Wright v. State

DAVIS, Judge. Jermaine Stelwagen Wright, appellant, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Worcester County (Groton, J.) of first degree murder, robbery, sodomy, assault and battery. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for the murder conviction, a consecutive term of fifteen years imprisonment for the robbery conviction, and a consecutive term of ten years imprisonment for the sodomy conviction. The sentences for the assault and battery convictions were merged.

Appellant presents one question on appeal: Did the trial court err in denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury read two newspaper articles about him which contained prejudicial material? FACTS 1 On June 14, 1995, sixteen-year-old Krista Ruggles and her friend, Tera Charles, went to the Night-Light Under Twenty-One Dance Club (Night-Light) in Ocean City, Maryland. Ruggles, a Pennsylvania resident, was in Ocean City for “June week.” While Ruggles and Charles were at the club, appellant approached Ruggles and danced with her. After the girls left the club, they walked northward on the boardwalk.

At 15th Street, they saw appellant. Appellant offered them a ride to their hotel. The girls accepted and appellant drove them to the Dunes Manor Hotel, where Ruggles was staying. He told the girls that his name was Jermaine.

They reached the hotel at approximately 3:45 a.m. At the hotel, appellant told Charles that he wanted to talk to Ruggles for ten ²⁴⁶ minutes. Over Charles’s objections, Ruggles agreed to talk to appellant. She told Charles she would be in the hotel room in ten minutes.

Charles watched appellant and Ruggles drive off, and saw appellant turning west on 29th Street. Ruggles had her purse with her. Charles waited for Ruggles in the hotel lobby. At 4:00 a.m., Charles went outside and looked for Ruggles, but did not see her.

Charles waited in the lobby until 5:30 a.m., then went to Ruggles’s room. Ruggles did not return. Later that morning, Charles filed a missing persons report with the police. Whaleysville is a village located between Ocean City and Salisbury.

On June 19, 1995, a woman who was biking on Fooks Road near Whaleysville noticed something pink approximately twenty-five feet off the road. Closer inspection revealed the body of a teen-aged girl. The body was subsequently identified as that of Krista Ruggles. The area where Ruggles’s body was found was located approximately ten to fifteen miles west of Ocean City and fifteen to twenty miles east of Salisbury.

The area was “a couple of miles” from Route 50. David Collins, a forensic investigator with the Maryland Medical Examiner’s Office, stated, however, that “it’s not a straight shot” from Route 50, and that one would have to “go up and around” to get to that location. An autopsy was performed on June 20, 1995. Dr. David Fowler, the assistant medical examiner, estimated that Rug-gles had been killed between three days to one week previously, with four days previously being the most likely time of death.

He determined that death had been caused by manual strangulation and blunt force injuries to the head. He stated, however, that the primary cause of death was manual strangulation. Fowler further stated that toxicology tests performed on the body were consistent with an ejaculation of prostatic fluid in or near the anus. Corporal Robert McQueeney of the Maryland State Police interviewed appellant on June 20,1995.

Appellant told Corporal McQueeney that he lived with roommates and his girl ²⁴⁷ friend in Salisbury. Appellant told Corporal McQueeney that, on the night of June 14, 1995, he was in Ocean City. Appellant said that he had walked to his aunt’s house and borrowed her car. He told Corporal McQueeney that he had $5 on him, and that he had bought a “deuce” of beer with some of the money.

During the interview, appellant stated that he had been to the Night-Light dance club that night and had danced with Ruggles. He acknowledged that, sometime around 3:00 a.m. or 3:30 a.m., he had given Ruggles and Charles a ride to their hotel. Initially, when Corporal McQueeney asked appellant what had happened, appellant told the corporal that he had dropped both girls off at their hotel and that they went inside. When Corporal McQueeney asked again what had happened, appellant said that Ruggles had said that she wanted to talk to him, and her friend said that she would meet Ruggles in the room.

According to Corporal McQueeney, appellant told him that they talked for a while, then went to the McDonald’s restaurant at 32nd or 33rd Street. Corporal McQueeney stated that appellant told him at one point that they had driven around for about ten minutes first, and at another point, he had said that they went directly to the McDonald’s. The corporal testified that appellant also told him the following: there were people going inside and out of the McDonald’s, and he waved to people although he did not know any of them. Ruggles exited the car and saw a man named Brian, whom she knew from Pennsylvania.

Ruggles spoke with Brian, a black man, slim, about six feet tall. Appellant waited for about fifteen minutes. 2 Ruggles gave Brian the name of the motel and her room number, and told him that she could meet him on the beach. Appellant then left the McDonald’s and went home. Corporal McQueeney testified that appellant told him that he “went back down Coastal, he rode around the inlet, up ²⁴⁸ Coastal, back past McDonald’s, he took Coastal to 73rd Street,” then he took Maryland Routes 90 and 50 home.

The corporal testified that appellant told him that he had stopped at a 7-Eleven and bought gas, took his aunt’s car to her house, and then took a cab to his home. According to Corporal McQueeney, appellant told him that he had wanted Ruggles to buy him something to eat and to buy gas. The corporal stated that appellant told him he did not have sexual intercourse with Ruggles because “he was just going to wait, it was too late to try anything.” Corporal McQueeney also testified that appellant “bragged that he could sell anyone anything and that he ripped people off’ at work. Anthony Hasting, the manager of the McDonald’s restaurant at the time of the incident, testified that the McDonald’s restaurant closed and the doors were locked at 2:00 a.m.

He testified that, if anyone was outside the building after the doors were locked, the police would be called to remove them. Hastings further testified that the drive-in window was closed at 3:00 a.m. John Dolch, an employee at the Eastern Correctional Institution, and appellant’s former high school wrestling coach, visited appellant in jail on June 20, 1995. Dolch wore a body wire for the State Police.

Dolch asked appellant what had occurred between him and Ruggles. Dolch testified that, to his recollection, appellant told him that Ruggles had gone inside the McDonald’s restaurant and that she was talking to a white man named Brian there. During cross-examination, defense counsel and Dolch read a portion of the transcript of the conversation between Dolch and appellant. The transcript revealed that appellant had not said that Ruggles had gone inside the restaurant, but that he said she spoke to a man named Brian in the parking lot.

The transcript indicated that appellant had, in fact, told Dolch that Brian was white. Antonio Lewis testified that he had been appellant’s cellmate at the Worcester County Jail. According to Lewis, one day shortly before appellant’s trial, appellant told him that he ²⁴⁹ was angry with his attorney because his attorney wanted him to take a judge trial instead of a jury trial. Lewis testified that appellant “just started talking” and that appellant told him that he had been with “the girl” that night, that they had gotten into an argument, and that she would not get out of the car.

According to Lewis, appellant told him that, once he went to drop her off, they got into an argument and fussing and fighting, and she wouldn’t get out, he said he just pulled off. And he didn’t say directly where they went at, [sic] but he said they got there, he stopped the car and they continued to fuss. And he said he smacked her. Appellant also told Lewis that, after he “smacked” the girl, “It just happened.” When Lewis asked appellant, “What happened?” appellant “just looked at [him] and said, ‘It happened.’ ” Lewis further testified that appellant told him that he had driven around until he could figure out what to do, and that he was late getting home.

THE PROCEEDINGS Prior to trial, appellant made a motion in limine to preclude disclosure to the jury of the fact that appellant had previously been convicted of sodomy and to preclude evidence of other bad acts, “such as bruises and rough treatment of his prior girlfriends.” The State did not oppose the motion, and the trial court granted it. Apparently, as exhibits to the motion, appellant submitted newspaper articles. The first article reported that appellant had been arrested and charged with the murder, but that because of a lack of evidence, the State’s Attorney had dropped the charges in January 1996. The article then recounted appellant’s criminal history.

It stated, in pertinent part: In May 1997, [appellant] was working for [a pool] company in Greensboro, N.C., when he was charged with two counts of statutory rape and indecent liberties with a child after allegedly raping a 15-year-old girl in his apartment there. Wright was found guilty in January 1998 of the indecent liberties charge, a felony in North Carolina involving lewd ²⁵⁰ and lascivious acts on a person under the age of 16. The jury could not agree on a verdict for the rape charge. The assistant district attorney planned to try him again on that charge, but a plea bargain was reached and Wright pleaded guilty to two more counts of indecent liberties with a child.

He was sentenced to a minimum of 57 months and a maximum of 69 months in prison. In addition to the North Carolina conviction, Wright has previous convictions for a fourth-degree sex offense in 1993 and for a perverted sex practice in 1994. In the 1994 case, he allegedly grabbed a girl by the throat and demanded sex at her home in Salisbury. He was charged with rape, sex offense by suffocation and numerous other sexual charges, but was only found guilty of the perverted practice charge and sentenced to one year in jail.

The article then stated that appellant was again indicted on the current charges in September 1997 and set forth the charges against him. The second article stated that appellant had previously been charged with the crimes for which he was being tried, but that the charges had been dropped at that time because of insufficient evidence. The article stated, in part: [Appellant’s] attorney, W. Burton Anderson, is expected to ask the judge to suppress references to [appellant’s] criminal history or his relationships with former girlfriends. The trial proceeded against appellant and, the jury, in due course, retired to deliberate.

At some point during the deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note asking, “Would the jury be wrong to consider Defendant’s Evidence 1 and 2 in this case?” The exhibits referred to were two newspaper articles about appellant. The trial court had the jury return to the courtroom. Upon their return, the trial court stated: Ladies and gentlemen, the reason that I brought you back into the courtroom is because I received a note which indicated “Would the jury be wrong to consider Defendant’s evidence 1 and 2 in this case?” 1 and 2 obviously were ²⁵¹ newspaper articles that were inadvertently sent back to the jury room. They were marked as Defendant’s 1 and 2 in a pretrial hearing, were not admitted into evidence in this particular case, and should not have been sent back to the jury room.

What I need to do at this time is to find out whether, in fact, anybody on the jury read the substance of the articles. If you did, please raise your hand. The trial court noted that every juror had read the articles. In response to a question by the trial court, the jury foreman told him that they had read the articles individually.

The following then occurred: THE COURT: Well, what I’ll do is this, as I just indicated, you all understand that these are — what is contained in these articles are not evidence in this case. They should not be considered in any fashion, in any manner whatsoever by you all in arriving at your decision. They should not be discussed and they can’t be considered. Do you all understand that?

JURY ARRAY: (Answering in the affirmative). THE COURT: What I am going to do is ask each individual juror whether they [sic] are going to be able to continue on with their deliberations, put what they read in these articles out of their mind, and make their decision based solely on the evidence that is presented in the courtroom. The trial court proceeded to ask each juror whether he or she could do so. Each juror replied that he or she could.

The State’s Attorney requested the trial court to further instruct the jury to report any attempted discussion of the articles. The following occurred: THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, as foreperson there’s been a request. You all have represented that you won’t consider any substance of these articles and won’t discuss it. If, in fact, for some reason a juror does bring it up and wishes to discuss it, if you would notify me by note, I would request that you do that. ²⁵² THE FOREPERSON: Your Honor, when I discovered it, I said I don’t think we should be discussing this anymore, and we stopped at that point.

We never discussed it to start with. We were just amazed to see it. The jury then returned to their deliberations. Defense counsel requested a mistrial.

The trial court responded to the request by stating: Well, I am impressed by the fact that they notified us that they had them, and therefore, probably realized it was improper, something that they shouldn’t consider. Based on that, they notified the [cjourt. And I found them to be believable when they said that they — even though they read them, they would not consider them, they would decide the case only on the testimony and evidence presented in court. For that reason, I will deny your motion for a mistrial.

The jury subsequently found appellant guilty of all charges. The record does not indicate how long the jury deliberated after reading the articles. However, when the jury announced that it had reached a verdict, the judge thanked the alternates for their patience, noting that they had sat in the conference room “for these last four or five hours.” DISCUSSION Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. Quoting from Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 410 , 614 A.2d 949 (1992), he contends that the impact of appellant’s history of crimes involving rape and choking of young girls “almost certainly had a substantial and irreversible impact upon the jurors, and may well have meant the difference between acquittal and conviction.” He further contends that the prejudice resulting from the jurors’ knowledge of his prior convictions could not be overcome by the curative actions of the trial court.

The State, on the other hand, contends that appellant has not demonstrated prejudice and that no mistrial was warranted. ²⁵³ A mistrial is “an extreme sanction that sometimes must be resorted to when such overwhelming prejudice has occurred that no other remedy will suffice to cure the prejudice.” Burks v. State, 96 Md.App. 173, 187 , 624 A.2d 1257 , cert. denied, 332 Md. 381 , 631 A.2d 451 (1993). Whether to grant a mistrial is a decision vested in the sound discretion of the trial judge, who can best weigh the danger of prejudice arising from any alleged impropriety within the context of the entire case, and who is, therefore, in the best position to determine if a mistrial is warranted. Stewart v. State, 334 Md. 213, 220 , 638 A.2d 754 (1994). We will not reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial unless the defendant was so clearly prejudiced that he or she was denied a fair trial.

Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 659 , 480 A.2d 800 (1984). The fundamental rationale in leaving the matter of prejudice vel non to the sound discretion of the trial judge is that the judge is in the best position to evaluate it. The judge is physically on the scene, able to observe matters not usually reflected in a cold record. The judge is able to ascertain the demeanor of the witnesses and to note the reaction of the jurors and counsel to inadmissible matters.

That is to say, the judge has his [or her] finger on the pulse of the trial. State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 278 , 604 A.2d 489 (1992). The potency of the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial relies on the promise that a defendant’s fate will be determined by an impartial fact finder who depends solely on the evidence and argument introduced in open court. Indeed, the notion that a jury’s verdict shall be based exclusively on the evidence offered at trial goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury.

Allen v. State, 89 Md.App. 25, 42 , 597 A.2d 489 (1991), cert. denied, 325 Md. 396 , 601 A.2d 129 (1992) (citations omitted). In Maryland, when a party alleges that he or she was denied a fair trial by virtue of a newspaper article, the party ²⁵⁴ must show that: (1) the newspaper articles were prejudicial, (2) a juror read the prejudicial article, and (3) the juror’s decision was influenced by the newspaper article. Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 555 , 168 A.2d 510 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 957 , 82 S.Ct. 399 , 7 L.Ed.2d 389 (1962). In the present case, it is clear that the articles were read by the jury.

The State contends, however, that appellant was not prejudiced by the jurors having read the articles and that their decision in the present case was not influenced by the articles. Several courts have considered, with varying conclusions, the effect of jurors having read newspaper articles regarding cases over which they presided. One annotator has commented: It has been stated that the test in determining whether a new trial, mistrial, or reversal should be granted in a criminal action upon a showing that the jurors have read newspaper accounts of the trial depends upon whether or not a fair trial, under the circumstances, has been interfered with. There is not one rule, however, which defines just what does or does not so interfere.

The inquiry, therefore, must center primarily around the facts in each case, and the ultimate decision rests in the sound judicial discretion of the court. Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Juror’s Reading of Newspaper Account of Trial in State Criminal Case During its Progress as Ground for Mistrial, New Trial, or Reversal, 46 A.L.R.4th 11 , 23 (1986). Courts that have been faced with this issue have considered several factors in determining whether exposure to newspaper accounts have interfered with a defendant’s right to a fair trial. These factors include the nature of the information and the actions of the trial court in minimizing the effect of the unauthorized information.

At least two courts have suggested that a juror’s failure to heed the admonition of the trial court not to read articles about the case indicated a lack of responsibility on the part of the juror. Other courts have considered the strength of the other evidence against the defendant in ²⁵⁵ determining whether a jury was influenced by prejudicial extraneous information. In addition, we have also opined that the number of jurors who learn of the extraneous information should be considered in determining whether a defendant’s right to a fair trial has been compromised. A. The Nature of the Information We do not read the State’s brief as seriously suggesting that the information of appellant’s prior convictions and the prior allegations against him were not prejudicial, but rather that the jurors were not influenced by it.

We agree with the United States Court of Appeals in United States v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.1978), that “news stories published during the trial that reveal to jurors a defendant’s prior criminal record are ‘inherently prejudicial.’ ” Id. at 569 (citation omitted). We also note that the judge considered the information sufficiently prejudicial as to warrant his granting a motion in limine to exclude it from evidence at trial. As will be seen infra, the cases generally consider such information to be prejudicial, the question being whether, under the circumstances, the prejudice can be overcome by the actions of the trial court. 1. Requiring Reversal of Conviction Several cases dealing with the effect of one or more jurors learning of a defendant’s prior convictions have held that the nature of the information interfered with the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

One such case is Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 , 79 S.Ct. 1171 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959). There, the United States Supreme Court considered the defendant’s conviction of dispensing drugs without a license. During the trial, jurors were exposed to two newspaper articles. One stated that the defendant had two prior convictions — one for forgery and one for practicing medicine without a proper license.

The other article said that the defendant had been identified as the individual who had “acted as a physician and prescribed restricted drugs for Hank Williams,” and that the defendant ²⁵⁶ had previously been convicted of forgery. The newspaper article also stated that the defendant’s wife had already been convicted of the drug charges. Three jurors read the first article, one juror read both, two jurors had “scanned” the first article and one juror had scanned both. The defendant moved for a mistrial based on the jurors having read the articles.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction. It acknowledged that “[t]he trial judge has a large discretion in ruling on the issue of prejudice resulting from the reading by jurors of news articles concerning the trial.” Id. at 312 , 79 S.Ct. 1171 (citation omitted). It stated, however, that each case must be decided on its own facts. Id.

It noted that the information received by the jurors was so prejudicial that it could not be offered as evidence. It then concluded that, under the circumstances presented there, a new trial was appropriate. Its decision, however, was based not on a constitutional ground, but on the Court’s supervisory function over the federal courts. A similar result was reached in People v. Holloway, 50 Cal.3d 1098 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 530 , 790 P.2d 1327 (1990), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stansbury, 9 Cal.4th 824 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 , 889 P.2d 588 (1995).

In Holloway , the defendant had been convicted of murdering two sisters in their townhouse, and of burglary and attempted rape in connection with that incident. During the second day of trial, one of the jurors read a newspaper article which stated that the defendant had been convicted of assaulting a woman with a hammer and was on parole from prison. The juror did not inform anyone that he had read the article, and his misconduct was not learned until after the verdict had been rendered. In assessing the necessity of a new trial, the California Supreme Court stated the “well settled” rule that “such juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice that may be rebutted by proof that no prejudice actually resulted.” Id. at 1332 (citations omitted).

Finding no factor to rebut that presumption, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction. ²⁵⁷ In State v. Roman, 473 So.2d 897 (La.Ct.App.1985), the Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed the defendant’s conviction of forcible rape and aggravated crime against nature. On the day the jury was selected, the local newspaper published an article about the defendant. The article stated, inaccurately, that the defendant was being tried for robbery. The article also stated that the defendant was serving a prison sentence for rape and robbery, and that he was serving time “ ‘in connection with a related “crime spree”, [sic] which included a couple of other assaults and robberies.’ ” Id. at 899 .

The article further stated that the defendant was arrested for rape and robbery once in May and twice in June of the previous year. The trial judge had neglected to instruct the jury not to read, listen to, or watch any news account of the trial. Five jurors admitted that they had read the article. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that the jurors who had read the article were unable to be impartial.

In People v. Hryciuk, 5 Ill.2d 176 , 125 N.E.2d 61 (1954), the defendant was convicted of rape. On the last day of trial, local newspapers printed articles about the defendant’s trial, stating that the defendant had confessed to two murders. One paper also reported that the defendant had boasted of attacking more than fifty women, and that the police described the defendant as a “vicious degenerate.” All of the jurors had read at least one of the articles. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction. The court opined that the nature of the articles would incite the jury and that “such emotions would linger in the consciousness of the most honest juror and tempt him [or her] to disregard the fundamental requirement of a fair trial and resolve any doubts he [or she] might have against the defendant.” Id. at 66. 2. Reversal Not Warranted In other cases, courts have found no error in the denial of a mistrial based on jurors having read, during trial, newspaper articles regarding a defendant’s prior record. ²⁵⁸ In People v. Malmenato, 14 Ill.2d 52 , 150 N.E.2d 806 , cert. denied, 358 U.S. 899 , 79 S.Ct. 222 , 3 L.Ed.2d 148 (Ill.1958), for example, the defendant was convicted of attempted burglary. During the trial, a newspaper article recounted that the defendant “reportedly has a record of 43 arrests and no convictions.” Id. at 812.

Inquiry by the court elicited that one juror had violated the trial court’s instructions not to read articles about the trial. The trial court admonished the juror that what he had read was not evidence and should not influence him in his deliberations and that he should not discuss it with the other jurors. The trial court also inquired as to whether he thought he could still be an impartial juror. The juror responded that the article “didn’t have that much effect on me.” Id.

Under those circumstances, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Upholding that decision, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that, “[t]o warrant a reversal, it must reasonably appear that the jurors, or at least some of them, have been influenced or prejudiced to the extent that they cannot be fair and impartial.” Id. at 813. The court found evidence of such influence or prejudice to be lacking in that case. In United States v. Bass, 10 F.3d 256 (5th Cir.1993), the defendant was tried in federal court on charges of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle and interstate transportation of stolen firearms.

On the second day of trial, two jurors read a newspaper