Wright v. State

Mason, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Charles E. Wright, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore for the crimes of manslaughter and violation of the handgun statute. He was sentenced to a term of five years for the manslaughter conviction and a consecutive term of five years for the handgun conviction. The evidence adduced at trial reveals that on 7 April, 1974, around 11:00 p.m., the appellant and the victim, James L. Bagley, became involved in a heated argument.

After exchanging profanities for several minutes, the victim removed his glasses and gave them to a bystander. He then took two steps toward the appellant and reached back into his hip pocket. The appellant in response to the action of the victim, pulled a .38 calibre pistol from his pocket and fired two shots which fatally wounded the victim. No weapon was found on the victim.

According to the appellant, he shot the victim because he thought the victim was reaching into his pocket for a gun. He had seen the victim carrying a gun on several occasions, and he knew the victim had previously shot and killed a man. Several other witnesses.also testified that they had previously seen the victim carrying a gun, and. that the victim had a reputation for being a violent person. The appellant in seeking a reversal of the judgment below, contends, inter alia, that “the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the burden of the appellant in a criminal case.” ⁵⁹ He assigns as error the following parts of the jury instructions: “.. .

The burden is on the defendant to show circumstances of mitigation, excuse or justification which will reduce the offense to manslaughter or not guilty.” “The burden of proving self-defense is on the defendant. Although this burden may be fulfilled by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence the defendant need not prove the defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” The objection now raised by the appellant to the jury instruction was not raised below. In fact, the identical parts of the instruction of which the appellant complains were included in his written request of proposed instructions submitted to the lower court. Ordinarily, the failure to object to an instruction before the jury retires to consider its verdict precludes appellate review.

However, this Court may, on its own motion, correct any plain error material to the rights of the accused even though not objected to. Brown v. State, 14 Md. App. 415 , 287 A. 2d 62 (1972), Maryland Rule 756 g. We hold the issue here cognizable on appeal because it has threshold constitutional implications and, because there was plain error material to the rights of the appellant in the challenged instruction. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975), the accused was convicted of murder.

The Supreme Court reversed this conviction on the basis that the State of Maine required the accused to prove that he acted in the heat of passion or sudden provocation to reduce the murder to manslaughter. The Court held that the Maine Rule did not comport with the requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged, including proving beyond a ⁶⁰ reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion or sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented. Not unlike Maine, it was the settled rule in this State that the accused had the burden of proving he acted in hot blood in