Wright v. State

Levine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from convictions on charges of storehouse breaking and receiving stolen goods following a jury trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. Appellant, Roland G. Wright, the Younger, also had been charged with a number of other offenses allegedly arising out of the same occurrence, but they were eliminated from the case by judgments of acquittal granted by the trial judge (Watts, J.). Because of the limited issue to be dealt with in this opinion, a detailed summary of the facts is unnecessary.

On the morning of January 5, 1974, it was discovered that sometime during the previous evening, the premises of Fort Haulage and Rental Company, Inc. had been burglarized, and property exceeding $4,000 in value had been taken. Within several hours, the investigation focused on appellant, mainly because of an identification of the license tags on his pick-up truck. At the trial, a police detective testified that after appellant was arrested, he was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), and that he then signed a police department waiver form. Thereafter, he was interrogated and, in the course of responding to a series of questions, claimed that he had been at home while the crimes were allegedly committed.

Then, this exchange occurred during the detective’s testimony: “Q Did he ever at any later point offer, agree to answer your question as to whether anyone had borrowed [his] truck that evening? “A No, he didn’t. He refused. “MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, I’m going to object. “THE COURT: Overruled.” ⁶² In addition to attacking this ruling, appellant alleges several other errors. The first category consists of two purported defects in the instructions to the jury, one respecting the charge of receiving stolen goods and the other pertaining to the defense of alibi.

Subsequent to the filing of appellant’s brief, however, the State submitted an affidavit of the court reporter with a corrected transcript. The latter eliminates any possible doubt that the original transcript of testimony was garbled in the two instances concerning us here. We accept the corrections furnished by the reporter, therefore, especially since the transcription errors are so obvious. As so corrected, the record completely undercuts the arguments advanced by appellant, and obviates any need to consider them here.

Additionally, appellant raises a number of other grounds for reversal which bear on the sufficiency of the evidence. We need not reach- these questions either, since a new trial will be necessary in any event. In our view, the issue presented by appellant’s refusal to answer the detective’s question “as to whether anyone had borrowed [the] truck that evening” is controlled squarely by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233 , 322 A. 2d 211 (1974). There, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused, as enunciated in Miranda , had been violated by evidence that after the fourfold warnings mandated by that decision had been given, he had refused .to answer several questions which were interspersed among a total of twenty-four.

In so holding, the Court emphasized these statements from Miranda , which it also quoted: “ ‘If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has' shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of complusion, subtle or otherwise.’ 384 U. S. at 473-74 . ⁶³ “ ‘Moreover, where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some