Wright v. State

WEANT, Judge. Appellant, Willie Earl Wright, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of robbery and ²¹⁷ robbery with a deadly weapon for which he was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Trial testimony indicated that appellant accosted the victim one night in a parking lot outside of her apartment building. He was wielding a plastic toy pistol.

The victim was not convinced that the toy was a real gun; she became enraged and threw a cup of Coke in appellant’s face. Appellant then grabbed her purse out of the top of a grocery bag and ran away. He was later identified in a line-up and charged. v On appeal we are presented with these questions: 1. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on assumption of a false name and consciousness of guilt? 2.

Did the trial court err in refusing to send a videotaped exhibit to the jury room or in the alternative, to allow the jurors to view the videotape as often as they wished or to stop the action of the tape? 3. Was a plastic toy pistol that the victim did not believe was a real gun a dangerous and deadly weapon within the meaning of Md.Code Art. 27, § 488? 4. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal where the evidence was insufficient to show that the taking of property was done by violence or intimidation? 1. Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury that “the assumption of a false name may be indicative of a consciousness of guilt.” The trial court further instructed, “Although such conduct is not sufficient, in itself, to establish guilt, the fact of an accused[’s] assumption of a false name is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt.” The trial court concluded by saying the determination of that fact “is a matter solely within your province.” This instruction was given because a police officer had testified that, while undercover, he had asked appellant his ²¹⁸ name.

Appellant replied, “Vincent Burris.” Appellant argues that the instruction was improper because “the probative value of evidence of flight or the giving of a false name is doubtful.” Because there was no objection to the false-name evidence at trial, however, appellant’s argument concerning probative value of the evidence is waived. Md.Rule 1085. Appellant properly preserved an objection to the court’s failure to include in its instruction concerning the giving of a false name a statement that a person might assume a false name for innocent reasons or reasons unrelated to a particular criminal case. The State argues that instructions similar to the ones given by the trial judge have been approved by the appellate courts in Maryland and that if there was any error it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

We agree. While it is better practice to mention the possibility of innocent motives in assuming a false name or in fleeing from police, we have found no authority demanding that addition. 2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to let the jury take a video tape of seven line-up sessions into the jury room for viewing during deliberations. The court was aware of several unrelated line-up sessions included on the tape in which appellant participated.

Only one session was pertinent to the instant case. The court ruled that to allow the jury to view the tape again and again would unduly emphasize that evidence. Appellant relies on the provision in Md.Rule 4-326(a) (which says, among other things) that “[Ujnless the court for good cause shown orders otherwise, the jury may also take ... exhibits which have been admitted into evidence ...” into the jury room. As we see it, the “good cause” mentioned in that rule encompasses the reasons articulated by the trial court.

We are not persuaded that the trial court was clearly wrong. ²¹⁹ 3. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to rule that a plastic gun, which was used during the incident, does not qualify as a dangerous or deadly weapon. We recognize the issue to be whether the trial court erred by allowing that determination to go to the jury when (1) the evidence showed that the “weapon” was, in fact, a toy gun made of plastic, (2) the victim did not believe the toy was a real gun, and 3) the victim was not intimidated by the toy. If appellant is correct, his sentencing under Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 488, Robbery with a Deadly Weapon, was improper.

A weapon for purposes of Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 488 (hereinafter § 488) has been broadly defined as anything used or designed to be used in destroying, defeating, or injuring an enemy or as an instrument of offensive or defensive combat. Bennett and Flynn v. State, 237 Md. 212 , 205 A.2d 393 (1964). The weapon used for purposes of § 488 need not be a handgun or even a firearm. See Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137 , 416 A.2d 265 (1980), Couplin v. State, 37 Md.App. 567 , 378 A.2d 197 (1977).

The dangerousness of a weapon is determined not only by its design, construction, or purpose but also by its capability to be used in such a way as to cause injury or death. Bennett, 237 Md. at 215 , 205 A.2d at 394 . Thus, a taxi cab’s microphone cord used as a garrote was deemed to be a dangerous or deadly weapon under § 488. Id. at 216, 205 A.2d at 395 .

The Court of Appeals in Whack, 288 Md. 137 , 416 A.2d 393 (citing Hayes v. State, 211 Md. 111, 115-16 , 126 A.2d 576 (1956)), said that § 488 “was intended to encompass devices for intimidation regardless of an ability to execute the implied threat.” The Whack case involved the use of a real handgun. In discussing use of an unloaded pistol in a case involving the predecessor of § 488, see Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 574A (1951), the Hayes Court said ²²⁰ The Maryland statute ... predicates the greater penalty attached to the use of a dangerous or deadly weapon upon the means employed in the intimidation. So long as there is an intent to rob by that means, it is unnecessary to find an intent or ability to execute the implied threat in the event of resistence. [Cites omitted.] Nor need it be shown that the person assailed was actually put in fear, if the means employed are calculated to instill fear in the heart or mind of a reasonable man. Id. at