Wright ex rel. Green v. Brown

Eccleston, J., delivered the opinion of this court. This is an action of covenant, instituted against the appellee to recover damages for the violation of his engagement to teach Wm. W. Green “the art or trade of a silversmith in all the branches thereof.” The plea is performance and issue is taken thereon, with an agreement to waive all errors in pleading. Proof was offered to show that Green had not been taught during his apprenticeship all the branches of the art or trade of a silversmith.

The defendant then offered to prove that ⁴⁰ there were many branches in this trade; that it would have been impossible during, the continuance of this apprenticeship to teach all the branches of the trade to any apprentice; that to undertake to teach all the branches would be injurious to the apprentice and would prevent him from becoming master of any one of them; that it was usual in the city of Baltimore during the time of apprenticeship, to put the apprentice at one branch and keep him at it until he. became acquainted with it. And also offered to prove that Green had been kept at one branch of the trade no longer than was necessary, and then had- been placed at another and taught it, and that he had attained considerable proficiency in the art or trade in the branches taugh him-, much greater than- that attained by most apprentices who served the same length of time which he did; and that considering the time of the apprenticeship, the boy had- been well and properly taught and advanced in the trade. The plaintiff objected to the admission of the evidence which tended to show, that no apprentice could be taught during the time of apprenticeship in this case all the branches of the trade of a silversmith, and that it was to his interest to be confined to one branch until he became well acquainted therewith; and that it was usual in the city of Baltimore to have the apprentice first taught one branch perfectly before he was instructed in another; and that Green had been well and perfectly advanced considering the time of his apprenticeship. This objection was overruled and the court permitted the testimony to be given.

From which- decision the present appeal is taken. In Clancy vs. Overman, 1 Dev. and Batt., S. C. R., 402, the nature and extent of the obligation of a master in- regard to teaching his apprentice a trade was under consideration. Overman had bound his slave to Clancy, who covenanted to teach and instruct, or cause to be taught and instructed, the negro boy “the art and mystery of the coach-making business.” ⁴¹ The pleas were, “covenants performed and not broken; previous covenants not performed.” Evidence was offered to show that the boy had not learned his trade. And the defendant gave evidence to prove that he made all proper exertions to teach the apprentice, but that he had not capacity enough to learn the coach-making business.

He also proved that in his absence the boy frequently would go to a neighboring store and procure spirits, by which he would occasionally become moderately intoxicated. In the court below the judge instructed the jury, that the covenants on both sides were mutual and independent, and that if the covenants on the part of the plaintiff had been broken it was no defence to the defendant. He likewise charged the jury, that the covenant of the defendant was absolute and he could not be excused from its performance, although the boy had not capacity to learn the trade; but he said “the jury might take that into consideration in estimating the damages if they should find for the plaintiff.” In the argument before the appellate court, the counsel of the plaintiff insisted that the covenant was absolute, and had not been performed unless the apprentice had become a good workman; that the contract contained no exceptions, nor did it merely oblige tbe master to endeavor to teach or to instruct the boy in the coach-making business, but positively required that he should be taught the trade. Tbe Supreme Court agree with the judge below that the covenants of the respective parties were mutual and independent, and also that the engagement of the defendant was absolutely binding to the extent of that engagement.

But they do not concur in the construction given below to the covenant. They say: “It seems to us that an engagement to teach the apprentice, or to cause the apprentice to be taught, a trade, is not an engagement that the apprentice will learn that trade,” and very good reasons are given why it should not be so. Again the court say: “It would be doing violence, we think, to the words found in this covenant to regard them as stipulating for more than faithful, diligent and skillful instruction.” ⁴² The opinion in this case was delivered by the learned Judge Gaston. Barger vs. Caldwell, 2 Dana, 129 , was an action upon an indenture of apprenticeship, in which the master covenanted to teach and instruct the apprentice the art and mystery of the tanning business.

The issue in that case seems to have been joined on the plea of performance; as it is said on page 130, “In the progress of the trial, upon an issue of covenants performed,