dealing with automobile insurance.”).

Section 19-511 of the Insurance Article, the provision presently before this Court for review, was enacted to “to provide a remedy [for] a [specific] problem that ha[d] existed in Maryland’s tort system for some time.” Buckley II, 437 Md. at 347 , 86 A.3d at 673 (citation and quotations omitted). As explained by this Court in Buckley II: [Previously,] an injured person who ma[de] a claim against a liability carrier for limits available under the liability policy [wa]s frequently not allowed by their uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier to give the liability carrier a full release of their claim. Therefore, if the injured person wishe[d] to make an additional claim for their injuries against their underinsured motorist coverage, they g[o]t caught in a situation where the liability carrier w[ould] not give them the limits of the at-fault party’s policy without a release and the uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier w[ould] not allow them to give a release to the liability carrier. As a result, they [we]re unable to recover funds from either carrier.

This dilemma c[ould] cause a lengthy delay in settlement. 437 Md. at 347 , 86 A.3d at 673 -74 (quoting Keeney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 Md.App. 396, 401 , 746 A.2d 947, 950 (2000)). Under § 19-511, “the injured party gets his money more quickly and the uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier would have ‘up front’ the liability settlement [offered by the ¹¹² tortfeasor].” Keeney, 130 Md.App. at 402 , 746 A.2d at 950 (quoting Senate Floor Report for S.B. 253 (1995)). B. Waiver With respect to Petitioner Woznicki, we must first determine whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that GEICO, as a matter of law, did not waive its right to receive written notice of Woznicki’s settlement offer from Nationwide under § 19-511 of the Insurance Article and Section IV of the GEICO insurance policy. 6 Prior to addressing whether GEICO did waive its rights, we must determine whether GEICO could waive such rights under § 19-511.

At the outset, we note that there is no dispute that Woznicki failed to send written notice of the settlement offer and failed to obtain GEICO’s written consent to settle. We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the question of whether Woznicki complied with § 19-511 is a question separate and apart from whether GEICO could, and did, waive compliance. We conclude that, consistent with the underlying purpose of § 19-511, an insurer may waive strict compliance with the relevant provisions at issue — namely the insured’s duty to send the insurer written notice of the pending settlement offer. We also conclude, as did the intermediate appellate court, that Woznicki failed to overcome GEICO’s motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment was entered in favor of GEICO on the ground that Woznicki had not satisfied the requirements of § 19-511 or Section IV of the insurance policy. Does § 19-511 Permit Waiver? Under § 19-511(a), where an injured insured receives a settlement offer from a tortfeasor’s motor vehicle liability insurer, “and the amount of the settlement offer, in combination with any other settlements arising out of the same occurrence, would exhaust the bodily injury or death ¹¹³ limits of the applicable liability insurance policy ... the injured person shall send by certified mail ... a copy of the liability insurer’s written settlement offer” to his or her UM carrier. Generally, “[wjhen a legislative body commands that something be done, using words such as ‘shall’ or ‘must,’ rather than ‘may’ or ‘should,’ we must assume, absent some evidence to the contrary, that it was serious and that it meant for the thing to be done in the manner it directed.” Thanos v. State, 332 Md. 511, 522 , 632 A.2d 768, 773 (1993) (per curiam) (quoting Tucker v. State, 89 Md.App. 295, 298 , 598 A.2d 479, 481 (1991)).

Although § 19-511 “establishes a settlement procedure to be followed when a claimant is injured by a party whose liability insurance limit is less than the claimant’s uninsured motorist limits” Buckley II, 437 Md. at 348 , 86 A.3d at 674 (quoting Senate Floor Report for S.B. 253 (1995)), § 19-511 is silent as to whether the various provisions may be waived by the parties involved. 7 In its brief before this Court, GEICO argues that, as a matter of law, neither an insurer nor an insured may waive the procedural requirements of § 19-511. In support of its contention, GEICO points to the plain language of the statute and the General Assembly’s use of the term “shall.” GEICO further states that, as we pointed out in Buckley II, § 19-511 “establishes a settlement procedure to be followed.” 437 Md. at 348 , 86 A.3d at 674 (emphasis added) (quoting Senate Floor Report for S.B. 253 (1995)). This choice of language, GEICO argues, “provides [a] clear indication that the Maryland Legislature did not intend that the parties could waive the statutory requirements under Insurance Art., § 19-511.” Ultimately, GEICO asserts that the decision of the intermediate appellate court would “wreak havoc on Maryland’s statutory insurance scheme” by permitting parties to circumvent the plain language of numerous statutory provisions of the Insurance Article. Strict adherence to the statute’s language, in GEI-CO’s view, promotes the remedial nature of § 19-511 and ¹¹⁴ serves to better meet § 19-51 l’s goals of protecting the insurer and its insured.

Although the Legislature elected to use the term “shall,” we decline to hold, as a matter of law, that an insurer may not waive its right to receive written notice under § 19-511. To be sure, the statute states neither that it is waivable nor nonwaivable. Permitting an insurer and its insured to waive the written notice component of the statute, however, is clearly consistent with both the purpose of § 19-511 and Maryland’s UM scheme in general. Waiver of the relevant provisions of § 19-511 in the context of the instant case is consistent with the Legislature’s goal of expediting recovery for the innocent victim.

Buckley v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Md.App. 574, 590 , 53 A.3d 456, 465 (2012) (“Buckley I ”), aff'd, 437 Md. 332 , 86 A.3d 665 (2014) (“The purpose of the UM settlement scheme is to expedite settlement negotiations; not to prolong them.”). Section 19-511 was enacted primarily to remedy the standstill that occurred between the uninsured/underinsured tortfeasor’s liability insurer, unwilling to provide the injured victim the limits of the at-fault party’s policy in the absence of a full release of all claims, and the injured victim’s UM carrier, unwilling to provide a full release of all claims.

Buckley II, 437 Md. at 347 , 86 A.3d at 673-74 . This standoff between insurers acted to prevent the injured party from obtaining a prompt recovery. In other words, § 19-511 was enacted principally to promote prompt settlement and recovery for the victim. We do not see how permitting a waiver in the instant case would be contrary to the “broader statutory goal to enable recovery for injured victims.” Buckley II, 437 Md. at 348 , 86 A.3d at 674 .

Our decision does not suggest that an insurer or its insured may waive any provision of an insurance statute in the interest of convenience as GEICO argues. For instance, under our reasoning the parties could not “agree for insurance to be issued at limits less than the statutorily required limits in exchange for lower premiums” as GEICO suggests. Such a ¹¹⁵ waiver would be entirely inconsistent with the purpose of “providing] minimum protection for individuals injured by uninsured motorists[.]” Heffernan, 399 Md. at 612 , 925 A.2d at 644 . Apart from GEICO’s reliance on the language of § 19-511, GEICO cites to several opinions of this Court and the Court of Special Appeals, which, in its view, demonstrate that “where there are statutory or regulatory procedures that, by their very terms, delineate what parties ‘shall’ do, such directives are mandatory and cannot be waived or ignored.” GEICO, for instance, relies on our decision in Gorge v. State, 386 Md. 600 , 873 A.2d 1171 (2005) to emphasize the “consequences of a failure to abide by statutorily-imposed procedures.” In Gorge , this Court was asked to consider “whether [a defendant] may be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole without having received written notice of the State’s intention to pursue that sentence [as required by Md.Code (2002, 2012 Repl.Vol., 2014 Supp.), § 2-203 of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”).]” 386 Md. at 610 , 873 A.2d at 1177 .

Under CL § 2-203, “[a] defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree may be sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole only if: (1) at least 30 days before trial, the State gave written notice to the defendant of the State’s intention to seek a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.” (Emphasis added). Although the State in Gorge failed to demonstrate that it provided written notice to the defendant, it argued that oral notice — which defendant admitted to receiving more than 30 days before trial — was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute. Gorge, 386 Md. at 611 , 873 A.2d at 1177 . Alternatively, the State contended that the defendant had waived his right to receive written notice under the statute.

Id. We held that the State’s oral notice to defense counsel was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of CL § 2-203. As to the issue of waiver, however, we explicitly stated that “[b]ecause the facts do not present themselves, however, we will not address whether [CL] § 2-203 contemplates permitting a waiver by a defendant of the requirements of the statute.” Gorge, ¹¹⁶ 386 Md. at 611 -12 n. 2, 873 A.2d at 1178 n. 2 (emphasis added). Gorge has little bearing on our decision in the instant case because we declined to address the issue of whether the statute at issue permitted a waiver.

Instead, we focused upon whether the conduct of the State complied with the language of the relevant statute. That is not the issue presented in this case. Rather, Woznicki argues that GEICO permitted her to deviate from the statutory language. We also note that, while not expressly addressed by this Court in Gorge , our opinion at least suggests that the defendant could have waived compliance with the relevant statute if the appropriate facts presented themselves.

See Gorge, 386 Md. at 611 -12 n. 2, 873 A.2d at 1178 n. 2 (“Insofar as the State is making the additional argument that the defendant waived the requirements of the statute itself, we note that there is no evidence in this record to suggest that the defendant or his counsel, at least 30 days before trial, exercised such a waiver.”). Our decision in Gorge does not suggest that, as a result of the Legislature’s use of the words “only if,” we must necessarily conclude that a statute is non-waivable as a matter of law. GEICO’s reliance on Motor Vehicle Admin, v. Baptist, 185 Md.App. 56 , 968 A.2d 638 (2009), is similarly misplaced. In Baptist , the intermediate appellate court considered, among other things, whether the trial court improperly ordered the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) to enroll appellee, Baptist, in the MVA’s Ignition Interlock Program following Baptist’s license suspension for driving under the influence.

Baptist was advised of his responsibilities for enrollment — which would permit him to drive under an ignition-interlock restricted license in lieu of suspension — but nonetheless faded to complete the requirements within the statutorily proscribed time period of thirty days. 185 Md.App. at 72 , 968 A.2d at 648 . Indeed, Baptist missed the deadline by nearly one month. Id. Despite this failure, the trial court ordered the MVA to enroll Baptist in the program. 185 Md.App. at 63-64 , 968 A.2d at 643 .

The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that “the court had no authority to excuse ¹¹⁷ Baptist’s noncompliance [under the statute].” 185 Md.App. at 72 , 968 A.2d at 648 . Moreover, the intermediate appellate court explained that permitting the trial court to waive Baptist’s compliance with the statute would be in contravention of the Legislature’s “ ‘paramount purpose’ ... to ‘craft[ ] a regulatory scheme of expedient procedures that swiftly would impose penalties for drunk driving[.]’ ” 185 Md.App. at 73 , 968 A.2d at 649 (citations omitted). We fail to see the similarity between disallowing a trial court to waive an individual’s failure to comply with a statute, which would contravene the Legislature’s intent to impose penalties for drunk driving, as in Baptist , and an alleged waiver between an insurer and its insured, where such waiver would be consistent with the Legislative purpose of the statute, as in the present case. Lastly, GEICO directs us to Kennedy Temps. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 57 Md.App. 22 , 468 A.2d 1026 (1984), in which the Court of Special Appeals addressed, among other things, whether a bid protestor’s failure to comply with the protest regulations under the Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”) requiring bid protests to be in writing and filed within seven days, was excused by the alleged waiver by a procurement officer of the Comptroller. 57 Md.App. at 39-40 , 468 A.2d at 1034-35 .

The intermediate appellate court noted, importantly, that the requirements imposed on bid protestors “w[ere] not that of the Comptroller. [Instead, the regulation] was adopted by the Department of Budget and Fiscal Planning, with the approval of the Governor and the Board of Public Works, and was imposed by those agencies upon the Comptroller’s office.” Kennedy Temps., 57 Md.App. at 41 , 468 A.2d at 1035 . The Court of Special Appeals, in reaching its conclusion, explained: Whatever the procurement officer’s authority might be to waive a procedural regulation of the Comptroller, we find no authority in the law for him to waive a requirement externally imposed pursuant to clear statutory authority. Such a power would be inconsistent with the whole thrust and scheme of the law. ¹¹⁸ Id. Apart from the factual difference between Kennedy Temps, and the instant case, Kennedy Temps., similar to Baptist , was based, in part, on the Court of Special Appeals’s determination that waiver would be inconsistent with the purpose underlying the law.

As outlined above, that is not the case here. Was Summary Judgment Appropriate? Having determined that GEICO could have waived compliance with the relevant portions of § 19-511, we now address whether the trial court and Court of Special Appeals erred in holding, as a matter of law, that GEICO had not waived any requirements under § 19-511 or Section IV of the insurance policy. As we stated in Butler v. S & S P’ship, 435 Md. 635, 665-66 , 80 A.3d 298, 316-17 (2013): The question of whether a trial court’s grant of summary judgment was proper is a question of law.

Pursuant to Md. Rule 2 — 501(f), summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To establish a genuine issue of material fact, a “party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. In other words, the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs claim is insufficient to preclude the grant of summary judgment; there must be evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” (citations omitted). Accordingly, we must determine whether Woznicki demonstrated the existence of “a genuine dispute as to a material fact by proffering facts which would be admissible in evidence” concerning the alleged waiver by GEICO to survive summary judgment.

Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993). We agree with the Court of Special Appeals and conclude that there existed no dispute as to a material fact. Therefore, the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment was proper as a matter of law. ¹¹⁹ “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right, and may result from an express agreement or be inferred from circumstances.” Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp., LLC v. Annapolis Towne Centre at Parole, LLC, 421 Md. 94, 122 , 25 A.3d 967, 983 (2011) (citation omitted). “[0]ur case law [ ] require[s] mutual knowledge and acceptance, whether implicit or explicit, of the non-conforming action.” Hovnanian, 421 Md. at 120 , 25 A.3d at 982 . “A waiver of a contractual provision must be clearly established and will not be inferred from equivocal acts or language.” Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 205 , 892 A.2d 520, 531 (2006).

As a general matter, “[g]iven the highly factual nature of the waiver inquiry, it is an uncommon case in which the issue can be resolved by summary judgment.” Hovnanian, 421 Md. at 123 , 25 A.3d at 984 . In some instances, however, the waiver, or lack thereof, may be so apparent that a court can make a determination as a matter of law. 421 Md. at 124 , 25 A.3d at 984 . See also Myers, 391 Md. at 207 , 892 A.2d at 531 (affirming grant of summary judgment because “[no] rational trier of fact [could] conclude that appellants’ [sole] statement^] ... standing alone, constituted an implied waiver”). Central to the dispute between Woznicki and GEICO is the deposition testimony of Woznicki’s former attorney, Castle, concerning the alleged telephone conversation between Castle and an unknown GEICO claims representative.

On the one hand, Woznicki asserts that based on Castle’s deposition testimony “there is [ ] no question that Mr. Castle received oral consent to settle.” (Emphasis in original). Woznicki directs us to Castle’s statement that “[GEICO] told me [they needed] the Release and the evidence of the coverage and that they would grant their consent.” This oral consent, Woznicki contends, “was sufficient to establish a waiver of the statutory and contractual requirements for written notice[.]” On the other hand, GEICO avers that “no rational trier of fact could conclude that GEICO orally provided [Woznicki] its consent to settle with the tortfeasor, or waived the provisions of its GEICO Policy or the requirements of Insurance Art., § 19- ¹²⁰ 511.” GEICO notes that it would “strain[ ] credulity to assert that [Woznicki’s then-attorney] just happened to attempt to comply” with § 19-511 where he was admittedly unaware of any such requirements. GEICO notes that Woznicki has relied upon an incomplete portion of Castle’s deposition testimony. GEICO argues that the deposition testimony, when considered in its entirety, does not support a reasonable inference that GEICO waived any provision of § 19-511 or its insurance policy.

Accepting the statements in Castle’s deposition as true, nothing in the record supports a reasonable inference that GEICO waived compliance with the provisions of § 19-511 or Section IV of the insurance policy. Notably, Castle testified at his deposition as follows: [Counsel for GEICO]: Did, in fact, GEICO ever give you consent to settle [ ] Woznicki’s claim against [ ] Houston who was insured by Nationwide? [Castle]: It was my understanding that they had, and it was done by telephone. And it was not [ ] Davis. It was somebody taking her place when she was unavailable. [Counsel for GEICO]: Tell me those details. [Castle]: My recollection is a telephone call to GEICO asking for [ ] Davis with whom I’d been dealing all along. [Counsel for GEICO]: And when did that happen? [Castle]: Well, it would have been probably within a week, ten days of July 7th prior to.

I can’t tell you exactly. And [Davis] was unavailable. And I spoke to someone who asked for the file number and policy number and so forth and told — it was a female. I know that.

And told her that — what the situation was and asked her what she wanted from me to confirm this. And I was told that she wanted a copy of the Release and a copy of the Declaration Page from the Nationwide Policy. And that would be the extent of it. ¹²¹ [Counsel for GEICO]: Not knowing [about §] 19-511, why would you have called GEICO even to get their permission then? [Castle]: Because that’s our practice in Delaware, and that has always been my customary practice when I’m dealing with an underinsurance claim, to be very careful to advise the underinsurance carrier as soon as I have a sense that there’s going to be an underinsured claim, which I think I did with GEICO, and also to find out whether there are any special circumstances or evidence that they want. And I also am very careful to make it clear in the Release that I’m not releasing the underinsurance claim. [Counsel for GEICO]: When you spoke with them, had you already settled with Nationwide? [Counsel for Woznicki]: You mean settled, you mean like accepted the tender? [Counsel for GEICO]: Accepted the tender from Nationwide. [Counsel for Woznicki]: Or gotten a check or — I don’t know what you mean. [Counsel for GEICO]: Reached an agreement with Nationwide that the claim of [ ] Woznicki against [ ] Houston was settled. [Castle]: As a practical matter, I certainly would have told them that we have settled or [are] going to settle or [are] willing to settle, that we’re going to take it.

I certainly would have communicated that that phase of the case is or has been or will be settled, and we’re going to be asserting a claim against GEICO for the underinsured coverage. What exact words I used, I can’t tell you. [Counsel for GEICO]: Okay. So you have given — you had advised Nationwide that for all practical purposes [ ] Woznicki’s claim against [ ] Houston was settled, but you wanted to pursue a UIM claim against GEICO? ¹²² [Castle]: That’s true. [Counsel for GEICO]: As I understand, the conversation that you ... claim to have had with GEICO about settlement with Nationwide, you’re not able to tell precisely whether you said it was your intention to settle or whether the claim had been settled? You just know, you spoke with GEICO about settling the claim? [Castle]: I know I spoke with GEICO, and I know I would have told them what the realities were and that the case was in the process of being settled.

Whether I said has been settled or will be settled or we need your permission to settle — I don’t think I said that, but I told them what the facts were. [Counsel for GEICO]: Did GEICO ever tell you that it did not require written notification? [Castle]: Only the conversation I referred to in which I asked them what they needed, and I was told the Release and the Declaration Page. [Counsel for GEICO]: But you would agree you were never told that you do not need to get written consent from GEICO? [Castle]: I don’t recall ever being told that in so many words, no. (Emphasis added). Absent from Castle’s testimony is any indication that GEI-CO informed Castle, or that Castle requested, that GEICO was waiving compliance with the relevant statutory and contractual provisions. That Castle did not request that GEICO waive the procedural requirements of § 19-511 and Section IV of the insurance policy is not unexpected given that he, admittedly, was unaware of any such requirements at the time of the conversation.

Nor is there any indication that GEICO was actually aware that Woznicki intended to assert a claim for UM coverage against GEICO. Woznicki’s argument rests upon the notion that GEICO, through an unknown claims representative, orally consented to ¹²³ the Nationwide settlement of the underlying bodily injury claim during the telephone conversation with Castle. We disagree with Woznicki that there is “no question” that Castle requested and received GEICO’s consent to settle during the alleged phone call. Indeed, during deposition, Castle stated that “[wjhether I said has been settled or will be settled or we need your permission to settle — I don’t think I said that[.]” (Emphasis added).

As stated above, it is not entirely surprising that Castle failed to request GEICO’s consent given that he was unaware of such requirements imposed on Woznicki. Although Castle testified that it was his understanding that GEICO had consented to the settlement with Nationwide during the telephone conversation, we are left to speculate as to what was actually said by either individual during this conversation. Importantly, Castle admittedly was never told “that [he] d[id] not need to get written consent from GEICO” prior to settling with Nationwide. Castle’s subjective understanding of what occurred during the conversation lies in contrast to his subsequent correspondence with GEICO by mail.

Particularly, on July 7, 2011, the same day Woznicki executed the Release, Castle wrote GEICO stating that “[w]e are writing to request GEICO’s consent to acceptance of the settlement.” (Emphasis added). When confronted with this language, Castle testified that “If I read that letter the way I’m thinking about it, is that I called, asked what information they needed. They told me the Release and the evidence of the coverage and that they would grant their consent.” There is no indication in the record that this letter was simply confirming the conversation Castle had with the unknown GEICO representative. Furthermore, following GEICO’s denial of UM coverage to Woznicki, Castle wrote: Your letter of August 15, 2011 disclaiming GEICO’s under-insured coverage for this loss surprised me.

Cognizant of the notice requirement[ 8 ] I contacted your office and in ¹²⁴ formed the person who took the call for you that the tortfeasor’s carrier had tendered its limits of $20,000, and inquired what should be done to obtain GEICO’s “consent.” I was instructed to forward a copy of the declaration page for the tortfeasor’s policy and a copy of the release. This was done by letter on July 7, 2011. (Emphasis added). No rational trier of fact could conclude that Castle’s sole statement that it was his understanding that he had obtained GEICO’s consent, standing alone, constituted a waiver, express or implied, of the statutory or contractual requirements imposed on Woznicki.

Myers, 391 Md. at 207 , 892 A.2d at 531 . Castle, who was admittedly unaware of the requirements of § 19-511 of the Insurance Article or the GEICO policy, was unable to recall what he might have said to the unknown claims representative who was not handling Woznicki’s claim, and was never informed that he did not need GEICO’s written consent to settle. Given Castle’s own testimony, it can hardly be said that the GEICO representative and Castle had “mutual knowledge and acceptance ... of the non-conforming action.” Hov nanian, 421 Md. at 120 , 25 A.3d at 982 . Castle’s subjective understanding of this conversation is simply not enough to establish a genuine dispute of material fact.

To hold otherwise would permit a jury to impermissibly engage in speculation on the basis of a single unsubstantiated statement. Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109, 134 , 259 A.2d 794, 806 (1969) (explaining that “a jury should not be permitted to engage in speculation”). Woznieki directs us to several out-of-state cases, in support of her argument that summary judgment is inappropriate under the facts here. Woznieki relies almost entirely upon Swiderski v. Prudential Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co., 672 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Ct.App.1984), noting that it “is particularly instructive.” In Swiderski the Court of Appeals of Texas held that a letter sent by the insurer to its insured was sufficient to create a factual issue as to whether the insurer waived compliance with the “consent to settle” clause of its insurance contract, thereby ¹²⁵ precluding summary judgment. Id. at 269-70 . The letter at issue stated: [PJlease provide with proper documentation when you settle with Dairyland Ins.

Co. so that I can give consideration to the UIM (under-insured motorist coverage) possibility. Id. (emphasis in original). This evidence, the Court held, “was sufficient to raise a fact issue of the material elements of waiver.” Id. at 270 .

Woznicki asserts that “the only material difference between the fact situation in Swiderski and that in the present case is that the claims representative’s communications in Swiderski w[ere] in writing, while the communication at issue here was oral[.]” We disagree and note that, unlike Swiderski , there is no record of what was actually said during the conversation at issue apart from Castle’s subjective understanding of what the unknown GEICO representative informed him. Moreover, in the instant case, Castle admittedly never asked GEICO for their consent, or to waive the requirements of the statute or the contract. Furthermore, GEICO never specifically informed Castle that Woznicki did not need written consent to settle. We also note that Castle’s own letters to GEICO belie his subjective understanding of the conversation.

Swiderski does not save Woznicki from summary judgment where the only support for Woznicki’s position is the equivocal statement of Castle concerning his subjective understanding of an undocumented conversation. C. Prejudice GEICO and Erie justify their disclaimer of coverage to Petitioners Woznicki and Morse respectively on the basis that Petitioners failed to obtain the insurers’ consent to settle as required by the insurance policies and § 19-511 of the Insurance Article. There is no dispute that Woznicki and Morse failed to comply, substantially or otherwise, with § 19-511 and the consent to settle provisions at issue. Rather, Petitioners assert that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that a UM carrier is not required to demonstrate prejudice in order to deny UM coverage to its insured for the insured’s ¹²⁶ failure to comply with the consent to settle provision of the insurance policy and § 19-511 of the Insurance Article.

We must, therefore, consider whether the prejudice rules are triggered in the context of this case. As explained below, the prejudice rules arise from statute, see § 19-110, and common law, see Prince George’s Cnty. v. Local Gov’t Ins. Trust, 388 Md. 162 , 879 A.2d 81 (2005). The prejudice rules apply where an insurer disclaims coverage as a result of the insured’s noncompliance with a condition contained in the insurance policy requiring notice or cooperation.

We conclude that noncompliance with § 19-511 and the liability policies’ consent to settle provision is neither a failure to